Houston v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2021] FedCFamC2G 214
•21 October 2021
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Houston v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 214
File number(s): PEG 372 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE LUCEV Date of judgment: 21 October 2021 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review – decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – citizens of South Africa – Subclass 457 Temporary Work Skilled – prescribed period to apply for review ended – where document transmitted by email to authorised representative and not personally to the applicant – whether jurisdictional error Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Pt 5, ss 116, 338, 347, 476, 494B, 494C
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 4.10(1(b), Sch 8, Condition 8107
Cases cited: Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 756
Calimoso v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1335; (2016) 162 ALD 631
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZANS [2005] FCAFC 41; (2005) 141 FCR 586; (2005) 215 ALR 733; (2005) 86 ALD 583
Murphy v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 657; (2004) 135 FCR 550
Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 724
Suh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2009] FCAFC 42; (2009) 175 FCR 515; (2009) 108 ALD 470Swee Yen Tay v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 23; (2010) 183 FCR 163
SZOBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2011] HCATrans 347SZOBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 151; (2010) 119 ALD 233
Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 31 Date of hearing: 21 October 2021 Place: Perth Applicants: In person Counsel for the First Respondent: Georgina Ellis Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
PEG 372 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: SHAVRON SHELDON HOUSTON
First Applicant
SIMONE EILEEN FRANKS
Second Applicant
SAMARA DEANNE HOUSTON (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LUCEV
DATE OF ORDER:
21 OCTOBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The originating application filed on 14 December 2020 as amended by an amended originating application filed 22 July 2021 be dismissed.
2.
The Applicants pay the First Respondent’s costs in the sum of $5,000 by
21 October 2022.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore and revised from transcript)JUDGE LUCEV
On 14 December 2020 the first applicant, Mr Shavron Sheldon Houston (“Mr Houston”) filed, together with the other applicants, his wife and two children, in the Perth Registry of this Court, an application for judicial review (“Judicial Review Application”) under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Migration Act”).
The visa status of Mr Houston’s wife and children is dependent upon Mr Houston’s visa status.
The Judicial Review Application was subsequently amended by consent by order of this court on 22 July 2021. In effect, that amended Judicial Review Application (“Amended Judicial Review Application”) seeks to review a 10 December 2020 decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“Tribunal Decision” and “Tribunal” respectively) that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review a decision of a delegate (“Delegate’s Decision” and “Delegate” respectively) of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (“Minister”), that Delegate’s Decision being to cancel
Mr Houston’s subclass 457 Temporary Work Skilled visa (“457 Visa”) under s 116(1)(b) of the Migration Act. As a result of the cancellation of Mr Houston’s 457 Visa, the ancillary visas of Mr Houston’s wife and two children were automatically cancelled.
By way of background, Mr Houston, his wife and two children are citizens of South Africa. On 3 November 2017 Mr Houston was granted the 457 Visa. His sponsoring employer at that time was a company called Gezellig Restaurant Pty Ltd (“Gezellig”) and he was employed at a restaurant called Flics Kitchen in Mandurah, south of Perth in Western Australia. He was employed to be a Senior Chef de Partie.
On 19 February 2020 Mr Houston found a different employer to Gezellig and that employer, Golden Cloud SPUR (“SPUR”) sought to sponsor him in employment. The nomination application for the new sponsor was refused on 26 August 2020 in circumstances where
Mr Houston’s employment with Gezellig had ceased on 10 March 2020. The net effect of all of that was that Mr Houston no longer had either employment or a sponsoring employer.
The Court understands from having read the papers that there are particular circumstances which are said to have led to Mr Houston’s ceasing employment at Gezellig which Mr Houston says caused him distress and caused him effectively to be constructively dismissed. Those circumstances, whilst no doubt distressing for Mr Houston, do not form any part of the consideration which this Court must undertake in relation to the Tribunal Decision.
On 18 August 2020 Mr Houston was issued with a notice of intention to consider cancellation of the 457 Visa (“Cancellation Notice”) under s 116(1)(b) of the Migration Act on the basis that Mr Houston had ceased employment for over 60 days and was therefore in breach of the 457 Visa conditions, specifically Condition 8107(3)(b) of Sch 8 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“Migration Regulations”). On the day that the Cancellation Notice was received Mr Houston responded by contacting what was then the Department of Home Affairs, now the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (“Department”), alleging that working conditions with Gezellig had been untenable and that he effectively had been coerced into leaving employment with Gezellig (and those are the circumstances that the Court has referred to at [5] above).
On 8 September 2020 an authorised representative for Mr Houston contacted the Department with a written response in draft format requesting an extension of two weeks to respond to the Cancellation Notice. It would appear that no response was received to that request. At the time of contacting the Department the authorised representative supplied a Form 956 which indicated that correspondence and information concerning the 457 Visa was to be sent to the email address supplied, which was an individual email address at a firm of lawyers who also employed registered migration agents (“Kotze Law Email Address”), and it would appear that the lawyer concerned was also a registered migration agent.
On 21 October 2020 the Delegate’s Decision was made to cancel the 457 Visa. The notification letter (“Notification Letter”) in relation to the Cancellation Notice, and the Delegate’s Decision with respect to the Cancellation Notice, were emailed to the Kotze Law Email Address on
21 October 2020. That fact, it would appear, is not in dispute. Mr Houston’s authorised representative received the Delegate’s Decision, therefore, on the same day that it was made, 21 October 2020, and, indeed, emailed the Department later that day referring to having been sent the Notification Letter and Delegate’s Decision on that day and seeking to have the Delegate’s Decision “vacated”. The Notification Letter appears, with other correspondence, at Court Book (“CB”) 17-27.The Notification Letter accompanying the Delegate’s Decision set out Mr Houston’s review rights, and that he had the right to make an application for merits review of the Cancellation Notice under the provisions of Pt 5 of the Migration Act and to make that application for review to the Tribunal, and that that application for merits review of the Delegate’s Decision had to be made to the Tribunal within seven working days after the time at which Mr Houston was taken to have received the Notification Letter which set out his review rights. The Notification Letter went on to point out that as the Notification Letter was sent by email Mr Houston was taken to have received it at the end of the day that it was transmitted, namely 21 October 2020. Significantly, the Notification Letter also said that the time in which the application to the Tribunal for merits review of the Delegate’s Decision had to be made was one that was prescribed by law and which could not be extended.
On 29 October 2020 the Department wrote to Mr Houston’s authorised representative indicating that they were not going to take any further action in relation to the matter. That was a response to the email from Mr Houston’s authorised representative on 21 October 2020 seeking that the Delegate’s Decision be “vacated”: CB 28-31. It is relevant to note that
29 October 2020 was a day before the relevant time limit for the making of an application for merits review to the Tribunal expired.
The Court notes that it would appear that on 22 October 2020 Mr Houston was personally made aware of the Delegate’s Decision to cancel the 457 Visa, by telephone communication with his authorised representative. The Court notes that, then, on 2 November 2020, Mr Houston, through his authorised representative, applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s Decision. The Tribunal review application was made in conjunction with an extension of time request on the basis that the Delegate’s Decision had been communicated to Mr Houston at a later date and thereby too late for him to realise the consequences of the Delegate’s Decision. That was articulated in the extension of time request in the following way, by his authorised representatives (original emphasis):
1.Although the notice was mailed to Kotze Law offices on 21 October 2020, Shavron only received the notice in a telephonic discussion to him on 22 October 2020.
2.The electronic mail was only received by him on 23 October 2020.
3.Only on 26 October 2020 via a consultation, the full content could be explained.
4.
DOHA [an abbreviation for Department of Home Affairs] only answered on
29 October 2020, when the receiver of the e mail was in a rural area with limited electronic communication.
In the circumstances Mr Houston’s authorised representative failed to appreciate that there is in these matters a strict time limit. It would appear that the authorised representative concerned did not take the necessary steps to ensure that Mr Houston’s rights were properly protected by making an application for merits review to the Tribunal within the relevant time period. Whether or not that should be the subject of a complaint by Mr Houston to the appropriate professional bodies is a matter for Mr Houston to determine and decide.
On 24 November 2020 the Tribunal sent Mr Houston’s authorised representatives what is usually referred to as a “natural justice letter” inviting comment on whether the Tribunal review application was valid given it had been filed with the Tribunal outside the permitted seven working days: CB 80-83. A written response was provided on 11 November 2020 by Mr Houston’s authorised representative referring to Mr Houston’s working history and circumstances in relation to Mr Houston and his family. As has been observed correctly by Counsel for the Minister today, albeit in a slightly different context, those are matters which might have been relevant had the Tribunal had a discretion to exercise with respect to extending a time period, but this is a case in which there was no discretion to be exercised in respect of the time period for reasons the Court will come to.
On 10 December 2020 the Tribunal Decision was that it had no jurisdiction to review the Delegate’s Decision. The Tribunal Decision set out relevant events by way of a brief chronology, and at [2] and [3] of the Tribunal Decision the Tribunal said as follows:
2. Pursuant to s.347(1)(b) of the Act and r.4.10 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations), an application for review of this decision had to be made within 7 working days after the applicant was notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements.
3.The material before the Tribunal indicates that the applicant was notified of the decision by letter dated 21 October 2020 and dispatched by email.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements.
At [5] of the Tribunal Decision the extension of time request sent by Mr Houston’s authorised representative was set out (again noting that the Notification Letter and Delegate’s Decision were received by Mr Houston’s authorised representative on 21 October 2020) as follows (without alteration):
The applicant's EOT request to the AAT includes the following points:
1. Although the notice was mailed to Kotze Law offices on 21 October 2020, Applicant only "received the notice", in a telephonic discussion to him on
22 October 2020. Although explained telephonically, the impact and consequences could not, and was not realized up until a detailed consultation on 26 October 2020.
2. The electronic mail was only received by him on 23 October 2020;
3. Only on 26 October 2020 via a consultation, the full content could be explained.
4. Applicant still awaited a response with regards to the request that DOHA
vacate the decision.
5. DOHA only answered on 29 October 2020, when receiver of the email was in a rural area with limited electronic communication.
At [7] and [8] of the Tribunal Decision, the Tribunal found as follows:
7. The Tribunal finds that the applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision on Wednesday, 21 October 2020 : s.494C of the Act. Therefore,
the prescribed period to apply for review ended on 30 October 2020. The Tribunal has no discretion to vary or extend the mandated time limit for the filing of an application [footnote omitted].
(and reference was made to Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 756)
8.As the application for review was not received by the Tribunal until 2 November 2020, it follows that the application for review was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in the matter.
Mr Houston’s authorised representatives filed the Judicial Review Application and Amended Judicial Review Application in this Court, then acting as lawyers for Mr Houston (a role from which they subsequently withdrew). Mr Houston has indicated today that as lawyers they were acting pro bono, but as the Court indicated in an exchange with Mr Houston,
the mere fact that a lawyer is acting pro bono does not alter or diminish their obligation to properly advise a client and conduct the matter on that client’s behalf.
In any event, the Amended Judicial Review Application sets out seven grounds of review. Those seven grounds of review, in essence, make a single complaint, and that is that the Tribunal was wrong to find that the application to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate’s Decision was lodged outside the allowed time period, and that it therefore did not have jurisdiction to review the Delegate’s Decision. The seven grounds of review (without alteration) are as follows:
1.The Second Respondent erred and fell into jurisdictional error by holding that there is “nothing in the submission concerning the timing of notification of the cancellation”, thus over emphasising the notification, and not adjudicating receiving of the notification in fact or in law.
Particulars
Particulars were advanced on both when the cancellation notice was sent, and facts when the applicant de fact received the notice. Second Respondent;
a. Failed to look into and adjudicate the facts when the notice was received.
b. Failed to find that although a notice was sent by mail, due to explained circumstances, it was only received by the applicant a lay later.
2.The Second Responded erred and fell into jurisdictional error by failing to adjudicate and evaluate the facts with regards to receiving of the cancellation.
Particulars
Particulars were advanced on both when the cancellation notice was sent, and facts when the applicant de facto received the notice. Second Respondent;
a. Failed to look into and adjudicate the facts when the notice was received.
b.Failed to find that although a notice was sent by mail, due to explained circumstances, it was only received by the applicant a lay later.
c. Failed to find that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate facts on “receiving” the notice of the cancellation.
3.The Second Respondent erred by and fell into jurisdictional error by interpreting “transmitting” mean only the act of sending a document by email, rather than both the sending and receipt of that document and also the de facto receipt.
Particulars
Particulars were advanced on both when the cancellation notice was sent, and facts when the applicant de fact received the notice. Second Respondent;
a. Failed to look into and adjudicate the facts when the notice was received.
b.Failed to find that although a notice was sent by mail, due to explained circumstances, it was only received by the applicant a day later.
4. The Second Respondent erred and fell into jurisdictional error by failing to recognise or consider exercising its power to adjudicate on which day the applicant received the cancellation.
Particulars
Particulars were advanced on both when the cancellation notice was sent, and facts when the applicant de fact received the notice. Second Respondent;
a.Failed to look into and adjudicate the facts when the notice was received.
b.Failed to find that although a notice was sent by mail, due to explained circumstances, it was only received by the applicant a day later.
c.Failed to find that fact must be adjudicated to find on which day the notice was received.
5.The Second Respondent erred and fell into jurisdictional error by misinterpreting the fact as only a request for extension of time, thus holding that the Tribunal has no discretion to vary or extend the mandated time limit, whereas the correct date on when the cancellation was received should have been adjudicated.
6.The Second Responded erred and fell into jurisdictional error by interpreting that the deeming provision, where it is taken that a document be received by the applicant is not rebuttable by an applicant in providing facts when it was received.
Particulars
Second Respondent:
a. Failed by indirect finding that a deeming provision under these circumstances cannot be rebutted.
7.The Second Respondent erred and fell into jurisdictional error by finding the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction, with an incorrect interpretation of the deeming receiving provision, and not finding on the onus of proof that shifted due the deeming provision.
Particulars
Particulars were advanced on both when the cancellation notice was sent, and facts when the applicant de fact received the notice. Second Respondent;
a.Failed to look into and adjudicate the facts when the notice was received.
b.Failed to find that although a notice was sent by mail, due to explained circumstances, it was only received by the applicant a day later.
c.Failed to find that fact must be adjudicated to find on which day the notice was received.
d.Failed by indirect finding that a deeming provision under these circumstances cannot be rebutted.
Having regard to the law it must be said that that those seven grounds of review are entirely misconceived. The propositions they put are simply wrong at law, and together with the failure to ensure that Mr Houston filed his merits review application with the Tribunal on or before the relevant date, do not reflect well on the professionals concerned. The Court is conscious that they are not present and not represented, but it is apparent that they did not take steps to ensure that the application to the Tribunal was made on time and the grounds of review in this Court in the Amended Judicial Review Application are entirely misconceived. The Delegate’s Decision was a reviewable decision under Pt 5 of the Migration Act, as defined in s 338(3) of the Migration Act, and none of the relevant exceptions therein apply. And as the Tribunal correctly pointed out, s 347(1)(b) of the Migration Act relevantly provides that an application for review of a reviewable decision under Pt 5 of the Migration Act must be given to the Tribunal within the prescribed period, and that prescribed period, by reason of reg 4.10(1)(b) of the Migration Regulations is seven working days after the day on which the Notification Letter annexing the Delegate’s Decision was received, and that means that the Tribunal review application, having been lodged on 2 November 2020, was out of time, it being required to be filed on 30 October 2020.
By reason of s 494B(5) of the Migration Act, which provides that the Minister, here the Delegate, can transmit a document by email, which was done here, and
s 494C of the Migration Act which provides that a document so transmitted is held to be received, s 494C(5) of the Migration Act provides that a document given to a person by email is taken to have been received at the end of the day on which the document is transmitted, in this case, that was 21 October 2020.
The grounds of the Amended Judicial Review Application, which effectively seek to set up propositions that Mr Houston did not receive the Notification Letter and the Delegate’s Decision until he was either told about them by his authorised representative or actually physically received them himself, as opposed to his authorised representative receiving them (here by email to the Kotze Law Email Address) is not a proposition which is correct at law, and nor is the proposition that the time of receipt set out in s 494C(5) of the Migration Act is a rebuttable presumption.
The Court observes that the Full Court of the Federal Court in SZOBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 151; (2010) 119 ALD 233 (“SZOBI”) at [59] per Bromberg J (with whom Stone and Jagot JJ agreed), said that s 494B(4) of the MigrationAct was one which dealt with the sending and not the receiving of a document, and so the relevant provisions in ss 494B and 494C(5) of the MigrationAct are provisions which concern the date on which the document was sent, not the date on which it was received.
The Court notes that SZOBI was a case in respect of which the High Court refused special leave to appeal: SZOBI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] HCATrans 347. The Court also notes that the Federal Court in Calimoso v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1335; (2016) 162 ALD 631 indicated in relation to s 494C(5) of the MigrationAct that “end of the day” referred to therein does not mean the beginning of the following day, and that therefore puts at nought some of the grounds made in the Amended Judicial Review Application, particularly grounds 1 through to 5.
The deeming provision in s 494C of the MigrationAct, read together with s 494B of the MigrationAct, contain deeming provisions which operate even though the Notification Letter and Delegate’s Decision were sent to Mr Houston’s authorised representative as opposed to
Mr Houston himself: Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 724 at [13]-[15] per Flick J. The suggestion implicit in much if not all of grounds 1 through to 7 of the Amended Judicial Review Application is that there is a rebuttable presumption in relation to the receipt of the Notification Letter and Delegate’s Decision. That is that, although s 494C(5) of the MigrationAct provides for the document to have been received at the end of the day on which the document was transmitted, the Amended Judicial Review Application suggests that that proposition can be rebutted by facts to the contrary. That proposition is contrary to the law for reasons that will be discussed.
In Murphy v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 657; (2004) 135 FCR 550 (“Murphy”) at [69] per Spender J the Federal Court observed as follows in relation to the expression “taken to have received the document” (emphasis added):
The person is taken to have received the document in the circumstances of this case seven working days after the date of the document. In my view, this provision manifests in an intention that a person is taken to have received the document seven working days after the date of the document without qualification. There is nothing to indicate that the effect of the subsection is to be read as if there was a proviso that a person was not taken to have received the document where the documents had been returned undelivered to the sender within seven working days after the date of the document or that the subsection operates in its terms only until the contrary is proved.
Murphy was cited with approval by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172 where the Full Court observed at [13] per Spender, Kiefel and Dowsett JJ that:
Nothing in this section suggests that there is merely a rebuttable presumption.
quoting with approval Murphy at [69] per Spender J.
In Swee Yen Tay v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 23; (2010) 183 FCR 163 the Full Court of the Federal Court expressly considered whether s 494C(5) of the MigrationAct created a rebuttable presumption of fact, and at [24] and [25] per Dowsett, Stone and Bennett JJ the Full Court of the Federal Court said as follows:
Section 494C makes very detailed provision for determining when a document is taken (deemed) to have been received from the Minister. Those provisions must be construed in a statutory context of similarly detailed provisions concerning the methods by which the Minister may give documents to a person when this is a requirement (s 494B) … These provisions all evidence concern that there should be certainty in the transfer of documents from the Minister both as to the method and as to the time of delivery. This was recognised by the Full Court in Xie leading it to conclude that s 494C(4) did not create a rebuttable presumption. That s 494C(5) does not create a rebuttable presumption of fact is supported not only by our construction of the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions, but also by extrinsic material relevant to the introduction of those provisions …
and the Full Court of the Federal Court goes on to cite the relevant second reading speech of the Minister.
In the circumstances, this was a case in which the Tribunal never had power to extend the time for the filing of Mr Houston’s Tribunal review application seeking a merits review of the Delegate’s Decision. There is no doubt that the law with respect to that might be in the circumstances considered to be harsh, but it is the law. It is that law that this Court applies to the circumstances of this case, and it is that law as expounded by the Full Court of the Federal Court and the Federal Court at first instance which is binding on this Court as the junior federal court in the hierarchy of federal courts, and that this Court is bound to apply: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZANS [2005] FCAFC 41; (2005) 141 FCR 586; (2005) 215 ALR 733; (2005) 86 ALD 583 at [38] per Weinberg, Jacobson and Lander JJ; Suh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCAFC 42; (2009) 175 FCR 515; (2009) 108 ALD 470 at [29] per Spender, Buchanan and Perram JJ.
That, therefore, leads the Court to find that there was no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal Decision in this case. That therefore means that the Court must order that the Judicial Review Application filed 14 December 2020 as amended by the Amended Judicial Review Application filed 22 July 2021 be dismissed.
The Court notes that submissions were made to it by both Mr Houston, and also passionately by Mr Ronald Reed whom the Court allowed to make certain submissions on behalf of
Mr Houston, as to what the Court might do by way of recommending that certain courses of action be followed with respect to possible extension of Mr Houston’s time in Australia or employment in Australia. Those are not matters which are within the Court’s remit. They are, however, matters in respect of which Mr Houston and those who are assisting him might make equally passionate, and equally logical, representations to either the Minister or the Department, or the elected representatives who represent those in the area in the federal electorate in which Mr Houston resides. The Court recognises Mr Houston obviously is not an Australian citizen, but those who seek to support him are, and as they point out, in circumstances where there is a significant shortage of labour, particularly in the hospitality industry in this State, it might be seen to defy logic that a person qualified to work in that area would not be allowed to work. But that is a matter for others, it is not a matter for the Court. The Court can say no more with respect to that.There will therefore be an order in the terms the Court has indicated. Impecuniosity not being a basis on which to not award costs, but being a basis on which the time to pay costs might be extended, there will be a further order that the applicants pay the Minister’s costs in the sum of $5,000 by 21 October 2022.
I certify that the preceding thirty-one (31) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Lucev. Dated: 2 November 2021
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
PEG 372 of 2020 Applicants
Fourth Applicant:
SHILOH JACQUES HOUSTON
0
10
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