Adhikari v Minister for Immigration
[2017] FCCA 1884
•10 August 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| ADHIKARI & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2017] FCCA 1884 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Tribunal found it had no jurisdiction as review application lodged outside prescribed time – application refused. |
| Legislation: Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth), s.5 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s.74 Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.66, 347, 476, 477, 494B, 494C, 494D |
| Cases cited: AZAFX v Federal Circuit Court of Australia (2016) 244 FCR 401; [2016] FCA 1139 Cheng v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 198 FCR 559; [2011] FCA 1290 MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 242 FCR 585; [2015] FCA 1391 |
| First Applicant: | BINDA ADHIKARI |
| Second Applicant: | HARIRAM PANDEY |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 2478 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Barnes |
| Hearing date: | 15 June 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 10 August 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Newman and Associates |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | DLA Piper Australia |
ORDERS
The application for review of the decision of a delegate of the First Respondent of 29 March 2016 is dismissed.
The application for an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) within which to seek review of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal of 29 July 2016 is refused.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2478 of 2016
| BINDA ADHIKARI |
First Applicant
| HARIRAM PANDEY |
Second Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application for a review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 29 July 2016. The Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction to review a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent not to grant the Applicants student visas.
The Applicant did not seek judicial review of the Tribunal decision until 13 September 2016. Her husband (the Second Applicant) was included as a party to these proceedings in December 2016. Under s.477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) an application to this court under s.476 in relation to a migration decision must be made within 35 days of the date of the decision. This application was not made within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal decision. Under s.477(2) of the Act the Court may extend the 35 day period as it considers appropriate if an application has been made in writing to the Court specifying why the applicant considers it necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an order and the Court is satisfied it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so.
At the time the Applicant commenced these proceedings she was self-represented. She sought review of the delegate’s decision on the basis that the delegate did not take into account facts provided during the proceeding. She also contended that she was denied procedural fairness as the Tribunal “review was not granted”. She sought an extension of time on the basis that she did not get the Department’s decision on time and the Tribunal did not accept the decision to review.
Prior to the scheduled hearing date the Applicants obtained legal representation. A proposed amended application annexed to an affidavit of the Applicants’ solicitor, Mr Newman, of 29 March 2017 was said to discard all previous grounds. It sought review only of the delegate’s decision on the basis that it contained no statement of reasons and was of no effect. However at the hearing leave was granted to the Applicants to file and rely on an amended application.
As filed, the amended application did not specify any grounds in support of the application for an extension of time. It maintained the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the First Respondent of 29 March 2016 (misdescribed as a decision of 29 July 2016) to refuse the applications for Student (Temporary) (TU) visas (the subject of grounds 1 and 2) as well as adding a ground in relation to the Tribunal decision (ground 3).
As pointed out in written submissions for the First Respondent, and as the Applicants did not dispute, this court has no jurisdiction in relation to a primary decision such as the delegate’s decision (see s.476(2)(a) and s.476(4)(a) and (b) of the Act). Insofar as the Applicants seek review of the delegate’s decision, that application must be dismissed.
It is, however, necessary to determine whether to grant an extension of time under s.477(2) of the Act for the Applicants to seek judicial review of the Tribunal decision.
In SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719 Wigney J outlined applicable principles in relation to extension of time applications, pointing out that s.477(2) does not define or confine the matters to which the Court shall have regard. There are, however, factors that are ordinarily taken into account, including whether there has been a reasonable and adequate explanation for the delay, whether there is any prejudice to the Minister, and whether the applicant’s substantive case is sufficiently arguable to justify the extension of time (and see SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (2013) 236 FCR 442; [2013] FCA 1284). It has also been suggested (see AZAFX v Federal Circuit Court of Australia (2016) 244 FCR 401; [2016] FCA 1139) that it is relevant to take into account the fact that there is no right of appeal from a decision refusing an extension of time.
I have borne in mind that, as Mortimer J explained in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 242 FCR 585; [2015] FCA 1391 at [63] (affirmed in MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 152 ALD 478; [2016] FCAFC 110), in considering the merits of a case and, in particular, whether a case is “reasonably arguable”, “sufficiently arguable” or has “reasonable prospects of success”, the approach taken under s.477(2) should not be transformed into a de facto hearing.
For the reasons that follow, I am not satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the 35 day period for making an application to this court in relation to the decision of the Tribunal.
I have had regard to all of the relevant circumstances in so far as it is possible to do so on the material before the Court. I have borne in mind that a weighing process is involved in consideration of an application for an extension of time.
Tribunal decision
The delegate refused the visa application on 29 March 2016 on the basis that the Applicant did not meet cl.570.227 in Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). The Applicants lodged an application with the Tribunal on 22 April 2016. In its reasons for decision the Tribunal had regard to these dates. It stated that pursuant to s.347(1)(b) of the Act and reg.4.10 of the Regulations the review application had to be made within 21 days after the Applicant was notified of the delegate’s decision in accordance with the statutory requirements. It found that the material before it indicated that the Applicant was notified of the delegate’s decision “by letter dated 29 March 2016 and dispatched by email”. The Tribunal was satisfied that the Applicant was notified of the delegate’s decision in accordance with the statutory requirements.
The Tribunal referred to the fact that it had invited the Applicants, through their migration agent, to comment on the validity of the application. It granted an extension of time to respond as sought by the agent, and subsequently unsuccessfully attempted to make telephone contact with the agent. No further comment or response was received.
The Tribunal concluded that in accordance with s.494C of the Act the Applicant was taken to have been notified of the delegate’s decision on 29 March 2016 so that the prescribed period within which the review application could be lodged ended on 19 April 2016. The Tribunal found that as the review application was not received until 22 April 2016 it was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation and that it had no jurisdiction.
It is convenient to consider first the issue of whether there is a reasonable and adequate explanation for the delay in commencing these proceedings. The Tribunal decision was dated 29 July 2016. The application to this court was made on 13 September 2016. It is not in dispute that the application to this court should have been filed on or before 2 September 2016, and was filed 13 days out of time.
The delay in question is reasonably short. In the original application the Applicant described the application as prepared by “self” and contended, without explanation or evidence, that she did not receive notification of the Department’s decision on time. However in support of the application for leave to file and rely on an amended application, the Applicants’ solicitor Mr Newman attested in his affidavit of 29 March 2017 that he was instructed by the Applicant (who was said to speak limited English) and that he understood his instructions to be that at the departmental stage and at the commencement of these proceedings she had engaged professional representation.
It appears from the Courtbook that the Applicants had the assistance of a migration agent at the time the matter was before the delegate and in connection with their application to the Tribunal. There is no record of legal representation at the time the Applicant commenced these proceedings. According to Mr Newman’s affidavit, his instructions were that the Applicant acted on the advice she received and was not aware at the relevant times that there were time limits and/or that they were not respected and “only later did she find out that important cut off dates had been missed by a few days and indeed the application to this court was itself filed outside of the prescribed time but not by much”. However in subsequent written submissions for the Applicants it was suggested that the Applicant was unrepresented at the time she sought judicial review and was “bewildered”.
There is no evidence from the Applicants themselves to explain the delay. There is an apparent inconsistency in the explanations provided, none of which is entirely satisfactory, particularly in circumstances where the notification of the Tribunal decision sent to the Applicants through their migration agent on 29 July 2016 included Tribunal information which stated that applicants could apply to this court for judicial review of Tribunal decisions, but must do so within 35 days of the date of the decision (or seek an extension of time).
Although the period of delay is short, I am not satisfied that the Applicants have provided a reasonable and adequate explanation for the delay.
Furthermore, the substantive application has no prospects of success. For the reasons that follow it is, in the sense discussed by Mortimer J in MZABP (at [62]), plainly hopeless.
The two grounds in the proposed amended application related to the delegate’s decision. It was contended, in essence, that the delegate’s decision contained no statement of reasons contrary to s.66(2)(c) of the Act and hence was of no effect. These grounds were maintained in the filed amended application. As the delegate’s decision in relation to both Applicants is a primary decision it is not reviewable by this court. However, for the sake of completeness, I note that the grounds in this respect are plainly misconceived. The delegate clearly provided a statement of reasons in relation to both Applicants (reproduced in the Courtbook at pp.62-70).
Despite the absence of any ground of review in relation to the Tribunal decision in the proposed amended application annexed to Mr Newman’s affidavit, in pre-hearing written submissions for the Applicants it was suggested that “[t]he difficulty for the Tribunal is that there is no proof as to when the decision was transmitted to the applicant’s agent, and the applicant asserts thereby her review application for review ought not to have been refused in the absence of such proof.” The submissions also took issue with the admissibility of evidence “produced thus far” in relation to notification to the Applicant of the delegate’s decision. It appeared that it was contended that the Tribunal had erred in failing to apply the rules of evidence to the material before it in relation to transmission of the delegate’s decision.
However, when the application for an extension of time came before the Court for hearing, issue was taken not only with the admissibility of material before the Tribunal, but also with the affidavit of a solicitor for the First Respondent that had been filed in these proceedings annexing screenshots from departmental records in relation to the date of email notification to the Applicants of the delegate’s decision. It appeared that the Applicants also intended to raise the issue of whether the Tribunal was correct in finding that it had no jurisdiction and the jurisdictional fact of transmission of the email notification of the delegate’s decision (as to which see Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 231 FCR 573; [2015] FCA 220 at [36]-[37] per Perry J).
The hearing of the application for an extension of time was adjourned to allow the Applicants to file an amended application including a ground of review in relation to the Tribunal decision, and for the First Respondent to file and serve any further affidavit evidence (as would be relied on at a hearing if the jurisdiction of the Tribunal had clearly been put in issue by the Applicants before the hearing date) and for the Applicants to file any evidence in reply.
However, the only pleaded ground of review in relation to the Tribunal decision was as follows:
The second respondent had insufficient evidence before it to be able to correctly determine the date of transmission of the decision to the applicant’s agent.
The Minister filed and relied on an affidavit affirmed on 31 May 2017 by Herdip Kaur Gill, Assistant Manager of the Students Section at the NSW Student Visa Centre of the Department. Mr Gill attested to his experience, role and familiarity with the Department’s Integrated Client Services Environment (ICSE) and described the meaning of the screenshots in the Courtbook that were before the Tribunal as well as what was shown on three attached screenshots.
In oral submissions the Applicant’s solicitor took issue with the evidence before the Court as to transmission of the delegate’s decision to the Applicants as well as maintaining the ground as pleaded. Despite the limits of the pleaded ground, I have considered not only whether it is arguable but also whether there is a reasonably or sufficiently arguable case that the Tribunal erred in finding it had no jurisdiction on the material that would be before the Court at a final hearing.
I note that the need to adopt an “impressionistic” reading of a ground of review for the purposes of determining an application for an extension of time (see MZABP at [62]) was complicated by the manner in which this wider claim was raised. In order to consider the “merits” of the pleaded ground and the issue of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal it is necessary to refer to applicable provisions in the Act and Regulations, the evidence as to notification of the delegate’s decision, and the Tribunal decision.
Under s.347(1)(b) of the Act and reg.4.10 of the Regulations, an application to the Tribunal for review of a delegate’s decision has to be made within 21 days of an applicant receiving notice of the decision. If the review application is received outside this time limit it is not a valid application and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction (see Cheng v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 198 FCR 559; [2011] FCA 1290 at [16] per Flick J).
Pursuant to s.66(1) of the Act a delegate’s decision has to be notified to an applicant by a prescribed method. Reg.2.16(3) requires the Minister to notify an applicant of a decision to refuse to grant a visa by one of the methods specified in s.494B of the Act. Section 494B(5) provides for transmission by email to the last email address provided to the Minister for the purpose of receiving documents. If an applicant has appointed an authorised recipient the Minister must give the authorised recipient notification of the delegate’s decision (s.494D(1)). If the Minister gives a document to the applicant’s authorised recipient it is taken to have been given to the applicant (s.494D(2)). Critically, if the Minister gives a document to a person by email in accordance with s.494B(5) the recipient is taken to have received the document (in this case the delegate’s decision) at the end of the day on which it was transmitted (see s.494C(5)).
The Applicants’ pleaded ground does not take issue with whether any of these requirements were in fact met. As explained in submissions, it involves a contention that the Tribunal erred in having regard to “inadmissible” evidence in relation to the date of transmission of the delegate’s decision. This is a reference to a copy of printouts from departmental records in relation to the Applicants on the Tribunal file (Courtbook pp.78-79). These printouts appear to be the result of a search on 27 April 2016 (after the application to the Tribunal). The printouts (described as “permission request review”) on their face relate to the Applicants’ student visa applications and record events described by “effect date” and “record date” and contain supplementary information. They clearly record that both Applicants’ Student visas (TU 570) were refused on 29 March 2016 because “[c]riteria not met” and “[l]etter sent via Email/Fax 29/03/2016, 570”. In addition it is recorded that correspondence, being a notification, was sent on “29/03/2016”.
Insofar as the Applicants’ ground of review is based on an argument that this evidence before the Tribunal was hearsay and inadmissible, such an argument is misconceived and bound to fail. The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence (see s.353(a) of the Act). Beyond this, there was no explanation for the contention that the printouts were not evidence on which the Tribunal could determine the date of transmission of the delegate’s decision.
Moreover, any broader assertion of error on the basis that there was “insufficient” evidence before the Tribunal has not been shown to be arguable. In addition to the screenshots, the Tribunal had before it the departmental file, including the Form 956 appointing a migration agent as the Applicants’ authorised recipient and providing an email address of “[email protected]” for correspondence; a copy of the refusal notification letter dated 29 March 2016 marked “Transmission Method: Email sent to [email protected]” and (at p.56 of the Courtbook) what appears to be the content of a cover letter to the appointed agent enclosing correspondence marked “This email and attachment(s) was sent to [email protected].”
The solicitor for the Applicants submitted orally that the document at p.56 of the Courtbook was inadequate evidence of transmission by email on 29 March 2016 given that it was not apparent from this document alone that an email was sent to the Applicants’ authorised recipient containing the notification of refusal letter and the delegate’s decision on any particular date. This appeared to be another basis for the contention that there was insufficient evidence before the Tribunal for it to find it had no jurisdiction.
However while the document at p.56 is not in itself evidence of email transmission of the refusal notification to the authorised recipient on 29 March 2016, the Tribunal also had before it the computer printouts from the Department’s records in the Courtbook which state that a refusal notification was sent by email/fax in relation to each of the Applicants on 29 March 2016. In addition, the details of the authorised recipient and the correct email address were recorded on the refusal notification letter dated 29 March 2016 (at pp.57 and 60 in the Courtbook).
In these circumstances, it cannot be said that there is even an arguable case that it was not open to the Tribunal to have regard to the printouts from the departmental records or that there was no evidence or “insufficient” evidence before the Tribunal upon which it could reach the conclusion which it reached as to the method and date of transmission of the delegate’s decision to the Applicants’ agent (if this is what was intended by the ground) or that otherwise in proceeding on the information that was before it as to the date of transmission of the email notification of the delegate’s decision the Tribunal fell into error.
I note for the sake of completeness that the Tribunal wrote to the Applicants (through their migration agent) by letter dated 6 June 2016 bringing to their attention the view that the applications were not lodged within the relevant time period of 21 days from the date they were taken to have been notified of the primary decision. It stated that the primary decisions (for the Applicant and for her spouse) were emailed to them on 29 March 2016, and that on that basis 29 March 2016 was taken to be the date on which they were taken to have been notified, so that the last day for lodging the application for review was 19 April 2016. The Tribunal indicated that as the application was not lodged until 22 April 2016 it appeared to be out of time. The Applicants were given the opportunity to comment as to whether a valid application had been made. Their authorised recipient requested an extension of time on 20 June 2016 “due to unable to contact the client” and the Tribunal allowed until 4 July 2016. Despite two voicemail reminders to the Applicants’ authorised recipient no response to this correspondence was provided. There can be no arguable suggestion of a denial of procedural fairness in these circumstances.
As indicated, the Applicants’ complaint was not simply with the adequacy of the evidence before the Tribunal, but was also a more general complaint that in circumstances where they raised an issue as to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, there ought to be appropriate affidavit evidence before the Court to enable it to determine the issue of jurisdiction. As discussed above, in circumstances where these concerns did not emerge until the hearing, I gave the First Respondent the opportunity to file and serve evidence from an officer of the Department that would be relied on at a final hearing (were an extension of time to be granted) in relation to determination of the objective jurisdictional fact of transmission of the email notification of the delegate’s decision to the Applicants as that was the fact on which the jurisdiction of the Tribunal would ultimately depend (see Singh at [37] per Perry J).
It is well-established that the Court is in a position to determine whether such jurisdictional fact is or is not established (see Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission (2000) 199 CLR 135; [2000] HCA 5 at [28], [33]-[34] Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). Further, as stated by Perry J in Singh (at [45]), given that such a jurisdictional precondition is objective, it does not automatically follow that it is sufficient for the Minister to rely on evidence in the same form as was before the Tribunal. As her Honour pointed out, the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence. However evidence placed before the Court on such an issue must be in admissible form in compliance with the rules of evidence (see Singh at [45]).
For the purposes of determination of the application for an extension of time in these circumstances I considered it appropriate to have before me the evidence that would be before the Court had it been made clear in the application that a jurisdictional fact was in issue.
The Applicants’ expression of concern about whether there was admissible evidence of transmission of the email notifying them of the delegate’s decision at a time that was such that the Tribunal was correct to find that the review application was lodged out of time (and hence that it had no jurisdiction) does not establish an arguable ground of review that the Tribunal erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction such as to support the application for an extension of time.
Objection was taken to Mr Gill’s affidavit and the First Respondent did not read certain parts of the affidavit. Beyond this, Mr Gill’s evidence was admissible evidence, consistent with the suggestion by Perry J in Singh at [55] that evidence such as screenshots from departmental records should be annexed to an affidavit by a deponent with relevant knowledge of departmental records and their meaning who could explain the printouts, how they were generated and verify the facts evidenced by the printout.
Mr Gill confirmed that the screenshot in the Courtbook included a record of events in relation to the Applicants visa applications and the fact that the refusal notification letter was sent by email or fax on 29 March 2016.
The first screenshot annexed to Mr Gill’s affidavit (headed “Event/Decision Detail”) also bears Ms Adhikari’s name as the “client name”, records an event “Refused” and “Criteria not met”, and the name of the person who recorded this information on 29/03/2016. It also records that a notification letter was sent via email/fax dated 29/03/2016; includes a “Legislative Reference Text” of 570.227 (clearly a reference to the visa criterion that was not met); and, importantly, records “Refusal notification sent by email to:[email protected]” which was the address provided for the authorised recipient.
Mr Gill explained in his affidavit that by opening a “Correspondence summary” referred to in this screenshot it was possible to obtain further detail about the correspondence in relation to the visa refusal. As shown in the second annexure to his affidavit, this additional screenshot records that correspondence was addressed to Ms Adhikari (the main Applicant) in relation to a file which bears the file number appearing on documents in the Courtbook identifying the Applicant and her visa application. It records that an “IMMI Refusal Notification” was sent at 08:40:22 on 29 March 2016. This is consistent with the first screenshot from the database explained in Mr Gill’s affidavit as providing a record of correspondence (sent to the Applicant’s migration agent) by email to the address [email protected] which also referred to a refusal notification.
The third screenshot is from the “Enterprise Correspondence” database and contains a record of correspondence to the Applicants’ migration agent (addressed to the Applicant) by email to the address [email protected], being the same visa refusal notification. It is described as “Date sent” and also “Sent – Storage Pending” at 08:40:22 on 29 March 2016. Mr Gill’s evidence is that the words “Storage Pending” indicate that at the time the email was sent it was still pending storage in the Department’s “Enterprise Correspondence” database and that, as indicated on the screenshot, it was subsequently stored (sent) at 08:42:14 on 29 March 2016.
This screenshot also contains the opening words of the letter to the Applicants’ migration agent, which are the same as those appearing in the document in the Courtbook at p.56.
Further, as pointed out by the First Respondent, Singh contains a helpful discussion of the admissibility of computer printouts from departmental records in themselves in relation to proof of transmission of documents by email at [45]-[55]. In that case there was a stand-alone computer printout in evidence in relation to the transmission of the delegate’s decision. Perry J was satisfied that such evidence was sufficient to prove transmission of the email and its attachments for reasons that she gave, but made the point that it would be preferable for such evidence to be annexed to an affidavit by a deponent with relevant knowledge (see Singh at [55]).
Insofar as the Applicants pointed to the hearsay character of computer printouts, consistent with the reasoning of Perry J in Singh at [46]-[54], the computer printouts themselves (in the attachments to Mr Gill’s affidavit and in the Courtbook) would be admissible under s.71 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (the Evidence Act) as evidence that the email notification of the delegate’s decision was sent to the Applicants on 29 March 2016 (and see the definition of electronic communications in s.5(1) of the Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth), the rebuttable presumption in s.161 of the Evidence Act and also note s.75 of the Evidence Act).
The issue for the Court in determining the jurisdiction of the Tribunal would be to determine the objective fact of whether the email notification of the delegate’s decision was sent to the Applicants in accordance with the provisions in the Migration Act and Regulations including, in this case, whether it was sent by email on 29 March 2016.
There is nothing pointed to in the screenshots or otherwise that is contrary to the clear indication as to transmission of the email notification on 29 March 2016.
I am not persuaded by Mr Newman’s contention that the fact that the screenshots did not include complete copies of the refusal decision and notification means that the jurisdictional issue is arguable. Nor is this fact such as to render arguable the contention that there is no evidence that the Applicants were notified of the delegate’s decision by letter dated 29 March 2016 dispatched by email to the correct address for their authorised recipient on that day.
As the First Respondent submitted, on the evidence before the Court it is not arguable that there was any failure by the Department to notify the Applicant in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act and Regulations. Nor is it arguable that the email to the Applicants’ migration agent/authorised recipient was not transmitted on 29 March 2016.
As there is no arguable case that the Applicant was not notified of the delegate’s decision by email sent on 29 March 2016, it is not arguable that the Tribunal erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction having regard to the date on which review was sought.
There is clear evidence in the affidavit of Mr Gill and the computer printouts that the delegate’s visa refusal notification was transmitted to the correct address by email on 29 March 2016 such that it cannot be said to be arguable that the Applicants have any prospects of success in an application for review of the Tribunal’s decision on the basis that it had jurisdiction because their application to it was not out of time.
The Applicants’ case is plainly hopeless. In these circumstances, notwithstanding the short (albeit not satisfactorily explained) delay, the absence of prejudice to the Minister were an extension of time to be granted and the absence of a right of appeal, I am not satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time in which to bring these proceedings. Accordingly the application for an extension of time should be refused.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Barnes
Date: 10 August 2017
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