DZH21 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DZH21 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 881

Appeal from: DZH21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 403 (14 March 2024)
File number: QUD 210 of 2024
Judgment of: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 6 August 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal decision of Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) – where claim for protection visa dismissed on 22 April 2021 – where application for review lodged out of time – where Administrative Appeals Tribunal found to have no jurisdiction to consider the relief sought – whether decision of primary judge attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration – whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused, supposing decision of primary judge were to be wrong – application dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1102

BAX16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 181

Beni v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 228

DZH21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 403

DZH21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 1196

ERT19 v Minister for Immigration [2020] FCCA 2620

SunshineLoans Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2023] FCA 707

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 43
Date of hearing: 31 July 2025
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr M Hawker of Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

QUD 210 of 2024
BETWEEN:

DZH21

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

DERRINGTON J

DATE OF ORDER:

6 AUGUST 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The first respondent’s name be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent in the sum of $4,000.00.  

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DERRINGTON J:

Introduction

  1. The applicant, DZH21, seeks leave to appeal a decision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) delivered on 14 March 2024:  see DZH21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 403 (DZH21 (No 2)).

  2. The requirement to seek leave arises because the primary judge refused to grant the applicant an extension of…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 881
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of DZH21 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicant, a citizen of India, sought leave to appeal against the dismissal of his application for a protection visa. The application was lodged out of time, and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) found that it had no jurisdiction to consider the relief sought. The legal issues that the court was required to decide included whether the primary judge's decision was attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration and whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong.

The court found that the primary judge's decision was self-evidently correct. The Delegate's decision was a "Part 7-reviewable decision" within the meaning of s 411(1)(c) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). An application for review of any such decision was required to have been given to the Tribunal within the "period prescribed", being a period ending not later than 28 days after the applicant received notification of the decision. The applicant was notified of the Delegate's decision on the day that it was sent to his "email address for correspondence", being 22 April 2021: ss 66, 494B(5)(b) and 494C(5) of the Act. It follows that the last day on which the applicant could have applied to the Tribunal for review was 19 May 2021. That period had expired when the applicant filed his application for review on 11 August 2021. Once it was established that the application had been filed out of time, the Tribunal held no jurisdiction to deal with it.

Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent in the sum of $4,000.00. The court also noted that the first respondent's name be amended to "Minister for Immigration and Citizenship".

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first respondent’s name be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent in the sum of $4,000.00.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is also noted that the merit of this application turns upon specific provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) and the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations). As is to be expected, those instruments have evolved with the passage of time; as such, these reasons will refer to them as they existed as at the time of their application by the Tribunal in late 2021.BackgroundThe Visa Application The applicant is a citizen of India. He arrived in Australia in November 2019. On 16 December 2019, the applicant applied for a protection visa (the Visa Application). The foundation of his claim was identified as follows. The applicant claimed he operated a business involved in the supply and manufacture of footwear products in western India. Circumstances are said to have transpired such that he could not deliver products to his customers for which they had paid nor could he repay those monies they had advanced to him. Such customers are alleged to have chased and attacked the applicant. Similar allegations were raised with respect to entities who had once supplied leather to his business, as well as local authorities. These claims were recorded in the Visa Application and a letter dated 14 December 2019. No corroborative evidence was provided. For instance, the Visa Application only identified that:Provide reasons why this applicant left that country or those countries:TO SAVE MYSELF FROM THE BIG FINANCE COMPANY AND CLIENT AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT.…Give details including:• the name of the person/organisation/authorities this applicant asked for help• what help they provided, if they helpedYES, CONTACTED POLICE BUT THEY IN STEAD OF HELPING ME, TORTURED ME.…Explain what the applicant thinks will happen to them if they return to that country or those countries:IN WILL DEFINITELY BE PUT BEHIND BARS BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT IF I RETURN BACK. The Visa Application also identified the applicant’s “email address for correspondence”. This is, as will be seen, of some significance. The applicant’s email was set out below the following:The Department [of Home Affairs] prefers to communicate electronically as this provides a faster method of communication and delivery of information. If you (the applicant) agree that the Department can communicate with you electronically, provide an email address in the space below. On 30 October 2020, a delegate of the Minister (the Delegate) sent a letter to the applicant that enclosed a request for further information in support of the Visa Application. That letter noted:You must respond to this request within 28 days after you are taken to have received this letter.…If you do not reply within the timeframe specified above your application may be decided without the requested information being taken into account. If you are unable to provide this information within this time you should contact Humanitarian Program below. The request for further information included a not insubstantial list of material that the Delegate required, such as a broader articulation of the applicant’s claims and any supporting evidence. As the Delegate later noted, this was because the “claims put forward in [the Visa Application] lacked significant details such as why [the applicant] feared harm from the state government”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant did not respond to this request.The Delegate’s Decision On 22 April 2021, the Delegate dismissed the Visa Application (the Delegate’s Decision). This was because the Delegate was satisfied that the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia owed any protection obligations under the Act. Nor was he a “member of the same family unit” as a non-citizen who (a) the Minister was satisfied that Australia owed protection obligations to; and (b) held a Protection visa of the class as that applied for by the applicant. In his reasons, the Delegate recorded that, on 30 October 2020, the applicant was “sent a letter inviting them under s 56 of the Act to provide additional information about some of the claims in their application and to provide clarification on particular points” (including substantiating details, such as dates and locations of alleged events). The reasons also record that such letter advised the applicant that, in order to allow proper consideration of the legitimacy of his claims, further information vis-à-vis what had allegedly transpired in India was required. It was noted that the applicant had been advised of the time-frame for providing the additional information sought, as well as the possible consequences that would befall him should he fail to do so. The Delegate then recorded that, as at the date of the assessment, the applicant had not provided additional information in relation to his claims. Nor was there evidence that he had attempted to contact the Department to request any further time to do so. As such, the Delegate held that the applicant had been afforded a reasonable opportunity to provide additional information and evidence to substantiate his claims and that, in the circumstances, it was appropriate to proceed with the decision-making process on the basis of the information then before the Department. On that footing, the Delegate ultimately determined that the applicant had provided insufficient information to substantiate the facts that were provided in support of the Visa Application. In particular, it was found that he had failed to prove that he had been “targeted by any groups or individuals due to his financial situation before he left India”. Similarly, the Delegate found that the applicant had failed to provide any cogent evidence that he would be targeted by State authorities in India were he to return, nor was it apparent why any such authorities would have any adverse interest in him. As such, the Delegate did not accept the applicant had “departed India because he feared harm from the state authorities” or that he had been “arrested, tortured or suffered any other forms of harm at the hands of the Indian authorities before his departure”. As a result of the foregoing, the Delegate determined that the applicant had failed to establish that he was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations under the Act:Part 7: Findings on Australia’s protection obligationsI am not satisfied that [the applicant] is a refugee as defined by s5H of the Act. Therefore, I am not satisfied [the applicant] is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in s36(2)(a) of the Act.I am not satisfied there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of [the applicant] being removed to India, there is a real risk they will suffer significant harm as defined in s36(2)(aa) of the Act.Therefore, I am also not satisfied that [the applicant] is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as provided for in s36(2)(aa) of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant needs leave to appeal the primary judge’s decision. This is because the decision was an interlocutory judgment. Relevantly, it also dealt with an issue of practice and procedure, being whether an extension of time should be given to allow the applicant to file an application for review of the Tribunal’s Decision. As was identified by Yates J in SunshineLoans Pty Ltd v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2023] FCA 707 (at [5]):Not only is the judgment below an interlocutory judgment, it is one dealing with a matter of practice and procedure involving the exercise of judicial discretion. In relation to such judgments, the consistent practice of the Court in relation to whether the leave to appeal should be granted is to address the two interrelated questions posed in Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 (Decor Corporation): (a) whether, in all the circumstances, the decision under review is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered by a Full Court; and (b) whether substantial injustice would result if leave to appeal were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong.Consideration (1): Was the primary decision attended with sufficient doubt? It is appropriate to first address whether the primary judge’s decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant the subject matter being reviewed by the Full Court. The grounds cited in the application for leave to appeal from DZH21 (No 2) were as follows:Grounds of Application1.The Hon Judge failed to consider that The Tribunal decision was effected by jurisdictional error in that the Tribunal failed to correctly apply the law.2.The learned Judge dismissed the application without considering the legal and factual errors contained in the decision of AAT. Those grounds do not contain particulars from which the Minister might be able to formulate any useful response. In this sense, they are inappropriate and do not sustain a valid application: WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 [35]. In any event, the primary judge’s decision was self-evidently correct. The Delegate’s Decision was a “Part 7-reviewable decision” within the meaning of s 411(1)(c) of the Act. By reason of s 412(1)(b) of the Act and reg 4.31(2) of the Regulations, an application for review of any such decision was required to have been given to the Tribunal within the “period prescribed”, being a period ending not later than 28 days after the applicant received notification of the decision. The applicant was notified of the Delegate’s Decision on the day that it was sent to his “email address for correspondence”, being 22 April 2021: ss 66, 494B(5)(b) and 494C(5) of the Act. It follows that the last day on which the applicant could have applied to the Tribunal for review was 19 May 2021. That period had expired when the applicant filed his application for review on 11 August 2021. Once it was established that the application had been filed out of time, the Tribunal held no jurisdiction to deal with it: ERT19 v Minister for Immigration [2020] FCCA 2620 [41], citing Beni v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 228.