FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
AHL22 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1350
File number: MLG 141 of 2022 Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK Date of judgment: 10 December 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection (subclass 866) visa – extension of time – where application to the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review delegate’s decision was made outside the time prescribed – where Tribunal found it had no jurisdiction – where proposed review grounds do not engage with the decision made by the Tribunal – whether the inclusion of a defunct email address in the delegate’s notification of decision rendered the notification defective – where judicial review application made 163 days out of time – where there is no acceptable explanation for delay – where there is no arguable case of jurisdictional error – application to extend the 35-day period is dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) pts 7, 5, div 4, ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 66, 66(2), 66(2)(d)(iv), 412(1)(b), 412(4), 422B, 422B(1), 477(1), 477(2), 477(2)(b), 477A(2), 477A(2)(b), 494B(5), 494C(5), 500
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) item 2, div 1, pt 2, sch 2
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.31(2)
Cases cited: BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189
BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218
BUH23 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 995
CJG22 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1087
Daksh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 612
DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64; 270 FCR 492
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Manna v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 400
Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133
Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144; (2021) 286 FCR 556
SZEYK v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 1940
SZMNO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 797
SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 31 Date of last submission/s: 6 November 2024 Date of hearing: 20 November 2024 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms T Weir Solicitors for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 141 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: AHL22
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
DATE OF ORDER:
10 DECEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an order extending the 35-day period within which an application for judicial review of a migration decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1350
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the principles established in Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs, which emphasise that the focus of the court's discretion is on the broader interests of the administration of justice, rather than the interests of the applicant. The court considered the well-established principles for extending time, including whether the applicant provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, any prejudice caused to the respondent, and the merits of the underlying application. The applicant's reasons for delay, including financial constraints and reliance on volunteer assistance, were considered in this context. The court also noted that the absence of prejudice to the respondent is not sufficient to justify an extension of time.
Following this analysis, the court determined that the application for an extension of time should not be granted. The applicant had not provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, and the court was not satisfied that it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend the time limit. The application was therefore dismissed.
The court did not make any orders extending the time for the applicant to lodge his application for judicial review, as the application for an extension of time was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
By application lodged on 14 January 2022 in the Court, the applicant applies for an order to extend the time within which he can make an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision.CONSIDERATION An application to the Court for a review of a migration decision must be made within 35 days of the date of the decision: s 477(1) of the Act. The Tribunal’s decision was made on 29 June 2021 and the 35-day period within which an application to the Court must be made ended on 3 August 2021. The applicant therefore made his application 164 days after the time prescribed lapsed. Section 477(2) of the Act allows the Court, by order, to extend the 35-day period as the Court considers appropriate if the Court considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so. The applicant’s grounds in support of his application for an extension of time specify the following:1.I DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH MONEY FOR THE COURT APPEAL PROCESS AT THE TIME.2.I ALSO CAN NOT PAY LEGAL SERVICE FOR APPEAL TO THIS COURT AT THAT MOMENT, SO TO MAKE SURE I IN LAWFULL (sic) I GET VOLUNTEERED IN UNION OF WORKERS TO HELP ME IN THIS APPEAL PROCESS. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28 Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ explained the exercise of the Court's discretion under s 477(2) of the Act, by reference to the corresponding provision for applications made to the Federal Court of Australia in s 477A(2). In short compass, the focus of s 477A(2)(b) (and so also s 477(2)(b)) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. This allows the Court to consider “a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application”: Tu'uta Katoa at [12]. Their Honours noted that the level of satisfaction that must be reached is not low because the Court “must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice”: at [12]. In this regard, their Honours noted that it is appropriate to consider the well-established principles guiding decisions whether to extend time in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-349; Tu’uta Katoa at [13]. The non-exhaustive principles set out in Hunter Valley to which reference in Tu'uta Katoa is made were cited with approval in Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6] as follows:1.applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislated time limits are not to be ignored. The applicant must show an "acceptable explanation for the delay"; it must be "fair and equitable in the circumstances" to extend time;2.action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for review, is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished;3.any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings that is caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension;4.however, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension; and5.the merits of the substantial application are to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted.See also Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113 at [2], [33]-[36]; SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218 at [33]; Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144; (2021) 286 FCR 556 at 566, [40].