BCL21 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2024] FedCFamC2G 984
•8 October 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
BCL21 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 984
File number(s): ADG 112 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE GERRARD Date of judgment: 8 October 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa – extension of time – where delay is very lengthy – where explanation for delay unsatisfactory – whether the applicant was properly notified of the delegate’s decision – where merits of substantive application not strong Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 66(2), 66(2)(d), 412, 412(1)(b), 476, 477, 477(1), 477(2), 494B, 494C, 494C(5)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) rr 4.31, 4.31(2)
Cases cited: Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1102
BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 271 FCR 517, [2019] FCAFC 189
CDC23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 574
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 270 FCR 492; [2019] FCAFC 64
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21, [2022] FCAFC 3
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437, [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, [2010] HCA 16
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99, [2013] FCA 317
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 242 FCR 585, [2015] FCA 1391
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 158, [2015] FCA 1392
Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491
SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) 228 CLR 294, [2005] HCA 24
Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 434
SZMNO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 797
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579, [2022] HCA 28
Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 48 Date of last submission/s: 6 September 2024 Date of hearing: 21 August, 30 August and 20 September 2024 Place: Adelaide Applicant: Self-represented with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Claudia Crawley Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
ADG 112 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BCL21
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GERRARD
DATE OF ORDER:
8 OCTOBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application to extend the period within which to make an application for judicial review is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE GERRARD:
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia. On 9 August 2018, the applicant arrived in Australia on a UD-601 Electronic Travel Authority (ETA), having previously visited Australia on the same authority for a week in October 2015. On 5 November 2018, the applicant applied for a Protection (subclass 866) Visa (the visa), which was marked as received by the Department on 6 November 2018 (Court Book (CB) 1, 72).
On 16 July 2019, a delegate of the first respondent (the Minister) refused to grant the applicant the visa. The delegate found that the applicant did not satisfy subsection 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act), which requires the applicant to be a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations (CB 68-79).
On 23 September 2019, the applicant applied to the second respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal), for review of the delegate’s decision (CB 80-81).
On 3 December 2019, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting her to comment on the validity of the Tribunal application, noting that the application was not lodged within the relevant 28-day time limit as prescribed by reg 4.31(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations) (CB 85-87). The applicant was invited to comment on the validity of the Tribunal application by responding in writing by 17 December 2019.
On 13 December 2019, the applicant responded by email to the Tribunal as follows (CB 89):
…
I would like to explain why the didn’t lodge within the time frame.I have missed out the email dated 16th July 2019.I didn’t notice until I check myVEVO that the date line is August 12 2019 , which I thought I have another 35 days grace period to lodge, that’s why I only did it on September 23 2019.
…
On 24 February 2020, the Tribunal decided that it did not have jurisdiction to review the application because the application was not made within the statutory timeframe (CB 98-99). The applicant was notified of this decision on 26 February 2020 (CB 97).
On 29 April 2021, the applicant filed an application for judicial review in this Court. That application seeks review of the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to s 476 of the Act.
Section 477 of the Act requires an application for judicial review to be filed within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal decision. Accordingly, the application for judicial review was filed 395 days out of time, and the applicant seeks an order under s 477(2) that the time for making such an application be extended.
THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
The Tribunal’s decision in this matter is 7 paragraphs long. Given the conciseness of the Tribunal decision, it is beneficial to set out those substantive paragraphs in full (CB 99, [1]-[6]):
This is an application for review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration made on 16 July 2019 to refuse to grant a protection visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958. The review application was lodged with the Tribunal on 23 September 2019.
As the applicant…was not in immigration detention on the day she was notified of the decision, an application for review of the decision had to be made within 28 days: r.4.31(2) of the Migration Regulations 1994. In DZAFH v Minister for Immigration [2017] FCCA 387, the Federal Circuit Court held that the prescribed period in r.4.31 commences on, and includes, the day the applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision: at [44] – [46].
The material before the Tribunal indicates that [the applicant] was notified of the decision by letter dated 16 July 2019 which was dispatched by email. The Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements.
On 3 December 2019, the Tribunal wrote to [the applicant] informing her that it appeared that her review application is not a valid application because it was not lodged within the relevant time limit. It invited her to comment on the validity of her application by 17 December 2019. On 13 December 2019, [the applicant] responded to the Tribunal’s letter. She stated:
‘I have missed out the email dated 16th July 2019. I didn't notice until I check myVEVO that the date line is August 12 2019, which I thought I have another 35 days grace period to lodge, that's why I only did it on September 23 2019.’
[The applicant] did not suggest that she did not receive the notification letter or that it was not dispatched by email on 16 July 2019.
The Tribunal finds, based on the evidence before it, that [the applicant] is taken to have been notified of the decision on 16 July 2019: s.494C of the Act. Therefore, the prescribed period to apply for review ended on 12 August 2019.
As the application for review was not received by the Tribunal until 23 September 2019 the application for review was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in this matter.
APPLICATION TO THIS COURT
The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 29 April 2021 contains the following grounds of review (without alteration):
1.The Tribunal Member was refuse my visa application
2.Because Im not respond the Member on time limit
3.Because of lake of English Im not read the email sent by AAT
4.Im not able to apply ontime because COVID 19
5.I need more time to provide some of the prove
6.The Member was not found any jurisdiction on my application
7.The Member was not consider my application because of not attend the hearing
8.My situation was very bad on the pendamic timeand Im not well
9.Thats why Im not attend the hearing
As observed, the applicant also seeks an extension of time. An application to this Court for review of the Tribunal’s decision was required to have been made within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal’s decision (s 477(1) of the Act). As the Tribunal’s decision was made on 24 February 2020, any application was required to have been made by 30 March 2020. Clearly, the application for judicial review is substantially late, having been filed more than a year after the prescribed period for filing an application had elapsed. Nevertheless, this Court may extend the time period within which an applicant may bring an application if an application for an extension of time is made in writing specifying why the applicant considers that it is necessary, in the interests of the administration of justice, that the Court make an order extending time and the Court is so satisfied.
The applicant has made an application for an extension of time in writing, setting out the following grounds (without alteration):
1.Because of pendamic Im not able to apply ontime.I got financial problem thats why Im not apply
2.Please give a chance to review my case.
3.Please review my case again because of situation in my country.
This matter first came before the Court for hearing on 21 August 2024. On that occasion, the applicant advised that she had not received a copy of the Court Book or the Minister’s written outline of submissions. The Minister had not filed an affidavit of service confirming that these documents had been served on the applicant. Consequently, the Court adjourned to allow those documents to be served on the applicant.
The matter returned to the Court on 30 August 2024. On that occasion, the Court raised with counsel for the Minister that the written outline of submissions filed on behalf of the Minister omitted to address the applicant’s explanation for the delay in filing an application to this Court, but rather, addressed the applicant’s reasons for the delay in filing an application to the Tribunal. The Court gave the Minister an opportunity to file amended submissions to redress this, and also asked the Minister to address the issue of whether the Department had complied with the prescribed notification requirements. The Minister filed amended submissions on 6 September 2024. The applicant was provided with an opportunity to file further evidence or submissions by 13 September 2024 but did not do so.
When the matter again returned to the Court on 20 September 2024, the Court took some time to explain that it would listen to whatever the applicant had to say in respect of why she said she should be granted an extension of time, but that the following matters were relevant (consistent with Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579, [2022] HCA 28):
(a)The length of the delay;
(b)Whether the explanation for the delay is adequate;
(c)Whether the Minister would suffer any prejudice due to the delay; and
(d)Whether the proposed substantive application for judicial review has merit.
The Court also explained to the applicant that it would consider whether the application for judicial review had merit at a “reasonably impressionistic level” (MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 242 FCR 585 at [62], [2015] FCA 1391 at [62]). It was explained to the applicant that the Court would consider whether the applicant had identified an arguable case even if that had not been fully developed.
The Court also took some time to explain that, in assessing whether the application for judicial review had merit, this did not mean that the Court could undertake a merits review of the Tribunal’s decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259). The Court could only consider whether or not the Tribunal decision revealed jurisdictional error. The Court explained that, in migration cases such as the decision being challenged by the applicant, common categories of alleged jurisdictional error included:
(a)Where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 178 (Craig));
(b)Where the decision-maker ignores relevant material (Craig at 178);
(c)Where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material (Craig at 178);
(d)Where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 330, [2005] HCA 24 at [207]-[208)) including compliance with notification requirements;
(e)Where the decision-maker fails to consider the entirety of an applicant’s claims (or integers of the claims) made (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [111], [2013] FCA 317 at [111]);
(f)Where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias (SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]); and
(g)Where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 27, [2022] FCAFC 3 at [33]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648, [2010] HCA 16 at [131]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445, [2014] FCAFC 1 at [44] (Singh)).
However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list, and she should attempt to tell the court why she said the Tribunal had fallen into error.
Against this background, the applicant initially sought to address the Court on the merits of why she should be granted a protection visa. The Court explained again that it could not engage in merits review and invited the applicant to address the relevant factors for an extension of time. In response, the applicant told the Court that she had relied on friends to help her. The applicant told the Court that it was her friends who had prepared her application for an extension of time and had stated that the COVID-19 pandemic (the pandemic) and financial difficulties were the grounds for requiring an extension. The applicant said that the pandemic had caused her financial difficulties because she could not work at the time, but did not indicate further why those financial difficulties had led to the applicant being unable to make an application to the Court for over a year.
When asked about whether there was an error in the Tribunal’s decision, and consequently an arguable case, the applicant said: “I would not say they have done something wrong. It’s a big issue. I just have some argument about my – the visa application”. When asked to clarify, the applicant again said she had relied upon friends and just wanted her visa to be extended because she would be harmed if she returned to her home country.
CONSIDERATION
Delay
Turning first to the delay of 395 days, it is clear that is, by any measure, a delay of some significance. Absent any satisfactory explanation, a delay of this length would itself be a sufficient basis to refuse the application for an extension of time (Tran v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 533 at [38]).
As observed above, the applicant’s explanation in her application for an extension of time was that the delays were caused by the pandemic and financial difficulties. Whilst the applicant said that it was her friend who prepared these grounds, her submissions to the Court clarified that her explanation is that because she could not work during the height of the pandemic, this had caused her financial difficulties.
The Minister argues that both explanations lack merit. The Minister notes that the applicant’s reference to the pandemic is not elaborated upon, that there is nothing to indicate that the applicant was unaware of the time limit for making an application for judicial review, or that she was unable to make an application by electronic means. The Minister also argued that impecuniosity is not a basis for failing to seek review (relying upon SZMNO v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 797 at [24]-[26]). Furthermore, the applicant’s proffered explanations do not properly account for the significant delay of over a year.
In the Court’s view, the applicant has not provided an adequate explanation for the delay. Despite being given an opportunity to clarify and expand upon her explanation, the applicant did not say anything more than the pandemic had caused her financial difficulties. Even giving the applicant as much latitude as possible, including considering the effect of lockdowns and avoidance of contact situations, the Court cannot see how the applicant was prevented from making an application during this period. The Court also agrees that the financial difficulties the applicant has referred to, but not expanded upon, do not explain her delay. Similarly, having regard to the very lengthy delay, the Court does not consider that the applicant’s lack of English could be taken as a reasonable explanation.
The Court also considered whether the applicant’s reliance upon the assistance of a friend in making an application has any bearing on whether the applicant has an adequate explanation for the delay. There was no suggestion from the applicant that the delay was attributable to this. In any event, the applicant is responsible for the filing of her own application for judicial review. There is no explanation, let alone evidence, of any steps the applicant took during the 395-day period to either file an application, approach the Court in respect of filing an application or seek advice in respect of filing an application.
Prejudice
The Minister accepted that there is no relevant prejudice to him save for the significant public interest in the finality of judicial decisions (relying upon Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Marks (2000) 177 ALR 491).
Whilst acknowledging that the absence of prejudice does not by itself justify the grant of an extension of time, the Court does not view this factor as weighing against the exercise of its discretion.
Merits of the substantive application
Noting that the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to remain alert to the possibility of a reasonably arguable error which may support an extension being granted in the interests of the administration of justice (MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 238 FCR 158; [2015] FCA 1392).
In relation to the merits of the substantive application, the Minister argues that the applicant’s proposed grounds “fail to address the substance of the Tribunal’s ‘no jurisdiction’ decision”. In this respect, the Minister argues that the relevant issues were whether the applicant was given effective notice of the delegate’s decision refusing her application for the visa and whether the applicant applied for review within the statutory timeframe.
The Court agrees that the issues identified by the Minister are the relevant issues and that they are essentially linked. That is, the Court must determine whether or not the applicant was properly notified of the delegate’s decision and, if so, determine whether the applicant applied within the prescribed period.
It is therefore useful to set out the relevant legislative framework.
Legislative framework
Section 66 of the Act governs the notification of decisions made by the Minister when refusing to grant a visa and relevantly provides as follows;
(1) When the Minister grants or refuses to grant a visa, he or she is to notify the applicant of the decision in the prescribed way.
(2) Notification of a decision to refuse an application for a visa must:
(a) if the grant of the visa was refused because the applicant did not satisfy a criterion for the visa—specify that criterion; and
(b) if the grant of the visa was refused because a provision of this Act or the regulations prevented the grant of the visa—specify that provision; and
(c) unless subsection (3) applies to the application—give written reasons (other than non-disclosable information) why the criterion was not satisfied or the provision prevented the grant of the visa; and
(d) if the applicant has a right to have the decision reviewed under Part 5 or 7 or section 500—state:
(i) that the decision can be reviewed; and
(ii) the time in which the application for review may be made; and
(iii) who can apply for the review; and
(iv) where the application for review can be made
...
The time within which an applicant who is not in immigration detention must file an application for review of a decision to refuse a protection visa is governed by s 412 of the Act and r 4.31 of the Regulations:
s 412
(1) An application for review of a Part 7 – reviewable decision must:
…
(b) be given to the Tribunal within the prescribed period, being a period ending not later than 28 days after the notification of the decision; and
…
r 4.31
(2) For paragraph 412(1)(b) of the Act, if an applicant is not in immigration detention on the day the applicant is notified of a Part 7 - reviewable decision, the period in which an application for review of the decision must be given to the Tribunal by or for the applicant is 28 days, commencing on the day the applicant is notified of the decision.
Sections 494B and 494C identify the methods by which the Minister gives documents to a person and when a person is taken to have received that document. In respect of documents sent to a person by email, s 494C provides as follows:
…
(5) If the Minister gives a document to a person by the method in subsection 494B(5) (which involves transmitting the document by fax, email or other electronic means), the person is taken to have received the document at the end of the day on which the document is transmitted.
…
As the applicant was notified by email of the delegate’s decision on 16 July 2019, she was taken to have received notice at the end of that day. The prescribed period for review of 28 days ended on 12 August 2019. The applicant did not lodge her application for review by the Tribunal until 23 September 2019.
Consequently, unless the applicant was not properly notified in the prescribed way, her application for review by the Tribunal was not lodged within the prescribed period and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to review her application.
In order to satisfy the notification requirements set out in s 66(2)(d), the notification was required to state:
·That the decision can be reviewed;
·The time in which the application for review may be made;
·Who can apply for the review; and
·Where the application for review can be made.
In DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 270 FCR 492 at [58]; [2019] FCAFC 64 at [58] (DFQ17), Perram J concluded that the word “state”, when used in s 66(2), means that the relevant information must be set out in a way that is both complete and clear.
There have been a number of authorities which have considered the question of whether an applicant has been provided with effective notification of a decision. In CDC23 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 574 at [82], Judge Kendall helpfully summarised the following principles which can be gleaned from the relevant authorities:
(a)Where the statement in the letter which outlines the time in which an applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision is found beneath a disconnected and incorrect heading (such as “Financial and Case Worker Assistance”), the notification will lack clarity (DFQ17; BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 271 FCR 517, [2019] FCAFC 189 (BMY18));
(b)Where the statement outlining the time in which an applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision is found beneath a heading that is relevant to an applicant’s right of review (such as under the heading “Lodging an Application for Review”), this is sufficiently clear (Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1102 (Ali));
(c)Where the statement outlining the time in which an applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision is found beneath a heading that sufficiently identifies this information, and uses linking or referable language to the review rights (such as under the heading “Receiving this Letter”), the notification is clear (Singh);
(d)The letter should be read as a whole. Hence, the fact that different pieces of information may be spread across a number of pages is not decisive in relation to the level of clarity (Ali). Where the layout is confusing, however (for example, unclear headings are used), the separation of the information may result in a lack of clarity (BMY18); and
(e)Whether a notification is “clear” will turn upon the language and terms in which the notification is expressed when read as a whole by a person exercising a reasonable level of care (Singh; Ali). It is not significant that an applicant may not speak English as a first language. The question is whether the letter conveys the required information.
Further, in Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 434 at [51]-[52] (Sandor), Markovic J found that, where notification is sent to an authorised recipient, the use of the words “you are taken to have received” were not clear as it required the recipient of the notification to “piece together the facts which would allow [them] to know the time in which an application may be made”.
In this matter, the notification clearly identified that the applicant did not meet the relevant criteria for the grant of a protection visa because the delegate was not satisfied that the applicant satisfied subsection 36(2). The notification explained that provision required the applicant to be a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations or a member of the same family unit as such a person. The notification advised that more detailed information was included in the decision record and attached a copy of that decision record.
Under the heading “Review Rights”, the notification set out the following information (CB 68-69) (without alteration):
The department cannot consider your visa application any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a merits review of this decision. An application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within the period of 28 calendar days, commencing on the day you are taken to have received this letter.
As this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.
Please note that the abovementioned time in which you may apply to the AAT for merits review of this decision is prescribed by law and cannot be extended.
The notification then went on to provide detailed information in respect of how an application for merits review could be made by the applicant under the heading “Lodging an application for merits review”.
The Court accepts that the notification in this matter is complete and clear in the sense identified by the authorities. It is not apt to confuse or mislead the applicant. Under a clear heading of “Review Rights”, the applicant was informed that she had a right to seek merits review in the Tribunal, that she must do so within 28 days of receiving the notification and that time could not be extended, and when she was taken to have received that notification. She was then given clear information, once again under a clear heading, of how and where to make an application.
Further, the Court accepts that the error identified in Sandor does not arise in this matter as the notification was sent directly to the applicant and not to an authorised recipient.
Having regard to the above, the Court accepts that the applicant was properly and effectively notified of the delegate’s decision. She was properly notified of her right to seek merits review in the Tribunal and the timeframe within which such an application must be made. She failed to do so and the Tribunal made the only decision which was available to it.
In those circumstances, there is no merit to the substantive application.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds that it is not in the interests of the administration of justice for the Court to grant an extension of time in this matter.
Accordingly, the application for an extension of time is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty-eight (48) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard. Associate:
Dated: 8 October 2024
2
34
2