VRRQ and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration)
[2025] ARTA 588
•15 May 2025
VRRQ and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (Migration) [2025] ARTA 588 (15 May 2025)
Applicant:VRRQ
Respondent: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
Tribunal Number: 2025/1345
Tribunal:General Member K. Thornton
Place:Melbourne
Date:15 May 2025
Decision:The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review the application. The application is dismissed under s 97 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth).
...................[SGD].....................................................
General Member K. Thornton
Catchwords
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – jurisdiction – migration – visa refusal – nine day time limit to apply for merits review – whether notice at s 501G(1) of the Migration Act complied with and given in prescribed manner – whether application for review lodged within time – notice complied with and given in accordance with s 501G – application not lodged within time – no discretion to extend time to lodge review application – no jurisdiction – application dismissed
Legislation
Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)Cases
DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EFX17 (2021) 271 CLR 112
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Park [2024] FCAFC 136
Mohamed and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] AATA 3606 [13]
Pomare v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 458; (2008) 167 FCR 494
Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 434
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 31
Wilson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1421Statement of Reasons
The Applicant seeks review of a decision of a delegate of the Respondent made on 29 October 2024 refusing to grant the Applicant a Protection (Class XA, Subclass 866) visa under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’).
Section 500(6B) of the Act relevantly provides that where a decision is made under s 501 of the Act, an application for review of the decision must be lodged with the Tribunal within nine days after the day on which the person was notified of the decision in accordance with subsection 501G(1). Section 500(6B) expressly provides that sections 18 and 19 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (‘the ART Act’) (which deal with applications for extension of time) do not apply to the application.
The Applicant was notified of the visa refusal decision on 29 October 2024.[1] Therefore, the nine-day application period expired on 7 November 2024. The Applicant filed his application with the Tribunal on 25 February 2025 which is well outside the nine-day time period. The Tribunal does not have the power to extend the appeal period set down by s 500(6B) of the Act.
[1] Exhibit R1 186-90.
The central issue between the parties was whether the notification made on 29 October 2024 was made according to law. If it was not, then time does not begin to run until the notification is properly made.[2] If notification was made correctly, then the provisions of the Act specifically prohibit the Tribunal from extending time, and accordingly, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear this application.
[2] Exhibit R2 [14], Mohamed and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] AATA 3606 [13], citing Pomare v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 458; (2008) 167 FCR 494 at [31] which concerned the equivalent requirements for notification of a s 501CA decision.
The Tribunal hearing on this issue proceeded by telephone on 1 May 2025. The Applicant was represented by Ms Jazmine Elmolla, lawyer, from Victoria Legal Aid. The Respondent was represented by Mr Christoper McDermott of counsel on behalf of Sparke Helmore Lawyers. Each party relied upon written submissions which was supplemented by oral argument. The Tribunal advised the parties it would hand down written reasons as soon as it was able to.
The Tribunal has considered the written materials and the parties’ oral submissions. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has determined the 29 October 2024 notification was made according to law and therefore the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to review the application. The application is therefore dismissed.
OVERVIEW
The dispute to be resolved before this Tribunal concerns the validity of the notification of the refusal of the Applicant’s Protection visa under s 501(1) of the Act. The Applicant was notified of the visa refusal decision by the Department via email to his personal email address on 29 October 2024.[3] The email was addressed to him personally and was not copied to anybody else. The notification was addressed to him alone, contained his name, his email address, his current residential address and referred to him by name. The notification was not addressed to any other party.
[3] Exhibit R1, 186-90.
The notification contained the following passage under ‘Review rights’ on page 2:[4]
The Department cannot consider the refusal of your visa any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART) for a merits review of this decision to refuse to grant you a Permanent Protection (Class XA) visa. An application for merits review of the decision must be given to the ART within nine (9) days after the day on which you are taken to have received this letter. The ART has no power to extend this timeframe.
As this letter was sent by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted. You have appointed an authorised recipient and are taken to have received this letter at the end of the day it was transmitted to your authorised recipient.
[Tribunal’s emphasis in bold]
[4] Ibid 190.
The addition of the statement ‘You have appointed an authorised recipient and are taken to have received this letter at the end of the day it was transmitted to your authorised recipient’ was erroneous. The Applicant did not have an authorised recipient. That is not disputed by the parties. The Respondent concedes that the statement referring to an authorised recipient in the notification was included in error.
The Applicant argues that this error infects the notification such that notification was never taken to have been validly made. This is because it posits two possible dates on which the notification was taken to have been received (one being the day end of the day the Applicant received it, and second, the end of the day it was transmitted to an authorised recipient).
The Respondent submits that despite the notification erroneously referring to an ‘authorised recipient’, the objective facts are that the notification was validly made to the Applicant, and to him alone. The Applicant had not appointed an authorised recipient, and it was clear on the face of the notification that it was emailed and addressed to him and only to him. The Respondent submits that notification was validly made in accordance with the requirements under the Act and as such the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision.
Protection visa background
On 22 January 2024 the Applicant made an application for a Class XA Subclass 866 Protection visa.
On 28 February 2024 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the Applicant the Protection visa on the basis he was not owed protection by Australia.
The Applicant sought review of that decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. On 15 May 2024, the Tribunal set aside the refusal decision and remitted the matter back to the Department with a direction that the Applicant satisfied the requirements of s 36(2)(a) of the Act and was owed protection.
On 29 October 2024 the Applicant was notified that he was refused a Protection visa under s 501(1) of the Act.
It is this notification that the Applicant submits was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to review decisions made under s 501(1) of the Act is enlivened by s 105 of the ART Act and s 500(1)(b) of the Act.
Section 500(6B) of the Act provides the following:
If a decision under section 501 of this Act, or a decision under subsection 501CA(4) of this Act not to revoke a decision to cancel a visa, relates to a person in the migration zone, an application to the ART for a review of the decision must be lodged with the ART within 9 days after the day on which the person was notified of the decision in accordance with subsection 501G(1). Accordingly, sections 18 and 19 of the ART Act do not apply to the application.
Section 500(6B) of the Act specifically provides that sections 18 and 19 of the ART Act do not apply. Those provisions relate to the timeframe for applying to the Tribunal for a review of a decision, and the circumstances in which the Tribunal may extend the period during which an applicant may apply.
Consequently the Tribunal has no power to extend the time within which an applicant can apply for review of a decision under s 501 or 501CA(4) of the Act.
Section 501G(3) provides that a decision under s 501(1) must be given in a prescribed way. Section 5 of the Act states that ‘prescribed’ means ‘prescribed by the regulations.’
The Migration Regulations 1994 (Regulations) at r 2.16 relevantly deals with notification of decisions on visa applications under s 501G(3). It provides:
(1) For subsections 66(1) and 501G(3) of the Act (which deal with giving notice of decisions), this regulation sets out the way of notifying a person of a decision to grant or refuse to grant a visa.
…
Refusal to grant visa
(3) The Minister must notify an applicant of a decision to refuse to grant a visa by one of the methods specified in section 494B of the Act.
Note: If the Minister gives a person a document by a method specified in section 494B of the Act, the person is taken to have received the document at the time specified in section 494C of the Act in respect of the method.
Notification of a visa decision must be given in accordance with s 494B of the Act, which refers to methods by which the Minister can give documents to a person. Section 494B(1) and (5) provide that:
Coverage of section
(1) For the purposes of provisions of this Act or the regulations that:
(a) require or permit the Minister to give a document to a person (the recipient); and
(b) state that the Minister must do so by one of the methods specified in this section;
the methods are as follows.
…
Transmission by fax, email or other electronic means
(5) Another method consists of the Minister transmitting the document by:
(a) fax; or
(b) email; or
(c) other electronic means;
to:
(d) the last fax number, email address or other electronic address, as the case may be, provided to the Minister by the recipient for the purposes of receiving documents; or
(e) if the recipient is a minor—the last fax number, email address or other electronic address, as the case may be, for a carer of the minor that is known by the Minister.
Section 494C of the Act states the position with regard to when a person is taken to have received a document from the Minister. Section 494C(1) and (5) provide:
(1) This section applies if the Minister gives a document to a person by one of the methods specified in section 494B (including in a case covered by section 494A).
…
Transmission by fax, email or other electronic means
(5) If the Minister gives a document to a person by the method in subsection 494B(5) (which involves transmitting the document by fax, email or other electronic means), the person is taken to have received the document at the end of the day on which the document is transmitted.
Section 494D of the Act relates to authorised recipients:
(1) If a person (the first person) gives the Minister written notice of the name and address of another person (the authorised recipient) authorised by the first person to receive documents in connection with specified matters arising under this Act or the regulations, the Minister must give the authorised recipient, instead of the first person, any documents in connection with those matters that the Minister would otherwise have given to the first person.
Note: If the Minister gives a person a document by a method specified in section 494B, the person is taken to have received the document at the time specified in section 494C in respect of that method.
(2) If the Minister gives a document to the authorised recipient, the Minister is taken to have given the document to the first person. However, this does not prevent the Minister giving the first person a copy of the document.
(3) Subject to subsection (3A), the first person (but not the authorised recipient) may vary or withdraw the notice under subsection (1) at any time, but must not (unless the regulations provide otherwise) vary the notice so that any more than one person becomes the first person’s authorised recipient.
(3A) In addition to the first person being able to vary the notice under subsection (1) by varying the address of the authorised recipient, that recipient may also vary that notice by varying that address.
(5) The Minister need not comply with subsection (1) if:
(a) the authorised recipient is not a registered migration agent (within the meaning of Part 3); and
(b) the Minister reasonably suspects that the authorised recipient is giving immigration assistance (within the meaning of that Part); and
(c) the Minister has given the first person a notice, by one of the methods specified in section 494B, stating that he or she does not intend to give the authorised recipient documents as mentioned in subsection (1).
Section 501G of the Act provides that for decision made under s 501 of the Act:
(1) If a decision is made under subsection 501(1) or (2) or 501A(2) or section 501B, 501BA, 501CA or 501F to:
(a) refuse to grant a visa to a person; or
(b) cancel a visa that has been granted to a person; or
(ba) not revoke a decision to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person;
the Minister must give the person a written notice that:
(c) sets out the decision; and
(d) specifies the provision under which the decision was made and sets out the effect of that provision; and
(e) sets out the reasons (other than non‑disclosable information) for the decision; and
(f) if the decision was made by a delegate of the Minister under subsection 501(1) or (2), or section 501CA and the person has a right to have the decision reviewed by the ART:
(i) states that the decision can be reviewed by the ART; and
(ii) states the time in which the application for review may be made; and
(iii) states who can apply to have the decision reviewed; and
(iv) states where the application for review can be made; and
(v) in a case where the decision relates to a person in the migration zone—sets out the effect of subsections 500(6A) to (6L) (inclusive); and
(vi) sets out such additional information (if any) as is prescribed.
(2) If the decision referred to in subsection (1):
(a) was made by a delegate of the Minister under subsection 501(1) or (2), or section 501CA; and
(b) is reviewable by the ART; and
(c) relates to a person in the migration zone;
the notice under subsection (1) that relates to the decision must be accompanied by 2 copies of every document, or part of a document, that:
(d) is in the delegate’s possession or under the delegate’s control; and
(e) was relevant to the making of the decision; and
(f) does not contain non‑disclosable information.
(3) A notice under subsection (1) must be given in the prescribed way.
(4) A failure to comply with this section in relation to a decision does not affect the validity of the decision.
(5) Section 267 (decision‑maker must have regard to rules when giving notice of decision) of the ART Act does not apply in relation to notices given under subsection (1) of this section.
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL
The Tribunal received into evidence the following material:
(a)Exhibit A1: Applicant’s Outline of Submissions dated 8 April 2025;
(b)Exhibit A2: Applicant’s Reply Submissions dated 24 April 2025;
(c)Exhibit R1: Joint Relevant Documents Bundle comprising 198 pages;
(d)Exhibit R2: Respondent’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions dated 17 April 2025.
The parties’ submissions are summarised briefly below.
Applicant’s submissions
The Applicant lodged his application for review of the visa refusal decision on 25 February 2025. It was indicated on that form that the Applicant did not have a representative. The Application was accompanied by a letter from the Applicant dated 24 February 2025 which stated:[5]
Dear Registrar,
I am requesting a review of the cancellation of my Protection (Class XA) subclass 866 visa. The purported notice of cancellation was sent by email on the 29 October 2024. However, I believe that the notice did not comply with the requirements of the Act. This is in line with recent authority in the Federal Court’s judgments in Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 434 and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Park 2024] FCAFC 136. The Notification letter includes the following statement:
As this letter was sent by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted. You have appointed an authorised recipient and are taken to have received this letter at the end of the day it was transmitted to your authorised recipient.
It is unclear if my authorised recipient received the notification, how the authorised recipient was notified (letter or email) and when (the date of notification) the authorised recipient was notified of the cancellation. I find the notification to be unclear and confusing. In my circumstance, I did not have access to my emails at the time of notification and I was not notified of the cancellation through my authorised recipient.
[5] Exhibit R1, 197.
Copies of Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Park were provided to the Tribunal with the Applicant’s application for review.[6] They were relied upon by the Applicant as examples of authorities where it was determined that the time an application could be made was not clearly stated in notifications given under s 66(2)(ii) of the Act (which is equivalent to the wording in s 501G).[7]
[6] Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 434 (‘Sandor’); Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs v Park [2024] FCAFC 136 (‘Park’).
[7] Exhibit A1 [9]-[10].
In written submissions to the Tribunal (as prepared by Victoria Legal Aid) the Applicant states that the notification sent to the Applicant’s email address on 29 October 2024 was ineffective because it failed to clearly state the time in which the application for review could be made.[8] The Applicant reasons that accordingly the nine-day timeframe has not yet started and the Applicant’s application to the Tribunal lodged on 25 February 2025 is in time. The Applicant submits that the Tribunal would fall into error if it were to find that it did not have jurisdiction.[9]
[8] Exhibit A1 [4].
[9] Ibid [5].
The Applicant relied upon Wilson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship in which it was stated there is no ‘near miss’ that would cause the Applicant’s nine-day timeframe to begin on the day it was ‘deemed’ to be received.[10] The Applicant submits that if the content of the notice does not comply with s 501G(3) of the Act the matter is concluded and the Applicant has not been properly notified.[11]
[10] Wilson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1421 [22].
[11] Ibid [8].
The Applicant points to the following information contained in the notification under ‘review rights’:[12]
This letter was sent by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted. You have appointed an authorised recipient and are taken to have received this letter at the end of the day it was transmitted to your authorised recipient.
[12] Ibid [11], Exhibit R1, 190.
The Applicant submits that the notification error lies in the reference to ‘authorised recipient’ and the associated new timeframe in which the Applicant can apply to the Tribunal for review of the decision.[13]
[13] Exhibit A1 [12].
The Applicant maintains that he did not have an authorised recipient.[14] He was receiving limited assistance from Ms Dickenson of the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre (ASRC).[15] The nature of the Ms Dickenson’s assistance was communicated by her to the Department on 12 July 2024 and 10 October 2024.[16]
[14] Ibid [13].
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid [13], Exhibit R1, 27 and 195.
The Applicant also notes that on 10 October 2024, the Department erroneously notified the ASRC of the cancellation of the Applicant’s Child visa, to which Ms Dickenson responded and advised that she was not the authorised recipient.[17] The Applicant invited the Tribunal to infer that there must have been some confusion on the part of the Department, and that such confusion affected the notification of the decision to refuse the Applicant’s Protection visa.[18]
[17] Ibid [14], Exhibit R1, 195-6.
[18] Ibid [14].
The Applicant submits that the reference by the Department to the two possible dates (one being the date received by the Applicant, and the date received by the authorised recipient) means that notification was not sufficiently clear so as to allow the Applicant to understand when the application for review can be made.[19] The Applicant submits that this gives rise to confusion which means that the nine-day timeframe cannot be calculated.[20]
[19] Ibid [15].
[20] Ibid.
The Applicant relied on DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection in which his Honour Justice Perram held that:[21]
‘The [AAT] regime creates a strict review system but requires certain critical information to be provided to an applicant. That scheme would be undermined were the information provided under s 66(2) either less than complete or less than clear.’
[21] Ibid [18], DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64 [57].
The Applicant submits that the notification was prima face ‘less than clear’ and that the Tribunal should determine that it has jurisdiction to hear the matter and accept the Applicant’s application for review of the refusal decision.[22]
[22] Exhibit A1 [19]-[20].
The Applicant’s reply submission submits that it is simply unreasonable for a non-citizen to assume that the Department has made a mistake if it refers to an authorised recipient where there is none.[23] The Applicant submits that if the Respondent’s position were to be accepted, a non-citizen would be expected to cherry-pick information from notification letters which deal with serious matters as visa cancellation and associated appeal rights.[24] The Applicant accepts that such appeal rights cannot be extended.[25]
[23] Exhibit A3 [4].
[24] Ibid [5].
[25] Ibid [4(b)].
Respondent’s submissions
The Respondent accepts that the words in the notification letter ‘You have appointed an authorised recipient’ were incorrect.[26] The Respondent accepts that the Applicant had not appointed an authorised recipient for the purposes of receiving communications about his protection visa application.[27]
[26] Exhibit R2 [18].
[27] Ibid.
The Respondent otherwise submits that the delegate’s decision was provided in accordance with s 501G. In regard to the requirement under s 501G(1)(f)(ii) which provides that the written notice must state the time in which the application for review may be made, the Respondent submits that “the question of whether the notification stated ‘the time in which the application for review may be made’ necessarily devolves to an inquiry as to whether that information was clearly conveyed.”[28]
[28] Ibid [15] referring to DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64, [59] (Perram J, with whom Rares J and Farrell J agreed) (‘DFQ17’).
The Respondent also relied upon Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which the Full Federal Court considered whether there had been valid notification of the delegate’s decision under s 66(2)(d(ii) of the Act because of an alleged failure to state the time in which the application for review made be made.[29] The Respondent referred to the following passage from that decision:[30]
It is important not to depart from the words of the section and replace them with judicial words of explanation. The requirement in s 66(2)(d)(ii) is to “state ... the time in which the application for review may be made”. Whether or not a notification meets this requirement is a question of fact. Examining whether the notification is clear, or complete, or capable of being understood by a person exercising reasonable care in the circumstances, are unobjectionable as tools for determining whether the statutory requirement has been met, but should not be allowed to replace the statutory text – see: Baini v The Queen (2012) 246 CLR 469.
[29] Ibid [15] referring to Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 31 (‘Singh’).
[30] Singh [10].
The Respondent submits that although decisions such as DFQ17 and Singh were dealing with notifications under s 66 of the Act, the Tribunal still ought to have regard to those cases to the extent that those cases address s 66(2)(d)(ii) which mirrors the language in s 501G(1)(f)(ii).[31]
[31] Exhibit R2 [16].
It is argued that despite the inclusion of the statement referring to an ‘authorised recipient’, the notification, when read as a whole, and by reference to the correct objective facts, stated that the time in which the application for review may be made.[32]
[32] Ibid [18] referring to Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EFX17 (2021) 271 CLR 112 [42].
The Respondent relies on the fact that the notification was sent to the Applicant directly, and that the Applicant was therefore taken to have received the notification at the end of the day it was transmitted to him.[33] The Respondent submits that a person reading the letter with reasonable care would have known the letter was addressed solely to them on the specific date in question.[34] As such, it is submitted that the notification was properly made and the Tribunal therefore has no jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision.[35]
CONSIDERATION
[33] Exhibit R2 [19].
[34] Ibid [23].
[35] Ibid [24]-[25].
Did the contents of the notification comply with s 501G(1) of the Act?
The Applicant was notified of the decision through via email on 29 October 2024. He had nine days after this date to apply to the Tribunal for review of the decision (which expired on 7 November 2024).
The Tribunal is satisfied that the notification given to the Applicant on 29 October 2024 complies with the requirements of s 501G(1) of the Act.
The notice was given in writing to the Applicant via his personal email address. The notice set out the decision made, the provision under which the decision was made, and the effect of that provision.
The email to the Applicant contained the following attachments:
· Refusal Notification Letter
· Decision Record and Statement of Reasons – Copy 1
· Decision Record and Statement of Reasons – Copy 2
· Relevant Material A-X – Copy 1
· "How to apply for merits review by the Administrative Review Tribunal"
· Further information regarding the effect of s500(6A) to s500(6L) of the Migration Act.
The notification contained a detailed statement regarding ‘Review rights.’ It stated as follows:
The Department cannot consider the refusal of your visa any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART) for a merits review of this decision to refuse to grant you a Permanent Protection (Class XA) visa. An application for merits review of the decision must be given to the ART within nine (9) days after the day on which you are taken to have received this letter. The ART has no power to extend this timeframe.
As this letter was sent by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted. You have appointed an authorised recipient and are taken to have received this letter at the end of the day it was transmitted to your authorised recipient.
See the attached information sheet about ‘How to Apply for Merits Review by the Administrative Review Tribunal’, together with two copies of each of the following:
• the decision record and Statement of Reasons that sets out the reasons for the decision (other than non-disclosable information, if any); and
• each source document (“Attachment”) before the decision maker (other than documents containing non-disclosable information, if any);
Enclosed is also some further information about the effect of s500(6A) to s500(6L) of the Migration Act, which the Department is required by law to provide to you.
NOTE: If you believe that you may not have received a complete set of the above documents, contact the Department as soon as possible.
The notification then contained details regarding translating and interpreting service, detailed with regard to disclosure of personal information. The notification was signed by Department Case Officer. The notification also stated in enclosed the following:
·Two copies of the Decision Record and Statement of Reasons
·Two copies of the Table of Evidence and Material
·How to apply for merits review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal
·Further information regarding the effect of s500(6A) to s500(6L) of the Migration Act
The Respondent correctly acknowledges that the statement with regard to the authorised representative was erroneous. The Tribunal does not consider the addition of this statement to affect the validity of the notice by creating confusion as to when the Applicant’s appeal rights expired. The notification states that an application for merits review must be made within nine days after the day in which ‘you are taken to have received this letter’. The notification then states that because the letter was sent by email ‘you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.’
The notification complied with the requirements of s 501G(1) and the Tribunal makes this finding.
Was the notification given in a manner that complied with s 501G(3) of the Act?
Section 501G(3) states that the notice ‘must be given in the prescribed way.’
The Regulations provide that a notice may be given by email. That was the method selected by the delegate of the Respondent to convey the notification to the Applicant. The Respondent discharged its obligations by emailing the notification to the Applicant at his nominated email address. The notification was sent to this email address and was not (on the face of the correspondence) copied to any other party.
The Tribunal makes a finding that the Respondent complied with s 501G(3) of the Act and gave the notice to the Applicant in the prescribed way.
Can the notification in this case be distinguished from the notifications made in Sandor and Park?
Both of these decisions relate to the notification requirements of s 66(2) of the Act. This section mirrors the wording of s 501G relates to the review of decisions of other visas. It states:
(1) When the Minister grants or refuses to grant a visa, he or she is to notify the
applicant of the decision in the prescribed way.
(2) Notification of a decision to refuse an application for a visa must:
…
(d) if the applicant has a right to have the decision reviewed under Part 5
or 7 or section 500—state:
(i) that the decision can be reviewed; and
(ii) the time in which the application for review may be made; and
(iii) who can apply for the review; and
(iv) where the application for review can be made; and
…
Both parties agree that the Tribunal can have regard to the authorities that deal with this section and the Tribunal has done so.
In the case of Sandor, the relevant notification was sent via email to the appellant’s authorised recipient.[36] The appellant in that case authorised the Minister to send correspondence to an authorised recipient and the Minister did so.[37] The Court found there was no fault in the fact the notification was transmitted by email to the authorised recipient.[38]
[36] Sandor [8].
[37] Sandor [48]
[38] Ibid.
The issue that concerned the Court was whether the notification letter was incomplete and unclear because it did not explain that the appellant was taken to have received it at the end of the day to was transmitted to his authorised recipient.[39]
[39] Ibid [49].
The relevant notification contained the heading ‘Review rights’ and included the following passage:[40]
We cannot consider your visa application any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a merits review of this decision. An application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within 21 calendar days after the day on which you are taken to have received this letter.
You may only seek merits review of this decision with the AAT if you are physically present in Australia at the time this application for merits review is made.
This review period is prescribed in law and an application for merits review may not be accepted after that date.
[40] Ibid [45].
The notification also stated under the heading ‘Receiving this Letter’ that ‘As this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.’[41]
[41] Ibid.
The Court determined that the references in the notification to time running 21 days after the day in which ‘you are taken to have received this letter’ and ‘you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted’ required the appellant in that case to identify to whom the letter may have been transmitted by reference to other aspects of the letter (emphasis added).[42] The appellant was then required to put together pieces of information to enable him to calculate the time in which the application for review can be made.[43]
[42] Ibid [51].
[43] Ibid.
Ultimately the Court held that the notification did not comply with s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act:[44]
It follows that in my opinion the Notification Letter does not comply with s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act. It does not state the information required by that subsection in a way which is complete or clear nor does it, adopting the formulation in EFX17, state the time on which the application for review may be made either expressly or by reference to correct objective facts from which the period could be ascertained on the face of the letter.
[44] Ibid [52].
The Full Court of the Federal Court in Park also held that the notification given to the appellant in that case did not meet the requirements of s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act. The visa applicants in that case were a husband and wife and four children.[45] In their visa application, the primary visa applicant nominated a migration agent as an authorised recipient to receive written communications and provided an email address for that agent.[46] A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the primary visa applicant her visa, and as a consequence, the delegate also refused to grant visas to the secondary applicants. The notification was sent via email to the authorised recipient.[47] The letter itself was addressed to the primary visa applicant.[48] Under ‘Review rights’ the notification stated ‘An application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within 21 calendar days after the day on which you are taken to have received this letter.’[49] Under the hearing ‘Registries of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’, and following the listing of those registries were additional instructions in regard to lodgement of applications for review, appeared the statement ‘As this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.’[50]
[45] Park [12].
[46] Ibid [13].
[47] Ibid [14].
[48] Ibid [15].
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid [16].
The central issue in Park was whether the notification of the decision, in the context of the objective facts, stated the time in which the application for review may be made within the meaning of s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act.[51]
[51] Ibid [32].
The visa applicants contended that while all the necessary information was contained in the notification letter, the time in which the visa applicants had to apply for review was not clearly conveyed, and as such the letter failed to state information required by s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act.[52] It was submitted that because the notification was transmitted by email to the authorised representative but addressed to the primary visa applicant, the reference to ‘you’ when dealing with when the visa applicants are taken to have received the letter is incorrect, or at least, unclear and confusing. Further, because one letter dealt with all the visa applicants and refers to ‘you’ in respect to each of them, that creates additional confusion as to whom the ‘you’ refers to in that sentence.[53] The letter also did not refer to the applicable deeming provisions (for example, ‘as this letter was sent to [your authorised recipient] by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted to [your authorised recipient].’[54] The Court held that a description of the applicable deeming provisions in those terms would be ‘an unambiguously accurate and clear statement of the effect of the applicable provisions on the addressee of the letter in her particular circumstances.’[55]
[52] Ibid [35].
[53] Ibid [36].
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid [36].
Further the Court held:[56]
…there was no obvious or logical connection between the reference to the commencement of the 21-day period (the day on which the visa applicant is taken to have received the letter) under the heading ‘Review rights’ and the reference to the day on which the visa applicant was taken to have received the letter under the heading ‘Registries of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal’. The lack of clarity was compounded by the length of the letter, the remoteness of the references to the time of receipt of the letter from the references to the commencement of the 21-day period and by multiple references to the 21-day period for multiple visa applicants.
[56] Ibid [39].
In this case, the notification clearly stated the time in which the application for review may be made (s 501G(1)(f)(ii)):
An application for merits review of the decision must be given to the ART within nine (9) days after the day on which you are taken to have received this letter. The ART has no power to extend this timeframe.
As this letter was sent by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.
The appeal rights and the date they become effective are clearly reflected within the space of three sentences under the paragraph headed ‘Review rights’ which appeared on page two of the three-page notification. This notification can be clearly distinguished from the impugned notifications that occurred in Sandor and Park.
Applying the test set out in Singh, The Tribunal considers that the 29 October notification is clear, or complete, or capable of being understood by a person exercising reasonable care in the circumstances.[57]
[57] Singh [10].
The notification clearly stated on its face that an application for merits review must be given to the ART within nine days after the day on which ‘you are taken to have received this letter. The ART has no power to extend this timeframe.’ The notification then immediately states that as the letter was sent by email (which it was), ‘you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.’ It is the Tribunal’s finding that the time in which the application for review may be made was clearly and expressly stated. It is also clear from the ’correct objective facts’ on the face of the notification that the Applicant had nine days after the day on which ‘you’ (being the Applicant) are taken to have received the letter. The letter was transmitted by email to the Applicant (to his personal email address, which was replicated in the body of the notification). The notification stated that as the letter was sent by email, ‘you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted.’ In the Tribunal’s view this statement is clear and unequivocal. It might be said that the notification could have included the words ‘As this letter was sent by email to you’ but in the Tribunal’s view that was not necessary in the context of this notification. The Applicant was the sole visa applicant, the email and notification were plainly addressed personally to him, and only to him, via his personal email address. There can be no question that the ‘you’ in the notification meant the Applicant.
The Tribunal accepts that the inclusion of the erroneous statement regarding an authorised recipient is unfortunate and should not have occurred, especially given Ms Dickenson’s recent previous communication with the Department on 10 October 2024 that she was not acting on behalf of the Applicant and requested that the Department’s records be updated accordingly.[58] The Tribunal also acknowledges that the concept of an ‘authorised recipient’ holds particular significance given the deeming provisions contained in s 494D of the Act, but the erroneous reference to an ‘authorised recipient’ does not invalidate the notice. The words ‘authorised recipient’ does not appear anywhere else in the notice or the covering email other than in that sentence.
[58] Exhibit R1, 194.
In the Tribunal’s view, the 29 October notification meets the requirements of the Act.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, the Tribunal finds that the notification to the Applicant was sufficiently clear and compliant with the requirements under the Act.
The notification was addressed solely to the Applicant and contained clear and plain details about his appeal rights. The Tribunal does not accept the Applicant’s submission that the erroneous inclusion of the statement regarding the ‘authorised recipient’ invalidated the notice. The notification was compliant with the requirements of the Act and was given to the Applicant in the prescribed way.
The Tribunal has no discretion to waive the requirements of the Act. Even if the Tribunal did have discretion, the Applicant’s application is well out of time. The Applicant had until 7 November 2024 to lodge his review application, but did not do so until 25 February 2025, which is over three months later. But that is immaterial in the context of this application.
It follows that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in regard to the application.
DECISION
The Tribunal has no jurisdiction in this matter and dismisses the application.
Date of hearing: 1 May 2025 Advocate for the Applicant: Ms Jazmine Elmolla Solicitors for the Applicant: Victoria Legal Aid Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Christopher McDermott Solicitors for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
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