FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 434
Appeal from: Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 281 File number: NSD 337 of 2022 Judgment of: MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 9 May 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) dismissing application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the Tribunal determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear an application because it was made out of time – where the letter notifying of refusal of visa by Minister (Notification Letter) sent by email to appellant’s authorised recipient – where the appellant was deemed to have received the Notification Letter on the date it was sent to the authorised recipient – whether the Notification Letter “stated” the time in which the application for review may be made – appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66(2), 338(2), 347(1)(b), 494C(5), 494D(2), 501CA(3)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.10, Sch 2, cl 500.312
Cases cited: BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 271 FCR 517
CAV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 173
DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 270 FCR 492
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EFX17 (2021) 271 CLR 112
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKPO (2008) 166 FCR 84
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 31
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 56 Date of hearing: 12 April 2023 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr OR Jones Solicitor for the Appellant: Ray Turner Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Knowles SC and Ms K Hooper Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 337 of 2022 BETWEEN: TIBOR SANDOR
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 MAY 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) on 21 April 2022 be set side and in lieu thereof order that:
(a)The decision of the second respondent made on 3 May 2018 be quashed.
(b)The applicant’s review application be remitted to the second respondent for it to determine on the basis that it has jurisdiction to do so and according to law.
(c)The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding as agreed or taxed.
3.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or taxed.
4.The name of the first respondent be changed to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship…
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- Case
- [2023] FCA 434
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Notification Letter did not meet the statutory requirements as it did not clearly state the time within which the application for review could be made. The letter stated that the appellant was entitled to apply for review within 21 days from the date of receipt of the letter, but it failed to specify that the appellant was taken to have received the letter at the end of the day it was transmitted to his authorised recipient, as required by section 494D of the Act. This omission rendered the letter unclear and incomplete, thus failing to provide the appellant with the requisite information to timely lodge his application for review. Consequently, the court concluded that the Notification Letter did not comply with the statutory requirements, leading to the quashing of the AAT's decision and the remission of the review application back to the AAT for determination. The court also ordered that the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) on 21 April 2022 be set side and in lieu thereof order that:
(a) The decision of the second respondent made on 3 May 2018 be quashed.
(b) The applicant’s review application be remitted to the second respondent for it to determine on the basis that it has jurisdiction to do so and according to law.
(c) The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding as agreed or taxed.
3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or taxed.
4. The name of the first respondent be changed to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At [42] the Court concluded that the notice of contention should be upheld saying:For these reasons, an invitation to make representations “within the period … ascertained in accordance with the regulations” must crystallise the period either expressly or by reference to correct objective facts from which the period can be ascertained on the face of the invitation such as “28 days from the day that you are handed this document”. The invitation in the letter from the delegate of the Minister did not do so. …Consideration The appellant contended that the Notification Letter did not meet the requirements of s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act. He submitted that was so because the Notification Letter:(1)wrongly stated that it was sent to the appellant by email when it was sent by email to the appellant’s authorised recipient, i.e. his migration agent;(2)did not identify the date on which the appellant was taken to have received the letter by reason of the operation of s 494D of the Act; and(3)relatedly, wrongly stated that time started to run from the end of the day it was transmitted to the appellant, as opposed to when it was transmitted to his migration agent. The Notification Letter:(1)is dated 13 February 2018. On the first page it is addressed to the appellant at his address but also includes:Transmission Method Email sent to Karola@nextvisa.com.au (2)under the heading “Review rights”, on pages 1 to 2, includes:We cannot consider your visa application any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a merits review of this decision. An application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within 21 calendar days after the day on which you are taken to have received this letter. You may only seek merits review of this decision with the AAT if you are physically present in Australia at the time this application for merits review is made.This review period is prescribed in law and an application for merits review may not be accepted after that date. (3)under the heading “Receiving this Letter”, on page 3, includes:As this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted. (4)was emailed to the appellant’s authorised recipient on 13 February 2018. The appellant’s complaint about the Notification Letter focuses attention on the statement under “Receiving this Letter” set out above. He contends that: the statement is incorrect insofar as it says that the appellant was sent the letter, when the appellant’s authorised recipient was sent the letter; unclear for the same reason; and incomplete and unclear insofar as it fails to explain to the appellant that he is taken to have received the letter at the end of the day it was transmitted to his authorised recipient. The question before me is whether the Notification Letter meets the requirements of s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act. Put another way, does the Notification Letter set out in a complete and clear way the time in which the application for review can be made: see DFQ17 at [57]-[58]. The resolution of the question hinges upon a “simple factual inquiry into whether or not the [Notification Letter] states the time within which the application for review may be made”: see Singh at [23].