Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 28 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 434

Appeal from: Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 281
File number: NSD 337 of 2022
Judgment of: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 9 May 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) dismissing application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the Tribunal determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear an application because it was made out of time – where the letter notifying of refusal of visa by Minister (Notification Letter) sent by email to appellant’s authorised recipient – where the appellant was deemed to have received the Notification Letter on the date it was sent to the authorised recipient – whether the Notification Letter “stated” the time in which the application for review may be made – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66(2), 338(2), 347(1)(b), 494C(5), 494D(2), 501CA(3)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.10, Sch 2, cl 500.312

Cases cited:

BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 271 FCR 517

CAV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 173

DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 270 FCR 492

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v EFX17 (2021) 271 CLR 112

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Parata (2021) 284 FCR 62

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZKPO (2008) 166 FCR 84

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 31

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 56
Date of hearing: 12 April 2023
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr OR Jones
Solicitor for the Appellant: Ray Turner Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr P Knowles SC and Ms K Hooper
Solicitor for the Respondents: Minter Ellison Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent:  The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 337 of 2022
BETWEEN:

TIBOR SANDOR

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 MAY 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) on 21 April 2022 be set side and in lieu thereof order that:

(a)The decision of the second respondent made on 3 May 2018 be quashed.

(b)The applicant’s review application be remitted to the second respondent for it to determine on the basis that it has jurisdiction to do so and according to law.

(c)The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding as agreed or taxed.

3.The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or taxed.

4.The name of the first respondent be changed to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicult... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2023] FCA 434
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant, a visa applicant, sought judicial review of a decision by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) dismissing his application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT had determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appellant’s application for review of a decision to refuse a Student (Temporary) visa as it was made out of time. The primary issue before the court was whether the letter notifying the appellant of the refusal of his visa (the Notification Letter) met the statutory requirements under the Migration Act 1958, specifically whether it clearly stated the time within which the application for review could be made.

The court found that the Notification Letter did not meet the statutory requirements as it did not clearly state the time within which the application for review could be made. The letter stated that the appellant was entitled to apply for review within 21 days from the date of receipt of the letter, but it failed to specify that the appellant was taken to have received the letter at the end of the day it was transmitted to his authorised recipient, as required by section 494D of the Act. This omission rendered the letter unclear and incomplete, thus failing to provide the appellant with the requisite information to timely lodge his application for review. Consequently, the court concluded that the Notification Letter did not comply with the statutory requirements, leading to the quashing of the AAT's decision and the remission of the review application back to the AAT for determination. The court also ordered that the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs pay the appellant's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Div 2) on 21 April 2022 be set side and in lieu thereof order that:

(a) The decision of the second respondent made on 3 May 2018 be quashed.

(b) The applicant’s review application be remitted to the second respondent for it to determine on the basis that it has jurisdiction to do so and according to law.

(c) The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding as agreed or taxed.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or taxed.

4. The name of the first respondent be changed to Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 3 May 2018 the Tribunal determined that it did not have jurisdiction in the application for review of the delegate’s decision.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal’s decision is brief. It is convenient to set out its reasons in full:1.This is an application for review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration on 13 February 2018 to refuse to grant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). The review application was lodged with the Tribunal on 20 March 2018. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has found that it has no jurisdiction to review the decision.2.Pursuant to s.347(1)(b) of the Act and r.4.10 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations) an application for review of this decision had to be made within 21 days after the applicant was notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements.3.The material before the Tribunal indicates that the [appellant] was notified of the decision by letter dated 13 February 2018 and dispatched by email. The Tribunal is satisfied that the [appellant] was notified of the decision in accordance with the statutory requirements.4.On 10 April 2018 the [appellant] was invited to comment that the application was not a valid application as it was not lodged within the relevant time limit. On 23 April 2018 the [appellant] responded explaining that he had problems with his internet access and his advisor was overseas so that he could not ask her for advice. He requested that the Tribunal consider his application as compassionate and compelling an exercise its discretion.5.The Tribunal has considered the [appellant’s] submission but the Tribunal does not have discretion to waive the statutory requirements.6.The Tribunal finds that the [appellant] is taken to have been notified of the decision on 13 February 2018. Therefore the prescribed period to apply for review ended on 6 March 2018.7.As the application for review was not received by the Tribunal until 20 March 2018 it follows that the application for review was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in this matter. On that basis the Tribunal determined that it did not have jurisdiction in the matter.PROCEEDING BEFORE THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT By application filed on 31 May 2018 the appellant applied for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. At the time he was not legally represented. The appellant raised the following grounds of review (as written):1.Due to our relatively poor English knowledge we missed the 21 days deadline to appeal. We were wrongly in the belief that we had 35 days to lodge an appeal.2.It was quiet unfortunate we could not have adequate internet access. TPG mistake (reported).3.We did not have enough money to pay another solicitor to give us advice while our agent was absent to overseas till middle of March.4.We believe that we have provided sufficient proof to Immigration and AAT that our relationship is real, strong and lasting one. The authorities have questioned the sheer validity of our relationship whereas they should rather consider here the common future lives of two individuals. We have submitted all relevant and and requested documents. Our aim is to plan our [text cut off page] while helping each other. It is quiet a threat to know that authorities could separate us. Hereby I ask court respectfully reconsider our case and give our relationship a chance.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At [42] the Court concluded that the notice of contention should be upheld saying:For these reasons, an invitation to make representations “within the period … ascertained in accordance with the regulations” must crystallise the period either expressly or by reference to correct objective facts from which the period can be ascertained on the face of the invitation such as “28 days from the day that you are handed this document”. The invitation in the letter from the delegate of the Minister did not do so. …Consideration The appellant contended that the Notification Letter did not meet the requirements of s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act. He submitted that was so because the Notification Letter:(1)wrongly stated that it was sent to the appellant by email when it was sent by email to the appellant’s authorised recipient, i.e. his migration agent;(2)did not identify the date on which the appellant was taken to have received the letter by reason of the operation of s 494D of the Act; and(3)relatedly, wrongly stated that time started to run from the end of the day it was transmitted to the appellant, as opposed to when it was transmitted to his migration agent. The Notification Letter:(1)is dated 13 February 2018. On the first page it is addressed to the appellant at his address but also includes:Transmission Method Email sent to Karola@nextvisa.com.au (2)under the heading “Review rights”, on pages 1 to 2, includes:We cannot consider your visa application any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a merits review of this decision. An application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within 21 calendar days after the day on which you are taken to have received this letter. You may only seek merits review of this decision with the AAT if you are physically present in Australia at the time this application for merits review is made.This review period is prescribed in law and an application for merits review may not be accepted after that date. (3)under the heading “Receiving this Letter”, on page 3, includes:As this letter was sent to you by email, you are taken to have received it at the end of the day it was transmitted. (4)was emailed to the appellant’s authorised recipient on 13 February 2018. The appellant’s complaint about the Notification Letter focuses attention on the statement under “Receiving this Letter” set out above. He contends that: the statement is incorrect insofar as it says that the appellant was sent the letter, when the appellant’s authorised recipient was sent the letter; unclear for the same reason; and incomplete and unclear insofar as it fails to explain to the appellant that he is taken to have received the letter at the end of the day it was transmitted to his authorised recipient. The question before me is whether the Notification Letter meets the requirements of s 66(2)(d)(ii) of the Act. Put another way, does the Notification Letter set out in a complete and clear way the time in which the application for review can be made: see DFQ17 at [57]-[58]. The resolution of the question hinges upon a “simple factual inquiry into whether or not the [Notification Letter] states the time within which the application for review may be made”: see Singh at [23].