IXT24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Link copied
Case Copied 42 min read

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

IXT24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1283

File number: MLG 3697 of 2024
Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
Date of judgment: 26 November 2024
Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa (subclass 866) – visa refused – where first notification of a decision of a delegate of the (then) Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was invalid – where application for review to the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal not made within 28 days of the date of notification of the delegate’s decision – where first Tribunal dismissed the matter for want of jurisdiction – where second notice of the delegate’s decision given following BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189 – where second notification sent to incorrect email address – where applicant made a second application for review by the Tribunal more than 28 days after second notification where Tribunal found it had no jurisdiction to review the matter – judicial review – extension of time – applications for judicial review must be made by applicant within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal’s decision – where applicant made application for judicial review almost 3 years and 3 months after time elapsed – applicant in immigration detention – applicant given notice of involuntary removal from Australia – application for urgent injunctive relief to restrain removal of applicant from Australia – whether there is a serious question to be tried – whether balance of convenience favours the grant of relief – injunctive relief granted
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) pts 5, 7, ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 66, 66(2)(d)(iv), 412(1)(b), 477(1), 477(2), 477A(2), 494B, 494B(5), 494C, 494C(5), 500

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2, cl 866.411, regs 4.31, 4.31(2)

Cases cited:

Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57

BBU15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1324

Bernard v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 2187

BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189

BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218

Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 1) (1985) 5 FCR 464

Cheng v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1290

CPK20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 825

Daksh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 612

Frigger v Trenfield[2019] FCA 1746

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113

Merriman v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 834

Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs vBhardwaj[2002] HCA 11

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Parata [2021] FCAFC 46

Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133

Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144

Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238

Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs[2023] FCA 434

SZLIH…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read IXT24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2024] FedCFamC2G 1283
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of IXT24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a Malaysian citizen, sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) that it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse his application for a protection visa. The applicant had been in immigration detention since 26 September 2024 and faced involuntary removal from Australia on 22 November 2024. The applicant sought an extension of time to apply for judicial review, as well as an interlocutory injunction to prevent his removal from Australia.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the applicant had established a serious question to be tried regarding the jurisdictional error of the Tribunal, and whether the balance of convenience favoured the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief. The court had to determine if the applicant had a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of his application for judicial review to warrant the preservation of the status quo. This involved assessing whether the Tribunal's decision to deem the applicant notified of the delegate's decision on 30 May 2020 and to find it lacked jurisdiction due to the late filing of the application was legally sound.

The court held that there was a serious question to be tried regarding the Tribunal's jurisdictional error. Specifically, the court found it arguable that the Tribunal erred in concluding the applicant was notified of the decision on 30 May 2020, as the second notification was sent to an incorrect email address. Additionally, the court considered it arguable that the Tribunal's decision was affected by legal unreasonableness. Given these considerations, the court concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of an interlocutory injunction to prevent the applicant's removal from Australia. The court granted the interlocutory injunction and ordered the respondent to refrain from removing the applicant from Australia until further order.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 24 October 2024, the applicant applied for an extension of time pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) to seek judicial review of a decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 21 June 2021. The Tribunal determined it did not have jurisdiction to review a decision of a delegate of the (then) Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refusing to grant the applicant a protection visa. The applicant has been in detention since 26 September 2024 and was scheduled for involuntary removal from Australia on 22 November 2024. By application lodged on 14 November 2024, the applicant applies for an interlocutory order seeking, in substance, to enjoin the first respondent, his department and officers for taking any step to remove the applicant from Australia involuntarily. During the hearing of the interlocutory application, the first respondent gave an undertaking to the Court not to remove the applicant before 4:00 pm on Tuesday 26 November 2024.BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia who applied for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa on 12 January 2017: Court Book (CB)1-CB36, having arrived in Australia on 23 September 2014: CB20 on a (UD-601) Electronic Travel Authority visa, which ceased on 23 December 2014: Supplementary Court Cook (SCB)1. In his protection visa application, the applicant claimed he came to Australia because he gambled away 10,000K ringgit and borrowed 15,000K ringgit from an unlicensed company. He claimed that when he could not make repayments on time, the company hired three gangsters to bother him at home and kept making death threats if the debt could not be resolved: CB31. The applicant claimed that no-one wanted to help him; he believes the Malaysian authorities are corrupted and so did not seek their assistance; and if he returned to Malaysia the gangsters would try to find him and kill him: CB31, CB33. On 19 May 2017, the delegate refused the visa application: CB48, concluding the applicant was not a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations as outlined in ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act: CB48-CB64. A written notification of the refusal of the protection visa application dated 19 May 2017 (first notice) was sent to the applicant by email transmission: CB48, which was the email address the applicant provided in the protection visa application: CB16 (first email address). On 19 June 2017, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision: CB65-CB66. On 23 June 2017, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising him that it appeared his application was not valid as it was not lodged within the relevant time limit, that is, 28 days commencing and including on the day the applicant is notified of the decision (19 May 2017): CB68. As the application was received by the Tribunal on 19 June 2017, the Tribunal invited the applicant to make any comments by 7 July 2017 about whether a valid application had been made: CB68.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The earlier mentioned fact sheet relevantly provided the applicant with the following information:Review of decisionsApplicants can apply to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (the Court) for judicial review of our decisions. The Court will consider whether we made a jurisdictional error. If you wish to apply for review, you must do so within 35 days of the date of our decision. If you require an extension of time, you must ask for it in the application and explain why. The Court will decide whether or not to grant an extension of time. CB113. The applicant made a third application to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision on 29 February 2024: CB115-CB122, in which he gave the first email address as a contact address: CB118. On 7 March 2024, the Tribunal notified the applicant that it appeared his application was not valid as it was not lodged within the prescribed time and invited the applicant to make any comments about the validity of his application by 21 March 2024: CB124-CB125. By the Tribunal’s third decision made on 28 March 2024, and dispatched to the applicant via his first email address on 2 April 2024, the Tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction in the matter because: the applicant had been notified of the delegate’s decision on 30 May 2020; the review application was not received by the Tribunal until 29 February 2024; the application was not received within the prescribed period, and so was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation: CB129-CB131. The applicant was located; detained by the Australian Border Force under s 189 of the Act on 26 September 2024 and transferred to Immigration Detention: Exhibit R3, Affidavit of Tess Price, annexure TP-2, – “Removal Details”. On 14 October 2024, Australian Border Force issued the applicant with a “Notice of Intention to Remove from Australia” (NOIRA), informing the applicant that he was liable for removal from Australia under s 198 of the Act, and that it was anticipated he would be removed on 25 October 2024. It appears the NOIRA was issued by phone using a Malay interpreter and that the applicant refused to sign an acknowledgement of receipt of the NOIRA: Exhibit R3, Affidavit of Tess Price, annexure TP-1. As earlier noted, by application made on 24 October 2024, the applicant applied for an extension of time pursuant to s 477(2) of the Act to seek judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal made on 21 June 2021, which is the second Tribunal decision mentioned in the foregoing chronology. The applicant was issued with a Malaysian travel document on 30 October 2024 which expires on 30 November 2024: Exhibit R3, Affidavit of Tess Price, annexure TP-2. He was assessed on 7 November 2024 as being fit to travel. The assessment expires on 5 December 2024: Exhibit R3, Affidavit of Tess Price, annexure TP-4. On 8 November 2024, an officer of the Department provided the applicant with a letter dated 7 November 2024 from the first respondent’s solicitors advising the applicant he was scheduled for involuntary removal from Australia on or after 22 November 2024. The letter provided information about filing an application seeking an injunction: Exhibit R3, Affidavit of Tess Price, annexure TP-3. As previously mentioned, the applicant subsequently filed an application to this Court on 15 November 2024, seeking interlocutory injunctive relief. CONSIDERATION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant was issued with a Malaysian travel document on 30 October 2024 which expires on 30 November 2024: Exhibit R3, Affidavit of Tess Price, annexure TP-2. He was assessed on 7 November 2024 as being fit to travel. The assessment expires on 5 December 2024: Exhibit R3, Affidavit of Tess Price, annexure TP-4. On 8 November 2024, an officer of the Department provided the applicant with a letter dated 7 November 2024 from the first respondent’s solicitors advising the applicant he was scheduled for involuntary removal from Australia on or after 22 November 2024. The letter provided information about filing an application seeking an injunction: Exhibit R3, Affidavit of Tess Price, annexure TP-3. As previously mentioned, the applicant subsequently filed an application to this Court on 15 November 2024, seeking interlocutory injunctive relief. CONSIDERATION The principles guiding the exercise of the Court’s discretion whether to grant interlocutory injunctive relief are well established and need only be briefly stated. The applicant must show that there is a serious question to be tried (or a prima facie case), that he is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate remedy and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, 81-84; Frigger v Trenfield[2019] FCA 1746 at [6]; Merriman v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 834 at [15]. When considering the grant of an interlocutory injunction, the question of whether there is a serious question (or a prima facie case) should not be considered in isolation from the balance of convenience: Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238, 261, [67]. And it is not necessary for the applicant to show that he will succeed on his application, either for extension of time or judicial review. That which needs to be shown is that there is a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending a hearing of the application. An apparently strong claim may lead a Court more readily to grant an injunction when the balance of convenience is fairly even. A more doubtful claim (which nevertheless raises "a serious question to be tried") may still attract interlocutory relief if there is a marked balance of convenience in favour of it: Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 1) (1985) 5 FCR 464, 472. The first respondent contends that the applicant’s application to the Court for an extension of time has little merit, and if I were only considering the strength of that application by reference to that which the applicant, who is unrepresented and requires the assistance of a Malay interpreter, advances, I would agree. But there are two further bases on which it may be said the Tribunal’s decision is attended by jurisdictional error. The first is in respect of the second notice being transmitted to the second email address. I consider there is an arguable case the Tribunal erred in concluding the applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision on 30 May 2020 by reason of s 494C(5) of the Act. The second is that it is arguable the Tribunal’s decision was affected by legal unreasonableness. And so, for reasons I will explain, I consider that there is a serious question to be tried whether the 35-day period within which the applicant can apply to the Court for judicial review should be extended. I also consider there is a serious question to be tried whether the Tribunal’s decision is attended by jurisdictional error on the two bases just described. The balance of convenience, taking into account the strength of the prima facie case identified, also favours the grant of an interlocutory injunction.