FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
IXT24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1283
File number: MLG 3697 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK Date of judgment: 26 November 2024 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection visa (subclass 866) – visa refused – where first notification of a decision of a delegate of the (then) Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was invalid – where application for review to the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal not made within 28 days of the date of notification of the delegate’s decision – where first Tribunal dismissed the matter for want of jurisdiction – where second notice of the delegate’s decision given following BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189 – where second notification sent to incorrect email address – where applicant made a second application for review by the Tribunal more than 28 days after second notification where Tribunal found it had no jurisdiction to review the matter – judicial review – extension of time – applications for judicial review must be made by applicant within 35 days of the date of the Tribunal’s decision – where applicant made application for judicial review almost 3 years and 3 months after time elapsed – applicant in immigration detention – applicant given notice of involuntary removal from Australia – application for urgent injunctive relief to restrain removal of applicant from Australia – whether there is a serious question to be tried – whether balance of convenience favours the grant of relief – injunctive relief granted Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) pts 5, 7, ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 66, 66(2)(d)(iv), 412(1)(b), 477(1), 477(2), 477A(2), 494B, 494B(5), 494C, 494C(5), 500
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2, cl 866.411, regs 4.31, 4.31(2)
Cases cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57
BBU15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1324
BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189
BQQ15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 218
Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 1) (1985) 5 FCR 464
Cheng v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 1290
CPK20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCA 825
Daksh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 612
Frigger v Trenfield[2019] FCA 1746
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113
Merriman v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 834
Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 [2020] HCA 46
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs vBhardwaj[2002] HCA 11
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133
Porter v Ghasemi [2021] FCAFC 144
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238
Sandor v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs[2023] FCA 434
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1283
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the applicant had established a serious question to be tried regarding the jurisdictional error of the Tribunal, and whether the balance of convenience favoured the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief. The court had to determine if the applicant had a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of his application for judicial review to warrant the preservation of the status quo. This involved assessing whether the Tribunal's decision to deem the applicant notified of the delegate's decision on 30 May 2020 and to find it lacked jurisdiction due to the late filing of the application was legally sound.
The court held that there was a serious question to be tried regarding the Tribunal's jurisdictional error. Specifically, the court found it arguable that the Tribunal erred in concluding the applicant was notified of the decision on 30 May 2020, as the second notification was sent to an incorrect email address. Additionally, the court considered it arguable that the Tribunal's decision was affected by legal unreasonableness. Given these considerations, the court concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of an interlocutory injunction to prevent the applicant's removal from Australia. The court granted the interlocutory injunction and ordered the respondent to refrain from removing the applicant from Australia until further order.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant was issued with a Malaysian travel document on 30 October 2024 which expires on 30 November 2024: Exhibit R3, Affidavit of Tess Price, annexure TP-2. He was assessed on 7 November 2024 as being fit to travel. The assessment expires on 5 December 2024: Exhibit R3, Affidavit of Tess Price, annexure TP-4. On 8 November 2024, an officer of the Department provided the applicant with a letter dated 7 November 2024 from the first respondent’s solicitors advising the applicant he was scheduled for involuntary removal from Australia on or after 22 November 2024. The letter provided information about filing an application seeking an injunction: Exhibit R3, Affidavit of Tess Price, annexure TP-3. As previously mentioned, the applicant subsequently filed an application to this Court on 15 November 2024, seeking interlocutory injunctive relief. CONSIDERATION The principles guiding the exercise of the Court’s discretion whether to grant interlocutory injunctive relief are well established and need only be briefly stated. The applicant must show that there is a serious question to be tried (or a prima facie case), that he is likely to suffer injury for which damages will not be an adequate remedy and that the balance of convenience favours the grant of an injunction: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57, 81-84; Frigger v Trenfield[2019] FCA 1746 at [6]; Merriman v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 834 at [15]. When considering the grant of an interlocutory injunction, the question of whether there is a serious question (or a prima facie case) should not be considered in isolation from the balance of convenience: Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238, 261, [67]. And it is not necessary for the applicant to show that he will succeed on his application, either for extension of time or judicial review. That which needs to be shown is that there is a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending a hearing of the application. An apparently strong claim may lead a Court more readily to grant an injunction when the balance of convenience is fairly even. A more doubtful claim (which nevertheless raises "a serious question to be tried") may still attract interlocutory relief if there is a marked balance of convenience in favour of it: Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 1) (1985) 5 FCR 464, 472. The first respondent contends that the applicant’s application to the Court for an extension of time has little merit, and if I were only considering the strength of that application by reference to that which the applicant, who is unrepresented and requires the assistance of a Malay interpreter, advances, I would agree. But there are two further bases on which it may be said the Tribunal’s decision is attended by jurisdictional error. The first is in respect of the second notice being transmitted to the second email address. I consider there is an arguable case the Tribunal erred in concluding the applicant is taken to have been notified of the decision on 30 May 2020 by reason of s 494C(5) of the Act. The second is that it is arguable the Tribunal’s decision was affected by legal unreasonableness. And so, for reasons I will explain, I consider that there is a serious question to be tried whether the 35-day period within which the applicant can apply to the Court for judicial review should be extended. I also consider there is a serious question to be tried whether the Tribunal’s decision is attended by jurisdictional error on the two bases just described. The balance of convenience, taking into account the strength of the prima facie case identified, also favours the grant of an interlocutory injunction.