KPA25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1544
•17 September 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
KPA25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1544
File number(s): MLG 3334 of 2025 Judgment of: JUDGE CORBETT Date of judgment: 17 September 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION - Safe Haven Enterprise Subclass 760 protection visa – Application for urgent injunctive relief to restrain Minister from removing unlawful non-citizen - Whether serious question to be tried or a prima facie case – Whether balance of convenience favours grant of interlocutory application - Application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 198, 477(1), 477(2), 477A(2), 473DC, Pt 7AA
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: CRW20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 18
Hunter Valley Development Proprietary Limited v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
IXT24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1283
Minister for Home Affairs v DUA16 & Anor [2020] HCA 46
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs & Others v MZAPC [2025] HCA 5
Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs and Others v MZAPC [2024] FCAFC 34
P1/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2003] FCA 1029
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133
Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 43 Date of last submission/s: 17 September 2025 Date of hearing: 17 September 2025 Place: Melbourne Solicitor for the Applicant: Asylum Seeker Resource Centre Counsel for the Applicant: Ms G Costello KC Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Ms K Chan ORDERS
MLG 3334 of 2025 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: KPA25
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE CORBETT
DATE OF ORDER:
17 SEPTEMBER 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the second respondent is amended to ‘Administrative Review Tribunal’;
2.The applicant's application for urgent injunctive relief, filed 12 September 2025, is dismissed; and
3.The applicant pay the first respondent's costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application for an injunction, fixed in the sum of $4,553.02.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from transcript)JUDGE CORBETT
These are the reasons for judgment delivered ex tempore on 17 September 2025, revised from transcript only to include extracts of cited documents and to make corrections of typographical errors or minor matters to reflect the intention of the Court.
In that matter, I propose to deliver ex tempore reasons for judgment. I reserve the right to revise and correct these reasons with the benefit of transcript. The time is now 4.41 pm.
On 12 September 2025, the applicant filed an originating application with this court seeking an extension of time within which to commence an application for judicial review of the decision of the then Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) made on 24 August 2021 (Decision). In the Decision, the Authority affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister, not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The originating application for judicial review was accompanied by an unsworn or unaffirmed affidavit purporting to be made by the applicant dated 12 September 2025.
In that affidavit, the applicant annexed a copy of the Decision and two screenshots of alleged correspondence with the Authority. The applicant is now in immigration detention at the Villawood Detention Centre in New South Wales. He has been in detention since February 2025. He was given a notice of intention to remove him from Australia, foreshadowing his removal from Australia today. After the filing of the originating application and service of it, the first respondent, the Minister, agreed to postpone the removal of the applicant until this Friday, 19 September 2025. The applicant seeks an urgent interlocutory injunction from this Court to restrain the Minister and his officers, servants and agents from removing the applicant from Australia until the hearing of his application for an extension of time and judicial review of the Decision.
The application for the injunction is opposed by the Minister, as is the application for an extension of time to commence an application for judicial review. The application for urgent injunctive relief was first listed before me at 10:00am on Tuesday, 16 September 2025. Shortly before the hearing, the solicitors for the Minister filed and served an affidavit of Ms Tess Price, a solicitor, affirmed 16 September 2025 in opposition to the application for injunctive relief. The affidavit and annexures thereto were 142 pages in length. The solicitor for the Minister also filed an outline of written submissions in opposition to the relief sought. Senior counsel for the applicant, Ms Costello KC, and the Court did not have the opportunity to read and consider this material or respond to it.
The Court also raised concern about the adequacy of the evidence in support of the applicant's claim for interlocutory relief. Because the immediate urgency of the application had abated due to the Minister agreeing not to remove the applicant from Australia until Friday, 19 September 2025, the hearing of the application for injunctive relief was adjourned to 2:15 pm on Wednesday, 17 September 2025. The hearing of the application for injunctive relief resumed this afternoon. In the interim, two affidavits were filed with the Court on behalf of the applicant, the first by Ms Caitlin Caldwell, a solicitor, which was affirmed 16 September 2025, and the second also by Ms Caldwell, which was affirmed today.
In those affidavits, Ms Caldwell gave evidence on the basis of information and belief arising from conversations that she had had with the applicant whilst he was in immigration detention. On behalf of the Minister, reliance was placed on the affidavit of Ms Price affirmed on 16 September 2025, to which I have referred, and a further affidavit of Ms Price affirmed 16 September 2025, annexing a copy of the file kept by the Authority in relation to the review of the delegate's decision. A third affidavit affirmed today, 17 September 2025, was also relied upon in which Ms Price annexed an email from the Authority to the applicant dated 10 October 2022.
The three affidavits filed on behalf of the applicant and the three affidavits filed on behalf of the Minister are the evidence upon which this application for injunctive relief are to be determined. The principles upon which a court may grant interlocutory injunctive relief to restrain the Minister from removing an unlawful non-citizen from Australia are well settled. In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs & Others v MZAPC [2025] HCA 5 at [23] and [36], the High Court, constituted by Gageler CJ, Gordon, Gleeson and Jagot JJ, said:
No court has an unlimited power to grant an interlocutory injunction and an order must be framed so as to come within the limits set by the purpose which the order can properly be intended to serve. Further, the primary purpose of an interlocutory injunction remains "to keep matters in status quo until the rights of the parties can be determined at the hearing of the suit". The condition precedent remains that "a plaintiff seeking an interlocutory injunction must be able to show sufficient colour of right to the final relief in aid of which interlocutory relief is sought", the usual description of the sufficiency of that colour of right being the establishment of a serious question to be tried or a prima facie case.
At [36], the court referred to the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) which recognise that this court, the Federal Court and the High Court of Australia, are courts all having jurisdiction as conferred by the Migration Act to give injunctive relief if it is necessary to effectuate the original jurisdiction of each court. The court said:
The provisions of the Migration Act recognise this Court, the Federal Court, and the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) as courts having jurisdiction as conferred by that Act and otherwise by s 75(v) of the Constitution and s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).[65] The High Court or a Justice "may at any time make such order as is necessary to effectuate the grant of original or appellate jurisdiction in the Court"[66] and the Federal Court has power to make orders, including interlocutory orders, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, as the Court thinks appropriate.[67] By s 140 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to "make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, as the Court considers appropriate". Therefore, these Courts each have power to grant an interlocutory injunction to make orders to protect the integrity of their own processes by ensuring their capacity to effectively exercise their jurisdiction in a proceeding pending before them, including orders to preserve the subject-matter of the proceeding and to prevent the determination of that proceeding being frustrated. Section 198(6) of the Migration Act, accordingly, is to be construed in this common law and statutory context. The appellants and Attorney-General's construction of s 198(6) treats the provision as if it operates in a legal vacuum divorced from the reality of the jurisdiction and power of these Courts.
Therefore, the applicant must establish to the satisfaction of this Court that there is a serious question to be tried or a prima facie case, or, as the High Court now says, ‘a colour of right’, and that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an interlocutory injunction. On the basis of the evidence in the affidavits upon which the parties rely, I can ascertain the following background facts.
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He arrived in Australia on 26 October 2012 as an unlawful maritime arrival. On 23 June 2017, the applicant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise Subclass 760 protection visa, claiming that if he was forced to return to Sri Lanka, he would be seriously harmed because of his Tamil ethnicity and imputed political support of the LTTE movement, of which his first cousin was a member and active lieutenant. At the time of making the application for a visa, the applicant provided a postal address, but not an email address for correspondence. On 28 November 2018, the applicant notified the Ministerial Department of a change of postal address. On 8 July 2021, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a visa. On 13 July 2021, the applicant was referred to the Authority for fast-track review under part 7AA of the Act.
On 11 August 2021, the applicant wrote to the Authority seeking further time to submit further information to the Authority. The applicant did not identify the further information he wished to submit or any other reason why an indulgence of further time was required. The Authority gave the applicant until 20 August 2021 to provide further information. There was then email correspondence between the applicant and the Department on 18 and 19 August 2021, in which the applicant sought a copy of the delegate's decision. On 21 August 2021, the applicant sought a further extension of time from the Authority in which to provide further information, which was refused by the Authority.
The Decision was then made on 24 August 2021 and sent to the applicant's address, which was then via email, at an email address which I will not repeat because of the pseudonym given for the purposes of this proceeding. However, it was the email address which was consistently used by the applicant shortly prior to the Decision of the Authority and on several occasions thereafter. There is then a largely unexplained delay and inactivity by the applicant until late 2024 and more relevantly, February 2025. There is some evidence in the documents produced by Ms Price on behalf of the Minister of correspondence between the applicant and the Authority in April 2022, October 2022 and July 2024.
In that correspondence, the applicant expresses confusion and seeks further information regarding the status of the review by the Authority and his status as a visa holder. The applicant says in his affidavit in support of the originating application that he was unrepresented at the Authority and he asked for more time to obtain a lawyer to help him with the case, and he told the Authority that he was struggling to find legal representation due to COVID. He also says that:
It was still during the COVID lockdowns that the IAA made their decision to refuse my visa.
And that he thought that:
I would either receive a phone call or a letter, but I never received either.
The applicant says that, on 11 August 2021, he called the Department to ask about his Decision, but they could not give him any information. He also emailed in October 2022 and June 2024. He produces screenshots of that correspondence. He says that once the COVID-19 lockdown was over, he went to a lawyer to seek legal advice and was advised to seek Ministerial intervention, which he did. It was not until he went into immigration detention in February 2025 that he sought the assistance of the Refugee Advice & Casework Service in Sydney and then later the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre in Melbourne.
In the affidavit of Ms Caldwell made 16 September 2025, there is an explanation given on information and belief of the steps taken by the applicant to secure legal representation during the period from February 2025 until notification of removal on 6 September 2025. Ms Caldwell also says that she is informed by the applicant, and believes, that he thought he had a bridging visa after the Decision, but it was not until some time thereafter when he was intercepted by police for a driving offence that he realised that he did not have a visa. In the further affidavit of Ms Caldwell, affirmed today, there is evidence on information and belief that the applicant struggled to comprehend the outcome of his review to the Authority and similarly his visa status.
Ms Caldwell also obtained instructions that the applicant had been involved in an altercation in December 2019 where he had sustained a head injury for which an extract from a medical report was produced. And as a result of this head injury, Ms Caldwell believes that there may be some residual mental health issue or other disability suffered by the applicant which may have impeded his ability to obtain assistance and pursue his rights in relation to a review of the Decision.
In the first affidavit of Ms Price affirmed 16 September 2025, there is reference to annexure TP9, which is reasons for decision of the Administrative Review Tribunal in which the applicant sought review of his refusal to grant a bridging visa.
In that application, the applicant was assisted by a community legal service to pursue that application and there is no evidence to suggest in those reasons that the applicant suffered any disability or was unable to pursue his legal rights due to any mental health issue or lack of capacity.
AUTHORITY DECISION
The Decision of the Authority is summarised in the outline of the submissions filed on behalf of the Minister. The refusal of the application for a further indulgence sought by the applicant is recorded in the reasons for decision, as is the information upon which the Decision is based. The reasoning in the Decision is comprehensive, and it appears that the Authority considered all of the claims raised by the applicant and no other claims or information has been identified as absent from that reasoning.
The relevant legal criteria and tests to be applied were identified and considered by the Authority. The Authority found on the information supplied to the delegate, and which it considered, that the applicant's fears of persecution were not well-founded and that on the basis of DFAT information, there was no real chance of persecution or a real risk of serious harm should the applicant be returned to Sri Lanka. Save for the refusal to grant the applicant further time, there is no obvious material jurisdictional error identified by the applicant arising from the reasons or findings of the Authority in the Decision. I turn now to the submissions made on behalf of both parties.
APPLICANT’S SUBMISSIONS
Counsel for the applicant submits that there is a serious question to be tried or a prima facie case that the Decision was legally unreasonable because the Authority unreasonably refused the applicant's request for further time within which to place further evidence or information before it, or to make further submissions to the Authority before affirming the decision of the delegate of the Minister. In the originating application, the grounds of review identified by the applicant were also cast on the basis that the Authority denied the applicant procedural fairness by refusing to grant the applicant more time to obtain legal representation and to properly present his case to the Authority.
Ms Costello submitted that the request for a further extension, or an extension of time to provide further information to the Authority must also be viewed in the context of the COVID restrictions, the applicant's need for an interpreter, the fact that the applicant was not legally represented, and the fact that the applicant was confused regarding his rights and ability to review the delegate's decision. I was referred to the decision of Judge Gostencnik in IXT24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 1283 (IXT24) and also to the decision of Judge Riley in CRW20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 18 as examples of cases in which a serious question had been found to exist sufficient to warrant the granting of an injunction in relation to an application for an extension of time.
In Judge Riley's decision, the Authority acted unreasonably in refusing to grant the applicant further time to provide additional information and make submissions to the Authority. In that case, the conduct of the Authority was found to have been unreasonable. But as her Honour observed at [24] in that decision, ‘each case must be decided on its own facts’. And as her Honour also observed at [29], ‘no two cases are the same’. In IXT24, Judge Gostencnik found that there were a number of serious questions to be tried in relation to the extension of time, and that there was some merit in some of the substantive arguments raised as the merits or grounds of a review in that particular case.
Ms Costello KC also submitted that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction to preserve the status quo pending the hearing of an application for an extension of time and the merits of the grounds of review. It was correctly conceded by the Minister that if the applicant is removed from Australia, the applicant's application for protection ends and is rendered futile. Injunctive relief also preserves the integrity of the jurisdiction of this court to review decisions of the Authority for jurisdictional error. Further, it was submitted that there would be no genuine prejudice to the Minister to delay the removal for a short period of time to allow for the hearing of the application to progress and for the customary preparation of a court book, submissions and the opportunity to provide further evidence, all of which Ms Costello submitted could be achieved within a few weeks’ time rather than an extended period.
MINISTER’S SUBMISSIONS
Ms Chan of counsel, who appeared on behalf of the Minister today, submitted that there is no serious question to be tried because the prospects of obtaining an order for extension of time are poor because the applicant's delay is extreme and the merits of his claim for review are poor. The Minister points to part 7AA of the Act which contains an exhaustive statement of the requirements of procedural fairness, and in particular section 473DC of the Act which gives the Authority a limited discretion to consider additional information. There was no obligation to provide the applicant with a further indulgence, and it was not unreasonable to refuse the applicant's request for a further indulgence in the circumstances of this case, particularly where the applicant has not identified any particular information on which he would seek to rely.
It was also submitted on behalf of the Minister that the balance of convenience did not favour the grant of an injunction. The Minister relied on the positive duty to remove an unlawful non-citizen contained in section 198 of the Act and referred to the decision of Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs and Others v MZAPC [2024] FCAFC 34 in the Full Federal Court at [127] to [128] per Derrington, Colvin and Jackson JJ, where reference was made to the need for a strong case before the court could restrain an officer of the Commonwealth from performing a statutory duty. I was also referred to the decision of P1/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2003] FCA 1029 (P1/2003), a decision of French J (as he then was) , and in particular [51] of that decision. On the balance of convenience, the Minister also referred to and relied on the costs of airline tickets required to escort the applicant to Sri Lanka and the costs of the Commonwealth of continuing detention. The Minister also relied on the inconvenience that would be incurred as a result of having to renegotiate or reobtain confirmation from the Sri Lankan Government of the applicant's authority to travel to Sri Lanka, which permission or authority was due to expire on 24 September 2024.
REPLY
In reply to the Minister's submissions, Ms Costello referred to the evidence of Ms Caldwell and also the evidence of Ms Price in her second affidavit in relation to the application for review of the bridging visa application as showing that there was evidence that the applicant first knew that he required an additional bridging visa in February or March of this year. Ms Costello also noted that it was necessary for the applicant to obtain legal advice to make him aware of the ability to review the Decision of the Authority on the grounds of unreasonableness. This is a technical argument which would not be apparent to a lay person. Ms Costello also discounted the efficacy of the need to obtain diplomatic approval for travel and the weight that should be given to that in determining the balance of convenience.
In the submissions of Ms Chan on behalf of the Minister, reference was also made to the decision of the High Court in Minister forHome Affairs v DUA16 & Anor [2020] HCA 46 as being an example of circumstances in which a decision of the Authority may or may not be unreasonable where there is a refusal of the opportunity to provide further information. Ms Costello, who appeared as counsel in that proceeding, sought to distinguish that case and the findings in it, and noted that the decision of the High Court differed from the decision, at first instance, by Judge Riethmuller in relation to questions of fraud and unreasonableness. Ms Costello reiterated that there was a serious question to be tried and forensic arguments about the evidence and knowledge of the applicant as to his rights was a matter which should be considered at the time of the consideration of the extension of time.
Ms Costello reiterated that English is a second language for the applicant and that there was evidence that he was confused as to the state of affairs regarding his visa at all relevant times. There was also evidence of a lack of financial resources and that a more diligent litigant might have taken steps; however, in this circumstance, the applicant ought to be given the benefit of the doubt and in the absence of real prejudice to the Minister and inconvenience to the Minister, an injunction to preserve the status quo was the preferred course of action.
CONSIDERATION
In the circumstances of this case, and after hearing the submissions made on behalf of the Minister and the applicant, I am not persuaded that there is a serious question to be tried. The circumstances in which an extension of time will be granted have been repeated on a number of occasions and were referred to in detail in the decision of Judge Gostencnik in IXT24.
An application to the Court for review of a decision of the Authority must be made within 35 days of the date of the Authority's decision. That is set out in section 477(1) of the Act. In this case, the Authority made its Decision on 24 August 2021, and the time within which to make an application for review has expired almost four years ago. In Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28 (Tu'uta Katoa), the High Court explained the exercise of the Court's discretion under section 477(2) of the Act by reference to the corresponding provisions, in relation to the Federal Court of Australia, in section 477A(2).
The non-exclusive principles upon which an extension of time is to be granted are also set out in Hunter Valley Development Proprietary Limited v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348 to 349 and which were approved in Tu'uta Katoa and also Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6]. The principles are that an application for an extension of time is not to be granted unless it is proper to do so. The legislative time limits are not to be ignored. The applicant must show an acceptable explanation for the delay. It must be fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time. Action taken by the applicant other than by way of making an application for review is relevant to the consideration of the questions whether an acceptable explanation for delay has been furnished, and any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceeding that is caused by the delay is a material factor mitigating against the grant of an extension.
However, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension, and the merits of a substantial application are to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted. The merits need not to be considered in detail but may be considered on a reasonably impressionistic basis.
It is with that test in mind that I consider that the prospects of an extension of time and the prospects of success in relation to that application are poor.
I am satisfied that the applicant may have been confused by the circumstances giving rise to the Decision, may well have been confused about the Decision itself and the consequences of the Decision, and that he did make attempts to contact the Authority shortly after the making of the Decision, and on a number of occasions thereafter as to his status. However, there is no adequate explanation for his conduct between the period from the making of the Decision in 2021 to him going into immigration detention in February 2025 and nor do I find that the explanation given by him in his affidavit, sworn 12 September 2025, are convincing or persuasive.
Despite the attempts by Ms Caldwell to supplement that evidence by way of information and belief, I am also not satisfied that the explanations given by the applicant for his subsequent conduct during the period February 2025 until 12 September 2025 are convincing or persuasive, or a reason why an extension of time is likely to be granted. In the circumstances of this case, the delay is extreme and has not been adequately explained by persuasive evidence to support the exercise of the Court's discretion to grant a further indulgence.
Further, in relation to the apparent merits of the application for judicial review, I am also not satisfied that there are sufficient prospects or that it is likely to succeed on the grounds of unreasonableness. As Judge Riley observed in the decision to which I was referred by senior counsel for the applicant, each case depends on its own facts and the facts in that case were similar to the facts in this case, but there were substantially different reasons as to why the Authority was found to have acted unreasonably in the circumstances. In this case, an indulgence was sought by the applicant and originally granted by the Authority, and then a further indulgence was sought but without sufficient or any explanation as to any period of time required by the applicant or when the applicant would be in a position to respond meaningfully to the Authority.
The Authority had an obligation to decide a review on a fast-tracked basis and the rules in relation to the application of natural justice and procedural fairness are limited under the Act in respect of fast-tracked reviews undertaken by the Authority. In the circumstances of this case, I do not regard that there is a strong prospect that the applicant would succeed in establishing that the Decision of the Authority was unreasonable. That goes against the likelihood or prospect of success of an application for an extension of time; however, my primary reason for finding that there is no serious question to be tried is that the time or the period of delay by the applicant, which in my view has not been satisfactorily explained, is verging on extreme in the circumstances of this case and it is my view that there is no serious question to be tried in relation to an application for extension of time.
In relation to the balance of convenience, although it is probably unnecessary for me to consider it, having found that there is no serious question to be tried, it is in my view that in the circumstances of this case, the balance of convenience lies with the Minister given the late timing of this applicant or the belated nature of this application and the steps that were being taken by the Minister to procure the removal of the applicant from immigration detention and return him to Sri Lanka. I am also conscious of the provisions of section 198 of the Act, which casts a positive duty on officers of the Commonwealth to remove unlawful non-citizens within a reasonable time and without delay. In that regard, I also refer to the decision to which I was referred in submissions by the Minister of French J in P1/2003.
I do accept that the consequences of not granting an injunction and the balance of convenience of not granting an injunction will have an impact on the applicant and will, in effect, mean that his application for protection will be futile. However, given my views as to the serious question to be tried and the merits of the ultimate application for judicial review, the position of the Minister exceeds on the balance of convenience the position of the applicant and the consequences of his removal from Australia. In the circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that an interlocutory injunction should be granted and I will make the following orders.
ORDERS
The name of the second respondent is amended to ‘Administrative Review Tribunal’; and
The applicant's application for urgent injunctive relief, filed 12 September 2025, is dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Corbett. Associate:
Dated: 17 September 2025
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