Wilson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wilson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1421

Citation: Wilson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1421
Parties: THOMAS HUDSON WILSON v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
File number: VID 585 of 2011
Judge: EDMONDS J
Date of judgment: 14 December 2012
Catchwords: IMMIGRATION – decision to cancel visa made pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review the decision on the ground that the application for review was filed by the applicant’s authorised recipient out of the nine day period referred to in s 500(6B) – whether, as required by s 501G(1)(f)(ii), information was given in the notice in relation to the time in which an application for review could be made to the Tribunal – where inadequate or inaccurate information given: whether written notice duly given for the purposes of s 501G – whether the nine day period, referred to in s 500(6B), has commenced
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66, 476A(1)(b), 494B, 494G, 494D, 500, 501G
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) r 2.55
Cases cited: Chan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 134 FCR 308 applied
Pomare v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 167 FCR 494 applied
Zhan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 128 FCR 469 applied
Date of hearing: 5 November 2012
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 35
Solicitor for the Applicant: KTG Lawyers
Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 585 of 2011

BETWEEN:

THOMAS HUDSON WILSON
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 DECEMBER 2012

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be allowed.

2.The decision of the second respondent be set aside.

3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application, as agreed or taxed.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of  the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 585 of 2011

BETWEEN:

THOMAS HUDSON WILSON
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EDMONDS J

DATE:

14 DECEMBER 2012

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application under s 476A(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review of a decision of the second respondent (“the Tribunal”) ([2011] AATA 325) that it did not have jurisdiction to review the decision of the first respondent (“the Minister”) to cancel the applicant’s visa (“the cancellation decision”).

  2. The Minister was required to give the applicant notice of the cancellation decision pursuant to s 501G(1) of the Act. No issue arises in the present proceeding as to the way in which the Minister purported to give notice. Rather, the application requires an…

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Details
Case
[2012] FCA 1421
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Wilson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the central issue was the adequacy and accuracy of the information provided in the notification of a visa cancellation decision, which was critical to determining whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had jurisdiction to review the decision. The applicant, who had been granted a visa and subsequently imprisoned, received a notification of intent to cancel his visa in 2009. The visa was eventually cancelled in 2011, and the Minister notified the applicant of this decision via his authorised representative. However, the notification contained inaccuracies regarding the method and timing of the notification, leading to the applicant's argument that the notice was insufficient and that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review the decision.

The court examined whether the notice provided to the applicant was adequate and accurate as required by section 501G(1)(f)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958. The court found that the notice was deficient because it incorrectly implied that the notice was delivered by post when it was actually not delivered, and it did not correctly reflect the method and timing of the notice as required by the Act and Regulations. The court held that the notice did not comply with the statutory requirements, and thus the Tribunal was correct in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to review the visa cancellation decision because the application for review was made outside the stipulated nine-day period.

Consequently, the court allowed the application, set aside the decision of the Tribunal, and ordered the Minister to pay the applicant's costs of the application. This decision underscores the importance of precise and accurate statutory notifications in immigration proceedings and highlights the consequences when such notifications fail to meet legal requirements.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be allowed.

2. The decision of the second respondent be set aside.

3. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application, as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Minister was required to give the applicant notice of the cancellation decision pursuant to s 501G(1) of the Act. No issue arises in the present proceeding as to the way in which the Minister purported to give notice. Rather, the application requires an assessment of the adequacy and accuracy of the information given in the notice in relation to the time in which an application for review could be made to the Tribunal as required by s 501G(1)(f)(ii) of the Act. In the event of the information given being found to be inadequate or inaccurate, the ultimate issue is whether the Tribunal was correct to decide that, because the application to the Tribunal was lodged outside the nine day period referred to in s 500(6B) of the Act, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review the cancellation decision. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The background facts are uncontroversial. The applicant was born in New Zealand in 1963. He visited Australia for 17 days in 1982 and then returned on 29 March 1987. On 1 September 1994, by operation of law, he was granted a Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa, which entitled him to remain in Australia. For the greater part of the period from 6 December 1994 until at least November 2011, the applicant was in prison in New South Wales. On 4 March 2010 the applicant, pursuant to s 494D of the Act, gave the Minister written notice of the name and address of another person authorised by the applicant to receive documents in connection with matters arising under the Act or the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) – (his “authorised recipient”). That person was Raymond Charles Turner of Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers at 302–368 Sussex Street, Sydney (“the Sussex Street address”). The applicant had not withdrawn his notification at any time before 11 March 2011. Mr Turner was at all material times a migration agent. The applicant was issued with a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation on 12 August 2009, which was sent by registered post to him at Long Bay Correctional Centre, New South Wales. On or about 2 March 2011, the Minister received a letter of that date from Mr Turner on letterhead bearing an address for Mr Turner of Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers, that was not the Sussex Street address, namely, an address at 251–253 Elizabeth Street, Sydney (“the Elizabeth Street address”). On 10 March 2011, a delegate of the Minister decided to make the cancellation decision, cancelling the applicant’s visa pursuant to s 501(2) of the Act. On 11 March 2011, an officer of the Department on behalf of the Minister prepared and signed a letter of notification of the cancellation decision (“notification letter”) addressed it to Mr Turner at the Elizabeth Street address, dated it 11 March 2011 and dispatched it by prepaid post (Australia Post registered mail) within 3 working days. The notification letter was dispatched to Mr Turner of Turner Coulson Immigration Lawyers at the Elizabeth Street address, but was not duly delivered to Mr Turner at that address.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister refuted the applicant’s construction of the information given in the notification letter and submitted that the references to “delivered by post” or “delivered by hand, fax or email” are to the method of dispatch employed by the Minister in accordance with subreg 2.55(3); the immediately preceding sentence is “unnecessary” and “unhelpful”, but does not mean that the paragraph is “corrupted”. So read, the notification letter does comply with s 501G(1)(f)(ii). CONSIDERATION At the outset, it may be said, with confidence, that if the last three sentences of the Review Rights paragraph had read as indicated below, there would be no doubt that s 501G(1)(f)(ii) had been complied with:You are taken to have been notified of the decision when the notification letter and the attached information [is taken to have been received by you or your authorised representative (if applicable)]. If the letter is [dispatched/sent] by post, it is taken to have been received seven (7) working days after the date shown on it. If it is [given] by hand, [or transmitted by] fax or email, it is taken to be received on the day [it is handed to the person or the day it is transmitted, as the case may be]. Relevantly, what this reconstruction of the paragraph does is disclose the problems with the Review Rights paragraph as it appears in the notification letter. Neither the word “delivered”, nor the phrase “delivered by post”, is used in reg 2.55 of the Regulations or s 494C(4) of the Act. Both the word and the phrase imply actual delivery, when actual delivery is irrelevant where the method of giving the notice is by prepaid post. Indeed, the word “delivered” is not even used when the notice is given by hand; the phrase used is “handed to”. And the word is not used in the context of a giving of the notice by fax, email or other electronic means; the phrase used is “transmitted to”. On any view, the last three sentences of the Review Rights paragraph in the notification letter, both individually, and read as a whole, are inadequate, but they are also inaccurate, in terms of whether they comply with the requirements of s 501G(1)(f)(ii) of the Act. So much is exemplified by the facts of the present case. While the notification letter was undoubtedly dispatched by prepaid post (subreg 2.55(3)(c)/subs 494B(4)), it was not “delivered by post”; it was given by hand, the hand of Matouk lawyers, who had nothing to do with the postal service engaged by the Minister by way of dispatch. On the face of the Review Rights paragraph it was entirely reasonable for the applicant’s authorised recipient to believe that the time for applying for review ran from that point in time when, by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Regulations and the Act, that time had well and truly expired. For these reasons, I am of the view that the notification letter does not comply with s 501G(1)(f)(ii); that no “notification” has been given with the result that time has not begun to run in respect of an application for review to the Tribunal under s 500(6B) of the Act.