FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Wilson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1421
Citation: Wilson v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 1421 Parties: THOMAS HUDSON WILSON v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: VID 585 of 2011 Judge: EDMONDS J Date of judgment: 14 December 2012 Catchwords: IMMIGRATION – decision to cancel visa made pursuant to s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Administrative Appeals Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review the decision on the ground that the application for review was filed by the applicant’s authorised recipient out of the nine day period referred to in s 500(6B) – whether, as required by s 501G(1)(f)(ii), information was given in the notice in relation to the time in which an application for review could be made to the Tribunal – where inadequate or inaccurate information given: whether written notice duly given for the purposes of s 501G – whether the nine day period, referred to in s 500(6B), has commenced Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 66, 476A(1)(b), 494B, 494G, 494D, 500, 501G
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) r 2.55Cases cited: Chan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 134 FCR 308 applied
Pomare v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2008) 167 FCR 494 applied
Zhan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 128 FCR 469 appliedDate of hearing: 5 November 2012 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 35 Solicitor for the Applicant: KTG Lawyers Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 585 of 2011
BETWEEN: THOMAS HUDSON WILSON
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE OF ORDER:
14 DECEMBER 2012
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be allowed.
2.The decision of the second respondent be set aside.
3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application, as agreed or taxed.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
VID 585 of 2011
BETWEEN: THOMAS HUDSON WILSON
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
EDMONDS J
DATE:
14 DECEMBER 2012
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
This is an application under s 476A(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) for review of a decision of the second respondent (“the Tribunal”) ([2011] AATA 325) that it did not have jurisdiction to review the decision of the first respondent (“the Minister”) to cancel the applicant’s visa (“the cancellation decision”).
The Minister was required to give the applicant notice of the cancellation decision pursuant to s 501G(1) of the Act. No issue arises in the present proceeding as to the way in which the Minister purported to give notice. Rather, the application requires an…
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- Case
- [2012] FCA 1421
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the notice provided to the applicant was adequate and accurate as required by section 501G(1)(f)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958. The court found that the notice was deficient because it incorrectly implied that the notice was delivered by post when it was actually not delivered, and it did not correctly reflect the method and timing of the notice as required by the Act and Regulations. The court held that the notice did not comply with the statutory requirements, and thus the Tribunal was correct in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to review the visa cancellation decision because the application for review was made outside the stipulated nine-day period.
Consequently, the court allowed the application, set aside the decision of the Tribunal, and ordered the Minister to pay the applicant's costs of the application. This decision underscores the importance of precise and accurate statutory notifications in immigration proceedings and highlights the consequences when such notifications fail to meet legal requirements.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be allowed.
2. The decision of the second respondent be set aside.
3. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application, as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister refuted the applicant’s construction of the information given in the notification letter and submitted that the references to “delivered by post” or “delivered by hand, fax or email” are to the method of dispatch employed by the Minister in accordance with subreg 2.55(3); the immediately preceding sentence is “unnecessary” and “unhelpful”, but does not mean that the paragraph is “corrupted”. So read, the notification letter does comply with s 501G(1)(f)(ii). CONSIDERATION At the outset, it may be said, with confidence, that if the last three sentences of the Review Rights paragraph had read as indicated below, there would be no doubt that s 501G(1)(f)(ii) had been complied with:You are taken to have been notified of the decision when the notification letter and the attached information [is taken to have been received by you or your authorised representative (if applicable)]. If the letter is [dispatched/sent] by post, it is taken to have been received seven (7) working days after the date shown on it. If it is [given] by hand, [or transmitted by] fax or email, it is taken to be received on the day [it is handed to the person or the day it is transmitted, as the case may be]. Relevantly, what this reconstruction of the paragraph does is disclose the problems with the Review Rights paragraph as it appears in the notification letter. Neither the word “delivered”, nor the phrase “delivered by post”, is used in reg 2.55 of the Regulations or s 494C(4) of the Act. Both the word and the phrase imply actual delivery, when actual delivery is irrelevant where the method of giving the notice is by prepaid post. Indeed, the word “delivered” is not even used when the notice is given by hand; the phrase used is “handed to”. And the word is not used in the context of a giving of the notice by fax, email or other electronic means; the phrase used is “transmitted to”. On any view, the last three sentences of the Review Rights paragraph in the notification letter, both individually, and read as a whole, are inadequate, but they are also inaccurate, in terms of whether they comply with the requirements of s 501G(1)(f)(ii) of the Act. So much is exemplified by the facts of the present case. While the notification letter was undoubtedly dispatched by prepaid post (subreg 2.55(3)(c)/subs 494B(4)), it was not “delivered by post”; it was given by hand, the hand of Matouk lawyers, who had nothing to do with the postal service engaged by the Minister by way of dispatch. On the face of the Review Rights paragraph it was entirely reasonable for the applicant’s authorised recipient to believe that the time for applying for review ran from that point in time when, by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Regulations and the Act, that time had well and truly expired. For these reasons, I am of the view that the notification letter does not comply with s 501G(1)(f)(ii); that no “notification” has been given with the result that time has not begun to run in respect of an application for review to the Tribunal under s 500(6B) of the Act.