DSA19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1095
File number(s):
SYG 2493 of 2019
Judgment of:
JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS
Date of judgment:
18 July 2025
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Judicial review – protection visa – oral testimony and photographic evidence – inconsistencies and assessment of credibility – whether Tribunal failed to articulate the significance of an inconsistency when making an adverse credibility finding – whether Tribunal failed to consider an explanation for an inconsistency when making an adverse credibility finding – delay in making a protection visa application – where delay may be considered as part of Tribunal’s assessment that an applicant has a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ – jurisdictional error established.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN:
DSA19
First Applicant
DSB19
Second Applicant
DSC19
Third Applicant
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE PAPADOPOULOS
DATE OF ORDER:
18 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to ‘Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’.
2.A writ of certiorari shall issue, removing the record of the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In DSA19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, the applicants, a family unit from Bangladesh, challenged the decision of the Tribunal affirming the Minister's decision to refuse their application for protection visas. The applicants argued that the Tribunal made errors in its assessment of their credibility and in its consideration of the evidence provided to support their claims of persecution based on their Christian faith and activities in Bangladesh. The legal issues in the case primarily revolved around whether the Tribunal failed to appropriately assess the credibility of the applicants' evidence and whether it failed to properly consider the explanation for inconsistencies in their accounts of specific incidents of persecution.
The court examined the Tribunal's reasoning in detail, particularly focusing on the adverse credibility findings related to the evidence provided by the first and second applicants concerning the June 2015 incident. The applicants argued that the Tribunal did not adequately explain the relevance of the inconsistencies in their accounts and failed to consider their explanation for those inconsistencies. The court noted that the Tribunal's reasons for rejecting the claims relating to the June 2015 incident did not sufficiently address the significance of the inconsistencies and the explanation provided by the applicants.
In its decision, the court concluded that the Tribunal had failed to properly exercise its jurisdiction in assessing the credibility of the applicants' evidence. Specifically, the court found that the Tribunal did not give adequate reasons for its adverse credibility findings concerning the June 2015 incident, and did not consider the explanation provided by the applicants for the inconsistencies in their accounts. The court held that these errors amounted to jurisdictional error, leading to the conclusion that the Tribunal's decision was legally unreasonable.
Consequently, the court allowed the application for judicial review, quashed the decision of the Tribunal, and remitted the matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration. The court's decision underscored the importance of thorough and reasoned assessment of credibility in refugee status determinations, highlighting the need for decision-makers to adequately explain their reasoning and to consider explanations provided by applicants for inconsistencies in their evidence.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
For the reasons that follow, the application succeeds.BACKGROUND The relevant background to the matter was summarised in the parties’ written submissions, which I primarily adopt. The applicants are Bangladeshi nationals who arrived in Australia on 30 July 2015.[1] This family unit comprises a woman (the first applicant), her husband (the second applicant) and their young daughter (the third applicant). The first and second applicants were married in Bangladesh in January 2010.[2] The third applicant was born in Bangladesh in October 2014.[3][1] Court Book (CB) 256, 485 [2].[2] CB 40.[3] CB 63, 112.The protection visa application The applicants applied for protection visas on 6 October 2015, in which both the first and second applicants made claims for protection.[4] Those claims were detailed within the protection visa application form and statements made by the first and second applicants.[4] CB 1 to 126. In the first applicant’s statement,[5] she raised the following claims:(a)She is a Christian of the Catholic faith who faced intimidation and harassment.(b)She worked as a music teacher in Bangladesh and was targeted by Muslim groups because she taught Christian songs to Muslim children.(c)In 2001, she became a singing member of the Bangladesh Udichi Shilpigosthi (Udichi), a performance group that was part of a movement against religious extremism and to promote democracy. As part of her singing role in Udichi, she was involved in the Shahbag Movement and performed at political rallies. This made her a target of Islamic extremists.(d)In 2002, Islamic extremists tried to abduct her, but she escaped and had to stop attending college.(e)On 19 April 2013, she participated in a performance with Udichi. When she returned to her home after the performance, she was beaten and accused of being an infidel engaging in anti-Islamic activities (April 2013 incident). She had a miscarriage during the attack.(f)She continued her involvement with Udichi, taught songs at her local church and was harassed because of her Christian activities.(g)On 26 June 2015, she and her husband were attacked by three Islamic extremists (June 2015 incident). Her husband was injured and hospitalised as a result of the attack. The applicants’ lodged a ‘General Diary’ at Kafrul police and the incident was reported in the newspaper.(h)On 13 August 2015, after the applicants arrived in Australia, people visited their home in Bangladesh looking for them and attacked her brother (August 2015 incident). Her family lodged a ‘General Diary’ at the police station and the incident was reported in the newspaper.[5] CB 87 to 88. In the second applicant’s statement,[6] he referred to a range of matters including the April 2013 incident, the June 2015 incident and the August 2015 incident. He claimed he would be targeted because he is Christian and because his wife, who was involved in the Shahbag Movement, promoted Christianity through music teaching and singing.[6] CB 89. On 7 March 2016, the applicants attended an interview with the delegate.[7][7] CB 258.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Accordingly, Ground 1a. does not succeed.Ground 1b. - Adverse credibility finding in relation to the inconsistent evidence of the first and second applicants in relation to the June 2015 incident Again, the applicants submit the Tribunal failed to comply with an applicable legal standard for administrative fact-finding by making an adverse credibility finding which is legally unreasonable. The applicants essentially raise two issues with the Tribunal’s reasons in relation to its rejection of the claims relating to the June 2015 incident. By way of:(a)pre-hearing submissions the applicants contend the Tribunal failed to give an explanation of the relevance or significance of an inconsistency between the evidence of the first applicant and the second applicant in relation to the assault of the second applicant and how that bore upon the Tribunal’s rejection of the claim that the June 2015 incident had occurred. For sake of clarity, I will refer to this as the significance argument.(b)post-hearing submissions, the applicants further allege the Tribunal erred by failing to consider the explanation given for the inconsistency in the oral evidence of the first and second applicants in relation to two photographs provided to the Tribunal as evidence of the assault of the second applicant in June 2015. For sake of clarity, I will refer to this as the explanation argument. The applicants take issue with the Tribunal’s reasons set out at [79] of its decision. It is helpful at this juncture to set out the entirety of that paragraph before further addressing the parties’ submissions on this issue:In support of the applicants’ claims that they were both attacked by Islamic extremists on 26 June 2015 and that applicant 2 was injured/cut on his face during the attack the applicants produced copies of two photographs described as showing the injuries of applicant 2, including a photograph which the applicants both claim show a gash on his face. When the Tribunal questioned the applicant and applicant 2 about the photographs the applicants gave different evidence about why, when and where these photographs of applicant 2’s claimed injuries were taken, in particular the injury to his face; the particulars of the oral evidence given by the applicant and applicant 2 to the Tribunal are set out in the s.424A letter sent to the applicants by the Tribunal; the contents of the s. 424A letter are set out in full earlier in this decision. Given that the evidence of the applicants was different as to why, when and where the photograph of the applicant’s alleged facial injury was taken, in the Tribunal’s view the response to the s.424A letter did not provide a reasonable or plausible explanation for the different evidence provided by the applicants at the hearing. The explanation was that applicant 2 was confused about the photographs and that photos taken for their visa applications on 15/16 June 2015 and also cctv footage at the place which processes the Australian visas confirm there were no marks on her husband’s face at that time of application for the visa. The Tribunal finds that the photographs of applicant 2’s claimed injuries are not reliable evidence that the applicant 2 was injured in an attack on him in June2015 as the applicants claim and they are not reliable evidence that such an attack occurred. The Tribunal finds that these copies of photographs were produced by the applicants in support of their application for protection to give credence to their claims that such an attack occurred so that they would have a better chance to be granted a visa to remain in Australia. The Tribunal finds that the applicants have given the Tribunal untrue evidence in relation to their claims that applicant 2 was injured in an attack on the two of them in June 2015.The significance argument
Decision
Reasons for decision
On 4 September 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the decision under review.Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal identified the criteria for a protection visa set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), whereby an applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). The Tribunal summarised the applicants’ claims for protection (at [11]-[28]), the applicants’ evidence submitted prior to the Tribunal hearings (at [29]-[34]), the evidence and submissions provided during the Tribunal hearings (at [35]-[42]), and the applicants’ response to the Tribunal’s invitation to comment (at [43]-[54]). The Tribunal noted the applicants’ request that it contact seventeen witnesses by telephone, being twelve witnesses in Bangladesh and a further five witnesses in Australia, whom the applicants submitted could give the Tribunal evidence to support and corroborate their claims. As the Tribunal did not have any doubts in relation to the claims raised in relation to the religious identification, observance and practice of the applicants, it determined that it was unnecessary for it to contact those witnesses.[15][15] CB 493, [38]-[39]. The Tribunal did, however, try to contact by telephone the six witnesses in Bangladesh whom it was claimed could give the Tribunal corroborating evidence about the April 2013 incident and the June 2015 incident. The Tribunal was unsuccessful, after multiple attempts, to contact all but one of those witnesses, ‘Ms EG’.[16][16] CB 493 to 494, [40]-[41]. In its consideration of the applicants’ claims and evidence, the Tribunal made relevant findings in relation to:(a)the incident claimed to have occurred in 2002;[17](b)the applicants’ delay in leaving Bangladesh and delay in claiming protection after arriving in Australia;[18](c)the applicants’ failure to apply for protection in the United Kingdom;[19](d)the April 2013 incident and the June 2015 incident;[20] and(e)the August 2015 incident which occurred after the applicants had arrived in Australia.[21][17] CB 502 to 503, [75]-[76].[18] CB 500 to 501, [69]-[72].[19] CB 501 to 502, [73]-[74].[20] CB 503 to 505, [77]-[82].[21] CB 505 to 506, [83]-[85]. In relation to the incident claimed to have occurred in 2002, the Tribunal found that the first applicant did not, and does not, fear harm in Bangladesh because of this incident. In reaching this finding, it noted that the first applicant described the incident as ‘separate’ or ‘isolated’ and of no importance to her in 2002. In relation to the applicants’ delay in leaving Bangladesh and later claiming protection in Australia during 2015, the Tribunal:(a)noted the applicants’ delayed their departure from Bangladesh before travelling to Australia;(b)observed that the applicants waited over two months after arriving in Australia to lodge their protection visa application;(c)noted the evidence of both the first and second applicants about their indecision to remain in Australia stemmed from a variety of matters including that they had good jobs in Bangladesh, their life was there, their families were there, it was difficult and painful for them to decide not to return to their country, they had to spend time talking to family and lawyers, there was a language barrier here, and that things took time to arrange;(d)did not consider the applicants gave a reasonable or plausible explanation either for being undecided in relation to returning Bangladesh or why they delayed applying for protection in Australia. The Tribunal rejected the explanations given the seriousness of the harm the applicants claimed to fear, including their claims about what happened to them on 26 June 2015 (two days before they were granted their Australian visas), and their claims that they were receiving ongoing abuse and threats of harm (because they were in a religious minority).
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At hearing before me on 6 May 2025, it became apparent during the making of oral submissions in relation to Ground 1 that the Court would be assisted by further submissions from both parties concerning the Tribunal’s findings in relation to the two photographs of the second applicant’s injuries which had been provided to corroborate the applicants’ claims for protection. Accordingly, I made orders for the filing of post-hearing supplementary written submissions. On 9 May 2025 and 16 May 2025, the applicant and Minister respectively filed their supplementary written submissions. Those submissions, where relevant, are addressed below.CONSIDERATIONGround 1 By way of this ground, the applicants contend the Tribunal failed to exercise its jurisdiction to assess the credibility of the first applicant, or exercised it in a manner that was unreasonable. By way of particulars, the applicants take issue with two aspects of the Tribunal’s series of adverse credibility findings:(a)First, the applicants allege the Tribunal failed to properly assess the credibility of the witness, Ms EG, because it applied ‘a naïve and widely discredited view of memory’ when it made adverse credibility findings on the basis of inconsistencies between her statement dated 19 July 2015 and her oral evidence at hearing on 19 June 2019 about matters relating to April 2013 incident. For sake of clarity, I will refer to this as Ground 1a.(b)Secondly, the applicants allege the Tribunal erred when making an adverse credibility finding as a result of the inconsistency between the evidence of the first applicant and the second applicant in relation to the assault of the second applicant during the June 2015 incident. For sake of clarity, I will refer to this as Ground 1b. Before examining the Tribunal’s credibility findings in relation to each of these matters, it is helpful to set out the relevant principles which govern legal unreasonableness in the context of adverse credibility findings based upon inconsistencies in evidentiary material.Relevant principles The obligation to give reasons extends to giving reasons for any credibility or reliability findings necessary to dispose of a matter. The evolution of legal unreasonableness since Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611; HCA 16 (SZMDS) and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; HCA 18 has facilitated the advent of greater judicial scrutiny of a Tribunal’s reasons and any credibility findings made. Assessment of credibility is an inherently difficult process and modern authority emphasises that when assessing the credibility of a propounded narrative, decision-makers are encouraged ‘to limit their reliance on the appearances of witnesses and to reason their conclusions, as far as possible, on the basis of contemporary materials, objectively established facts and the apparent logic of events’: Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; HCA 22 at [31] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ.