FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
DNJ18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1479
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1479
- Decision Date
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The delegate also found the applicant was an excluded fast track review applicant. The delegate noted that the Iraqi National Identification card the applicant provided to an officer of the Department in support of his application for a protection visa on 20 March 2017 as evidence of his identity, nationality or citizenship was assessed by a document examiner, who found that the document’s manufacturing or issuing security characteristics were fraudulently compromised or personal data was fraudulently altered. The examiner opined that the impugned identity document was a legitimately manufactured document which had been fraudulently altered. After considering the applicant’s response to the concern that the Iraqi National Identification card was a bogus document, the delegate concluded the impugned document was bogus and that the applicant had not provided a reasonable explanation for presenting a bogus document to an officer of the Department.CONSIDERATION The applicant applied for judicial review of the delegate’s decision on 6 July 2018. As the application was made outside the time prescribed, the applicant also applied for an extension of the time within which his application for review of a migration decision may be made under s 477 of the Act. The applicant’s amended application lodged on 16 July 2025 sets out five paragraphs in support of his extension of time application, which appear directed to providing an explanation for the delay, as follows:1.The Applicant due to his limited English language skills and lack of legal advice was unaware his appeal to Federal Circuit Court was required within a limited timeframe.2.The Applicant moved from Queensland to Victoria and had failed to inform the Department of Home Affairs of his change of address. He was made aware of the decision some weeks after the notification by the department was sent.3.The appeal is made outside of the prescribed timeframe by about 3 months and 13 days.4.The applicant has sought to make the appeal as soon as he has been made aware.5.The applicant relies on his affidavit sworn on 6-7-2018 in which he explains the delays. Section 477(1) of the Act imposes a limitation period of 35-days within which an application may be brought. Section 477(2) allows the Court, by order, to extend the 35-day period as the Court considers appropriate, if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so. In Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28, 276 CLR 579, Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ explained the exercise of the Court’s discretion under s 477(2) of the Act, by reference to the corresponding provision for applications made to the Federal Court of Australia in s 477A(2). In short compass, the focus of s 477A(2)(b) (and so also s 477(2)(b)) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. This allows the Court to consider “a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant's delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application”: Tu’uta Katoa at [12]. Their Honours noted that the level of satisfaction that must be reached is not low because the Court “must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice”: at [12]. In this regard, their Honours noted that it is appropriate to consider the well-established principles guiding decisions whether to extend time in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 186, 3 FCR 344 at 348–349: Tu’uta Katoa at [13].