SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 3)

Link copied
Case Copied 41 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 3) [2019] FCA 589

Appeal from: SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2017] FCCA 3086
File number: NSD 2301 of 2017
Judge: ALLSOP CJ
Date of judgment: 30 April 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for Protection Visa – complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – adverse credibility findings made against appellant based on inconsistencies – corroborating evidence afforded lesser weight – whether unwarranted assumptions made – whether Tribunal failed to consider holistically the evidence before it – whether Tribunal reached conclusions about the credibility of the appellant in a way that was legally unreasonable
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(aa), 48A
Cases cited:

ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; 250 FCR 109

ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; 361 ALR 227

CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496

CWR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 859

DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; 258 FCR 175

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99

Re Minister; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; 168 ALR 407

SZGIZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 71; 212 FCR 235

SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2018] FCA 1417

SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 687

SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 1001

Date of hearing: 11 May 2018; 12 December 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 57
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B D Kaplan
Amici Curiae Mr S Free SC with Ms C Trahanas

ORDERS

NSD 2301 of 2017
BETWEEN:

SZHYH

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ALLSOP CJ

DATE OF ORDER:

30 April 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made in SYG 551 of 2016 on 15 December 2017 be set aside, and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a)the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 23 February 2016 be set aside;

(b)the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for re-determination according to law; and

(c)the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 3... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2019] FCA 589
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 3), the appellant challenged the decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which had dismissed his applications for protection and bridging visas. The appellant, a Chinese national, had claimed that he feared for his life if he returned to China and provided evidence, including a letter from his daughter, to support his claims of persecution by the Chinese government. The Tribunal's decision hinged on adverse credibility findings based on perceived inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence, which led to the rejection of corroborative documents such as the Election Certificate, the Detention Certificate, the Arrest Order, and the daughter's letter.

The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal had erred in its handling of the evidence, particularly whether the Tribunal made unwarranted assumptions, failed to consider the evidence holistically, and reached conclusions about the credibility of the appellant in a legally unreasonable manner. The court examined the Tribunal's approach to the inconsistencies in the appellant's account and its treatment of the corroborative documents. The court noted that the Tribunal did not make express findings that any document was a forgery or fraudulent but instead relied heavily on perceived inconsistencies to discredit the appellant's evidence.

The court found that the Tribunal did not engage in an active intellectual manner with the corroborative documents, instead placing greater weight on the inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence. The court held that the Tribunal's approach was legally unreasonable as it failed to sufficiently consider the corroborative documents and the appellant's explanations for the inconsistencies. The court also found that the Tribunal's rejection of the appellant's claims without addressing the potential implications of the corroborative evidence was flawed.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the orders of the Federal Circuit Court were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the AAT for re-determination according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, and the appellant was awarded costs of the proceedings before the Federal Circuit Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made in SYG 551 of 2016 on 15 December 2017 be set aside, and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

(a) the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 23 February 2016 be set aside;

(b) the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for re-determination according to law; and

(c) the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

He said he feared for his life and someone assisted with his departure. He considered that he would be still the subject of interest to the local government. In support of this he provided a letter from his daughter dated 28 June 2010 which stated that the family was “often harassed by the local government”. The letter stated, amongst other things:What was more frightening is that we were often harassed by the local government. They often mythically [sic] followed us, kept a lookout over us and investigated my father’s recent situation etc. Their intention of arresting my father and avenging us scares me. We dare not ask my father to come back for the sake of his safety. We miss him a lot, but we don’t want him to be persecuted. The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal’s decision turned on a lack of belief in the appellant’s evidence because of perceived inconsistencies. It also referred in its reasons to the advice of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade that “fraudulent documents are relatively easy to produce in China”. No express finding, however, was made that any document was a forgery or fraudulent, though, perhaps, there may be no escape from that conclusion. Thus, the findings that the appellant was entirely untruthful, and that apparently corroborating documents could be put to one side (including the one that had been destroyed by an earlier Tribunal) rested entirely on the strength of perceived inconsistencies in the appellant’s accounts of his claims and history. The Tribunal did not accept that the appellant had been elected as a director of the committee or head of Beichen Village in 2004; that he had organised protests, or been arrested; that his wife had paid money to have him released, or that he was required to report as a condition of his release, or that not having done so, he was wanted; that he was on bail when he left China or that a friend helped him by paying money to enable him to evade the controls of people departing China; that the appellant’s wife and children moved to another province after he left China; that his family had any problems with the authorities, including any problems as referred to in the daughter’s letter; that the appellant is regarded by the Chinese authorities as an anti-government activist or a person who had strong anti-government ideologies or dissident opinions or that the appellant had ever been of interest to the Chinese authorities. The discussion of the inconsistencies is over nearly four pages of single-spaced typescript from [47]-[58]. The first group of inconsistencies concerned matters that dated back to his first application when events were somewhat fresher. They related to the evidence as to where he lived and his employment. The first subject was his employment. In his first application the appellant referred to employment with the Fuzhou Chuangxin Computer Company from August 1998 to December 2004. He had been “confronted with the fact” that in seeking a visa to visit Australia in October 2004 he had said that he was employed by the Fujian Fuqing Longxing Color Printing Company. He explained this by stating that in preparing his first protection visa application he had forgotten to tell the migration agent of his employment with the printing company. In a subsequent statutory declaration in 2007 he said he worked for the printing company from January 2002 to August 2004 for 15 hours per week, and normally worked at the computer company 25 hours per week. However, before the third Tribunal he had said that his trip to Australia in October 2004 had been a business trip for the printing company (for which he had said in the statutory declaration he ceased employment in August 2004). The Tribunal then put these inconsistencies to him and recorded his response at [49] of the decision record:… After the Tribunal asked him why he would have come here on a business trip for the printing company in October 2004 if he had ceased working for the company in August 2004 he said that because it was some time ago he was confused with the dates. He said that perhaps he could start from the beginning and give the Tribunal the correct information. He said that because he had been beaten in the past this had affected his memory. He said that the truth was that he had kept working in the company until December 2004. He claimed that he had stated that his employment had ceased in August 2004 because he had been confused and he had not been thinking clearly. He said that he had not referred to his employment with the printing company in his first application for a protection visa because he had not felt it was necessary because he had believed that the Department would have all the records in relation to his business trip sponsored by the company.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The fourth proposition was that the Tribunal failed to engage in an active intellectual manner with the corroborative documents; namely the Election Certificate, the Detention Certificate, the Arrest Order, and the daughter’s letter. In rejecting the appellant’s claims as a matter of logic the Tribunal must have rejected the corroborative documents. However the Tribunal did not attempt to analyse or explain the documents and simply gave greater weight “to the problems with the inconsistent evidence”. Consideration The development of the law on legal unreasonableness since Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 has seen the clearer recognition that findings of fact, even ones based on credit, are not immune from judicial review based on jurisdictional error. See, for example and in particular, the important judgment of Robertson J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99. It can be accepted that credit findings have a particular and important place in decision-making, whether of courts or tribunals: see the remarks of McHugh J in Re Minister; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; 168 ALR 407 at [67]. For this reason, no doubt, a court exercising the power of judicial review should be cautious in its approach to deciding whether the decision-maker, in dealing with the factual material, including the oral evidence of the applicant, has failed to exercise its statutory task by an approach which can be criticised as seriously irrational, illogical or lacking material foundation in important aspects. There is no formula involved. Careful attention must be paid to the reasons and approval of the decision-maker: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437 (Allsop CJ, Robertson and Mortimer JJ) not for the purpose of ascertaining the facts, but for the purpose of deciding whether the approach of the tribunal was sufficiently lacking in foundation, rationality, or logical coherence in a way that could have affected the outcome so as to be legally unreasonable. It can be accepted that reasonable differences of views as to material are insufficient to found legal unreasonableness. The flaw in the fact-finding or treatment of the evidence must be sufficiently seriously illogical, irrational or groundless as to compromise the decision, in that the credit finding can be seen as compromised. See the Full Court decisions which deal with the review of credit findings: ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; 250 FCR 109; ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38; AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; 361 ALR 227; CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496; DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; 258 FCR 175. I refer to what I said in CWR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 859 at [60]-[65].