FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 3) [2019] FCA 589
ORDERS
NSD 2301 of 2017 BETWEEN: SZHYH
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
ALLSOP CJ
DATE OF ORDER:
30 April 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made in SYG 551 of 2016 on 15 December 2017 be set aside, and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
(a)the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 23 February 2016 be set aside;
(b)the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for re-determination according to law; and
(c)the…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 589
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the Tribunal had erred in its handling of the evidence, particularly whether the Tribunal made unwarranted assumptions, failed to consider the evidence holistically, and reached conclusions about the credibility of the appellant in a legally unreasonable manner. The court examined the Tribunal's approach to the inconsistencies in the appellant's account and its treatment of the corroborative documents. The court noted that the Tribunal did not make express findings that any document was a forgery or fraudulent but instead relied heavily on perceived inconsistencies to discredit the appellant's evidence.
The court found that the Tribunal did not engage in an active intellectual manner with the corroborative documents, instead placing greater weight on the inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence. The court held that the Tribunal's approach was legally unreasonable as it failed to sufficiently consider the corroborative documents and the appellant's explanations for the inconsistencies. The court also found that the Tribunal's rejection of the appellant's claims without addressing the potential implications of the corroborative evidence was flawed.
Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the orders of the Federal Circuit Court were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the AAT for re-determination according to law. The Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal, and the appellant was awarded costs of the proceedings before the Federal Circuit Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made in SYG 551 of 2016 on 15 December 2017 be set aside, and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:
(a) the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 23 February 2016 be set aside;
(b) the matter be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for re-determination according to law; and
(c) the first respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
3. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The fourth proposition was that the Tribunal failed to engage in an active intellectual manner with the corroborative documents; namely the Election Certificate, the Detention Certificate, the Arrest Order, and the daughter’s letter. In rejecting the appellant’s claims as a matter of logic the Tribunal must have rejected the corroborative documents. However the Tribunal did not attempt to analyse or explain the documents and simply gave greater weight “to the problems with the inconsistent evidence”. Consideration The development of the law on legal unreasonableness since Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611 and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; 249 CLR 332 has seen the clearer recognition that findings of fact, even ones based on credit, are not immune from judicial review based on jurisdictional error. See, for example and in particular, the important judgment of Robertson J in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99. It can be accepted that credit findings have a particular and important place in decision-making, whether of courts or tribunals: see the remarks of McHugh J in Re Minister; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1; 168 ALR 407 at [67]. For this reason, no doubt, a court exercising the power of judicial review should be cautious in its approach to deciding whether the decision-maker, in dealing with the factual material, including the oral evidence of the applicant, has failed to exercise its statutory task by an approach which can be criticised as seriously irrational, illogical or lacking material foundation in important aspects. There is no formula involved. Careful attention must be paid to the reasons and approval of the decision-maker: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; 231 FCR 437 (Allsop CJ, Robertson and Mortimer JJ) not for the purpose of ascertaining the facts, but for the purpose of deciding whether the approach of the tribunal was sufficiently lacking in foundation, rationality, or logical coherence in a way that could have affected the outcome so as to be legally unreasonable. It can be accepted that reasonable differences of views as to material are insufficient to found legal unreasonableness. The flaw in the fact-finding or treatment of the evidence must be sufficiently seriously illogical, irrational or groundless as to compromise the decision, in that the credit finding can be seen as compromised. See the Full Court decisions which deal with the review of credit findings: ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; 250 FCR 109; ASB17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 38; AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; 361 ALR 227; CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; 253 FCR 496; DAO16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 2; 258 FCR 175. I refer to what I said in CWR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 859 at [60]-[65].