FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
FBK17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 943
File number(s): MLG 2483 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE SYMONS Date of judgment: 25 October 2023 Catchwords: MIGRATION – decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the Authority erred in applying s 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Authority took finding under s 473DD(b)(i) into account when considering whether new country information met criterion of exceptional circumstances in s 473DD(a) – whether the Authority’s assessment of the applicant’s claim to fear harm as a former LTTE supporter was premised on unwarranted assumptions as to the behaviour of the Sri Lankan authorities – no error disclosed – application dismissed with costs Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473DD. Cases cited: AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 494; [2020] HCA 37.
SZHYH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 3)(2019) 165 ALD 463; [2019] FCA 589
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 39 Date of last submission/s: 3 October 2023 Date of hearing: 3 October 2023 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr M Guo Solicitor for the Applicant: WLW Migration Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Barrington Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
MLG 2483 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: FBK17
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTRAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE SYMONS
DATE OF ORDER:
25 OCTOBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the first respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs”.
2.The amended application for judicial review filed on 6 September 2023 be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the amount of $8371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE SYMONS:
INTRODUCTION
By an application filed on 17 November 2017 and amended on 6 September 2023, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) made on 3 November 2017, pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The Authority affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (visa). The Minister opposes the application. The Authority enters a submitting appearance and has not participated in the proceeding.
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a Tamil Hindu citizen of…
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- Case
- [2023] FedCFamC2G 943
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the authority had correctly applied section 473DD in considering the new country information and whether its assessment of the applicant's fear of harm as a former supporter of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was based on assumptions that were not supported by the evidence. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the authority had appropriately weighed the new information against the existing country information and if its decision was free from errors of law or unreasonableness.
The court found that the authority had not erred in its application of section 473DD. It held that the authority's findings were justified and that it had properly considered the new country information in the context of the overall evidence. The authority had acknowledged that the new information was recent but had concluded that it did not demonstrate a change in circumstances or provide evidence that was qualitatively different from what had already been presented. Instead, the new information was seen as repetitive and supportive of the points already made by the applicant. The court further determined that the authority's assessment of the applicant's fear of harm was not based on unwarranted assumptions but was supported by the evidence, including the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report, which indicated a diminishing risk profile for individuals like the applicant. The court rejected the notion that the authority had failed to appropriately consider the new information or had made unreasonable assumptions.
The court dismissed the application and ordered that the applicant pay the Minister's costs in the amount of $8,371.30. This decision underscores the importance of the presentation and context of new evidence in migration cases, as well as the need for a reasoned and evidence-based approach to the assessment of claims under the Migration Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submits that the balance of the Authority’s paragraph dealing with s 473DD contains an evident and intelligible justification for its finding that there were not exceptional circumstances to consider new information. It was said that when read fairly and in context, the Authority considered that the new country information provided by the applicant simply provided further support, or established points already made, by the applicant’s material. Put differently, the concern of the Authority was that the new country information traversed the same ground as earlier country information. On either analysis, it was clear that the Authority was cognisant of the character of the new information as having been published after the date of the delegate’s decision and that it was being used to rebut information contained in the DFAT Report.Consideration I am not persuaded that the Authority erred in its application of s 473DD of the Act. The reason for this conclusion reflects the manner in which the applicant (through his representative) presented the new country information to the Authority. In its presentation, the significance of the country information was identified not for its novelty (in the sense that it post-dated the decision of the delegate) or because it provided evidence of a change in circumstances not disclosed by the earlier country information. Instead, the new country information was provided on the explicit basis that it constituted “further evidence” of the point that had been made in submissions to the delegate dated 14 July 2017 that Sri Lankan Tamils with even the most tenuous connections in the past to the LTTE remain at risk of harm and that the situation in Sri Lanka, as described in the DFAT Report, was not entirely accurate. The Authority correctly appreciated the basis upon which the new information was provided to it when it referred to the information as “additional” (a synonym for “further”). Its treatment of the new information occurred contextually in circumstances where the entire suite of country information provided by the applicant’s representative, including when the application was before the delegate, was capable of being characterised as “recent”. In this respect, although it was objectively the case that the new information satisfied s 473DD(b)(i) of the Act, its novelty, relatively speaking, was modest in the scheme of the country information (as a whole) considered by the Authority. I am also not persuaded that the reasoning adopted by the Authority was unreasonable, irrational or illogical. This is because I reject the thesis that underscores this ground of review, namely, that the Authority proceeded on the basis that the applicant had the opportunity to pre-empt the DFAT Report with information that had not even come into existence. Instead, the Authority reasoned (again responsive to the presentation by the applicant of the new information) that the applicant had already been afforded the opportunity to put before it country information concerning the reliability of the DFAT Report and that the new information, not being qualitatively different or demonstrating a change in circumstances, was merely repetitive of an earlier made and subsequently repeated, point.GROUND TWOThe submissions of the applicant