SZTMH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTMH v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 124

Citation: SZTMH v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCA 124
Appeal from: SZTMH v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 1807
Parties: SZTMH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File number: NSD 927 of 2014
Judge: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 27 February 2015
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – refusal of protection visa – whether risk of serious harm under s 91R of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether apprehended bias –grounds of appeal not made out

COSTS – application for personal costs order against solicitor – whether s 486E of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) contravened – whether appeal had reasonable prospect of success – where one ground had a reasonable prospect of success – where remaining grounds had no reasonable prospect of success – no contravention of s 486E

Legislation: Evidence Act1995 (Cth) ss 140(1) and 140(2)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 91R, 486E and 486F
Refugees Convention Article 1A(2)
Cases cited: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 cited
Chan v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379 cited
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466 cited
Hot Holdings Pty Limited v Creasy (2002) 210 CLR 438 cited
Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300 cited
Levick v Deputy Commission of Taxation [2000] FCA 674 cited
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507 cited
NAHI v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 cited
Park v Brothers (2005) 80 ALJR 317 cited
Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 cited
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 75 ALJR 982 cited
Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch 205 cited
SZFDZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 155 FCR 482 cited
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 cited
SZVAG & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No. 2) [2014] FCCA 2536 cited
VBAO v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 233 CLR 1 cited
WZAPNv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 cited
Date of hearing: 19 November 2014
Place: Brisbane (heard in Sydney) via video link to Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 67
Solicitor for the Appellant: Mr C McArdle of McArdle Legal
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 927 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

SZTMH
Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 FEBRUARY 2015

WHERE…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 124
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal was brought by the appellant, a citizen of China, against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia that dismissed his application for judicial review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal to refuse his application for a protection visa. The appellant sought to challenge the Tribunal's refusal to accept facts that were obvious to him, including the similarities between the Catholic Church in Australia and the underground Catholic church in China. The appellant also contended that the Tribunal was predisposed to refuse his application, thereby denying him procedural fairness, and that the Tribunal's decision was encumbered by characteristics that would lead a reasonable person to apprehend bias.

The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's decision was affected by apprehended bias, which would render the decision unlawful. The court considered the appellant's allegations of bias, including the Tribunal's questioning of the appellant about his religious beliefs and activities, the Tribunal's reliance on US reports for country information, and the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's likelihood of suffering harm in Fujian province. The court found that the Tribunal's assessment of the appellant's likelihood of suffering harm in Fujian province was appropriate, as it was reasonable to infer that the appellant would return there if he were to go back to China. The court also found that the Tribunal's use of country information sourced from US reports was appropriate, as the Tribunal was required to rely on reputable country information to establish the risk of harm to the appellant in his home province.

The court concluded that the record did not support a finding of apprehended bias, and that the appellant failed to establish jurisdictional error. Therefore, the primary judge dismissed the appellant's application for review. The appellant appealed the decision, raising additional grounds of appeal based on the judgment of North J in WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947, which was delivered after the Circuit Court's judgment. The court granted the appellant leave to rely on the grounds based on WZAPN as those grounds were not raised before the primary judge. However, the court found that the grounds based on WZAPN did not have a reasonable prospect of success, as the court was not persuaded that the Tribunal failed to apply the correct test when assessing whether the appellant was at risk of serious harm within the meaning of s 91R of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal. The court found that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success, as one ground had a reasonable prospect of success, but the remaining grounds had no reasonable prospect of success. The court did not find that s 486E of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) was contravened, as the appeal had a reasonable prospect of success on one ground.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The appellant has appealed from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“the Circuit Court”) which dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent, the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (“the Minister”), to refuse to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa.Background The appellant is a citizen of China who lived in Fujian province. He first arrived in Australia on 13 August 2007 on a subclass TU 571 (Schools Sector) visa. He returned to China for brief stays in 2009 and 2012 and for a longer period in 2010. During this time he applied for and was granted a number of different visas. The appellant applied for a protection visa on 6 June 2012. The appellant claims that if he returns to China he will face persecution because of his Catholicism. The appellant claims that he was introduced to the Catholic faith by his girlfriend in around mid-2006 and that when he returned to China, he attended meetings of the underground Catholic church (“the underground church”) with his girlfriend. The underground church is unable to be registered with the Chinese government because it maintains its allegiance to the Vatican instead of the Communist Party. The appellant claims that during one visit to China in April 2012, his girlfriend organised three youth group meetings of the underground church at the home of a church member. The appellant was to speak to other young people about his Catholic beliefs and understandings based on his experiences overseas. He claims that the police arrived suddenly during the third meeting on the suspicion that attendees were participating in an illegal meeting. The police found three bibles and two hymn books which had been published in Taiwan. The attendees were taken away and interrogated by the police. The appellant told the police that he did not think the meeting was illegal and that everyone had the right to freedom of religious belief. Following his interrogation, he was sent to a detention centre with a number of other leaders of the underground church including his girlfriend. He was kept in detention for 18 days. During the period of his detention, he claims that he was interrogated, forced to complete manual labour and subjected to “inhuman torture”. The appellant feared that he would be tortured to death. The appellant states that he was released from detention on 27 April 2012, after his father provided a large bribe to the police and the other members of the church told the police that the appellant was not a member of the underground church and did not provide any support to them. The appellant left China on 2 May 2012 after his father allegedly bribed an officer at the airport in Fuzhou. Upon his arrival in Australia, the appellant learned that a number of attendees of the youth group had confessed that the appellant was a key member of the underground church. He claims that since then, his family have been investigated by the police.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal found that there was no evidence to suggest the appellant would face a real chance of serious harm in China on the basis of his religious practice in Australia. The Tribunal found that there was no real chance that the appellant would face persecution in the reasonably foreseeable future if he returned to China. The Tribunal also affirmed the delegate’s decision on the complementary protection criterion. The Circuit Court’s decision The appellant relied on the following grounds in his application for review of the Tribunal’s decision made to the Circuit Court:1.The Applicant appeals against or in the alternative seeks a declaration as specified above regarding the entirety of the purported privative clause decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 19 September 2013 on the grounds that it was not a decision under the act.Particularsi. Section 5Eii.Transcript and evidence, whereby the Tribunal refused to accept facts that are obvious.iii.For example, the Catholic Church in Australia is an identical body to the Underground church in China.2.The Tribunal “come what may” did not permit the facts as to religious intolerance in Fujian province China to be considered. See decision record generally, and especially paragraph 64 and 65.3.The Tribunal did not permit the facts as to the application of the refugee application to be considered. See generally and especially paragraph 74, 79, 834.The Tribunal was so predisposed to refuse to believe the applicant as to deny them procedural fairness by way of statutory breach5.The Tribunal’s conclusion was encumbered by characteristics which would lead a reasonable person to apprehend bias, and was thus not an effective decision that is protected by Section 474.(Errors in original) The primary judge narrowed the appellant’s grounds of review into the question of whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by apprehended bias. The primary judge had before him a transcript of the Tribunal hearing. The transcript had been typed by an interpreter and annexed to an affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant. The appellant relied on the transcript to support his allegation that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by apprehended bias. It is convenient to summarise both the appellant’s allegations and the primary judge’s findings on the question of apprehended bias.·The appellant argued that the question “Other than your religious beliefs and activities, what other reasons are you afraid to return to China?” evidences an intention on the part of the Tribunal to dismiss the entirety of the appellant’s claim because of his religion. The primary judge found that this question gave an opportunity for the appellant to advance the claims he wished to rely on.·The appellant claimed he was “peppered” with questions regarding the practice of Catholics at Christmas. The primary judge held that the questions asked were legitimate, and provided the appellant with an opportunity to address doubts about whether he was a genuine Catholic.·The appellant contended that the Tribunal subjected him to a “bible quiz” and that it was “probable that the Member [was] not interested in hearing the answers”. The primary judge was prepared to accept that at one point, the Tribunal asked a question before the appellant had a chance to finish his previous answer. However, the primary judge was not prepared to find that the Tribunal was not interested in the answer because it then gave the appellant an opportunity to finish his answer.·The appellant claimed that the Tribunal’s questioning over what he said to the police during his detention evinced an intention on the part of the Tribunal to fault his claims. The primary judge was not prepared to accept this argument, and found that the Tribunal’s questioning of the appellant merely formed part of the Tribunal’s obligation of disclosure under the Act.·The appellant contended that the Tribunal cut the evidence of Father McGee short. The primary judge found that the Tribunal was aware that the interpreter had been booked for a fixed period. Rather than “being uninterested” in the evidence that was being given, the Tribunal was cognisant of the fact that the appellant had an opportunity to understand the events of the hearing while the interpreter was present; with no interpreter, the hearing could not have proceeded. The primary judge also noted that the appellant could have recalled Father McGee on the adjourned hearing date. The primary judge did not accept that the Tribunal determined that Father McGee was a perjurer. ·The primary judge found that the Tribunal’s assessment of the appellant’s likelihood of suffering harm in Fujian province was appropriate because it was reasonable to infer that he would return there if he were to go back to China. The harm he claimed he would suffer in a different province was not relevant to the determination of the matter before the Tribunal.·Finally, the appellant complained about the use of country information sourced from US reports by the Tribunal. The primary judge found that it was appropriate for the Tribunal to rely on “reputable country information” to establish the risk of harm to the appellant in his home province.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge concluded that the record did not support a finding of apprehended bias. As the appellant failed to establish jurisdictional error, the primary judge dismissed the appellant’s application for review. Consideration The appellant raised the following grounds of appeal in his notice of appeal to this Court:1.The Federal Circuit Court erred when it rejected ground 1 of the Application before it.Particularsi.Section 5E Migration Actii.Transcript and evidence, whereby the Tribunal refuses to accept facts that are obvious.iii.For example, the Catholic Church in Australia is an identical body to the Underground catholic church in China.2.The Federal Circuit Court erred when, despite the Application, it found that the Tribunal had not applied an onerous standard of proof.Particularsi.Failure to note the expressed belief by the Tribunal that the Appellant had not addressed the issue of persecution to the Tribunal, which was the opposite of the facts.3.The Federal Circuit Court erred when, despite the Application, and despite the authorities, it found that a reasonable person would not have apprehended bias on the part of the Tribunal, and therefore contrary to the Act. In his written outline of submissions the appellant raised for the first time additional particulars of his first two grounds of appeal, based on the judgment of North J in WZAPNv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 (“WZAPN”). WZAPN was delivered on 3 September 2014, after the Circuit Court’s judgment had been delivered on 22 August 2014, but before the institution of this appeal. The Minister has applied for special leave to appeal to the High Court from the decision in WZAPN. The Minister objected to the appellant relying on the grounds based on WZAPN as those grounds were not raised before the primary judge. Parties are generally bound by the conduct of their case at first instance. A court will permit a party to raise a point that was not raised at trial only in limited circumstances and in the interests of justice: see Park v Brothers (2005) 80 ALJR 317 at [34] and the cases cited therein. As WZAPN had not been delivered before the Circuit Court gave its judgment, I am prepared to grant the appellant the leave necessary to rely on the grounds based on that case. In WZAPN, North J found that the Tribunal failed to apply the correct test when assessing whether the appellant in that case was at risk of serious harm within the meaning of s 91R(1)(b) and (2)(a) of the Act. Section 91R provides, relevantly:91R Persecution(1)For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol does not apply in relation to persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in that Article unless:(a)that reason is the essential and significant reason, or those reasons are the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and(b) the persecution involves serious harm to the person; and (c) the persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct.(2)Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:(a) a threat to the person’s life or liberty;(b) significant physical harassment of the person; (c) significant physical ill-treatment of the person;…