BUK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BUK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 558

Appeal from: BUK16 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3279
File number: NSD 2279 of 2018
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 28 April 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from costs order made in migration litigation in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge made a finding that the litigation had no reasonable prospects of success – whether the primary judge was required to consider whether to make an order under s 486F of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) against the appellant’s former lawyer – whether former lawyer contravened s 486E – former lawyer encouraging the commencement of the litigation, including by advising the appellants their application had a 100 per cent chance of success – grounds in proceeding below contrary to well established body of authority – whether orders under s 486F may be made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in connection with proceedings in Federal Circuit Court of Australia – matters relevant to the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 486F
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 65, 91X, 422B, 424A, 425, 486E, 486F, 486I, Pts 7, 8B

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 28, 37AG

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 4.12

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

AKD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 3026; 315 FLR 228

BRF038 v Republic of Nauru [2017] HCA 44; 349 ALR 67

BUK16 & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3279

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Thiyagarajah (2000) 199 CLR 343

Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZMKG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 177 FCR 555

SZTMH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 550

VHAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 80

Date of hearing: 14 October 2019
Date of last submissions: 25 October 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 75
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr M Forgacs
Solicitor for the Appellants: Wotton + Kearney Pty Limited
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice

ORDERS

NSD 2279 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BUK16

First Appellant

BUL16

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

CHARLESWORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

28 APRIL 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is allowed.

2.Order 2 made by…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 558
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of BUK16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the primary dispute revolves around the litigation conducted by the appellants in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The appellants sought to challenge the Minister's decision to refuse their application for a protection visa. The legal issues at the core of this case pertain to whether the primary judge correctly determined that the litigation had no reasonable prospects of success, and if the primary judge was required to consider making an order under section 486F of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) against the appellant's former lawyer, who allegedly contravened section 486E by advising the appellants that their application had a 100% chance of success. Additionally, the case examined the grounds presented in the proceedings below and their alignment with established authority, as well as the applicability of section 486F orders in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

The court meticulously reviewed the arguments presented, particularly focusing on the statutory provisions and the procedural fairness obligations outlined in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The court emphasised that section 422B of the Act, which provides for the comprehensive procedural code in respect of the requirements of procedural fairness, excludes the common law natural justice hearing rule. The court also highlighted the importance of the information and invitation requirements under section 424A, which mandate that the Tribunal must provide the applicant with clear particulars of any information relevant to the review and ensure the applicant understands its relevance and consequences. The court noted that the appellants had been afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to present their arguments, as required by section 425 of the Act. Ultimately, the court found that the appellant's arguments did not align with the established authority and that the primary judge's determination was correct.

In light of the court's reasoning, the appeal was allowed. The court set aside the costs order made by Judge Dowdy on 20 November 2018 in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia proceedings and substituted it with new orders. Specifically, Christopher Levingston & Associates Pty Ltd was required to pay the costs incurred by the first respondent in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia proceedings. Additionally, the law firm was ordered to repay the costs and disbursements paid by the appellants in connection with the same proceedings. Lastly, the court ordered the suppression of the appellants' names in any materials related to these proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. Order 2 made by Judge Dowdy on 20 November 2018 in Federal Circuit Court of Australia proceedings SYG 1834/2016 is set aside and, in lieu of that order, there be orders in terms of [3] and [4] of these orders.

3. Pursuant to s 486F(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Christopher Levingston & Associates Pty Ltd is to pay the costs incurred by the first respondent in Federal Circuit Court of Australia proceedings SYG 1834/2016.

4. Pursuant to s 486F(1)(c)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), Christopher Levingston & Associates Pty Ltd is to repay to the appellants the costs and disbursements paid by them pursuant to the costs agreement forming annexure “SA1” to the affidavit of the second appellant sworn on 18 September 2019 or otherwise charged in connection with Federal Circuit Court of Australia proceedings SYG 1834/2016.

5. Pursuant to s 37AG of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and s 91X(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the names of the appellants be suppressed as they appear in any materials filed, adduced or transcribed in these proceedings.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an appeal by BUK16 against the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellants, BUK16, sought a protection visa in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, represented by their migration agent, who had encouraged them to commence the litigation, advising them their application had a 100 per cent chance of success. This advice contradicted a well-established body of authority. The Federal Circuit Court rejected the grounds of the appeal, finding the litigation had no reasonable prospects of success. The court made an order under s 486F of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) against the appellants’ former lawyer, Christopher Levingston & Associates Pty Ltd, requiring them to pay the costs incurred by the Minister and to repay the costs and disbursements paid by the appellants.

This appeal originated from a decision made in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, where the primary judge dismissed the appellants' application for a protection visa. The appellants, dissatisfied with the outcome, appealed to the Federal Court of Australia. The appeal was heard and decided by the Federal Court, which allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order made in the Federal Circuit Court. The Federal Court made orders under s 486F of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) against the appellants’ former lawyer, requiring them to pay the costs incurred by the Minister and to repay the costs and disbursements paid by the appellants.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In his written reasons for rejecting these claims, the Minister’s delegate had regard to country information reports published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2013 and 2014 concerning the general security situation in Iraq and the treatment of Shias there.The Tribunal’s decision The delegate’s decision was reviewed by the Tribunal in the exercise of powers conferred under Pt 7 of the Act, titled “Reviewable decisions: conduct of review”. Importantly, s 422B of the Act provides that Div 4 of Pt 7 is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with. Section 424A is contained in Div 4. It provides:424A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:(a)give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and(b)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.(2) The information and invitation must be given to the applicant:(a)except where paragraph (b) applies—by one of the methods specified in section 441A; or(b)if the applicant is in immigration detention—by a method prescribed for the purposes of giving documents to such a person.(2A)The Tribunal is not obliged under this section to give particulars of information to an applicant, nor invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, if the Tribunal gives clear particulars of the information to the applicant, and invites the applicant to comment on or respond to the information, under section 424AA.(3) This section does not apply to information:(a)that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or(b)that the applicant gave for the purpose of the application for review; or(ba)that the applicant gave during the process that led to the decision that is under review, other than such information that was provided orally by the applicant to the Department; or(c)that is non disclosable information.(4)A reference in this section to affirming a decision that is under review does not include a reference to the affirmation of a decision that is taken to be affirmed under subsection 426A(1F). Section 425(1) of the Act provides:(1)The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. In response to an invitation given under s 425(1), the appellants each appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments. They were represented at the hearings by a migration agent. Following the hearings, the Tribunal issued an invitation to each appellant under s 424A to comment on inconsistencies in their evidence. The appellants responded with the assistance of their representative.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge went on to note that the 2015 Report was not put into evidence by either party. There was, his Honour said “no suggestion that it was in any way specifically about the Applicants for the purposes of s.424A(3)(a) of the Act” (at [28]). He continued (at [36]):The following passage from the judgment of Bennett and Foster JJ in SZNKG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 177 FCR 555 at 567 - 568 [49] - [50] is adversely dispositive of Mr Arch’s submissions, and in particular with respect to s.425 of the Act:[49]The reasons advanced in support of this submission may be shortly stated as follows:(a)Section 422B(I) was introduced into the Act by Act No 60 of 2002. This Act received the Royal Assent on 3 July 2002 and commenced the next day. The Review Application in VEAL 225 CLR 88 was determined by the Tribunal on 14 June 2002 and was thus not subject to s 422B(1). The High Court in VEAL 225 CLR 88 was·considering a statutory scheme which did not include s 422B(1) or any provision of like effect;(b) Section 422B(1) provides that Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act:… is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with.(c)The effect of that provision is that Div 4 of Pt 7 provides a comprehensive procedural code in respect of the requirements of procedural fairness that must be accorded to review applicants in the conduct of reviews under that Division to the exclusion of the common law natural justice hearing rule (see VXDC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 146 FCR 562 at [22]-[31]; and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214 at [60]-[70]);(d)The principles invoked by the High Court in VEAL 225 CLR 88 are part of the common law procedural fairness principles that are encompassed within what is described in s 422B(1) as ‘the natural justice hearing rule’;(e)In the present case the Tribunal’s procedural fairness obligations are limited to putting information that would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review (subject to certain exceptions, as to which see s 424A(3)) to the appellant in writing pursuant to s 424A(l), or, orally during the hearing, pursuant to s 424AA, and to affording to the appellant a fair and reasonable opportunity of ascertaining and of responding to those issues which are determinative of his application during the course of the hearing (s 425 of the Act);(f)The information and material which was the subject of the references made by the Tribunal in [19], [37] and [79] of its reasons were not the reason nor part of the reason for the Tribunal’s decision to affirm the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant a protection visa to the appellant;(g)In addition, and in any event, the information contained in the OSCO reports was general country information and was therefore excepted from the requirements of s 424A(l) by s 424A(3)(a) and similarly excepted from the requirements of s 424AA if that section was engaged in the present case (see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v NAMW (2004) 140 FCR 572); and(h)Accordingly, none of s 424AA, s 424A or s 425 was engaged in the present case and there was no room for any residual operation of the common law natural justice hearing rule.[50]We think that these submissions are correct and we accept them. The appellant therefore fails in the principal arguments advanced by him to this Court.(original emphasis)