Buk16 v Minister for Immigration
[2018] FCCA 3279
•20 November 2018
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BUK16 & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 3279 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – protection visa application – claim that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by not providing to the applicants country information or an opportunity to rebut country information in breach of natural justice and in beach of s.425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Tribunal’s failure to provide country information to the applicants did not breach s.425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) due to being specifically excluded from requiring to be provided under s.424A(3)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and s.422B(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) confined natural justice in this case – no jurisdictional error established – application for judicial review dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 357A, 422B, 424A, 425 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) |
| Cases cited: AKD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 315 FLR 228 AWA15 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 604 BRF038 v Republic of Nauru (2017) 349 ALR 67 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 243 CLR 319 Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 SZNKG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 177 FCR 555 VHAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 80 |
| First Applicant: | BUK16 |
| Second Applicant: | BUL16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1834 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Dowdy |
| Hearing date: | 9 August 2017 |
| Date Judgment Reserved: | 1 December 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 20 November 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | Mr M. Arch |
| Solicitors for the Applicants: | Christopher Levingston & Associates |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr T. Reilly of Counsel |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE AS FOLLOWS:
The Application filed in this Court on 15 July 2016 is dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1834 of 2016
| BUK16 |
First Applicant
| BUL16 |
Second Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The First Applicant in this proceeding is a male citizen of Iraq aged 70 years, having been born on 2 January 1948.
The Second Applicant in this proceeding is a female citizen of Iraq aged 56 years, having been born on 6 February 1962 and is the wife of the First Applicant (collectively the Applicants).
By Application filed in this Court on 15 July 2016 they seek to quash and have re-determined the decision of the Second Respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal), dated 24 June 2016 which affirmed the respective decisions each dated 3 August 2014 of the Delegate (Delegate) of the First Respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Minister), refusing to grant to them Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visas (Protection visa(s)).
The First Applicant was granted a Tourist (Class TR) (Subclass 676) visa (Tourist visa) offshore on 10 March 2013 and arrived in Australia on 8 April 2013, and lodged his application for a Protection visa on 20 May 2013. The Second Applicant was also granted a Tourist visa offshore on 10 March 2013 and arrived in Australia on 8 April 2013, and lodged her application for a Protection visa on 20 May 2013.
Claims for Protection
First Applicant’s Claims
The First Applicant claimed as follows:
a)He faced serious threats to his life and liberty because of the growing domination of religious militias in Iraq.
b)His family were victims of the sectarian war in Iraq which they opposed.
c)He encountered corruption and mismanagement at the oil company where he worked, and wanted to “blow the whistle”, but realised that those who were responsible were powerful and well protected by their political supporters.
d)He received many death threats against members of his family and himself, and there is currently in Iraq an antagonism towards educated people who support a secular state.
e)He was accused of being an enemy of Islamic State, and feared being killed or imprisoned in Iraq for expressing his ideas; he had experienced physical and psychological harm and he feared harm from religious militias and government officials if he returns to Iraq.
Second Applicant’s Claims
The Second Applicant claimed as follows:
a)Her family had to leave Baghdad due to the “sectarian war”. They returned to live in Al Amarah in the south of Iraq.
b)Al Amarah is a conservative town controlled by Al Sadr followers.
c)She is a midwife who used to work from home and was later employed at a hospital.
d)As a mid-wife her life was exposed to danger from armed people who forced her to work at gunpoint.
e)One morning at 2am, members of the Al Sadr “Current” forced her to go with them.
f)In Iraq woman are completely deprived of their rights and· looked upon as “inferior creatures” especially by the “fanatics” who are the dominant political force in Iraq.
g)She was forced at gun point to go and treat injured individuals who could not go to hospital.
h)She was subjected to harassment and abuse by religious groups and their militias.
i)The dominant religious militias and the government aim to implant religious laws which deprive woman of their basic rights.
Relevant Criteria and Law Applicable to Protection Visa Applications
A convenient summary of the relevant grounds and criteria for the grant of the Protection visas in this proceeding can be found in the judgment of Charlesworth J in AWA15 v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 604 at [5] – [7] as follows:
[5]The Minister is to grant a visa if satisfied that the visa applicant satisfies the relevant criteria. If the Minister is not so satisfied, he must refuse to grant the visa: s 65(1) of the Act. For the appellant to qualify for the grant of a protection visa it was necessary for the Minister to be satisfied that (among other things) the appellant fulfilled either the criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Act (Refugee Criterion) or the criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act (Complementary Protection Criterion).
[6]The Refugee Criterion requires that the Minister be satisfied that the visa applicant is a non-citizen in Australia to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention, as amended by the Refugees Protocol, namely a person who:
... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
[7]Relevantly, the Complementary Protection Criterion requires that the visa applicant be a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because:
... the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; ....
Decision of Delegate
The First Applicant attended interviews with the Delegate on 22 November 2013 and 6 June 2014 and was accompanied by the Second Applicant at each interview. The Second Applicant also attended interviews with the Delegate on 22 November 2013 and 6 June 2014 and was accompanied by the First Applicant at each interview.
The Delegate considered the claims of the Applicants as made in their Protection visa applications, in a submission and materials provided by the Applicants’ migration agent and as made at the interviews with them.
In the result the Delegate made adverse credibility findings against the First Applicant and found that he had not provided an open and honest account of his movements and experiences in Iraq, and with respect to the Second Applicant, the Delegate found that there was no credible evidence to suggest that an adverse profile or religious profile would cause her to be targeted in Iraq.
Accordingly, the Delegate was not satisfied that Australia had protection obligations to the Applicants under s.36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) and cl.866.221 of Sch.2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the Regulations).
Decision of Tribunal
The Applicants applied to the Tribunal on 22 September 2014 for merits review of the Delegate’s decisions.
The Applicants appeared before the Tribunal on 21 October 2015, and again on 5 November 2015 to give evidence and present arguments with their migration representative in attendance.
At [21] of its Decision Record the Tribunal recorded that it did not find the First Applicant to be a credible and truthful witness having regard, in particular, to various inconsistencies in his evidence since making his Protection visa application and the unpersuasive nature of some key aspects of his claims. The Tribunal then at [22] – [37] set out its reasoning in this respect, and at [38] recorded that it found the totality of the First Applicant’s evidence as showing a propensity to fabricate claims and tailor and shift his evidence in a manner which sought to achieve his own purpose. At [39] – [46] the Tribunal recorded its more specific factual findings and at [47] – [48] noted its rejection of the First Applicant’s claims that he would be targeted for harm personally or as a member of a group in Iraq, or that there was any risk to him arising from the situation of general insecurity and political and sectarian violence in Iraq.
From [49] – [56] of its Decision Record the Tribunal considered the Second Applicant’s claims and recorded its findings, which were adverse to her.
In the result, having considered the Applicants’ claims individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal affirmed the decisions of the Delegate not to grant Protection visas to the Applicants.
I note that each Decision Record of the Delegate referred to DFAT Country Information of 29 November 2013 and June 2014, and copies of each Decision Record were given to the Tribunal at the time of lodging their review applications.
Ground of Attack on Tribunal Decision in this Court
The Ground relied upon by the Applicants is as follows:
1. The decision of 24 June 2016 is infected by jurisdictional error by reason of its failure to accord the Applicants procedural fairness.
Particulars
(a) At paragraph 20 of the decision record the tribunal refers to Ministerial Direction No.56 and in particular “country information” and the fact of the tribunal having "had regard to the DFAT Country Report Iraq (published on 13 February 2015); subsequently the tribunal refers at paragraph 42 that "The tribunal has found no information in any of the sources consulted to suggest that Shias holding secular views are at risk of serious or significant harm". The failure to provide the applicant with a copy of the country information and a proper opportunity to rebut the “findings” incorporated in that undisclosed document constitute a breach of procedural fairness.
(b) At Paragraph 46 of the decision record the Tribunal has had regard to the DFAT Country Report Iraq (published on 13 February 2015); concerning; inter alia, "general insecurity in Iraq". The failure to provide the applicant with a copy of the country information and a proper opportunity to rebut the “findings” incorporated in that undisclosed document constitute a breach of procedural fairness.
As may be seen, the Ground is a succinct one, namely to the effect that the Tribunal decision was made in breach of the rules of natural justice in that the Tribunal was procedurally unfair in not:
a)providing the Applicants with a copy of the DFAT Country Report Iraq of 13 February 2015 (DFAT 2015 Report); and
b)providing to the Applicants “a proper opportunity to rebut the ‘findings’ incorporated” in the DFAT 2015 Report.
In his Written Submissions Mr Arch, who appeared for the Applicants at the hearing, relied in particular on the decisions of the High Court in Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex Parte Miah (2001) 206 CLR 57 (Miah) and SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 (SZBEL) as supporting his argument that the Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by failing to provide to the Applicant a copy of the DFAT 2015 Report and “…with an opportunity to respond to, comment on, or rebut the material in that Report”.
At the hearing Mr Arch also relied on s.425(1) of the Act, which he contended stood “separate and independent from what is said in s.424A” and further submitted that s.425(1) “trumps” s.424A(3)(a), which latter section was relied up by Mr Reilly of Counsel, who appeared for the Minister at the hearing.
Relevantly, s.424A of the Act provides:
424A Information and invitation given in writing by Tribunal
(1) Subject to subsections (2A) and (3), the Tribunal must:
(a)give to the applicant, in the way that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances, clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and
(b) ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why it is relevant to the review, and the consequences of it being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and
(c) invite the applicant to comment on or respond to it.
...
(3) This section does not apply to information:
(a) that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member; or
…
Consideration
It is clearly established that questions concerning the nature and scope of procedural fairness in connection with the exercise of statutory powers must begin with the terms of the relevant legislation. In Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 Brennan J said respectively at 614 and 633 as follows:
To ascertain what must be done to comply with the principles of natural justice in a particular case, the starting point is the statute creating the power. By construing the statute, one ascertains not only whether the power is conditioned on observance of the principles of natural justice but also whether there are any special procedural steps which, being prescribed by statute, extend or restrict what the principles of natural justice would otherwise require…
(page 614)
The precise content of the requirements of procedural fairness which must be observed by a particular administrative decision-maker is controlled by any relevant statutory provisions and may vary according to the circumstances of the particular case…
(page 633)
In this case Mr Reilly submitted that s.424A(3)(a) of the Act did relevantly restrict the scope and nature of procedural fairness in connection with the DFAT 2015 Report. He submitted, and I accept, that the DFAT 2015 Report was country information which fell within the exception provided by s.424A(3)(a) and accordingly the Tribunal was not obliged under s.424A(1) to give a copy of such report to the Applicants, or invite them to comment on or respond to it.
The law in this regard is well settled and was set out by Kenny J in the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in VHAJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 131 FCR 80 at 95 [50] in the following terms:
[50]It is usual for the Tribunal to have regard to information about the social, political, religious and other conditions prevailing in a country relevant to an applicant’s claim for refugee status, with a view to assessing whether other individuals who share his or her racial, religious, political, social or other attributes suffer treatment of a kind amounting to persecution on Convention grounds in that country. Sometimes information of this kind concerns religious practice, government elections, educational opportunities or other matters. This kind of country information is relevant to the Tribunal’s decision-making task only because the applicant falls within the class of persons who share an attribute, which, according to his or her claim, gives rise to a well-founded fear of persecution in the country concerned. In this circumstance, the information does not cease to be information “just about” a class of persons simply because it can also be characterised as information about religious practice, government elections or educational opportunities. It has been repeatedly held that information of this kind falls within s 424A(3)(a) of the Act: see, eg, Tharairasa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 281 per Carr J; Pannasara v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001]FCA 570 per Carr, Lindgren and Katz JJ; Akpata v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 402 per O’Loughlin J; Islam v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 430 per RD Nicholson J; Kola v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 630 per Mansfield J; and W104/00A v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 771 per Lee J. Contrast VEAJ of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 678 at [36]-[38] and [43] per Gray J.
If there was any doubt about the matter, which there is not, it would be set to rest by the following passage from the judgment of the High Court in Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 243 CLR 319 (Plaintiff M61) per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel (as she then was) and Bell JJ at 356 – 357 [91]:
[91]Thirdly, procedural fairness required the reviewer to put before the plaintiff the substance of matters that the reviewer knew of and considered may bear upon whether to accept the plaintiff’s claims. The Migration Act makes special provision about how the Refugee Review Tribunal is to conduct its reviews. It provides (s 424A(1)) that the Tribunal must give an applicant “clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review”. But that obligation is subject to qualifications. In particular, it does not extend (s 424A(3)(a)) to information “that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member”. Hence country information is treated as a class of information which need not be drawn to the attention of applicants for review by the Refugee Review Tribunal. But those provisions were not engaged in respect of Independent Merits Reviews of the kind now under consideration or, we would add, in respect of the initial Refugee Status Assessments. The reviewer should have put to the plaintiff for his consideration and comment those aspects of country information known to the reviewer which the reviewer considered may bear upon the claims the plaintiff made. He did not.
(emphasis added)
Finally, in this connection it should be noted that in SZBEL itself the High Court noted the exclusory effect of s.424A(3)(a) of the Act in stating at [27] – [28] as follows:
[27]First, the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) obliged (s 425(1)) the Tribunal to “invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. The Tribunal was not bound to extend such an invitation to appear, if it considered that “it should decide the review in the applicant’s favour on the basis of the material before it” (s 425(2)(a)).
[28]Secondly, the Act empowered (s 424(1)) the Tribunal to seek additional information that it considered relevant, and obliged (s 424A(1)) the Tribunal to give to an applicant particulars of certain information that the Tribunal considered would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review. That latter obligation did not apply (s 424A(3)(a)) to information “that is not specifically about the applicant or another person and is just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person is a member”.
(emphasis added),
but then proceeded to point out at [29] that the position and circumstances in SZBEL were not affected by any such provision of the Act as s.424A(3)(a).
The DFAT 2015 Report was not put into evidence by either party but there was no suggestion that it was in any way specifically about the Applicants for the purposes of s.424A(3)(a) of the Act.
In Miah, which was relied on by Mr Arch, the High Court held that general common law obligations of natural justice were such that a delegate of the Minister under the Act, before making a decision on a Protection visa application, was bound to first advise the relevant applicant of substantial new relevant material on which he might rely when making his decision, and then to invite the applicant to comment on it.
However, the Commonwealth Parliament responded to Miah by enacting s.357A(1) of the Act for Part 5-reviewable decisions and s.422B(1) for Part 7-reviewable decisions. Section 422B(1) provides as follows:
422BExhaustive statement of natural justice hearing rule
(1)This Division is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with.
The effect of s.422B(1) of the Act was stated by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Khan v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 192 FCR 173 (Khan) at 184 [39] per Buchanan J, and agreed in by Yates J at [87], as follows:
[39]Parliament responded with the enactment of s 357A(1) (and similar provisions). Those provisions have, generally, been regarded in this Court as a clear statement of legislative intent excluding the continuing operation of common law principles of natural justice in the conduct of reviews by the MRT and the RRT (see, for example, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214 at [60]-[70]; SZCIJ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 62 at [7]-[8]; Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 176 FCR 53 at [24]-[32], [46]). Nevertheless, it is now clear that s 357A(1) (and similar provisions) are only effective to exclude the natural justice rule with respect to “matters” actually dealt with in the provisions to which they refer (Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252 at [35]-[42])…
See also the decision of Flick J in SZNSI v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 223 at [13] – [14].
Clearly s.424A of the Act is part of Division 4 of the Act and s.422B(1) means that any general law obligation which there otherwise might have been to give a copy of the DFAT 2015 Report to the Applicants and invite them to comment and respond to it was excluded: see Khan at [40] per Buchanan J and [87] per Yates J.
In my view the decision in Miah does not support this Ground. It predates the enactment of s.422B(1) of the Act, which relevantly negates its effect with respect to Tribunal decisions. I am further of the view that SZBEL does not assist the Applicants. That case was also decided before the enactment of s.422B(1). In SZBEL the High Court held that there had not been compliance with s.425(1) of the Act (which required that the Tribunal “…must invite the Applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”) because in the circumstances of that case the Tribunal had denied procedural fairness in that it had not notified the review applicant of potentially dispositive findings which differed from those of the delegate whose decision was being reviewed by the Tribunal.
However, as I have noted above at [27] the High Court expressly recognised that s.424A(3)(a) of the Act could affect the content of the Tribunal’s obligation to accord procedural fairness, but that in the particular circumstances of SZBEL it did not.
In my view, there is nothing in SZBEL that supports the Ground pressed here.
The following passage from the judgment of Bennett and Foster JJ in SZNKG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 177 FCR 555 at 567 – 568 [49] – [50] is adversely dispositive of Mr Arch’s submissions, and in particular with respect to s.425 of the Act:
[49]The reasons advanced in support of this submission may be shortly stated as follows:
(a) Section 422B(1) was introduced into the Act by Act No 60 of 2002. This Act received the Royal Assent on 3 July 2002 and commenced the next day. The Review Application in VEAL 225 CLR 88 was determined by the Tribunal on 14 June 2002 and was thus not subject to s 422B(1). The High Court in VEAL 225 CLR 88 was considering a statutory scheme which did not include s 422B(1) or any provision of like effect;
(b) Section 422B(1) provides that Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act:
… is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with.
(c)The effect of that provision is that Div 4 of Pt 7 provides a comprehensive procedural code in respect of the requirements of procedural fairness that must be accorded to review applicants in the conduct of reviews under that Division to the exclusion of the common law natural justice hearing rule (see VXDC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 146 FCR 562 at [22]-[31]; and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214 at [60]-[70]);
(d) The principles invoked by the High Court in VEAL 225 CLR 88 are part of the common law procedural fairness principles that are encompassed within what is described in s 422B(1) as “the natural justice hearing rule”;
(e) In the present case the Tribunal’s procedural fairness obligations are limited to putting information that would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review (subject to certain exceptions, as to which see s 424A(3)) to the appellant in writing pursuant to s 424A(1), or, orally during the hearing, pursuant to s 424AA, and to affording to the appellant a fair and reasonable opportunity of ascertaining and of responding to those issues which are determinative of his application during the course of the hearing (s 425 of the Act);
(f) The information and material which was the subject of the references made by the Tribunal in [19], [37] and [79] of its reasons were not the reason nor part of the reason for the Tribunal’s decision to affirm the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant a protection visa to the appellant;
(g) In addition, and in any event, the information contained in the OSCO reports was general country information and was therefore excepted from the requirements of s 424A(1) by s 424A(3)(a) and similarly excepted from the requirements of s 424AA if that section was engaged in the present case (see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v NAMW (2004) 140 FCR 572); and
(h) Accordingly, none of s 424AA, s 424A or s 425 was engaged in the present case and there was no room for any residual operation of the common law natural justice hearing rule.
[50]We think that these submissions are correct and we accept them. The appellant therefore fails in the principal arguments advanced by him to this Court.
(emphasis added)
Finally, Mr Arch also relied on the decision of the High Court in BRF038 v Republic of Nauru (2017) 349 ALR 67 (BRF038) and the decision of his Honour Judge Wilson in this Court in AKD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 315 FLR 228 (AKD16). However, both of those cases are in my view clearly distinguishable from this case.
First, in BRF038 the relevant Nauruan legislation reproduced at 70 – 71 [17] – [21] contained no equivalent provisions to ss.422B(1) or 424A(3)(a) of the Act.
Second, AKD16 concerned judicial review of a decision of an officer of the Minister conducting a Protection Obligations Evaluation, to which s.422B(1) and s.424A(3)(a) of the Act did not apply, whereas they do apply to the Tribunal.
Conclusion
In my view, the Applicants have failed to establish that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error and the Application to this Court is to be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding forty (40) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Dowdy
Date: 20 November 2018
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