FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BUK16 & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 3279 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – protection visa application – claim that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by not providing to the applicants country information or an opportunity to rebut country information in breach of natural justice and in beach of s.425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – Tribunal’s failure to provide country information to the applicants did not breach s.425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) due to being specifically excluded from requiring to be provided under s.424A(3)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and s.422B(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) confined natural justice in this case – no jurisdictional error established – application for judicial review dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 357A, 422B, 424A, 425 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) |
| First Applicant: | BUK16 |
| Second Applicant: | BUL16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 1834 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Dowdy |
| Hearing date: | 9 August 2017 |
| Date Judgment Reserved: | 1 December 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 20 November 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicants: | Mr M. Arch |
| Solicitors for the Applicants: | Christopher Levingston & Associates |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr T. Reilly of Counsel |
| Solicitors for the First Respondent: | Australian Government Solicitor |
THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE AS FOLLOWS:
The Application filed in this Court on 15 July 2016 is dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 1834 of 2016
| BUK16 |
First Applicant
| BUL16 |
Second Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The First Applicant in this proceeding is a male citizen of Iraq aged 70 years, having been born on 2 January 1948.
The Second Applicant in this proceeding is a female citizen of Iraq aged 56 years, having been born on 6 February 1962 and is the wife of the First Applicant (collectively the Applicants).
By Application filed in this Court on 15 July 2016 they seek to quash and have re-determined the decision of the Second Respondent, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal), dated 24 June 2016 which affirmed the respective decisions each…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 3279
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was the extent of the Tribunal's obligations regarding the natural justice hearing rule, particularly in light of amendments to the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth) and the application of common law principles. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the Tribunal's procedural fairness obligations were limited to the provisions of Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act, or if common law principles of natural justice could still operate independently. This involved considering the effect of section 422B(1) of the Act, which states that Division 4 is an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule.
Dowdy J adopted the reasoning of Bennett and Foster JJ in *SZNKG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship*, which held that section 422B(1) establishes a comprehensive procedural code for reviews under that Division, to the exclusion of the common law natural justice hearing rule. The Court found that the principles invoked by Mr Arch were part of the common law natural justice hearing rule encompassed by section 422B(1). Furthermore, the Court determined that the specific information and material referenced by the Tribunal were not the reason for its decision, and in any event, the OSCO reports constituted general country information, which was excepted from the notification requirements under section 424A(3)(a). Consequently, the Court concluded that sections 424AA, 424A, and 425 of the Act were not engaged, leaving no room for the residual operation of the common law natural justice hearing rule.
The appeal was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The following passage from the judgment of Bennett and Foster JJ in SZNKG v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2009) 177 FCR 555 at 567 – 568 [49] – [50] is adversely dispositive of Mr Arch’s submissions, and in particular with respect to s.425 of the Act:[49]The reasons advanced in support of this submission may be shortly stated as follows:(a) Section 422B(1) was introduced into the Act by Act No 60 of 2002. This Act received the Royal Assent on 3 July 2002 and commenced the next day. The Review Application in VEAL 225 CLR 88 was determined by the Tribunal on 14 June 2002 and was thus not subject to s 422B(1). The High Court in VEAL 225 CLR 88 was considering a statutory scheme which did not include s 422B(1) or any provision of like effect;(b) Section 422B(1) provides that Div 4 of Pt 7 of the Act:… is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with.(c)The effect of that provision is that Div 4 of Pt 7 provides a comprehensive procedural code in respect of the requirements of procedural fairness that must be accorded to review applicants in the conduct of reviews under that Division to the exclusion of the common law natural justice hearing rule (see VXDC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 146 FCR 562 at [22]-[31]; and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Lat (2006) 151 FCR 214 at [60]-[70]);(d) The principles invoked by the High Court in VEAL 225 CLR 88 are part of the common law procedural fairness principles that are encompassed within what is described in s 422B(1) as “the natural justice hearing rule”;(e) In the present case the Tribunal’s procedural fairness obligations are limited to putting information that would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review (subject to certain exceptions, as to which see s 424A(3)) to the appellant in writing pursuant to s 424A(1), or, orally during the hearing, pursuant to s 424AA, and to affording to the appellant a fair and reasonable opportunity of ascertaining and of responding to those issues which are determinative of his application during the course of the hearing (s 425 of the Act);(f) The information and material which was the subject of the references made by the Tribunal in [19], [37] and [79] of its reasons were not the reason nor part of the reason for the Tribunal’s decision to affirm the delegate’s decision to refuse to grant a protection visa to the appellant;(g) In addition, and in any event, the information contained in the OSCO reports was general country information and was therefore excepted from the requirements of s 424A(1) by s 424A(3)(a) and similarly excepted from the requirements of s 424AA if that section was engaged in the present case (see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v NAMW (2004) 140 FCR 572); and (h) Accordingly, none of s 424AA, s 424A or s 425 was engaged in the present case and there was no room for any residual operation of the common law natural justice hearing rule.[50]We think that these submissions are correct and we accept them. The appellant therefore fails in the principal arguments advanced by him to this Court.(emphasis added)