FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DAB16 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2021] FCA 120
Appeal from: DAB16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3957 File number: WAD 614 of 2018 Judgment of: CHARLESWORTH J Date of judgment: 23 February 2021 Catchwords: MIGRATION – costs orders under s 486F of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where previous finding that migration litigation had no reasonable prospect of success – whether contravention of s 486E of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by a legal practitioner – whether legal practitioner encouraged migration litigation – whether practitioner gave “proper consideration” to the prospect of success of an appeal – consideration of matters relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to award costs – where delay between judgment on substantive issues and determination of costs application –whether previous costs order can and should be varied or set aside Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H, 5J, 36, 473DC, 473DD, 474, 476, 476A, 486E, 486F, 486H, 486I, 486J, 486K
Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 4.12, 39.05
Cases cited: Celand v Skycity Adelaide Pty Ltd (2017) 256 FCR 306
DAB16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 2114
DAB16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3957
FJV18 v Minister for Home Affairs & Anor [2020] FCCA 1032; 351 FLR 315
Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v Treasury Wine Estates Ltd [2019] FCA 1458
SZFDZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 155 FCR 482
SZTMH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 550
Division: General Division Registry: Western Australia National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 102 Date of hearing: 18 February 2020, 22 September 2020, 29 October 2020 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant did not appear (18 February 2020)
Ms H Veale (22 September 2020, 29 October 2020)Solicitor for the Appellant: Dentons Australia Ltd Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D O’Leary Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice ORDERS
WAD 614 of 2018 BETWEEN: DAB16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 FEBRUARY 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to r 39.05(a) and r 39.05(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the orders in paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 of the orders made on 18 February 2020 are set aside.
2.Pursuant to s 486F(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Mr Haidari Smart is to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal, fixed in the sum of $7,000.00.
3.Pursuant to s 486F(1)(c)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Mr Haidari Smart is to pay to the appellant the sum of $5,000.00, by way of repayment of the legal fees paid by the appellant of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders…
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- Case
- [2021] FCA 120
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court had to resolve included whether the email sent by Mr Smart on 18 December 2019 encouraged the appellant to pursue a special leave appeal and if this email was admissible in the context of the case. Furthermore, the court had to assess whether Mr Smart's actions constituted a contravention of section 486E, given his professional obligations to properly consider the prospects of success of migration litigation. The court also considered the appropriate exercise of its discretion in awarding costs under section 486F, including whether a previous costs order could be varied or set aside.
The court found that the email sent by Mr Smart was not relevant to the determination of whether he encouraged migration litigation, as it was submitted after the initial judgment and did not align with the legal standards required under section 486E. It was held that proper consideration of the prospects of success required a balanced and thoughtful assessment, informed by a thorough understanding of migration law and judicial review principles. The court concluded that Mr Smart's actions did not meet the required standard, as he failed to provide a correct understanding of the limitations on the powers of the relevant authorities and the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. Consequently, the court set aside certain orders and ordered Mr Smart to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal, as well as repay a portion of the appellant's legal fees.
The final orders included setting aside specific orders made on 18 February 2020, requiring Mr Haidari Smart to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal and repaying the appellant's legal fees associated with the appeal. The court's decision underscored the importance of legal practitioners adhering to the standards set by section 486E, ensuring that migration litigation is pursued with a reasonable prospect of success.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to r 39.05(a) and r 39.05(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), the orders in paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 of the orders made on 18 February 2020 are set aside.
2. Pursuant to s 486F(1)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Mr Haidari Smart is to pay the Minister’s costs of the appeal, fixed in the sum of $7,000.00.
3. Pursuant to s 486F(1)(c)(ii) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Mr Haidari Smart is to pay to the appellant the sum of $5,000.00, by way of repayment of the legal fees paid by the appellant of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case Dab16 v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) came before the court following an earlier decision where it was found that the migration litigation had no reasonable prospect of success. The previous costs order made on 18 February 2020 was challenged by the appellant. The court was required to determine if the legal practitioner, Mr Haidari Smart, had contravened section 486E of the Migration Act by encouraging migration litigation without proper consideration. The court also had to consider whether the email sent by Mr Smart to the appellant on 18 December 2019 was relevant to the proceedings. The case involved a detailed examination of the content and timing of the email and its admissibility in the context of the legal practitioner's conduct.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the email sent to the appellant by Mr Smart on 18 December 2019 encouraged migration litigation and is relevant to the matters arising for determination under section 486F of the Migration Act.
2. Whether Mr Smart contravened section 486E of the Migration Act by not giving proper consideration to the prospect of success of the migration litigation.
3. What matters are relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to award costs under section 486F of the Migration Act.
4. Whether the delay between the judgment on substantive issues and the determination of the costs application is significant.
5. Whether the previous costs order made on 18 February 2020 can and should be varied or set aside.
Held
1. The email sent to the appellant by Mr Smart on 18 December 2019 is not relevant to the matters arising for determination under section 486F of the Migration Act, and the objection to its admissibility is upheld.
2. Mr Smart contravened section 486E of the Migration Act by not giving proper consideration to the prospect of success of the migration litigation.
3. The matters relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to award costs under section 486F of the Migration Act include the nature of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer’s competency in the area of migration law, and the understanding of the relevant limitations on the powers of the Authority, primary judge on review, and the Court on appeal.
4. The delay between the judgment on substantive issues and the determination of the costs application is not considered significant.
5. The previous costs order made on 18 February 2020 can and should be varied or set aside, with the new orders for costs as specified in the decision.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant’s Counsel sought to draw an inference from an email sent to the appellant from Mr Smart on 18 December 2019 (marked MFI-A2) by which, Counsel submitted, Mr Smart had encouraged the appellant to apply for special leave to appeal from the judgment delivered on 11 December 2019 to the High Court of Australia. Mr Smart objected to the admissibility of the email on the basis that it came into existence after the First Reasons were published and so was not relevant to whether he encouraged the migration litigation in this Court. I do not consider the content of the email to be relevant to the matters arising for determination under s 486F of the Act, not so much because of its timing but because of its content. The email does little more than to attach a copy of the First Reasons, inform the appellant of the time period in which an application for special leave may be made and (appropriately) inform the appellant that he should obtain alternative legal representation in relation to special leave because the issue under s 486F of the Act had arisen, so rendering it inappropriate for Mr Smart to continue to act. I uphold the objection to the admissibility of the email and have not taken it into account.No proper consideration For the purposes of s 486E(1)(b)(i), the subjective views of the legal representative are not determinative in the consideration of whether proper consideration has been given to the prospect of success. In SZFDZ, Moore J said at [25]:… The word ‘proper’ invites consideration of whether, in the circumstances, there was a balanced and thoughtful assessment of the prospects of success, such assessment being directed to whether, objectively, the litigant had prospects of success. … Here, the relevant circumstances include the nature of the lawyer-client relationship and the circumstance that the legal representative holds himself out as competent in the area of migration law, as evidenced by his entering into the retainer. In my view any consideration of the content of the requirement that a lawyer give proper consideration to the prospects of success of particular migration litigation must proceed from the reasonable expectation that the lawyer possesses a minimum degree of knowledge and competency in the migration area, particularly in circumstances where the lawyer holds himself or herself out as entitled to practice for fee or reward. To be “proper”, the lawyer’s consideration must proceed from a proper understanding not only of the Act but of the general law in relation to judicial and appellate review. More specifically in relation to this appeal, the requirement to give proper consideration required (at least) a correct understanding of the relevant limitations on the powers of the Authority, and of the primary judge on review, and of this Court on appeal. It required a correct understanding of the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the FCCA under s 476 of the Act and an appreciation of the difference between judicial review and merits review. It required an appreciation that the broader grounds for review under the ADJR Act did not apply and therefore an appreciation that cases concerning the ambit of that Act had no direct application.