Levick v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Levick v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2000] FCA 674

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Costs – Costs order made against solicitor acting for a debtor covering work done in respect of certain issues raised in a Notice of Opposition filed in bankruptcy proceedings – Whether order ought to have been made – Unarguable points raised in notice – Trial judge satisfied that the points “originated with lawyers” and were intended to delay the making of a sequestration order – Circumstances in which costs may properly be ordered against a solicitor – Whether it would have been more appropriate to require provision of security for costs.

WAYNE R LEVICK v DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
N1466 of 1999

WILCOX, BURCHETT and TAMBERLIN JJ
SYDNEY
23 MAY 2000


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1466 of 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

WAYNE R LEVICK
Appellant

AND:

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

WILCOX, BURCHETT and TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant, Wayne R Levick, pay to the respondent, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, his costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1466 of 1999

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

WAYNE R LEVICK
Appellant

AND:

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

WILCOX, BURCHETT and TAMBERLIN JJ

DATE:

23 MAY 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. THE COURT:  This is an appeal by a solicitor Wayne Levick, against an order made by a judge of the Court (Hill J) imposing upon him personal liability for certain costs incurred by the respondent, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (“the Deputy Commissioner”), in relation to bankruptcy proceedings against Paul Quinn, a client of Mr Levick.

    The history of the proceeding

  2. On 5 March 1999 the Deputy Commissioner filed with the Court a creditor’s petition against Mr Quinn alleging failure by him, on or before 25 November 1998, to comply with the requirements of a bankruptcy notice served on 4 November 1998.  The bankruptcy notice was founded on a final judgment obtained by the Deputy Commissioner against Mr Quinn in the District Court of New South Wales.

  3. On 27 July 1999 the petition was listed before a Deputy Registrar of the Court.  Mr D Fitzgibbon of counsel appeared for Mr Quinn and informed the Deputy Registrar that a Notice of Opposition would be filed that relied on constitutional grounds and the hearing would occupy three days.  Mr Fitzgibbon was instructed by Mr Levick.  The Deputy Registrar directed that any Notice of Opposition be filed by 5 August 1999 and indicated that the matter would be assigned to a judge’s docket.

  4. On 4 August Mr Levick filed a Notice of Opposition to the petition.  It contained three grounds based…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 674
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Levick v Commissioner of Taxation, the appellant, Wayne R Levick, challenged a decision of the court that imposed costs on him, arguing that his lawyers were responsible for the unreasonable conduct that led to the costs order. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining whether the costs order against Levick was appropriate, given the role of his legal representatives. The central legal issue was whether the court could hold Levick responsible for the costs incurred due to the unreasonable conduct of his lawyers in pursuing a case that lacked a rational basis for success.

The Court examined the principles established in previous cases, including Ridehalgh v Horsefield and Orchard, which emphasized the autonomy of clients to make decisions about their cases and the cautious approach courts should take when ordering costs against solicitors. The Court concluded that while it was important to respect the client's right to pursue unmeritorious cases, it was equally crucial to prevent the abuse of court processes. Unreasonable conduct by a solicitor, which includes initiating or continuing a case without a proper consideration of its prospects of success, could warrant a costs order against the client. The Court found that in this case, the lawyers themselves conceived the arguments and presented them without ensuring they had any rational basis for success, which constituted a dereliction of duty. Consequently, the Court held that Levick was responsible for the costs of the appeal.

The Court dismissed the appeal and ordered that Wayne R Levick pay the costs of the appeal to the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant, Wayne R Levick, pay to the respondent, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, his costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Goldberg J commented that this expression of principle “accommodates the competing principle that a party is entitled to have a practitioner act for him or her even in an unmeritorious case”. He referred to Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] Ch. 205, a decision of the English Court of Appeal. At 234 that Court pointed out that “clients are free to reject advice and insist that cases be litigated. It is rarely if ever safe for a court to assume that a hopeless case is being litigated on the advice of the lawyers involved”. The Court went on:“It is, however, one thing for a legal representative to present, on instructions, a case which he regards as bound to fail; it is quite another to lend his assistance to proceedings which are an abuse of the process of the court. Whether instructed or not, a legal representative is not entitled to use litigious procedures for purposes for which they were not intended, as by issuing or pursuing proceedings for reasons unconnected with success in the litigation or pursuing a case known to be dishonest, nor is he entitled to evade rules intended to safeguard the interests of justice, as by knowingly failing to make full disclosure on ex parte application or knowingly conniving at incomplete disclosure of documents. It is not entirely easy to distinguish by definition between the hopeless case and the case which amounts to an abuse of the process, but in practice it is not hard to say which is which and if there is doubt the legal representative is entitled to the benefit of it.”(iii) Our conclusions We accept the statements of principle made in the cases we have cited. We endorse the emphasis on caution in making orders against solicitors, particularly as it will often be difficult for a court to know all the details and circumstances of the solicitor’s instructions. We share the concern expressed by Donaldson MR and Dillon LJ in Orchard about the risk of a practice developing whereby solicitors endeavour to browbeat their opponents into abandoning clients, or particular issues or arguments, for fear of a personal costs order being made against them. We agree such conduct might amount to contempt of court. Having said that, it is equally important to uphold the right of a court to order a solicitor to pay costs wasted by the solicitor’s unreasonable conduct of a case. What constitutes unreasonable conduct must depend upon the circumstances of the case; no comprehensive definition is possible. In the context of instituting or maintaining a proceeding or defence, we agree with Goldberg J that unreasonable conduct must be more than acting on behalf of a client who has little or no prospect of success. There must be something akin to abuse of process; that is, using the proceeding for an ulterior purpose or without any, or any proper, consideration of the prospects of success. In the present case, Hill J inferred that the subject arguments “clearly originated with the lawyers”; that is, Mr Levick and Mr Fitzgibbon. No challenge can be made to that inference. So this is not a case, like Orchard, where a difficult case was taken to a lawyer by a client who wished it to be pursued in the court. Neither is it a case, like that contemplated in Ridehalgh v Horsefield, where the lawyer had “to present, on instructions, a case which he regards as bound to fail”. This is a case where the lawyers themselves thought up the “legal” points and advanced them on behalf of the client. It is unreasonable, in the sense of a dereliction of duty (to both the client and the court), for any lawyer to take that course without first being satisfied that the points are, at least, seriously arguable. We agree it was not necessary in the present case that the lawyers be satisfied that the points would succeed; but it was necessary they be satisfied there was a rational basis upon which they might succeed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.