2300705 (Refugee)

[2024] AATA 4160

2300705 (Refugee) [2024] AATA 4160 (9 September 2024)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

REPRESENTATIVE:Ms Penny Dimopoulos

CASE NUMBER:  2300705

COUNTRY OF REFERENCE:                   Lebanon

MEMBER:Shahyar Roushan

DATE:9 September 2024

PLACE OF DECISION:  Sydney

DECISION:The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

Statement made on 09 September 2024 at 9:50am

CATCHWORDS

REFUGEE – protection visa – Lebanon – Federal Circuit and Family Court remittal – particular social group – young Sunni woman – de facto relationship – honour crimes – gender-based violence – family support in Lebanon – children born out of wedlock – Consent Orders for travelling overseas with children – registering a marriage in Lebanon – decision under review remitted

LEGISLATION

Migration Act 1958, ss 5(1), 5H, 5J – 5LA, 36, 65, 91, 417, 499
Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2

CASES

AGA16 v MIBP [2018] FCA 628
SZTEQ v MIBP (2015) 229 FCR 497
VBAO v MIMIA (2006) 233 CLR 1

Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been omitted from this decision pursuant to section 431 of the Migration Act 1958 and replaced with generic information which does not allow the identification of an applicant, or their relative or other dependants.

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

BACKGROUND

1. The applicant is [age] years old. She is a national of Lebanon and a Sunni Muslim. She arrived in Australia [in] June 2010 on a Prospective Marriage (Subclass 300) visa sponsored by [Mr A]. [Mr A] subsequently withdrew his sponsorship and the applicant’s visa was cancelled.

2. On 29 October 2010, the applicant entered into an Islamic marriage with [Husband A] and on 9 November 2010, she lodged an application for a Partner visa sponsored by [Husband A].

3. On 30 November 20[Husband A] withdrew his sponsorship. The couple were divorced [in] February 2013 and the applicant’s Partner visa application was subsequently refused on 21 June 2013.

4. On 4 April 2013, the applicant married [Husband B] and she subsequently made a further application for a Partner visa sponsored by [Husband B]. This application was deemed invalid on 26 July 2013.

5. On 29 July 2014, the applicant lodged an application for a Protection visa.

6. On 20 March 2015, a delegate for the Minister of Home Affairs refused to grant the applicant a Protection visa under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) and the applicant applied for a review of the delegate’s decision.

7. On [date], the applicant and [Husband B’s] daughter, [Child A], was born. [In] October 2016, the couple were divorced. The divorce was preceded by periods of separation and family violence allegedly perpetrated against the applicant by [Husband B].

8. In June 2016, the applicant entered into a relationship with [Mr B]. Their [Child B], was born on [date] and the couple commenced living together in March 2017.

9. On 17 July 2017, a differently constituted Tribunal (the first Tribunal) affirmed the delegate’s decision to refuse the applicant a Protection visa.

10. [In] December 2017, the Minister decided not to exercise his power under s 417 of the Act to intervene in the applicant’s case.

11. [In] February 2018, the applicant applied for a judicial review of the first Tribunal’s decision.

12. On [date], the applicant and [Mr B’s] second child, [Child C], was born. The applicant and [Mr B] were subsequently married [in] July 2018 and their third child [was] born on [date].

13. [In] November 2022, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia quashed the first Tribunal’s decision and remitted the matter to be determined according to law.

14. This is a review of the delegate’s decision of 20 March 2015 by the presently constituted Tribunal (the Tribunal) pursuant to the order of the Court.

    CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

    Protection visa application

15. According to her Protection visa application, the applicant was born in [year] in Tripoli and resided at a single address in [an] area of Tripoli until her departure from Lebanon. She has completed [number] years of schooling and has never worked.

16. In response to questions in relation to her reasons for claiming protection, the applicant stated that she came to Australia on a spouse visa and was ‘a victim of [a] migration agent, who caused harm to [her] visa’. She stated that she had reported the matter to the Department and that she would explain her ‘severe circumstances’ at ‘the interview’. She further claimed that, as a child, she had experienced ‘harm’ as a result of ‘the conflict in [her] area, especially between the Alawi and Sunni Muslims’. If she were to return to Lebanon, she would be seriously harmed as a ‘young Sunni woman’ as a consequence of the continuing conflict between Alawis and Sunnis. There are too many ‘militants’ fighting in the area and her mother had previously travelled by boat to Australia to avoid being harmed.

    The interview

17. The applicant attended an interview with the Department on 25 November 2014. The interview was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages. In addition to the claims recorded in her Protection visa application, the applicant claimed at the interview that she was no longer married to [Husband B] and that she would be discriminated against in Lebanon as a divorced woman. She stated that her ‘life will be hell’ if she were to return to Lebanon as she is not in contact with her father and has no family support in Lebanon. She would be socially isolated and would find it difficult to remarry, find work and live in Lebanon.

    The delegate’s decision

18. The delegate did not accept that the applicant would not be supported by her father in Lebanon and was not satisfied that there was a real chance of the applicant being seriously harmed in Tripoli because she is a Sunni Muslim. He was not satisfied the applicant would face a real chance of being persecuted for a Convention reason and found that she did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. The delegate also found that there were no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Lebanon, there was a real risk that she would face significant harm.

    The review application

19. In support of the review application, the applicant submitted a copy of an Apprehended Violence Order (AVO), dated [in] October 2015, naming the applicant as the protected person and [Husband B] as the defendant. The order extended a previous AVO issued in March 2015 for a period of two years. She also submitted Statutory Declarations, declared by her and [Mr B].

20. In her Statutory Declaration, dated 1 May 2017, the applicant stated that she decided to enter into a de facto relationship with [Mr B] and to live with him on a permanent basis immediately after the birth of her second child. She recently entered into Consent Orders with [Husband B] and she is unable to travel overseas with her first child, [Child A], without his consent. He has indicated his unwillingness to provide consent as he fears not being able to see his daughter again should the applicant return to Lebanon.

21. The applicant claimed to fear being ‘abused and ostracised’ due to the nature of her relationship with [Mr B] as de facto relationships are not accepted socially or under Islamic law. As a Muslim woman, she is expected to be married, and any sexual relationship out of wedlock is not permitted and is considered ‘repugnant to the Islamic religion and cultural customs’. A woman in such a relationship is also considered ‘dishonourable’. Her father and other relatives are ‘obligated’ to harm her ‘in order to uphold social and religious expectations’. Her family and relatives have been ‘pressuring’ her to either leave her current partner or marry him and some relatives ‘who are offended by [her] current lifestyle have even threatened to physically harm [her] should [she] return to Lebanon’. She is not ready to commit to a marital relationship due to the abuse she suffered at the hands of her former husband.

22. The applicant stated that the Lebanese authorities would not protect her in Lebanon, as they do not generally intervene in religious or honour motived crimes. Her current relationship is not legally recognised under Lebanese laws as she is considered to be ‘in an illegitimate relationship with an illegitimate child’. She is also unable to internally relocate in order to avoid the harm she fears.

23. In his Statutory Declaration, dated 9 May 2017, [Mr B] stated that he had entered into a relationship with the applicant in June 2016. Together, they have one child, and the applicant has a child from a previous relationship. The applicant has suffered abuse at the hands of her ex-husband and has continued to suffer mentally. She is not ready to commit to marriage because of this abuse. [Mr B] stated that living in a de facto relationship is not accepted within the ‘conservative Lebanese Sunni Muslim Society’ and draws adverse attention from family. He also noted that the applicant would not be able to travel to Lebanon with her first child.

    The first hearing

24. On 10 May 2017, the applicant appeared before the first Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments. At that hearing (the first hearing), the first Tribunal also received oral evidence from [Mr B].

25. Following the first hearing, the applicant submitted further documents, including a statement, in which she explained that the person who had assisted her in preparing her Protection visa application had either excluded or misrepresented information in relation to her circumstances, such as information regarding her father’s location and her relationship with him. The applicant noted that in the course of her interview, she had told the delegate that her father was in Lebanon, but that she did not have a good relationship with him and did not know where he resided.

    First Tribunal’s decision

26. On 17 July 2017, the first Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a Protection visa. The first Tribunal did not find the applicant to be a truthful and credible witness and was of the view that the applicant’s claims for protection had been contrived to achieve a migration outcome. It was not satisfied that the applicant is at risk of serious harm by Alawi or Sunni Muslims or as a result of sectarian violence in Tripoli. It was also not satisfied that the applicant has no family support in Lebanon, including from her father. The first Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant faces a real chance of serious harm or a real risk of significant harm from her family or anyone else in Lebanon for the reason of her relationship with her current partner, having his child out of wedlock, being a divorced woman or for any other reason. Furthermore, the first Tribunal found the applicant’s claim that she was not ready to marry her current partner because of her previous experiences with her ex-husband to be implausible in light of her evidence that she was a practising Muslim. The first Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real chance that the applicant would face serious harm in Lebanon for any Convention reason, including her religion or membership of any particular social group. It also found that there were no substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Lebanon, there was a real risk that she would face significant harm.

    Judicial review

27. As noted above, [in] November 2022, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia remitted the matter to the Tribunal to be determined according to law.[1] The Court found that, whilst the majority of the first Tribunal’s findings were open to it on the evidence, its finding that the applicant’s claim to be a woman of faith was incongruous with her being in a de facto relationship, fell outside what was legally reasonable to determine her credibility. In view of the fact that the first Tribunal’s ‘overall findings turned on a disbelief of the applicant’s claims and that she had contrived claims to achieve a migration outcome’, the Court was ‘unable to determine whether the incorrect reasoning on this point did not carry over to infect the other credibility findings of the Tribunal on which the ultimate conclusion was based.’ In these circumstances, the Court found that the first Tribunal’s decision discloses jurisdictional error.

    The present Tribunal

    [1] [Citation deleted.]

28. On 15 February 2023, the applicant appointed Ms Penny Dimopoulos as her new representative.

29. On 11 May 2024, Ms Dimopoulos forwarded to the Tribunal a copy of the applicant and [Mr B’s] Australian marriage certificate and copies of their children’s birth certificates. Ms Dimopoulos also submitted medical evidence in relation to the applicant’s third child, [Child C], and a copy of orders issued by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia [in] November 2020, granting the applicant sole parental responsibility for [Child A]. Amongst other things, the Court made orders permitting [Child A] to leave Australia to live with the applicant ‘in the event the [applicant’s] visa is revoked.’

30. In her covering submission, Ms Dimopoulos stated that the applicant came to Australia when she was [age] years old and has lived here for 14 years. She has not lived in Lebanon as an ‘adult’. She has no family support, friends or network in Lebanon. All her relatives (mother and siblings) are in Australia, except for her father, with whom she does not have a close relationship. She is not in a ‘sound position economically’ and she has no relevant work skills or ‘credentials’. All of her children are under the age of [age] and one of the children has a serious ‘mental impairment’ (autism spectrum disorder – Level 2). She has three children with her current partner and one from her previous partner. Two of her children with her current partner were born out of wedlock. Her husband cannot return to Lebanon because there is a ‘meaningful risk’ that he would be required to join the Lebanese Armed Forces if there is an escalation in the fighting between Israel and Lebanon. He works in a [market] and earns a low salary, which does not give him the capacity to send adequate or regular amounts of money to the applicant. Lebanon is a poor country. It has no effective welfare or other government services. The economic, social and political situation in Lebanon could deteriorate further given that Lebanon is in the world’s most volatile region as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

31. Ms Dimopoulos submitted that the applicant would suffer harm amounting to persecution if she were to return to Lebanon on the basis that she is ‘effectively a stranger’ to Lebanon, she is a divorced woman with dependent children (one of whom has a disability), she has no family or meaningful support, and she would be a returning to a country ‘on the brink of financial collapse and possible war with Israel.’ It was submitted that women, particularly divorced women, in Lebanon face discrimination throughout Lebanon. The mistreatment of the applicant is likely to be worse than for other divorced women because she has had multiple partners and children born out of wedlock. The fact that the applicant is now married is ‘immaterial’ to the mistreatment that she would be subjected to given that her husband could not accompany her to Lebanon. The impact of discrimination on the applicant is heightened as she is a ‘poor returnee single mother with dependent children without any financial support.’ She has no skills to obtain employment in Lebanon and would be unable to work as the sole carer of her four young children.

    The second hearing

32. The applicant appeared before the Tribunal on 15 May 2024 to give evidence and present arguments (the second hearing). [Mr B] also gave evidence at the hearing. The hearing was conducted with the assistance of an interpreter in the Arabic and English languages. Ms Dimopoulos attended the hearing in person. Where relevant, the applicant’s oral evidence at the hearing is referred to in the Tribunal’s analysis below.

    Post-hearing submissions

33. Following the second hearing, Ms Dimopoulos submitted the following documents:

    ·Psychologist’s report in relation to the applicant from [Psychologist A], clinical psychologist.

    ·A letter from the applicant’s GP, [named].

    ·Statement from the applicant’s mother, [Mother A].

    ·Untranslated copies of [Mother A's] National ID card and Lebanese driver’s licence, and a copy of her Australian driver’s licence.

    ·Copy and translation of [Mother A's] Family Extract.

    ·Extracts from [Mother A's] Protection visa application reflecting her family composition.

    ·Screenshots of news reports and Facebook posts ‘pertaining to the violent criminal activities of the applicant’s maternal side of the family’ ([family names]).

34. In her covering submission, Ms Dimopoulos provided further details in support of the applicant’s claim that she would be subjected to mistreatment ‘as a formerly divorced woman who is in Lebanon without her husband and who has had two children out of wedlock and another child to a different father’ and the ‘vicarious harm’ she would be subjected to ‘due to the harm her mentally ill son will suffer in Lebanon.’

35. The submission also provided details in relation to claims raised by the applicant at the second hearing regarding the likely risk of harm she would face from ‘relatives in Lebanon who are part of a crime family.’

36. On 8 August 2024, Ms Dimopoulos made further submissions, requesting the Tribunal to consider ‘the increasingly unstable security situation in Lebanon’ and referred to a number of related news reports.

    CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE

37. The criteria for a Protection visa are set out in s 36 of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). An applicant for the visa must meet one of the alternative criteria in s 36(2)(a), (aa), (b), or (c). That is, the applicant is either a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the ‘refugee’ criterion, or on other ‘complementary protection’ grounds, or is a member of the same family unit as such a person and that person holds a protection visa of the same class.

38. Section 36(2)(a) provides that a criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (together, the Refugees Convention, or the Convention).

39. Australia is a party to the Refugees Convention and generally speaking, has protection obligations in respect of people who are refugees as defined in Article 1 of the Convention. Article 1A(2) relevantly defines a refugee as any person who:

    owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

40. If a person is found not to meet the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a), he or she may nevertheless meet the criteria for the grant of a Protection visa if he or she is a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that he or she will suffer significant harm: s 36(2)(aa) (‘the complementary protection criterion’).

1. In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.84, made under s 499 of the Act, the Tribunal has taken account of the ‘Refugee Law Guidelines’ and ‘Complementary Protection Guidelines’ prepared by the Department of Home Affairs, and country information assessments prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration.

   Analysis, reasons and findings

2. For the following reasons, I have concluded that the decision under review should be remitted for reconsideration.

3. The applicant’s evidence throughout the process raised concerns in my mind in relation to the reliability of aspects of her evidence, including her claims regarding her relationship and contact with her father, and new claims introduced at the second hearing in relation to her extended family members in Lebanon. These concerns, however, were not so significant as to undermine the veracity of other key claims advanced by the applicant and I have made no credibility findings resulting in the rejection of her claims for protection.

4. I accept the chronology and detail of events outlined in the ‘background’ section of these reasons. I accept the applicant’s account of her relationships since her arrival in Australia in 2010. In particular, I accept that the applicant married [Husband B] in April 2013, that she subsequently separated from him in February 2015, [detail deleted], and that they were divorced in October 2016. I accept that the applicant’s Australian marriage to [Husband B] and their subsequent divorce were never registered in Lebanon or with the Lebanese Mission in Australia. In order to register her divorce from [Husband B], her marriage should have first been registered either in Lebanon or at any mission and executed in the Civil Acts Register in Lebanon. The final divorce would take effect in Lebanon after ‘sanction by the Relevant Court’.[2] I accept that, as a result, the applicant has been unable to register the birth of her daughter with the Lebanese authorities.

   [2] Consulate General of Lebanon in Melbourne, Registration of Vital Events,

5. I further accept that the applicant entered into a relationship with [Mr B] in June 2016, and that they commenced living together in March 2017. During this period, the applicant gave birth to a son. The couple’s second son was born in [year] and before they were married [in] July 2018. I accept the applicant’s evidence that, as she never registered her marriage to and divorce from [Husband A], her current marriage cannot be officially registered in Lebanon. According to Human Rights Watch, a woman who wants to remarry needs to obtain a certification of divorce from a Sunni court if her husband has divorced her outside of a [Sunni] court proceeding.[3] Furthermore, the Lebanese Court of Cassation has ruled that if a couple holds both civil and religious ceremonies abroad, the marriage and its legal consequences are subject to religious law, and if both spouses are Sunni, as in this case, their foreign civil marriage will not be recognised by Lebanese Sunni courts.

   [3] Human Rights Watch, Unequal and Unprotected: Women’s Rights Under Lebanon’s Religious Personal Status Laws, 19 January 2015,

6. I accept that these circumstances entail a number of likely consequences. Firstly, if the applicant were to return to Lebanon with or without [Mr B], their Australian marriage would not be recognised, subject to a number of complex steps and lengthy proceedings. I am of the view that this would attract the imputation that the applicant is not married and that she is living in or has been in an adulterous relationship with [Mr B]. Secondly, this imputation or perception would be amplified by the fact that two of the applicant’s children with [Mr B] were born before they were officially married in Australia. I find that if the applicant were to return to Lebanon, she would take her children with her. I accept that any attempt by the applicant to register any of her children in Lebanon to facilitate their access to education and other essential services would likely draw attention to the fact that she has had two children out of wedlock, that she has a child from a previous unregistered marriage, and that her current marriage is also not registered in Lebanon.

7. In a Response to Information Request, the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada provided information in relation to ‘the treatment upon return to Lebanon of an unmarried woman with three children born out of wedlock’. The response stated:

   A woman in this situation will be seen as a prostitute by the Muslim community. She is not married to a man and has three children. The children will also be considered illegitimate… Even if the woman has had a civil marriage in Canada and brought the certificate with her to Lebanon, Muslim clerical leaders will not consider the civil marriage as valid, and will ask her to marry under religious rules… The clerical leaders will issue a fatwa, a religious opinion or interpretation, which is likely to give the custody of the children to her father or, if required, her brother…

   The source stated that there is no way the family of the woman will ever accept her back into the family circle. Intimate relationship between a man and a woman before marriage is not accepted in Lebanon in any religious community. Therefore, a woman with three illegitimate children will never be accepted… Lebanese men will probably try to take advantage of her status as a disreputable woman.[4]

   [4] Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Update to Response to Information Request LBN18762.E, On the treatment upon return to Lebanon of an unmarried woman with three children born out of wedlock, and on access to protection from the state, 28 February 1995, >

   While the above information is somewhat dated, I have found no other information in any of the sources consulted to contradict this evidence.

8. I accept the applicant’s evidence at the second hearing that she has limited contact with her father, who has taken a new wife and has young children from his second marriage. She did nor claim that she fears harm from her father. However, I accept that she has a total of [number] uncles and aunts residing in Tripoli. Her maternal side of the family is known by the surname of [Mother A’s family names]. I accept that members of the applicant’s extended family are aware of her circumstances. I accept that her male uncles and cousins, through communication with her mother, have conveyed their resentment and disapproval of the applicant because she was living with [Mr B] before they were married, and she had two children with him out of wedlock. I accept that they consider the applicant, regardless of her current marital status, to have brought shame upon the family. I accept that they refer to her as an ‘adulterer’ and to her sons as ‘bastards’. Based on the news reports and Facebook posts submitted following the second hearing, I accept that members of [Mother A’s] family in Tripoli are conservative Muslims and have been involved in violent inter and intra family disputes in the past.

9. The country information sources I have consulted suggest that gender-based violence (GBV) is a pervasive problem in Lebanon. Citing the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) noted ‘[a]n average of 1 in 2 persons reported that they personally know someone subjected to domestic violence, with 65% of reported incidents being committed by family members and 71% taking place on [sic] the perpetrator’s household’.[5] In conservative sectors of society, men can exercise considerable control over female relatives including restricting their activities outside the home.[6] In 2008, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women expressed concerns about ‘the persistence of violence against women and girls, including domestic violence, rape and crimes committed in the name of honour’.[7] ‘Honour killings’ do occur, particularly in rural areas, and they can be underreported.[8] One study in 2017 found that one-quarter of men and one-third of women said they had heard of an honour killing in their community within the last year.[9] DFAT states that ‘in-country sources confirm that so-called ‘honour killings’ of women (the murder of a woman or girl by male family members, due to the perpetrators’ belief that the victim has brought dishonour or shame upon the family) occur in Lebanon but are not common, with very few such killings reportedly occurring in the last few years. However, killings of women, frequently by partners or family members (but not honour killings) are more common’.[10] DFAT has assessed that women in Lebanon face a moderate risk of family and sexual violence and that this risk increases for members of vulnerable communities including those in rural areas and conservative religious groups.[11]

   [5] 'Gender-based Violence in Lebanon: Inadequate Framework, Ineffective Remedies', International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 12 July 2019,

   [6] 'Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022 - Lebanon', United States Department of State, 20 March 2023,

   [7] ICJ, n5, above.

   [8] Recent killing in Lebanon sheds light on honor killings in the country', Al Arabiya.net, 23 April 2020,

   [9] Understanding Masculinities: Results from the International Men and Gender Equality Survey (Images) - Middle East and North Africa', UN Women and Promundo-US, 02 May 2017,

   [10] 'DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 26 June 2023,

   [11] Ibid.

10. I find that if the applicant were to return to Tripoli, a conservative Sunni area, there is a real chance that she would be subjected to persistent discrimination, isolation, verbal abuse, harassment, including physical harassment and ill-treatment and threats to her life or liberty at the hands of members of her extended family. In assessing the seriousness of the harm, I have considered [Psychologist A’s] psychological report, dated 22 May 2024. I accept that the applicant has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed depression and anxiety and that she is psychologically vulnerable. I find that the applicant would be impacted differently by the less serious forms of harm identified, elevating the harm to serious harm.[12] I am not satisfied that the presence of [Mr B] in Lebanon would ameliorate the level, extent and impact of this harm.

    [12] See AGA16 v MIBP [2018] FCA 628, SZTEQ v MIBP (2015) 229 FCR 497 and VBAO v MIMIA (2006) 233 CLR 1. The Department’s Refugee Law Guidelines state that an applicant’s personal attributes are relevant in determining whether harm amounts to ‘serious harm’.

11. As it was correctly noted by Member Murphy in 1931275 (Refugee) [2022] AATA 2662 (30 June 2022),[13] family violence is a complex pattern of violent and abusive behaviours that seek to isolate, degrade, exploit and control victims. Whilst family violence often takes place between intimate partners, it may also occur between immediate and extended families and other communal or extended kinship relationships of mutual obligation or support. It is also widely acknowledged that women are significantly more likely than men to experience family violence.[14] On the basis of the specific factual findings made in that case, which also dealt with claims of family violence, albeit in a different country, Member Murphy found that the nature of the violence directed at the applicant before her was gendered and that gender was the essential and significant reason for the harm.

    [13] 1931275 (Refugee) [2022] AATA 2662 (30 June 2022)

    [14] Ibid, citing Australian Government Attorney General’s Department, Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, University of Queensland & University of Melbourne National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book June 2021 at 3.1 Contents - National Domestic and Family Violence Bench Book (aija.org.au).

12. The circumstances of the applicant before me are not dissimilar. I find that the nature of the harm that will be inflicted on the applicant by members of her extended family in Lebanon falls within the definition of family violence and the harm is gender-based.

13. As already mentioned, GBV is pervasive and prevalent across Lebanon, with the most common types being domestic violence and intimate partner violence.[15] Some estimates suggest rates of domestic violence are as high as one in three married women and an estimated one in every two individuals know someone subjected to domestic violence.[16] The country’s significant political and economic crises, coupled with cultural norms that oppress and accept violence against women, have contributed to the prevalence of GBV.[17] Cultural attitudes towards GBV in Lebanon are influenced by traditional norms and societal expectations. Lebanese cultural norms dictate how women may experience violence and how they may react to it. The society’s entrenched patriarchy and the prevalence of toxic masculinity play a significant role in perpetuating GBV. Men are often encouraged to be dominating, aggressive and unemotional, leading to the normalisation of power and control as perpetrators.[18] The normalisation of violence and the lack of accountability for such actions have also contributed to the persistence of GBV in the country.[19] These cultural attitudes present significant obstacles to addressing and preventing GBV in Lebanon.

    [15] Gender-Based Violence: Lebanon Secondary Data Review: 2018-2022, Social Development Direct, January 2023, Ibid.

    [17] Tessa Fox, Lebanon's economic collapse prompts rise in gender-based violence, The New Humanitarian, See also Lizzy Davis, Burned, suffocated, beaten: why women in Lebanon are dying at the hands of their partners, The Guardian, 27 February 2023,

    [18] Rawan Abou Hamzeh and Zainab Msaddi, Lebanon: Gender Inequality and Domestic Violence Reflection on Lebanon's Scenario, Global History Dialogues, August 2022, See also Rayan El Chami, Gender-Based Violence in Lebanon: An Analysis of the Unfair Laws, 14 December 2022, Tessa Fox, Lebanon's economic collapse prompts rise in gender-based violence, The New Humanitarian, >

    On the basis of the evidence before me, I find that the essential and significant reason for the harm that will be directed at the applicant is her gender and her membership of the particular social group of women in Lebanon.

14. I have found that if the applicant were to return to Lebanon she would be accompanied by her four young children, including her [age]-year-old son, [Child C], who has a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder and requires a significant level of support and medical attention. I have also accepted that the applicant is vulnerable due to her own state of mental health. Moreover, the applicant is entirely dependent on her husband for financial support. She has never worked and has never resided alone or independently of her family. Having regard to the applicant’s individual circumstances, I am not satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it would be reasonable, in the sense of ‘practicable’, for the applicant to seek refuge in another part of Lebanon.

15. I have also considered whether adequate and effective state protection is available to the applicant in Lebanon. The country information before me clearly indicates that, despite some progress over the years, the existing laws in Lebanon do not provide adequate protection for victims of GBV. As noted by Fatima Shehadeh, ‘gaps in the justice system and limited legal avenues makes gender-based violence of particular concern in Lebanon, often with fatal consequences’.[20] In a report, the Centre of Arab Women for Training and Research expressed the view that the ‘penal code in Lebanon is gender-based constructed, reinforcing discrimination in the concepts themselves and in the penalties. Therefore, gender inequality and [violence against women] can be regarded as virtually institutionalised’.[21]

    [20] Fatima Shehadeh, When will violence against Lebanese women get the attention needed?, Raseef22, 22 May 2023,

    [21] Centre of Arab Women for Training and Research, Situation Analysis of Gender-based Violence in Lebanon, 2012,

16. According to Human Rights Watch, a ‘growing number of femicide and domestic violence cases have underscored the need for a stronger implementation of Lebanon’s family violence law’.[22] The ICJ has observed:

    [Women’s] access to justice for and protection from GBV is often impeded by obstacles in Lebanon’s legal framework and the administration of justice, as well as economic, social and cultural barriers that affect women differently than men and pose a barrier to reform necessary to reduce the occurrence of GBV…

    The current Lebanese Criminal Code is more than 70 years old. Despite the fact that several amendments have been proposed to the Lebanese Parliament, there has not been to date any comprehensive review of the Criminal Code. Accordingly, it has not evolved to meet international human rights law and standards.

    The Code not only fails to criminalise all forms of GBV, but it legalises acts of discrimination against women. Although the provision on honour crimes (article 526), which mitigated a man’s sentence for killing or injuring his wife, daughter, or other relative to protect the family “honour”… was repealed, other articles still legitimize and shield the perpetrator of sexual offences from accountability to protect family “honour.” In practice, judges still consider “honour” a factor in mitigating sentences.[23]

    [22] 'Human Rights Watch World Report 2023', Human Rights Watch (HRW), 12 January 2023,

    [23] 'Gender-based Violence in Lebanon: Inadequate Framework, Ineffective Remedies', International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 12 July 2019,

17. The ICJ also observed that the primary responsibility for initiating investigations and prosecutions lies with the police and the prosecution authorities, who may lack ‘gender-sensitivity when dealing with violence against women’, and does not rest with those subjected to violence, regardless of the level or form of violence.[24] According to DFAT, many police still regard domestic violence as a family matter, with municipal police, in particular, reluctant to investigate.[25] In view of the evidence before me, I am satisfied that adequate and effective state protection is not available to the applicant in Lebanon and she is unable to avail herself of state protection.

    [24] Ibid.

    [25] 'DFAT Country Information Report: Lebanon', Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 26 June 2023,

1. For the above reasons, I find that if the applicant were to return to Lebanon, there is a real chance that she would face serious harm under s 91R(1)(b) of the Act. I am satisfied that the harm the applicant fears involves systematic and discriminatory conduct as required by s 91R(1)(c). I am satisfied that the essential and significant reason for her fear of persecution is her membership of the particular social group of women in Lebanon. I am not satisfied that adequate and effective state protection is available to the applicant in Lebanon. I find that it would not be reasonable for the applicant to relocate internally to avoid the persecution she fears. I find that the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Lebanon. I also find that the applicant has no presently existing right, however expressed, to enter and reside in any other country and s 36(3) therefore does not apply.  

2. Having reached these conclusions, I do not consider it necessary to assess other protection claims advanced by or arising from the applicant’s evidence.

   CONCLUSION

3. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention. Therefore, the applicant satisfies the criterion set out in s 36(2)(a).

   DECISION

4. The Tribunal remits the matter for reconsideration with the direction that the applicant satisfies s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act.

   Shahyar Roushan
   Deputy President