FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AVR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 737
Appeal from: AVR15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3137 File number: NSD 4 of 2018 Judge: BARKER J Date of judgment: 23 May 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for (class XA) protection visa – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the judge committed jurisdictional error – whether the Tribunal erred in finding the appellant was not owed protection obligations – where ground not raised before Circuit Court – where appellant misunderstood the Court’s role on appeal – where Tribunal properly understood its obligations to comply with Ministerial Direction 56 and section 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(3)(d)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 476, 499
Cases cited: ARS15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2135
BGZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1095
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN and Another; WZARV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2015) 254 CLR 610; [2015] HCA 22
SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another; SZTGM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2017) 347 ALR 405; [2017] HCA 34
SZVBT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 72 AAR 1; [2017] FCA 355
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2014) 229 FCR 477; [2014] FCA 947
Date of hearing: 23 May 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 69 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr JM McGovern Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz ORDERS
NSD 4 of 2018 BETWEEN: AVR15
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BARKER J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 MAY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant do pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the sum of $2,795.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BARKER J:
The appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the former Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant the appellant a protection (class XA) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
The appellant is a 26 year old male citizen of Sri Lanka, of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith. He arrived in Australia in August 2012, as an irregular maritime arrival. His wife and daughter remain in Sri Lanka.
In his application for protection, made in April 2013, the appellant claimed he feared mistreatment or harm…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 737
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the Federal Court were whether the Circuit Court had committed any jurisdictional error in dismissing the appellant’s appeal and whether the Tribunal had erred in its application of the law when it found that the appellant was not owed protection obligations under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant argued that the Tribunal did not properly consider his claims of past persecution and future risk of significant harm. The Minister contended that the Tribunal correctly applied the relevant legal standards and that any errors identified by the Circuit Court were not jurisdictional in nature.
The Federal Court found that the Circuit Court had correctly dismissed the appeal, as the appellant had not identified any jurisdictional errors in the Tribunal’s decision. The Court emphasised that its role was to review the Circuit Court’s decision, not to re-evaluate the Tribunal’s factual findings. The Tribunal had properly considered the 2012 UNHCR guidelines and the appellant’s relationship with his cousin, and had made findings consistent with the applicable legal standards. The Court also noted that the appellant’s subjective fears of harm upon return to Sri Lanka were insufficient to constitute significant harm for the purposes of complementary protection.
The Federal Court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, and that the appellant should pay the Minister’s costs. The Court held that the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Migration Act and the Ministerial Direction 56, and that the Circuit Court’s reasoning was sound. The Court found no basis to overturn the Tribunal’s decision, as the appellant had not demonstrated any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant do pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the sum of $2,795.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister particularly emphasised the judge’s reasoning in the Circuit Court dismissing the two grounds of appeal in that Court, on which the Minister relied and submitted were correct.CONSIDERATION As will be seen on a closer examination of the sole ground of the appeal in this Court and the terms of the written and oral submissions made by the appellant, there are some differences between the two. To the extent that the appellant now seeks to contend that the Tribunal erred in finding that Australia did not owe him protection obligations pursuant to s 36(2)(a) of the Act, that was not a ground of judicial review in the Circuit Court and the appellant should not now be allowed to raise it. It is plain, from his submission, that the appellant does misunderstand the role of this Court in an appeal like this. This Court’s appellate function is to ascertain whether the decision of the judge of the Circuit Court reveals any error, and does not involve reviewing the merits of the Tribunal’s earlier decision. Thus, I must refuse to countenance that portion of the submissions made by the appellant concerning the Tribunal’s earlier factual decision-making. In any event, the Tribunal expressly dealt with the significance of the 2012 UNHCR guidelines and the appellant’s relationship with his cousin in its decision‑making. Nothing relevant was left unconsidered by the Tribunal. So far as the appeal repeats the ground of judicial review that failed in the Circuit Court, I have set out in some detail above the reasoning of the judge in rejecting the related two grounds of judicial review advanced before the judge. As the judge reasonably said, particular (b) of ground 1 is not clear, but owed itself to what North J said in the subsequently overruled decision in WZAPN. See [40] above. I consider particulars (a) and (b) of ground 1 should probably be understood as related. Ground 1 is also related to ground 2. It is said, respectively, that a wrong test was applied in applying the significant harm factor under s 36(2A) of the Act, and that the related fact finding was “mistaken”. In substance, I consider that the appellant seeks to contend that the Tribunal erred by not considering his detention in Sri Lanka on return would amount to “significant harm”. However, as the judge held, the Tribunal properly understood its obligations to comply with Ministerial Direction 56 and s 499 of the Act and PAM3. It found against the appellant on the factual circumstances of his case. The facts of his case were different from those that arose in ARS15, and so ARS15 does not determine the outcome in this case. Also, as the judge pointed out, in SZTAL, where the High Court considered the operation of the complementary provisions of the Act, the subjective circumstances of detention, of which the appellant effectively complained in the particulars provided to ground 2 in the Circuit Court, are not relevant to and do not support a claim for complementary protection in circumstances such as the present. Temporary detention on return to Sri Lanka, and less than desirable prison conditions (by Australian standards), is not sufficient to constitute “significant harm” for complementary protection purposes.