AVR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AVR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 737

Appeal from: AVR15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3137
File number: NSD 4 of 2018
Judge: BARKER J
Date of judgment: 23 May 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for (class XA) protection visa – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether the judge committed jurisdictional error – whether the Tribunal erred in finding the appellant was not owed protection obligations – where ground not raised before Circuit Court – where appellant misunderstood the Court’s role on appeal – where Tribunal properly understood its obligations to comply with Ministerial Direction 56 and section 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 43(3)(d)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A), 476, 499

Cases cited:

ARS15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2135

BGZ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1095

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN and Another; WZARV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2015) 254 CLR 610; [2015] HCA 22

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another; SZTGM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2017) 347 ALR 405; [2017] HCA 34

SZVBT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 72 AAR 1; [2017] FCA 355

WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and Another (2014) 229 FCR 477; [2014] FCA 947

Date of hearing: 23 May 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 69
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr JM McGovern
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 4 of 2018
BETWEEN:

AVR15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BARKER J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MAY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant do pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the sum of $2,795.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BARKER J:

  1. The appellant appeals from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the former Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to grant the appellant a protection (class XA) visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

  2. The appellant is a 26 year old male citizen of Sri Lanka, of Tamil ethnicity and Hindu faith.  He arrived in Australia in August 2012, as an irregular maritime arrival.  His wife and daughter remain in Sri Lanka.

  3. In his application for protection, made in April 2013, the appellant claimed he feared mistreatment or harm…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 737
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In AVR15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, a Sri Lankan national, sought a review of the Federal Circuit Court’s decision to dismiss his appeal against the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT) to reject his application for a protection visa. The appellant argued that the MRT erred in its assessment of his claims for protection, particularly concerning his alleged detention and interrogation by Sri Lankan authorities and his belief that he would face significant harm if returned to Sri Lanka. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the Circuit Court had erred in dismissing the appeal and whether the Tribunal had made any jurisdictional errors in its decision.

The primary legal issues before the Federal Court were whether the Circuit Court had committed any jurisdictional error in dismissing the appellant’s appeal and whether the Tribunal had erred in its application of the law when it found that the appellant was not owed protection obligations under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant argued that the Tribunal did not properly consider his claims of past persecution and future risk of significant harm. The Minister contended that the Tribunal correctly applied the relevant legal standards and that any errors identified by the Circuit Court were not jurisdictional in nature.

The Federal Court found that the Circuit Court had correctly dismissed the appeal, as the appellant had not identified any jurisdictional errors in the Tribunal’s decision. The Court emphasised that its role was to review the Circuit Court’s decision, not to re-evaluate the Tribunal’s factual findings. The Tribunal had properly considered the 2012 UNHCR guidelines and the appellant’s relationship with his cousin, and had made findings consistent with the applicable legal standards. The Court also noted that the appellant’s subjective fears of harm upon return to Sri Lanka were insufficient to constitute significant harm for the purposes of complementary protection.

The Federal Court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed, and that the appellant should pay the Minister’s costs. The Court held that the Tribunal had correctly applied the relevant provisions of the Migration Act and the Ministerial Direction 56, and that the Circuit Court’s reasoning was sound. The Court found no basis to overturn the Tribunal’s decision, as the appellant had not demonstrated any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant do pay the first respondent’s costs, fixed in the sum of $2,795.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

To understand this ground it is necessary to consider how the appellant’s protection visa application was dealt with by the delegate, the Tribunal, and the judge.DELEGATE’S DECISION In his statutory declaration submitted with his protection application, the appellant described an incident in early 2008 in which officers from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) came to his house and questioned him and instructed him to attend the Kudathanai camp. He said he knew he needed to follow the orders, so went to the camp and was interrogated for two and a half hours regarding his knowledge of his cousin (who the appellant later confirmed was a member of the LTTE). The appellant claimed he was interrogated by the same CID officers roughly a fortnight later and that they again came looking for him the following month. When the appellant next reported to the camp, he claimed, he was threatened that he would be shot if he lied. The appellant also claimed that in 2009 he signed a petition opposing the company he worked for taking sand from a nearby sand forest. His supervisor was angry with him for having signed the petition. The company was owned by the EPDP. He said, the following year, he found out that a man who had also signed the petition was shot and killed by masked men, and he had no doubt the men were from the EPDP and were angry about people opposing one of their company’s actions. In 2011, according to the appellant’s statement, two other colleague who had signed the petition received letters indicating they would be killed. It was after this incident that the appellant tried to leave Sri Lanka, however the agent he gave his passport and paid money to disappeared, meaning the appellant was not able to leave the country at this point. Later in 2011, and again in 2012, the appellant claimed he was approached by Sri Lankan army officers who beat him. After the first assault, the appellant made a complaint to the army and was issued with an apology. He said he believed he was targeted merely due to his Tamil ethnicity. As part of his visa application, the appellant attended an interview with the delegate in September 2013. He was accompanied by his migration agent. In the delegate’s decision record, dated 1 October 2013, reference is made to submissions made on behalf of the appellant at the interview. In assessing the appellant’s claims, the delegate did not accept that he would be the only family member questioned about their cousin. Based on the distance between the appellant and his cousin’s villages, their age difference and the long period since they had had contact, the delegate also did not accept that the appellant would have been of any further interest to the CID after he was initially questioned. Further, the delegate found that there was no information provided to support the proposition that the appellant’s cousin was involved with the LTTE. In relation to the claim regarding the petition, the delegate accepted that the appellant signed the petition and that his colleague was shot, however was not satisfied that this occurred based on the petition which had been signed 18 months earlier. Similarly, the delegate was not satisfied that the threat letters were sent to the appellant’s colleagues as claimed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister particularly emphasised the judge’s reasoning in the Circuit Court dismissing the two grounds of appeal in that Court, on which the Minister relied and submitted were correct.CONSIDERATION As will be seen on a closer examination of the sole ground of the appeal in this Court and the terms of the written and oral submissions made by the appellant, there are some differences between the two. To the extent that the appellant now seeks to contend that the Tribunal erred in finding that Australia did not owe him protection obligations pursuant to s 36(2)(a) of the Act, that was not a ground of judicial review in the Circuit Court and the appellant should not now be allowed to raise it. It is plain, from his submission, that the appellant does misunderstand the role of this Court in an appeal like this. This Court’s appellate function is to ascertain whether the decision of the judge of the Circuit Court reveals any error, and does not involve reviewing the merits of the Tribunal’s earlier decision. Thus, I must refuse to countenance that portion of the submissions made by the appellant concerning the Tribunal’s earlier factual decision-making. In any event, the Tribunal expressly dealt with the significance of the 2012 UNHCR guidelines and the appellant’s relationship with his cousin in its decision‑making. Nothing relevant was left unconsidered by the Tribunal. So far as the appeal repeats the ground of judicial review that failed in the Circuit Court, I have set out in some detail above the reasoning of the judge in rejecting the related two grounds of judicial review advanced before the judge. As the judge reasonably said, particular (b) of ground 1 is not clear, but owed itself to what North J said in the subsequently overruled decision in WZAPN. See [40] above. I consider particulars (a) and (b) of ground 1 should probably be understood as related. Ground 1 is also related to ground 2. It is said, respectively, that a wrong test was applied in applying the significant harm factor under s 36(2A) of the Act, and that the related fact finding was “mistaken”. In substance, I consider that the appellant seeks to contend that the Tribunal erred by not considering his detention in Sri Lanka on return would amount to “significant harm”. However, as the judge held, the Tribunal properly understood its obligations to comply with Ministerial Direction 56 and s 499 of the Act and PAM3. It found against the appellant on the factual circumstances of his case. The facts of his case were different from those that arose in ARS15, and so ARS15 does not determine the outcome in this case. Also, as the judge pointed out, in SZTAL, where the High Court considered the operation of the complementary provisions of the Act, the subjective circumstances of detention, of which the appellant effectively complained in the particulars provided to ground 2 in the Circuit Court, are not relevant to and do not support a claim for complementary protection in circumstances such as the present. Temporary detention on return to Sri Lanka, and less than desirable prison conditions (by Australian standards), is not sufficient to constitute “significant harm” for complementary protection purposes.