AEF15 v Minister for Immigration
[2016] FCCA 997
•29 April 2016
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| AEF15 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2016] FCCA 997 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for review of decision of Refugee Review Tribunal (Tribunal) – whether Tribunal considered country information on which applicant relied – whether Tribunal, having found a law of general application was applied without discrimination nevertheless had to consider whether the law was appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the country concerned – no jurisdictional error. |
| Cases cited: Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] HCA 25; (2004) 217 CLR 387 Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114 WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 947 |
| Applicant: | AEF15 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | SYG 676 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Manousaridis |
| Hearing date: | 8 April 2016 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 29 April 2016 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant in person assisted by an interpreter. |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Ms C Hillary of DLA Piper |
ORDERS
The application is dismissed.
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal is substituted for the Refugee Review Tribunal as the second respondent.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 676 of 2015
| AEF15 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka and Sinhalese. He seeks judicial review of the decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa (Protection visa).
Claims for protection
The applicant arrived in Australia on 19 July 2012 as an irregular maritime arrival. The applicant was first interviewed by an officer of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship on 19 September 2012,[1] and he lodged an application for a Protection visa on 30 November 2012.[2] The applicant claimed he feared harm from Sri Lanka’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and army because of his political opinion, involvement in demonstrations against the government, and status as a failed asylum seeker.
[1] CB1-17
[2] CB18-83
The applicant articulated his claims for protection on a number of occasions, including in a statutory declaration that formed part of his application for a Protection visa,[3] and in a submission made by the applicant’s legal representative dated 19 November 2013.[4] The applicant’s claims, as summarised by the Tribunal, were as follows.[5]
[3] CB45-49
[4] CB161-168
[5] CB209, [22]-[28]
In 2006 the applicant was employed by a fisherman’s society (Society) as a fish broker. His role was to weigh fish owned by the wholesalers. He suspected the scales were faulty, and favoured the wholesalers.
Six months later, the applicant was elected to the committee of the Society. Its task was to introduce new scales. The Committee did introduce new scales, but this resulted in an increase in the price for which wholesalers paid for the fish sold by members of the Society. That angered the local retailers, and they threatened the applicant. With time, however, the new scales were accepted as the common and fair standard for weighing fish.
In 2009 the government decided to remove sand that was causing blockages of the local lagoon. Rather than using the sand it would remove to protect villagers’ homes from being flooded, the government intended to sell the sand. The Society organised a protest, and conflict ensued with government employees with consequent damage to government machinery. The government then refused to remove the sand, leaving the local community to do the necessary work.
After the protest, the deputy mayor, his brother, and local wholesalers lodged a complaint against the Society for the damage that was done to the government equipment. Several members of the Society, but not the applicant, were arrested and questioned. A member of parliament passed an order banning “the fish scale distribution and regulation by the Society in the market place”. Wholesalers who controlled the market banned Society members from attending the market; and retailers continued to threaten Society members. One retailer rang the applicant and threatened to stab him and chop up his body. The applicant ceased his fish scale duties and other fisherman duties, and started working in more distant locations, first as a fish labourer and, in 2011, as a housekeeper in a hotel.
In 2012 the Society tried to introduce (another) fair fish price scale at the market. The applicant received an anonymous phone call which the applicant suspected was from the deputy mayor. The anonymous caller told the applicant that if he went to the markets, the applicant would go missing. The applicant ceased working at the markets.
On 14 and 15 February 2012 villagers gathered and protested against the rise in kerosene prices. The Society played a key role in organising the protest. The applicant attended the protest with his father. The army used tear gas to dispel the protesters and shot into the crowd, killing one person, and injuring five. The army beat the applicant as he attempted to take the injured to the hospital.
The applicant attended the funeral of the dead protestor. Members of the opposition party also attended. Two weeks later, members of the CID began calling members of the Society to find out who instigated the kerosene protest. The applicant received an anonymous telephone call in which he was accused of being an instigator of the protest. The applicant was asked if he was a Tamil or a member of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The anonymous caller threatened to cut up the applicant if he returned to the market.
The applicant did not stay at his home, but stayed at different huts in his village. He discovered the CID had lodged a case against the local priest and a number of Society committee members for their involvement in the protest. The applicant then left Sri Lanka illegally.
Tribunal’s decision
The Tribunal accepted the applicant worked as a fish broker for the Society, and that his role was to weigh fish and undertake tasks such as searching for lost fishermen and nets. The Tribunal also accepted the applicant was elected as an advisor to the Society’s committee, that there was an issue with whether the scales were faulty, and that the Society was able to have correct scales introduced into the market place in 2008.[6] The Tribunal did not accept, however, the applicant received any threats before 2009. The Tribunal based that finding on the applicant’s having informed the Tribunal that he did not receive any threats before 2009, which was inconsistent with the claim he made in his statutory declaration that he did receive a threat before 2009.[7]
[6] CB213, [36]
[7] CB213, [37]
The Tribunal accepted that in 2009 there was an issue involving the sand blockage of the local lagoon, that the Society had organised a protest that resulted in conflict between the government workers, on the one hand, and villagers on the other, resulting in damage to government equipment, and that the villagers and the applicant laboured to remove the sand. [8] The Tribunal also accepted that, after the protest, the deputy mayor, his brother, and local wholesalers lodged a complaint against the Society for the damage done to the government equipment; that a number of Society members, but not the applicant, were arrested and questioned; that the government imposed an order banning the Society from fish scale distribution and regulation in the market place; wholesalers who controlled the markets banned Society members from attending the market; the applicant was not able to work at the market, but began to work in more remote locations as a fish labourer and as housekeeper in a hotel; and that the applicant received a telephone threat from a person called [C].[9]
[8] CB213, [38]
[9] CB213, [39]
The Tribunal noted, however, that the applicant did not claim that [C] threatened him again, or tried to harm the applicant during the ensuing three years the applicant stayed in the village. For that reason the Tribunal did not consider the chance or risk of the applicant being seriously or significantly harmed to be anything more than remote.[10] Also, because the applicant was able to find work as a fisherman and work in a hotel, and was unemployed only for short periods, the Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s inability to work at the fish market constituted serious harm.[11]
[10] CB213, [39]
[11] CB214, [39]
Although the Tribunal accepted the Society tried to introduce a fair fish scale price in January 2012, it did not accept the deputy mayor ever threatened the applicant. The basis of that finding was what the Tribunal found to be a significant inconsistency. Before the Tribunal, the applicant said he was called by the deputy mayor who identified himself, whereas in his statutory declaration, the applicant said the person who had threatened him by telephone did not identify himself. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant was of any adverse interest to the deputy mayor.[12]
[12] CB214, [40]
The Tribunal also accepted that the applicant and his father attended the protest against the rise in kerosene prices and the subsequent funeral, and that the applicant was hit on the back by the authorities when he attempted to help the injured.[13] The Tribunal, however, did not consider the applicant to be a credible witness in relation to his other claims arising from these incidents.
a)First, before the Tribunal the applicant said he had received maybe three threatening phone calls accusing him of being a Tamil or involved with JVP, whereas in his statutory declaration the applicant said he received only one such threatening call.[14]
b)Second, in his interview with the delegate, the applicant said that from the kerosene protests in February 2012 until his departure from Sri Lanka in June 2012, the applicant continued to work. Before the Tribunal, however, the applicant said he did not work during that period, and that he stayed in fisherman’s huts.[15] Apart from this inconsistency, the Tribunal noted that if the applicant had been of interest to the authorities, they could have located him in the huts, particularly because the applicant said he continued to do some work for the Society.[16]
c)Third, before the delegate the applicant said that neither the authorities nor anyone else came to his house after the kerosene protests, whereas before the Tribunal the applicant said the authorities came to know he was not at his home and their supporters would have given the authorities that information. The Tribunal considered the applicant’s explanation to be completely speculative, and further considered that the absence of anyone coming to his home to enquire about the applicant’s whereabouts is a factor that detracted from the applicant’s credibility.[17]
d)Fourth, the Tribunal was unable to identify any reports of members of the Society having been involved in the kerosene protests, or of anyone being targeted by the authorities after the protests. The Tribunal referred to country information that indicated that over 5,000 people attended the protests, and over 20,000 attended the subsequent funeral.[18]
[13] CB214, [41]
[14] CB214, [41], first bullet point
[15] CB214, [41], second bullet point
[16] CB214, [41], second bullet point
[17] CB214, [41], third bullet point
[18] CB214-15, [41], fourth bullet point
The Tribunal, therefore, did not accept the applicant was or is of any adverse interest to the authorities or anyone else on account of his involvement in the kerosene protests; that the applicant received any phone calls accusing him of being an instigator of the protests, or a Tamil, or a member of the JVP, or threatening to harm him if he returned to the market; that the applicant went into hiding; or that the Society or any members of the Society faced any charges in relation to the protest.[19]
[19] CB215, [42]
The Tribunal then considered whether the applicant faced significant harm because he was a failed asylum seeker. The applicant claimed that, although he was Sinhalese, he would be perceived to be a Tamil on his return. After referring to country information, the Tribunal concluded the applicant does not face a real chance of serious harm, now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, if he were to return to Sri Lanka as a failed asylum seeker; and was not satisfied there are substantial grounds for believing that as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant’s being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka that there is a real risk the applicant will suffer significant harm because he is a failed asylum seeker.[20]
[20] CB216, [52]
Finally, the Tribunal considered whether the applicant would face harm because he had departed Sri Lanka in breach of Sri Lanka’s Immigrants and Emigrants Act (IEA). The Tribunal found that the IEA did not on its face reveal a discriminatory intent or impact; and that it was not applied in a discriminatory manner.[21] The Tribunal noted there was nothing to indicate the applicant was involved in facilitating or organising people smuggling or terrorism.[22] The Tribunal also noted that country information showed that persons who had departed Sri Lanka illegally, although detained on their return for a short term, are immediately granted bail by magistrates on personal surety and are only fined.[23] Further, although the Tribunal accepted country information that showed returnees who departed Sri Lanka illegally are detained on their return, the detentions are for a short term.[24] The Tribunal also accepted that prison conditions in Sri Lanka are poor. The Tribunal found, however, that these conditions applied to the general population,[25] and in any event did not constitute significant harm.[26]
[21] CB216-217, [54]
[22] CB217, [55]
[23] CB217, [56]
[24] CB217, [56]
[25] CB217, [57]
[26] CB217-218, [58]
Hearing
The applicant was legally represented when he commenced these proceedings. That is reflected in the grounds of application stated in his application. By the time of the hearing, however, the applicant was not legally represented. Although I offered to have the grounds of application interpreted to the applicant with a view to inviting him to make submissions, the applicant said he did not wish me to do that, because he was not a lawyer. The applicant, however, made a number of submissions. I propose, therefore, first to consider each of the grounds stated in the application for review, and then the matters the applicant raised in his oral submissions before me.
Grounds of application
The application for review raises three grounds of review.
First ground
The first ground is:
The Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error by failing to take into account a relevant consideration, by failing to deal with the claims before it or by failing to perform its statutory task under the Act.
Particulars
a. There was a claim before the Tribunal that the applicant was owed protection obligations as a consequence of the risk of torture by Sri Lankan authorities (Torture Claim).
b. The applicant’s migration agent referred the Tribunal to country information capable of supporting the Torture Claim (Applicant’s Country Information).
c. The Tribunal, in its summary of the country information before it (particularly the information identified at footnote 8 of its decision) concluded that country information indicated that prison conditions in Sri Lanka might not meet international standards and that concerns included instances of torture, maltreatment and violence (Tribunal’s First Finding).
d. The Tribunal, however, concluded (apparently on the basis of a DFAT Report: Tribunal’s Decision at [46]) that the risk of torture or mistreatment for the great majority of returnees was low and, therefore the risk that the applicant would be subject to torture or any other form of significant harm was remote: Tribunal’s Decision at [59] (Tribunal’s Second Finding).
e. In the premises, in making the Second Finding, the Tribunal failed to take relevant considerations into account, viz the Applicant’s Country Information and the Tribunal’s First Finding (including the country information underlying the Tribunal’s First Finding).
f. Further and in the alternative, by failing to deal with the implications of the Tribunal’s First Finding when making the Tribunal’s Second Finding, the Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error.
g. Further and in the alternative, in making the Second Finding the Tribunal failed to perform its statutory task under the Act by failing to deal with the Applicant’s Country Information and the Tribunal’s First Finding (including the country information underlying the Tribunal’s First Finding) in a manner consistent with its statutory obligations.
The substance of this ground is that, although the Tribunal referred to country information[27] which the Tribunal acknowledged indicated the prison conditions in Sri Lanka may not meet international standards, and which the Tribunal also acknowledged indicated concerns that included overcrowding, poor sanitary facilities, limited access to food, the absence of basic assistance mechanisms, a lack of reform initiatives and instances of torture, the Tribunal did not in fact consider that country information.
[27] The country information is annexed to an affidavit filed by Mr Varess who was the applicant’s solicitor.
I do not accept the Tribunal did not consider, in the manner in which it was required to consider,[28] the country information on which the applicant relied. The Tribunal specifically referred to the applicant’s agent having referred to country information, both when the Tribunal considered the risk of harm to the applicant on the basis of the applicant’s being a failed asylum seeker,[29] and when the Tribunal considered the potential of the applicant’s being harmed on his return to Sri Lanka because he had left Sri Lanka illegally.[30] Further, the Tribunal said it “considered carefully the country information” and accepted “that prison conditions in Sri Lanka are poor”.[31] Having acknowledged prison conditions were poor, the Tribunal nevertheless concluded that the conditions did not constitute significant harm because of the short term nature of any detention.[32] Further, the Tribunal considered the possibility of the applicant experiencing torture while in detention. The Tribunal, however, concluded that the risk of that occurring was low; and the basis of its so concluding was “the short term nature of the detention and the country information that the risk of torture or mistreatment for the great majority of returnees is low”.[33]
[28] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114 at [39], [45], [50]
[29] CB215, [47]
[30] CB217, [56]
[31] CB217, [58]
[32] CB217-218, [58]
[33] CB218, [59]
I am not satisfied, therefore, the Tribunal did not undertake “any evaluation”[34] of the country information on which the applicant relied, or any “process of weighing” of all country information that was before it, including the country information on which the applicant relied.[35] Ground 1, therefore, fails.
[34] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114 at [45]
[35] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCAFC 114 at [50]
Second ground
The second ground stated in the application is:
The Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error by failing to ask itself the right question.
Particulars
a. In finding that the application of the Sri Lankan Immigration and Emigration Act involved the enforcement of a generally applicable law, the Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error by failing to ask itself whether the law was appropriate and adapted (in the sense of proportional) to a legitimate object of the State.
b. Further and in the alternative, in finding that the application of the Sri Lankan Immigration and Emmigration Act involved the application of the enforcement of a generally applicable law and was not discriminatory, the Tribunal failed to ask itself whether the application of the law had a discriminatory effect in respect of the particular social group to which the applicant claimed to belong, namely failed asylum seeker returnees or illegal departees.
The ground makes two claims. The first is that, having found that the IEA was a law of general application, the Tribunal was required, but failed, to consider whether the law was appropriate and adapted to a legitimate object of the State. The second claim is that, having found the IEA was a law of general application, the Tribunal was required, but it failed, to consider whether in its operation it discriminated against failed asylum seekers and illegal departees.
Ordinarily, persecution within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention[36] “will be manifested by a series of discriminatory acts directed at members of a race, religion, nationality or particular social group or at those who hold certain political opinions in a way that shows that, as a class, they are being selectively harassed”.[37] Thus, the “enforcement of a generally applicable criminal law does not ordinarily constitute persecution”.[38] A law of general application, however, “is capable of being implemented or enforced in a discriminatory manner”.[39] Whether the implementation of a law of general application in a discriminatory manner amounts to persecution depends on whether the discriminatory treatment is “appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the country [concerned]””,[40] although only in “exceptional cases is it likely that a sanction aimed at persons for reasons of race, religion or nationality will be an appropriate means for achieving a legitimate government object and not amount to persecution”.[41]
[36] Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
[37] Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 at page 258 (McHugh J)
[38] Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 at page 258 (McHugh J)
[39] Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] HCA 25; (2004) 217 CLR 387 at [42] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ)
[40] Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] HCA 25; (2004) 217 CLR 387 at [43] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ) (the passage in quotations is taken from the reasons for judgment of McHugh J in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 at page 258
[41] Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 at page 259
Turning to the first of the applicant’s two claims, the Tribunal found not only that the IEA was a law of general application, but that the IEA “is not selectively enforced and does not have a different impact on different groups”, and that the country information on which the Tribunal relied “indicates that all persons who are returnees who have left Sri Lanka by irregular means are dealt with equally regardless of ethnicity”.[42] Having made these findings, it was not necessary for the Tribunal to consider whether the IEA, was appropriate and adapted to a legitimate object of Sri Lanka. That question could only have arisen if the Tribunal had found that the IEA is applied in a discriminatory fashion. The Tribunal found the IEA is not applied in a discriminatory fashion.
[42] CB216-217, [54]
The second of the applicant’s two claims is incorrect. The Tribunal did consider whether the IEA had a discriminatory effect in respect of the particular social group to which the applicant claimed to belong, namely failed asylum seeker returnees or illegal departees. The Tribunal found the IEA did not have any such discriminatory effect.
Ground 2, therefore, also fails.
Ground 3
The third ground is:
The Tribunal engaged in jurisdictional error by failing to apply the law when it concluded that any detention that the applicant might face upon return to Sri Lanka did not amount to persecution.
This ground appears to rely on the reasoning of North J in WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection.[43] The High Court, however, disapproved of his Honour’s reasoning, and the conclusions and orders his Honour made on the basis of that reasoning.[44] Ground 3, therefore, also fails.
[43] [2014] FCA 947
[44] Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN [2015] FCA 22
Submissions made at hearing
The applicant made a number of submissions to me. First, he submitted that, when he was to be deported from Australia, the applicant was informed there were people in Sri Lanka who were still searching for him. The applicant said he fears returning to Sri Lanka, and he wants sympathy from the Court. These submissions do not disclose any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. Further, sympathy, by itself, is not a ground on which this Court can intervene to set aside the decision of the Tribunal.
Second, the applicant said he had a medical condition. He said acid had been spilled in his eye, impairing his vision. He said he was begging sympathy from the Court. These submissions also do not disclose any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. There is nothing to suggest the Tribunal was made aware of any medical condition the applicant suffered. There is no evidence before me to indicate the applicant did suffer from such condition at the time he appeared before the Tribunal. And there is no evidence to suggest that if the applicant did suffer from such medical condition, it affected his ability to effectively give evidence and present arguments to the Tribunal.
Third, the applicant submitted the Tribunal did not take into account the gravity of the incidents that occurred during the kerosene protests. In support of this submission, the applicant sought to tender two photographs,[45] and an untranslated letter the applicant claimed came from the Society.[46] The purpose of the applicant’s tendering the photographs was to prove that one of the persons appearing in each of the photographs was the person who had made the threats to him, and that that person had political connections. One of the photographs included a person whom the applicant said was the former president of Sri Lanka.
[45] Which were marked MFI1 and MFI2
[46] Which was marked MFI3
Ms Hillary, who appeared for the Minister, objected to the tender of these documents on the basis that the documents were not before the Tribunal. The documents were included among a bundle of documents that were annexed to an affidavit the applicant made on 15 January 2016. Near the beginning of the hearing before me, in response to my question, the applicant said that none of the documents he had annexed to the affidavit were given to the Tribunal. In his submissions in reply, however, the applicant said that the three documents were provided to the Tribunal. The applicant repeated that assertion under oath, and he was cross-examined.
In evidence given under cross-examination, the applicant said he provided the documents to the Tribunal ten minutes before the hearing concluded. When he was initially asked why the documents were not submitted by his lawyer before that time, the applicant said he had given the documents to his lawyer, but his lawyer did not submit them to the Tribunal, so the applicant decided to submit them. When asked why his lawyer did not submit the documents, the applicant said he made a mistake in the previous answer he gave. He said he did not in fact give the documents to the lawyer. When it was put to him that the applicant’s lawyer would have asked the applicant to provide to the lawyer all relevant documents, the applicant said he was not so advised. The applicant said he spoke to the lawyer by telephone only one week before the hearing, and the applicant was advised to bring all relevant documents to the hearing. When it was put to the applicant that his lawyer had submitted to the Tribunal the applicant’s identity card, the applicant said the photographs and the letter was new information he had obtained from Sri Lanka. He later said the documents were obtained from the Internet.
I do not accept the applicant’s evidence that he had provided the documents to the Tribunal. First, the applicant confirmed to me on at least two occasions that none of the documents annexed to his affidavit – which included the three documents the applicant sought to tender – had been given to the Tribunal. The only explanation he gave to me for later saying the three documents had been provided to the Tribunal was that he had made a mistake in confirming none of the documents had been provided to the Tribunal. Second, the evidence he gave under cross-examination shifted in several respects. He initially said he had provided the documents to his lawyer, and the applicant submitted the documents to the Tribunal only after his lawyer did not provide them to the Tribunal; but the applicant then said he did not provide the documents to his lawyer. Next, the applicant said that his lawyer advised him to bring the documents to the hearing. When confronted, however, with the fact that his lawyer submitted documents before the hearing, the applicant said the documents was new information. Lastly, he said the documents came from Sri Lanka, but then he said he obtained the documents from the Internet.
I therefore reject the tender of the two photographs and the purported letter from the Society on the ground of relevance. In any event, even if the Tribunal was provided with the photographs, I am not prepared to infer from the Tribunal’s not mentioning them in its reasons that it did not consider them. In the applicant’s lawyer’s written submissions, it was submitted that although the person who made the threats to the applicant did not give his name, the applicant suspected it was a Mr S. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that “[r]egardless of who the caller was, the caller was making a threat supporting the interests of” Mr S.[47] At most, the photographs only identified Mr S. There is nothing in the photographs by themselves, however, that could reasonably have been considered by the Tribunal as probative of the applicant’s claims that the person in the photograph was Mr S, or that the applicant had received a telephone threat from Mr S or from any other person. The only probative route to the Tribunal’s accepting those matters was the testimony of the applicant. The Tribunal, however, did not accept the applicant’s evidence that he had received a threat from anyone. It was not necessary for the Tribunal, therefore, to refer to the photographs, assuming the applicant had provided them to the Tribunal.
[47] CB165-166
As for the third document the applicant tendered at the hearing before me, the applicant said it was relevant to proving he was a member of the Society. Even if the applicant provided the document to the Tribunal, I do not accept the Tribunal did not consider it. The Tribunal accepted the applicant was a member of the Society.
Finally, I should refer to documents the applicant annexed to his affidavit made on 15 January 2016. I read that affidavit subject to relevance. The applicant acknowledged that all of the documents, except the three documents I have already considered, were not put to the Tribunal. For that reason, the documents are not relevant.
Conclusion and disposition
None of the grounds contained in the application have been made out; and none of the matters raised before me by the applicant disclose any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal. It follows, therefore, that the application must be dismissed. I will also make an order that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be substituted for the Tribunal as the second respondent.
I certify that the preceding forty-three (43) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Manousaridis
Associate:
Date: 29 April 2016
0
5
0