FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZTDT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2016] FCA 631
Appeal from: SZTDT v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1666 File number: NSD 767 of 2015 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 10 May 2016 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A)
Refugees Convention
Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 610
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2010) 210 FCR 505
SZSGA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774
SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 497
WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 229 FCR 477
Date of hearing: 10 May 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: G Johnson Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
NSD 767 of 2015 BETWEEN: SZTDT
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
10 MAY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)RARES J:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellant’s application for constitutional writ relief against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal given on 27 June 2013 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa: SZTDT v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 1666.
The issues
In the proceedings before his Honour the appellant was represented by counsel, however, he has appeared today to represent himself. The grounds of appeal assert that his Honour erred in failing to accept the two grounds for judicial review advanced in the Court below. Those were, in essence, that his Honour should have found that the Tribunal, first, had failed to consider the full integers of the appellant’s claims for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and complete the exercise of that jurisdiction and, secondly, had applied the wrong test under s 36(2)(aa).
Background
The appellant is an ethnic Tamil from the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. He is also a Hindu who had departed that country illegally. The appellant had claimed that he was entitled to protection on a number of bases. The Tribunal accepted, by giving him the benefit of the doubt that, in 2005, the appellant had been detained by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, for recruitment, but that he had escaped that detention after a short period.
The Tribunal also accepted that the…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 631
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the Tribunal's findings and concluded that the Tribunal had properly considered the appellant's claims and the relevant country information. It found that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant would suffer serious or significant harm upon his return to Sri Lanka, and thus, it was not satisfied that the statutory criteria for complementary protection had been met. The court also held that the Tribunal had correctly applied the test under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and found that the Tribunal's decision was lawful and reasonable.
In summary, the court held that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the appellant's claims and in its application of the statutory criteria for complementary protection. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. The court's decision was based on the Tribunal's findings, which demonstrated that it had properly considered the appellant's claims and the relevant country information and had correctly applied the statutory criteria.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant argued before me that he had been unable to provide anything other than his own oral evidence to support his claims, but that he did, in fact, have a genuine fear of suffering significant harm were he to be returned to Sri Lanka and that there were substantial grounds for believing, that as, a necessary and reasonably foreseeable consequence of that occurring, there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm. He claimed that the Tribunal had erred in failing to believe his claims and accept his oral evidence. He contended that the country information, on which the Tribunal had relied, was not reliable. His written submissions repeated the arguments that his counsel had put to the trial judge.Consideration In my opinion, the first ground of appeal must fail. The Tribunal expressly found at [40] that it was not satisfied that the appellant would suffer serious harm, that is, for a Convention reason, on return to Sri Lanka for any of the reasons that he had claimed. That was, in substance, a reference back to all of the reasons that the Tribunal had given for rejecting the appellant’s claims to protection under the Refugees Convention, including, for any other reason than those that he had advanced to the Tribunal. Next, at [40] of its reasons, the Tribunal considered an additional factor relevant to the claim to complementary protection, being the circumstances that, on his return, the appellant would be arrested and detained as a person who had allegedly departed Sri Lanka until he could be brought before a court, after a relatively brief period of remand, for a bail hearing. The Tribunal found that the only additional harm that the appellant might suffer in those circumstances was that he would be fined if found guilty. But it was not satisfied that such treatment, of arrest, detention and or fine could reasonably be said to amount to either serious harm, in a Convention sense, or significant harm within the meaning of s 36(2)(aa) and (2A) of the Act. The Tribunal’s obligation, standing in the shoes of the Minister, was to determine whether it was satisfied that the appellant had met the statutory criteria that enlivened Australia’s protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or (aa). That would only occur in relation to the complementary protection obligations if the Tribunal were satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the appellant being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm. In my opinion, the Tribunal’s findings, in [40] and [41] of its reasons, demonstrated that it had addressed this very question, namely, whether it was satisfied that Australia had those protection obligations. It was not satisfied that the appellant’s account of what had happened to him in Sri Lanka was credible for the purposes of his claims to protection under s 36(2)(a). Based on those findings, together with its rejection of his claim that the brief period of detention or remand and the fine that he would be exposed to, were he found guilty of being an illegal returning departee, would give rise to complementary protection obligations, it was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that he would suffer significant harm were he returned to Sri Lanka.