SZTDT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTDT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2016] FCA 631

Appeal from: SZTDT v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1666
File number: NSD 767 of 2015
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 10 May 2016
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2A)

Refugees Convention 

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 254 CLR 610

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB (2010) 210 FCR 505

SZSGA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774

SZTEQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 229 FCR 497

WZAPN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 229 FCR 477

Date of hearing: 10 May 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 26
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: G Johnson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 767 of 2015
BETWEEN:

SZTDT

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MAY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCRIPT)

RARES J:

  1. This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court refusing the appellant’s application for constitutional writ relief against the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal given on 27 June 2013 to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to grant the appellant a protection visa:  SZTDT v Minister for Immigration [2015] FCCA 1666.

    The issues

  2. In the proceedings before his Honour the appellant was represented by counsel, however, he has appeared today to represent himself.  The grounds of appeal assert that his Honour erred in failing to accept the two grounds for judicial review advanced in the Court below.  Those were, in essence, that his Honour should have found that the Tribunal, first, had failed to consider the full integers of the appellant’s claims for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and complete the exercise of that jurisdiction and, secondly, had applied the wrong test under s 36(2)(aa).

    Background

  3. The appellant is an ethnic Tamil from the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka.  He is also a Hindu who had departed that country illegally.  The appellant had claimed that he was entitled to protection on a number of bases.  The Tribunal accepted, by giving him the benefit of the doubt that, in 2005, the appellant had been detained by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, for recruitment, but that he had escaped that detention after a short period.

  4. The Tribunal also accepted that the…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 631
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of SZTDT v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant, an ethnic Tamil from the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, sought to appeal against the decision of his Honour, who dismissed his claims for judicial review. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider his claims for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and had applied the wrong test. The central legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had erred in its assessment of the appellant's claims and in its application of the statutory criteria for complementary protection. The court considered the appellant's arguments, including his claims of past persecution by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Sri Lankan Army, and his fear of future harm if returned to Sri Lanka.

The court examined the Tribunal's findings and concluded that the Tribunal had properly considered the appellant's claims and the relevant country information. It found that the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant would suffer serious or significant harm upon his return to Sri Lanka, and thus, it was not satisfied that the statutory criteria for complementary protection had been met. The court also held that the Tribunal had correctly applied the test under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and found that the Tribunal's decision was lawful and reasonable.

In summary, the court held that the Tribunal had not erred in its assessment of the appellant's claims and in its application of the statutory criteria for complementary protection. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent. The court's decision was based on the Tribunal's findings, which demonstrated that it had properly considered the appellant's claims and the relevant country information and had correctly applied the statutory criteria.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the first respondent.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the proceedings before his Honour the appellant was represented by counsel, however, he has appeared today to represent himself. The grounds of appeal assert that his Honour erred in failing to accept the two grounds for judicial review advanced in the Court below. Those were, in essence, that his Honour should have found that the Tribunal, first, had failed to consider the full integers of the appellant’s claims for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and complete the exercise of that jurisdiction and, secondly, had applied the wrong test under s 36(2)(aa).Background The appellant is an ethnic Tamil from the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka. He is also a Hindu who had departed that country illegally. The appellant had claimed that he was entitled to protection on a number of bases. The Tribunal accepted, by giving him the benefit of the doubt that, in 2005, the appellant had been detained by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, for recruitment, but that he had escaped that detention after a short period. The Tribunal also accepted that the Sri Lankan Army had conducted roundups and arrests in the Eastern Province during the Sri Lankan civil war and that, in 2005, after his escape from the LTTE, the appellant had been detained for two weeks. However, the Tribunal was not prepared to accept that subsequently to the conclusion of the war, the appellant had suffered, or was at risk of suffering, any further harm from the LTTE, the government, or groups associated with either the LTTE or the government. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant was a credible witness about his claims that he had suffered any further adverse experiences or consequences after his release by the army from the two week detention in 2005. Indeed, it found that the army had released him at that time and that fact “strongly suggests that he was not believed to have any connection with the LTTE”. The Tribunal found that, the appellant had been able to travel to Abu Dhabi on a genuine passport in his own name twice and that his passport had been renewed in 2009 while he was in Abu Dhabi. The Tribunal said this meant that the appellant could not have been of adverse interest to the Sri Lankan authorities, because of any actual or imputed behaviour or belief, as he had claimed. The Tribunal also was not satisfied of the appellant’s claim, when he returned to his village for two months in 2008, to have been of adverse interest to the Karuna or Pillayan paramilitary groups. Those groups had originally been aligned to the LTTE, but had switched sides to align themselves with the then government. The Tribunal found that because he lived in a small village, the army would have been well aware that he was there and, had he been of adverse interest, the army would have detained and harmed him, but that, as the appellant had said, no such events occurred. The Tribunal found that because he had performed no service at all for the LTTE during his very brief detention in 2005 and had escaped from them, there was no basis to conclude that he had ever been denounced to the authorities or to paramilitary organisations by any former LTTE members or informants. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant’s assertions that either paramilitary group had searched for him after he returned from Abu Dhabi in 2011 or had come to his sister’s house on three occasions in a white van, as he had claimed. It found that, had the appellant been of any interest to either of those groups or others, they would not have stopped simply at attending at his sister’s house and doing nothing else to seek him out, after being told that he was not there. It was not satisfied there was any reason to believe that the appellant was currently wanted or sought by the authorities or any paramilitary groups in Sri Lanka.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Indeed, having regard to the subsequent decision in WZAPN 254 CLR 610, that conclusion was open to the Tribunal. For these reasons, as well as those that the trial judge gave, I am of opinion that ground two must be dismissed.Conclusion The appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant argued before me that he had been unable to provide anything other than his own oral evidence to support his claims, but that he did, in fact, have a genuine fear of suffering significant harm were he to be returned to Sri Lanka and that there were substantial grounds for believing, that as, a necessary and reasonably foreseeable consequence of that occurring, there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm. He claimed that the Tribunal had erred in failing to believe his claims and accept his oral evidence. He contended that the country information, on which the Tribunal had relied, was not reliable. His written submissions repeated the arguments that his counsel had put to the trial judge.Consideration In my opinion, the first ground of appeal must fail. The Tribunal expressly found at [40] that it was not satisfied that the appellant would suffer serious harm, that is, for a Convention reason, on return to Sri Lanka for any of the reasons that he had claimed. That was, in substance, a reference back to all of the reasons that the Tribunal had given for rejecting the appellant’s claims to protection under the Refugees Convention, including, for any other reason than those that he had advanced to the Tribunal. Next, at [40] of its reasons, the Tribunal considered an additional factor relevant to the claim to complementary protection, being the circumstances that, on his return, the appellant would be arrested and detained as a person who had allegedly departed Sri Lanka until he could be brought before a court, after a relatively brief period of remand, for a bail hearing. The Tribunal found that the only additional harm that the appellant might suffer in those circumstances was that he would be fined if found guilty. But it was not satisfied that such treatment, of arrest, detention and or fine could reasonably be said to amount to either serious harm, in a Convention sense, or significant harm within the meaning of s 36(2)(aa) and (2A) of the Act. The Tribunal’s obligation, standing in the shoes of the Minister, was to determine whether it was satisfied that the appellant had met the statutory criteria that enlivened Australia’s protection obligations under s 36(2)(a) or (aa). That would only occur in relation to the complementary protection obligations if the Tribunal were satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the appellant being removed from Australia to Sri Lanka, there was a real risk that he would suffer significant harm. In my opinion, the Tribunal’s findings, in [40] and [41] of its reasons, demonstrated that it had addressed this very question, namely, whether it was satisfied that Australia had those protection obligations. It was not satisfied that the appellant’s account of what had happened to him in Sri Lanka was credible for the purposes of his claims to protection under s 36(2)(a). Based on those findings, together with its rejection of his claim that the brief period of detention or remand and the fine that he would be exposed to, were he found guilty of being an illegal returning departee, would give rise to complementary protection obligations, it was not satisfied that there were substantial grounds for believing that he would suffer significant harm were he returned to Sri Lanka.