FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AUF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 115
Appeal from: AUF15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2438 File number: NSD 1184 of 2015 Judge: MARKOVIC J Date of judgment: 19 February 2016 Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 r 36.05 Cases cited: AHI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 64
AUF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2015] FCCA 2438
Plaintiff s157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91
Date of hearing: 16 February 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 25 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms N Maddocks, DLA Piper Australia ORDERS
NSD 1184 of 2015 BETWEEN: AUF15
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MARKOVIC J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 FEBRUARY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia filed on 1 October 2015 be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MARKOVIC J:
This is an application pursuant to r 36.05 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (the Rules) seeking an order for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a judgment and orders of a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Federal Circuit Court) given and made on 4 September 2015: AUF15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2438 (AUF15).
By those orders the Federal Circuit Court dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) of a decision of the second respondent (then the Refugee Review Tribunal) (the Tribunal) and ordered the applicant to pay the first respondent’s (the Minister) costs. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) visa.
Pursuant to r 36.03(a)(i) of the Rules a notice of appeal must be filed within 21 days from which the judgment appealed from was pronounced or the order was made. In the present case, the last day on which the applicant could file a notice of appeal was 25 September 2015. The application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal now before the Court was filed on 1 October 2015, six days late.
The applicant therefore requires an order extending the time within which he can file his notice of appeal.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia as an illegal maritime arrival…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 115
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether to exercise its discretion to extend the time within which the applicant could file his notice of appeal. In determining this, the court considered the factors set out in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-9, including the need for an acceptable reason for the delay, any prejudice to the respondents, and the merits of the appeal. The applicant did not provide any explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal, and the Minister submitted that he could point to no prejudice should an extension of time be granted. The court found that the draft notice of appeal raised two grounds, neither of which identified any misconstruction or misapplication of s 5 or s 36(2A) of the Act. The court found that the Tribunal complied with Ministerial Direction 56 and took into account PAM 3 and that there was a “real intellectual engagement” with PAM 3.
The court dismissed the application for an extension of time to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court filed on 1 October 2015. The court found that the applicant had not provided any explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal, and that the draft notice of appeal did not identify any misconstruction or misapplication of s 5 or s 36(2A) of the Act. The court also found that the Tribunal complied with Ministerial Direction 56 and took into account PAM 3 and that there was a “real intellectual engagement” with PAM 3. The court ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia filed on 1 October 2015 be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In relation to the second ground, the primary judge found that the matters particularised in support of this ground did not identify any misconstruction or misapplication of s 5 or s 36(2A) of the Act. The primary judge found that the Tribunal complied with Ministerial Direction 56 and took into account PAM 3 and that there was a “real intellectual engagement” with PAM 3. The primary judge found that this ground was an impermissible challenge to the Tribunal’s adverse findings of fact which were open to it on the material before it: AUF15 at [8].CONSIDERATION Rule 36.05 of the Rules does not prescribe any particular factors to be taken into account by a court before exercising its discretion to extend the time within which to file a notice of appeal. As observed by Murphy J in SZQCZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 91 (SZQCZ) at [18], the Court has treated the factors set out in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-9 (Hunter Valley Developments) as the guiding principles for determining an application for an extension of time. At [19] of SZQCZ, Murphy J set out the following as factors to be considered in such an application:(a)satisfaction that it is proper to do so, noting that the prescribed period is not to be ignored. This usually requires an acceptable reason for the delay;(b)any prejudice to the respondents, noting that the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension;(c)the merits of the appeal. As observed by Edelman J in AHI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 64 at [19], none of the principles identified in Hunter Valley Developments is a precondition to a grant of leave and r 36.05 involves “an exercise of discretion having regard to all relevant factors” (emphasis in original). The applicant has not filed any written submissions in support of his application. He relies on his affidavit affirmed 1 October 2015 filed in support of his application. When invited to make submissions at the hearing of his application, both in support of the application and in reply to those made on behalf of the Minister, he declined to do so. The period of delay is relatively short. However, the applicant’s affidavit affirmed on 1 October 2015 in support of his application does not include any explanation, let alone an acceptable reason, for the delay in filing the notice of appeal. The Minister submitted that he can point to no prejudice should an extension of time be granted. I accept that submission and will deal no further with that factor. I turn then to consider the merits of the proposed appeal. The draft notice of appeal annexed to the application for an extension of time raises the following two grounds (as written):1.Her Honour Judge Street erred by not acting in accordance with rule of the Federal Court Circuit Rules 2001 (Cth) by not taking the Applicant’s application at its highest for the purposes of dismissing the proceedings.2.His Honour Judge Street erred by dismissing the proceedings in circumstances where the appellant was unrepresented.