AHI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AHI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 64

Appeal from: AHI15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2601
File number: QUD 1000 of 2015
Judge: EDELMAN J
Date of judgment: 10 February 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal – whether ground of appeal is arguable or has “merit” – assessment of the extent to which ground must have merit is influenced by consideration of other factors relevant to exercise of discretion – application allowed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal under r 36.05(1) Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – no preconditions exist to the grant of leave – discretion to be exercised having regard to all the circumstances

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 11(1)(c)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M(1)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 36(2)(aa), 65, 91R(1)(c)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 36.03, 36.05, 36.05(1)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2

Cases cited:

Dunlop v Fishburn (No. 3) [2012] FCA 315

Hunter Valley Developments v Cohen [1984] FCA 186; (1984) 3 FCR 344

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133

Samsung Electronics Co Limited v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; (2011) 217 FCR 238

SZHIU v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FCA 101

SZORZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 593

SZQZR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 69

Date of hearing: 10 February 2016
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 39
Solicitor for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person assisted by Mr R Gordon
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms C Symons
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice
Table of Corrections
12 February 2016 In paragraphs 2, 14, 24, 26 and 39, “leave to appeal” has been amended to “leave to extend time to file a notice of appeal”.
12 February 2016 In paragraphs 17 and 37, “to appeal” has been amended to “to file a notice of appeal”.

ORDERS

QUD 1000 of 2015
BETWEEN:

AHI15

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

EDELMAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 FEBRUARY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant be granted an extension of time in which to file and serve a notice of appeal until the date of this Order.

2.The draft notice of appeal annexed to the applicant’s application for an extension of time filed on 2 November 2015 be taken to be a notice of appeal filed by the applicant as required by Order 1.

3.The applicant have leave to file and serve an amended notice of appeal by…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AHI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against the Federal Circuit Court's decision to dismiss an application for judicial review of a decision to refuse a Protection Visa. The primary focus of the dispute was whether the Federal Circuit Court had erred in dismissing the applicant's grounds of judicial review, which included allegations that the court had not properly considered certain evidence and had taken into account irrelevant matters.

The legal issues that the court needed to decide included whether the grounds of appeal were arguable and had "merit" to warrant an extension of time. The court also needed to consider the extent to which these grounds had merit and whether the applicant's delay in filing the notice of appeal could be justified under the circumstances. Additionally, the court had to assess the potential prejudice to the Minister if the extension was granted, as well as the importance of the issues to the applicant.

The court found that two of the grounds of appeal were arguable and had sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time. It held that the Federal Circuit Court may have erred in its conclusions regarding these grounds, and that the issues should be addressed at the appeal stage rather than in an application for leave to extend time. The court also noted that the delay in filing the notice of appeal was significant, but it was not substantially prejudicial to the Minister. Furthermore, the importance of the issues to the applicant supported the grant of an extension. As a result, the application for leave to extend time to file a notice of appeal was allowed.

In summary, the court granted the applicant an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal, permitted the filing of an amended notice of appeal, and allowed the Minister to file a notice of contention. The costs of the application for the extension of time were ordered to be costs in the cause.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant be granted an extension of time in which to file and serve a notice of appeal until the date of this Order.

2. The draft notice of appeal annexed to the applicant’s application for an extension of time filed on 2 November 2015 be taken to be a notice of appeal filed by the applicant as required by Order 1.

3. The applicant have leave to file and serve an amended notice of appeal by 17 February 2016.

4. The first respondent have leave to file a notice of contention by 24 February 2016.

5. Costs of the application for the extension of time in which to file and serve a notice of appeal be costs in the cause.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

During oral submissions, counsel for the Minister accepted that it was arguable that the Federal Circuit Court erred in relation to two of the issues arising from the substratum of the grounds of appeal. Counsel submitted, however, that those arguable errors could be addressed by matters which would, effectively, be contained in a notice of contention. Having regard to all the factors described above (the length and explanation for the delay, the lack of substantial prejudice, and the importance of the issues to the applicant) these are matters that should be addressed at an appeal rather than an application for leave to extend time to file a notice of appeal.Outline of the facts and background The facts and background in this case, as relied upon by the Minister, can be described briefly for the purposes of this leave application. On 12 September 2013, a delegate of the Minister refused to grant a Protection (Class XA) Visa (Protection Visa) to the applicant under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act). On 24 September 2013, the applicant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal (which is now part of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (the Tribunal) for review of the delegate’s decision. The applicant attended the Tribunal hearing on 17 February 2015, accompanied by his representative and assisted by an interpreter in the Tamil and English languages. The applicant’s representative also submitted both pre-hearing and post-hearing written submissions to the Tribunal. The applicant claimed that he had satisfied the criteria for a Protection Visa set out in s 36 of the Migration Act and Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The Tribunal summarised the applicant’s claim, in broad outline, as follows. The applicant said that he feared harm from the Sri Lankan army, authorities and para-military groups because he supported the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and the local TNA candidate in the 2010 parliamentary elections. He said that he had been interrogated and threatened by the army in March 2010, and at the end of 2011, and questioned by a special taskforce in 2011. The applicant also claimed to have been living in fear with relatives until he left Sri Lanka in 2012. He said that after he left Sri Lanka an armed group came to his house enquiring about him. He also claimed that he feared harm as a failed asylum seeker who had supported the TNA. By a written decision on 5 March 2015, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the visa. The Tribunal’s findings included the following.(1)The applicant began his involvement with the TNA in February 2010.(2)The applicant had some basic knowledge of the TNA, supported the TNA and a TNA member of Parliament (Mr Seenithamby) at the 2010 parliamentary election. However, the Tribunal concluded that there was an inconsistency in the applicant’s evidence that (i) he had been “keeping his distance from the party” and reducing public activities and conduct, and (ii) the extent to which he claimed that he had been involved with the activities and work for the TNA, particularly after a “beating incident” when the applicant said he was beaten by the army in March 2010 (but which incident the Tribunal concluded lacked credibility). The Tribunal referred in particular to the applicant’s written statements which referred to him “keeping his distance” from the TNA after this time.(3)The applicant’s evidence about his first meeting with Mr Seenithamby lacked credibility and was vague. It was also not consistent with the evidence which the Tribunal expected would have been given by someone who claimed to campaign for him and who knew him personally.(4)The translation of a 2012 letter from Mr Seenithamby had no weight because it was inconsistent with the applicant’s claims, lacked credibility and had a number of inaccuracies and mistakes.(5)The applicant supported TNA at the 2010 parliamentary elections, and supported Mr Seenithamby, by door knocking and putting up posters and attending meetings. The applicant could not be expected to live discreetly to avoid harm. However, his level of interest in the TNA or politics was doubted by the Tribunal. He was not known to Mr Seenithamby nor was he a high profile campaigner, or high profile in the party. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant attended the national conference in 2012.(6)The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s evidence that he went into hiding from the March 2010 incident. Instead, he (i) continued his election work by door knocking and putting up posters, (ii) went to work on the family farm every day, and (iii) claimed that he attended a national conference in May 2012 attended by over 600 people.(7)The Tribunal did not accept the applicant’s evidence that people came looking for the applicant after he left Sri Lanka.(8)The applicant’s cousin was a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and was involved with meetings of LTTE. The applicant’s cousin disappeared in 2006. The applicant’s cousin had also asked the applicant to attend meetings but the applicant did not attend. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant would be imputed with any LTTE or anti-government sentiment because of (i) his Tamil ethnicity, (ii) support for the TNA, (iii) or any perception that he was involved with the LTTE.(9)Upon return to Sri Lanka, the applicant would be questioned, charged and bailed for his illegal departure. But the Tribunal concluded that all Sri Lankan nationals are treated in this manner by entry procedures into Sri Lanka and failed asylum seekers are not specifically targeted for adverse attention or mistreated. The Tribunal was not satisfied that questioning, arrest and poor conditions in remand, or any subsequent monitoring or questioning, or the application of a penalty for illegal departure amounted to systematic and discriminatory conduct as required by s 91R(1)(c) of the Migration Act.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Again, although the Federal Circuit Court described the second ground of judicial review as involving “merits review” it was not a complaint about the weight given to a finding of fact. It was an allegation of taking into account irrelevant matters. It is therefore arguable that the Federal Circuit Court erred in its conclusion that this ground of judicial review should be dismissed because this matter was “one of those strands that has justified the finding of the Tribunal that [it did] not accept the applicant as a credible witness”. Again, it is not appropriate on this application for leave to attempt to assess whether any error by the Federal Circuit Court in relation to this issue could have made a difference to the Tribunal’s decision. Nor is it appropriate to attempt to assess whether there were other reasons, not mentioned by the Federal Circuit Court, by which this ground might have been dismissed.Conclusion This application for leave to extend time within which to appeal is resisted by the Minister solely on the ground that the appeal has no prospects of success. In the circumstances of this case, including the length of the delay, the reasons for the applicant’s delay, and the lack of prejudice to the Minister, I consider that at least two of the issues underlying the grounds of appeal are sufficiently arguable for an extension of time for leave to file a notice of appeal. Counsel for the Minister properly conceded that if leave were given in relation to any of the grounds, then leave should be given for all the grounds of appeal. A consideration of the other grounds at this stage would add little, if any, time to the hearing of the appeal particularly where many of the grounds overlap substantially and where the applicant, who is now legally represented, would have an opportunity to amend his grounds of appeal. The application for leave to extend time to file a notice of appeal is allowed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the application for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal under r 36.05(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). The court noted there are no preconditions to the grant of leave, and the discretion must be exercised having regard to all the circumstances. The court evaluated the application based on the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the lack of prejudice to the Minister. Counsel for the Minister accepted that it was arguable that the Federal Circuit Court erred in relation to two of the issues arising from the substratum of the grounds of appeal. However, counsel submitted that those arguable errors could be addressed by matters which would effectively be contained in a notice of contention. The court held that these matters should be addressed at an appeal rather than an application for leave to extend time to file a notice of appeal. The court found that, considering the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the lack of prejudice to the Minister, at least two of the issues underlying the grounds of appeal were sufficiently arguable for an extension of time for leave to file a notice of appeal. The court also noted that a consideration of the other grounds at this stage would add little, if any, time to the hearing of the appeal, particularly where many of the grounds overlap substantially and where the applicant, who is now legally represented, would have an opportunity to amend his grounds of appeal. The court concluded that the application for leave to extend time to file a notice of appeal should be allowed.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that when assessing whether to grant an extension of time for filing a notice of appeal, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including the length and explanation for the delay, the lack of substantial prejudice, and the importance of the issues to the applicant. The court's discretion is not bound by any preconditions, and the decision will be based on a holistic assessment of the case's unique factors.