ARN17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ARN17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 974

Appeal from: Application for extension of time:  ARN17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2551
File number: NSD 19 of 2018
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 29 June 2018
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – application for extension of time – inadequate explanation for part of delay – proposed appeal without merit

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – delay in commencing appeal – documents prepared by lawyer not frankly stating facts relevant to the adequacy of the applicant’s explanation for the delay – direct access counsel – reasonable expectations of non-English speaking litigant as to terms of retainer with barrister – disruption to court’s processes by late briefing of alternate direct access counsel, late application to amend and late preparation of written submissions

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, 5AA, 46A, 473CB, 473CC, 473DD, 474, 476, Pt 7AA

Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 6

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.61, 36.03, 36.05

Cases cited:

AHI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 64

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958

CHF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 192

DYS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 33

Gomez v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 105, (2002) 190 ALR 543

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344

Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 152 ALD 478

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

SZKMS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 499

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) [1985] HCA 28, (1985) 60 ALR 68

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 15 May 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 70
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms U Okereke-Fisher
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a Submitting Notice

ORDERS

NSD 19 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ARN17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

CHARLESWORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 JUNE 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The orders in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the orders of 15 May 2018 are revoked.

3.The order of 12 June 2018 is revoked.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

CHARLESWORTH J:

  1. This is an application for an extension of time in which to appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 974
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a national of Sri Lanka, sought an extension of time to appeal against the refusal of a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The primary issues before the court were whether the applicant had provided an adequate explanation for the delay in lodging the appeal and whether there was prejudice to the respondent if the extension were to be granted. Additionally, the court had to consider the adequacy of the applicant's explanation for the delay in commencing the appeal and the prejudice caused by the late preparation of documents and the late application to amend the proposed grounds of appeal.

In addressing these issues, the court noted that the applicant's explanation for the delay was inadequate as it did not account for the period between his initial self-representation and the engagement of counsel. The applicant's affidavit, which was prepared by his lawyer, did not state when the applicant first received the reasons of the primary judge or when the barrister engaged to prepare the originating application and draft notice of appeal completed that task. The court found that the delay was caused in part by the applicant's failure to promptly engage counsel after being refused the visa. Furthermore, the court found that the late preparation of documents and the late application to amend the proposed grounds of appeal caused significant prejudice to the respondent, disrupting the court's processes.

The court concluded that the applicant's explanation for the delay was inadequate and that the respondent would suffer prejudice if the extension were granted. Therefore, the application for an extension of time was dismissed, and the orders previously made in relation to the application were revoked.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time, revoked the orders previously made, and noted that the entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The orders in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the orders of 15 May 2018 are revoked.

3. The order of 12 June 2018 is revoked.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Rule 36.05 requires “an exercise of discretion having regard to all relevant factors”: AHI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 64 at [19]. Among the relevant considerations are the length of the delay, the adequacy of any explanation given for the delay, the prejudice that might be suffered by the respondent if an extension of time were granted, the prejudice that may be suffered by the applicant if the extension were to be refused and, relatedly, the merits of the proposed appeal: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348 ⸺ 349. Where an adequate explanation is given for the delay and the respondent would suffer no prejudice by reason of the delay, an extension of time should ordinarily be granted, provided that the applicant can demonstrate that the grounds of appeal are at least arguable: MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 152 ALD 478. These principles are not to be taken as exhaustive: Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113 at [36], nor are they to be applied as if they were statutory preconditions to the grant of an extension of time. BACKGROUND The applicant is a national of Sri Lanka. He is of Tamil ethnicity and a Hindu. He arrived in Australia on 28 August 2012 as an “unauthorised maritime arrival” as that term is defined in s 5AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). By reason of that status, he was precluded from making a valid visa application: s 46A(1) of the Act. The Minister nonetheless exercised the power under s 46A(2) of the Act to permit the applicant to apply for a Temporary Protection visa or a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. On 24 November 2015 the applicant lodged an application for a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (visa), thereby becoming a “fast track applicant” within the meaning of s 5(1) of the Act. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant the visa. That decision was a “fast track decision” reviewable by the IAA under Pt 7AA of the Act. Pursuant to s 473CC of the Act the IAA must review a decision referred to it and, on review, may either affirm the decision or remit the decision for reconsideration in accordance with such directions or recommendations as are permitted by regulation. Before the IAA, the applicant claimed to fear harm by reason of:(1)his ethnicity (Tamil);(2)his religion (Hindu);(3)his imputed political opinions, being those of a supporter of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE);(4)his past involvement with the Tamil National Alliance; and(5)his status as a returned failed asylum seeker who had departed Sri Lanka illegally. The applicant provided further particulars of his claims, which are summarised by the IAA at [7] of its reasons. Pursuant to s 473CB of the Act, certain material (review material) was provided to the IAA for the purposes of the review. Subject to certain exceptions, the IAA was required to review the delegate’s decision by reference to the review material. One such exception is that contained in s 473DD of the Act. It provides:473DD Considering new information in exceptional circumstancesFor the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b)the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:(i)was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii)is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It is convenient to set out the evidence as it relates both to the application for an extension of time in which to appeal and as it relates to the application for leave to amend the proposed grounds of appeal and to file written submissions in connection with the proposed new grounds.EVIDENCE In his affidavit affirmed on 9 January 2018, the applicant says this of his grounds of appeal:10The grounds for my application turn on a media report dated 1 November 2016 referring to torture in Sri Lanka. This report predated the hearing before the delegate - but was not discovered by my lawyers or brought to my attention until after the decision of the delegate. The document could be regarded as significant credible personal information which was previously not known.11In determining whether exceptional circumstances exist, the Assessor only had regard to the date of the document to conclude that exceptional circumstances exist to justify passing the bar posed by section 473DD – and explicitly only referred to section 473DD(a) in their consideration.12In the authority of BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA, Justice White of the Federal Court held that this ‘narrow interpretation’ of section 473DD is a legal error. This is not the drafting of a self-represented non-English speaking litigant. Paragraphs 11 and 12 are in the nature of submissions. They were received on that basis. The appellant explained his reasons for not filing a notice of appeal on time as follows:1 I am the Applicant.2 I am unemployed.3I was self represented in the Federal Circuit Court because I could not afford a lawyer and could not find a lawyer who could represent me.4On 20 October 2017, my application to the Federal Circuit Court was refused. I was not provided a copy of the decision.5On or about 20 November 2017, I made contact with [Mr T], a man I knew through the Tamil community here in Sydney.6I discussed my situation with [Mr T], who referred me to a barrister with experience in the migration field. Critically, the barrister was able to allocate some time in December to look over my case.7In December, my lawyer read over the case and was able to discern jurisdictional error.8However, the community representative, [Mr T], had neglected to contact me to make arrangements to file documents with the court.9I am terribly sorry that this delay has occurred. I have never been through this experience as a litigant and did not know what I had to do. I also did not think I could contact my legal representative over the Christmas period without offending him. As Counsel for the applicant acknowledged, the affidavit does not state when the applicant first received the reasons of the primary judge. That was not the only significant lacuna in the affidavit evidence insofar as it concerned the delay between the delivery of judgment by the primary judge and the commencement of proceedings in this Court. The affidavit did not address the separate question as to why there was some delay between the commencement of the proceedings by the applicant (purportedly as a self-represented litigant) and the engagement of Counsel who ultimately appeared for him at the hearing. There was otherwise no admissible evidence before the Court concerning that issue. Nor does the affidavit state when the barrister engaged to prepare the originating application and draft notice of appeal completed that task. The affidavit itself was dated less than a week prior to the commencement of the application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Court should grant an extension of time for the applicant to appeal the decision of the Federal Circuit Court.
2. Whether the applicant has provided an adequate explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal.
3. Whether the respondent would suffer prejudice if an extension of time were granted.
4. Whether the applicant can demonstrate that the grounds of appeal are at least arguable.
5. Whether the late briefing of alternate direct access counsel, the late application to amend, and the late preparation of written submissions have disrupted the court's processes.

Held
1. The Court should not grant an extension of time for the applicant to appeal the decision of the Federal Circuit Court.
2. The applicant has not provided an adequate explanation for the delay in filing the notice of appeal.
3. The respondent would not suffer prejudice if an extension of time were granted.
4. The applicant cannot demonstrate that the grounds of appeal are at least arguable.
5. The late briefing of alternate direct access counsel, the late application to amend, and the late preparation of written submissions have disrupted the court’s processes.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In assessing the application for an extension of time, the court considered the relevant factors, including the length of the delay, the adequacy of the applicant's explanation for the delay, the potential prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the proposed appeal. The applicant, a non-English speaking litigant from Sri Lanka, engaged a barrister to prepare the notice of appeal only after the statutory time limit for filing had passed. Despite the applicant's explanation that he was unaware of procedural requirements and hesitated to contact his lawyer during the Christmas period, the court found his explanation inadequate due to significant omissions in his affidavit. Notably, the affidavit did not state when the applicant received the reasons of the primary judge or the precise timeline of events leading to the engagement of the barrister. Additionally, the affidavit did not explain the delay between the applicant's initial proceedings and the engagement of counsel, nor did it specify when the barrister completed the originating application and draft notice of appeal. The court held that the late briefing of alternate direct access counsel, the late application to amend the grounds of appeal, and the late preparation of written submissions caused significant disruption to the court's processes. Despite the respondent not suffering prejudice, the court found that the grounds of appeal were not at least arguable, particularly given the legal error identified by the court in the applicant's submissions concerning the interpretation of section 473DD. The court ultimately determined that granting an extension of time would not serve the interests of justice, and dismissed the application.