AYI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AYI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1554

Appeal from: AYI15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2811
File number: NSD 1370 of 2015
Judge: NICHOLAS J
Date of judgment: 22 December 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Section 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – complementary protection provisions – where decision maker required by Direction No. 56 to take account of PAM3 Refugee and Humanitarian Protection Visas – Complementary Protection Guidelines (“Guidelines”) – where decision maker’s reasons refer to Guidelines and the requirement that decision maker take account of them – whether it should be inferred that the decision maker did not take account of Guidelines
Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 36(2), 36(2A), 499(2A)

Cases cited:

AJW15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 197

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang & Ors (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

Portorreal v Dominion Republic, Comm No 188/1984 UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2

SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 1

SZTCV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1309

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 69

Date of hearing: 8 February 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights

Category:

Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 40
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr B Mostafa
Solicitor for the Appellant: Fragomen (Australia) Pty Ltd
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1370 of 2015
BETWEEN:

AYI15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

NICHOLAS J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 DECEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

NICHOLAS J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of a Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (Judge Street) given on 19 October 2015. By that judgment, the primary judge dismissed the applicant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (as it then was) (“the Tribunal”) dated 22 May 2015 affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (“the Minister”) not to grant the applicant a protection (Class XA) visa pursuant to s 36(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).

  2. The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. He left Sri Lanka and arrived in Australia as an unauthorised boat arrival on 29 May 2012. The appellant claimed fear of persecution in Sri Lanka for reason of his mixed Tamil ethnicity and imputed pro-Liberation Tigers…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1554
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of AYI15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, appealed against a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that dismissed his application for a protection visa. The applicant argued that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the Complementary Protection Guidelines (Guidelines) when assessing his eligibility for protection under section 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary issue before the court was whether the Tribunal's reasons for decision should be inferred to mean that it did not take into account the Guidelines as required by Ministerial Direction No. 56.

The court examined the Tribunal's reasons and found that while the Tribunal referred to the Guidelines and acknowledged its obligation to take them into account, it did not explicitly state whether it had done so in the applicant's case. The court held that the Tribunal's failure to explicitly mention the Guidelines did not necessarily mean that they were not considered. The court emphasised that the requirement to take account of the Guidelines was a procedural obligation and did not automatically affect the substantive outcome of the decision. The court concluded that the Tribunal had considered the applicant's complementary protection claims in light of the country information and did not err in its consideration of the Guidelines.

Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was not flawed to the extent that it warranted interference and that the appeal lacked merit. The court noted that the Tribunal had considered the relevant country information and the definitions of 'torture' and 'cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment' in the Migration Act. The court found that the Tribunal had correctly determined that the applicant did not have a real risk of suffering significant harm on return to Sri Lanka, as the country information did not indicate that returned asylum seekers who were not repeat offenders or facilitators of illegal departure were subjected to torture, cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment. The court held that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and lawful, and that the appeal should be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal as taxed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Those parts of the Reasons that are relevant to the issues that arise in this appeal appear at [19] and [89] to [99], where the Tribunal considers the appellant’s complementary protection claims under s 36(2A)(d) and (e) of the Act. The Tribunal said:[19]In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines- and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration. The tribunal has had regard to DFAT Country Information Report, Sri Lanka, 16 February 2015 (DFAT Report) and DFAT Thematic Report - People with links to the LTTE 3 October 2014 (DFAT LTTE Report).[…][89]The tribunal finds based on the country information that the applicant would be granted bail once taken before a court. As noted above the applicant may be remanded for a one to several days if he is unable to be brought immediately before a court.[90]Country information indicates that prison conditions in Sri Lanka may not meet international standards. Concerns include overcrowding, poor sanitary facilities, limited access to food, the absence of basic assistance mechanisms, a lack of reform initiatives and instances of torture, maltreatment and violence. Prison conditions in Sri Lanka have been reported as likely to breach Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which prohibits “inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. The US Department of State, citing an assessment by a former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, also reported that “the combination of severe overcrowding and antiquated infrastructure of certain prison facilities places unbearable strains on services and resources, which for detainees in certain prisons, such as the Colombo Remand Prison, amounts to degrading treatment”.[91]The applicant’s agent referred to the case of WZAPN v MIBP [2014] FCA 947 and submitted that being remanded in custody (albeit a short period) was a threat to the applicant's liberty and consequently significant harm. The Full Court of the Federal Court has since held that WZAPN was wrongly decided. The tribunal is not satisfied that any period in custody not [sic] matter how short amounts to significant harm.[92]In post hearing submissions the applicant's agent referred to country information which they submitted indicated that returned asylum seekers are remanded for more than a few nights before being granted bail. It was submitted that the time spent in custody on return varies with reports of persons being detained for up to 15 days and with some individuals detained for up to two weeks. The tribunal notes the reports referred to by the agents stated that 27 returnees were granted bail immediately and five were remanded for two weeks and in another case 47 persons were granted bail immediately and 36 were remanded 14-15 days. Those who were remanded had attempted to reach Australia by boats on more than one occasion and/or had facilitated the illegal departure. This information accords with the DFAT advice that those who are not charged with repeat offences or facilitating a departure are granted bail quickly. The applicant is not a repeat offender and did not facilitate the departure.[93]The tribunal has considered whether a short period of remand gives rise to a real risk the applicant will suffer significant harm.[94]‘Torture’ is defined in the Act [sic] an act or omission by which severe physical or mental pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted on a person to obtain information or a confession, to punish to intimidate or coerce or for a discriminatory reason.[95]There are reports of mistreatment of both Tamil and Sinhalese prisoners in Sri Lanka’s prison system. Freedom from Torture reported on a number of claims of torture in 2012 and identified that “those at particular risk included Tamils with an actual or perceived association with the LTTE including those returning from abroad”. The tribunal has found, for the reasons set out above, that the applicant does not have a perceived association with the LTTE which would cause him to be targeted in the prison system. The evidence before the tribunal does not indicate that returnees who have been charged with illegal departure and remanded in prison have been subjected to pain or suffering by an intentionally inflicted act or omission intended to obtain information, a confession, to intimidate or coerce or for any other reason whilst on remand.[96]‘Cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’ is defined in the Act as an act or omission by which severe physical or mental pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted on a person; or an act or omission by which physical or mental pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted on a person so long as the act or omission could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman. ‘Degrading treatment or punishment’ is defined in the Act as an act or omission that causes and is intended to cause extreme humiliation which is unreasonable.[97]The tribunal accepts that prison conditions in Sri Lanka are poor and overcrowded and that the applicant may suffer discomfort whilst in prison. The applicant may be remanded for a short period of time, between one night to several nights. The tribunal does not accept that in the applicant’s case as a young man that a relatively short period of remand amounts to an act or omission by which severe physical or mental pain or suffering is intentionally inflicted on the applicant or amounts to an act which could reasonably be regarded as cruel or inhuman. The tribunal does not accept that a relatively short period of remand amounts to an act or omission which is intended to cause extreme humiliation which is unreasonable.[98]The tribunal finds that a short period of remand on return to Sri Lanka does not give rise to a real risk the applicant will suffer significant harm in the form of torture or cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.[99]Further, under Australian law, cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment must be intentionally inflicted and degrading treatment or punishment must be intended to cause extreme humiliation. Mere negligence or lack of resources does not suffice to give rise to cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Australian law. The country information above indicates that the poor prison conditions in Sri Lanka are due to a lack of resources, rather than an intention by the Sri Lankan government to inflict cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment or cause extreme humiliation. Poor prison conditions involving inadequate resources and overcrowding do not appear to give rise to significant harm under Australian law. In SZTKF v MIBP the applicant argued that the tribunal applied the incorrect test in relation to significant harm by requiring an intentional element in respect of the overcrowding and poor conditions, and that the correct test was to assess whether the authorities’ placement of the applicant into those known conditions was intentional thereby exposing the applicant to significant harm. The court held that the proposition that intention is made out if there is an intentional act that exposes a person to the risk of serious harm is incorrect. ‘Intention’ in relation to a particular act or state of affairs requires advertence to the act or state of affairs and the desire to commit the act or bring about the state of affairs. Therefore in relation to the poor prison conditions in Sri Lanka there is no intention on the part of the Sri Lanka authorities to harm the applicant. The tribunal finds that a period of remand on return to Sri Lanka does not give rise to a real risk the applicant will suffer significant harm within the meaning of s 36(2A) or s 5 of the Act.[100]The tribunal has considered whether a conviction for illegal departure under the Immigrants and Emigrants Act gives rise to a real risk the applicant will suffer significant harm. As discussed with the applicant and set out above the country information indicates that the penalty most likely to be imposed on the applicant is a fine. Based on this information, the tribunal finds that the likelihood of a prison sentence is remote and not a real risk.(Footnotes omitted)THE PRIMARY JUDGE’S DECISION

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established