BXK16 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BXK16 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCA 251

Appeal from: BXK16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 1727
File number(s): VID 873 of 2018
Judgment of: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 21 March 2022
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the finding concerning the availability of a relative to provide surety was made on no evidence or irrationally – whether an integer of the appellant’s claim was given proper consideration – appeal dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5AA, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 425(1)
Cases cited:

ABA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1419

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 256 FCR 593

ATO17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 855

DCP16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 91

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389

Hossein v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34, 264 CLR 123

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802; 233 FCR 136

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZTQS [2015] FCA 1069

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; 240 CLR 611

MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17, 95 ALJR 441

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152

SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1370; 238 FCR 404

SZVYG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 955

VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 65
Date of hearing: 9 March 2022
Counsel for the Appellant:  Dr Adam McBeth (pro bono)
Solicitor for the Appellant Russell Kennedy Lawyers (pro bono)
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Timothy Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley
Counsel for the Second Respondent:  The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice.

ORDERS

VID 873 of 2018
BETWEEN:

BXK16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 MARCH 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant have leave to rely on the document headed “Amended Notice of appeal from the Federal Court of Australia” filed on 17 February 2020; and this document be treated as the amended notice of appeal filed in the proceeding.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 251
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, BXK16, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which affirmed the Minister for Home Affairs' decision to refuse the appellant's application for a protection visa. The appellant argued that the AAT erred in its finding that a relative could provide a surety for him if he were to be detained upon his return to Sri Lanka. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review, a decision which the appellant now appeals to the Federal Court of Australia.

The central legal issue in the appeal was whether the AAT's finding concerning the availability of a relative to provide surety was made on no evidence or irrationally. Another issue was whether an integer of the appellant's claim was given proper consideration by the AAT. The appellant argued that he was not given the opportunity to give evidence and present issues arising in relation to the decision under review, as required by law.

The court found that the AAT's consideration of the appellant's claim that he would be unable to pay a fine imposed for an offence under the Immigration Act 1958 (Cth) was adequate. It held that the Tribunal's finding that the appellant would be able to pay any fine imposed was open on the material before it. Concerning the surety, the court held that the AAT's finding was open because it was based on the appellant's own concession that a relative could provide a surety. The court also found that the appellant was given the opportunity to present his issues and evidence to the AAT as required by law.

The appeal was dismissed. The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant have leave to rely on the document headed “Amended Notice of appeal from the Federal Court of Australia” filed on 17 February 2020; and this document be treated as the amended notice of appeal filed in the proceeding.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellant applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision on 4 October 2013. He attended a hearing before the Tribunal on 13 March 2015, assisted by his migration agent and an interpreter. His agent gave the Tribunal written submissions before and after the hearing.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision on 28 June 2016, and notified the appellant of the Tribunal’s decision by letter dated 30 June 2016. The Tribunal summarised the appellant’s claims for protection in its statement of decision and reasons (D&R) at [20] as follows: In summary, the applicant’s claims are his family are originally from Northern province. He was born in an IDP camp in Colombo but later moved to a government run IDP camp in Northwestern province where he grew up with his mother. His father continued to live in Northern province and later remarried. Part of his family land in his father's home village was confiscated by the Sri Lankan navy to build a naval camp. His family received another piece of land in compensation, but it is inadequate due to the size and location of the land. In April 2012, he went with a group of people to participate in a protest against the confiscation of their land. His uncle also attended the protest for part of the time and helped to prepare the protest banners the applicant displayed. The protest lasted for about 8 hours and was at an event attended by the then defence secretary. He, together with the other protesters were rounded up by naval officers. His phone was taken from him and his details recorded. The naval officers told them the land is no longer theirs and that they would be shot if they returned. He was released, but 2 days later, naval officers came to his relative’s home searching for him, the applicant hid and then returned to his mother's home village. Nothing happened again until in June 2012, [when] naval officer[s] again started ask[ing] questions about the applicant in his father’s home village. Since the applicant departed Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan authorities have continued looking for him in his father's home village. The Tribunal accepted that “the applicant’s family land was confiscated by the Sri Lankan navy and that [he] participated in a protest attended by the defence secretary”, but it did not accept that the Sri Lankan authorities had continued to search for him: D&R at [20]. The Tribunal noted that the appellant’s pre-hearing submissions made “new claims that the Sri Lankan authorities have continued to look for him since he left Sri Lanka”, and that the appellant told the Tribunal at the hearing that the last time the authorities came looking for him was in 2014 at his relatives’ home. The Tribunal found, however, that this evidence was “vague”. The Tribunal noted that it had put to the appellant that “it would not be difficult for the Sri Lankan authorities to find [him as he] lived with his mother in Northwestern province and to look for him there” and that the appellant had apparently agreed with this: D&R at [22]. The Tribunal also noted that the appellant did not know the name of the camp at which the protest occurred nor when it opened: D&R at [23].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Furthermore, the Minister submitted that the Full Court’s comments in DCPI6 at [98] were pertinent to this case, in that the issue of surety arose only on “a triply contingent hypothetical”. First, the appellant had to plead not guilty. Second, if he pleaded not guilty, the appellant could be released on his own recognizance, in which event a surety would not be required. Only if he pleaded not guilty and his own recognizance was insufficient would a third situation arise, where a surety was required. The Minister contended that, as in DCP16, “this is in the realm of a hypothetical which the Authority did not need to speculate about or discuss in detail”: see DCP16 [98].Consideration of ground 1 As indicated at [13] above, the Tribunal specifically addressed the possibility that the appellant might face incarceration on return to Sri Lanka because of his illegal departure. It held, at [57], that, if convicted of an offence under the IEA, there was “no real chance” that he would receive a custodial sentence. The Tribunal stated that country information indicated that sentencing Magistrates “routinely” exercise a discretion to suspend sentence: see [57]. It held (at [52]) that “[o]nly returnees suspected of people smuggling offences have been … given a prison sentence”. The Tribunal went on to find that it was “highly likely” that the appellant would be fined for an offence under the IEA, noting that a Magistrate might give time for payment, which might also be done by instalments. The Tribunal considered the position of the appellant in this event, specifically concluding that “[t]he evidence … does not suggest [he] will be unable to pay that fine or that payment of the fine will cause him hardship”. The appellant did not challenge this finding. Rather, the appellant challenged the Tribunal’s finding (at [55]) as to the provision of a surety and, in particular, the Tribunal’s finding that the evidence “does not suggest he is without any relative able to provide surety”. The Tribunal referred (at [52] and [55]) to the provision of a surety in connection with the grant of bail: see [12] and [13] above. The Tribunal found (at [52]) that if charged with an offence under the IEA an individual such as the appellant would be held in remand until granted bail, and that “[a]fter a bail hearing, the returnees are granted bail with a personal surety and [are] able to return to their home area”. It also “noted” (at [55]) “the country information that bail is routinely given on the accused’s own recognisance although a personal surety is required”. The appellant’s case was in substance that he was not given the opportunity “to give evidence and present issues arising in the relation to the decision under review” as contemplated by s 425 and required by law: see SZBEL at [35]-[36]. As the Court said in SZBEL, “the point at which to begin the identification of issues arising in relation to the decision under review will usually be the reasons given for that decision” (at [35]); and “unless the Tribunal tells the applicant something different, the applicant would be entitled to assume that the reasons given by the delegate for refusing to grant the application will identify the issues that arise in relation to that dispute” (at [36]).