FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZVYG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 955
ORDERS
NSD 2110 of 2016 BETWEEN: SZVYG
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BROMWICH J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 AUGUST 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 955
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the AAT had not erred in its consideration of the appellant's post-hearing submission. The appellant had disavowed any reliance on a religious persecution claim at the hearing, but subsequently provided information to support such a claim. The court held that the AAT was obliged to consider and assess the information provided, including its inherent characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses. The court further noted that the obligation to comment or respond only extends to "information" and does not encompass the tribunal's subjective appraisals or determinations. Given the appellant's disavowal of the religious persecution claim at the hearing, the AAT was entitled to evaluate the information provided in the post-hearing submission, including its context and the indirect and inferential nature of the nexus asserted. The court found that the AAT's reasons demonstrated the necessary thought processes in carrying out its essential function of assessing the information.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal as assessed or agreed. The Federal Circuit Court held that the AAT had not erred in its consideration of the appellant's post-hearing submission and that the AAT's evaluation of the information provided was appropriate. The court found no basis for the appellant's contention that the AAT had failed to invite him to a further hearing or had misconstrued his post-hearing claim.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal as assessed or agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In response, it was submitted by counsel for the appellant that the question of s 424A(3) simply does not arise in this case, as it is not the appellant’s contention that the Tribunal failed to put to him “country information” falling within s 424A(3)(a). (That submission overlooks s 424A(3)(b), which addresses information that a review applicant gives for the purpose of the application for review by the Tribunal.) It should be observed that this submission appears to reflect the distinction drawn by the appellant for the purposes of s 425(1) between the country information itself, and the Tribunal’s specific concerns about that information, such as its refusal to extrapolate a risk of harm to Udappu. It was further said that s 424A represents a carve-out of s 424, and not of s 425. Consideration of ground 1 A combination of the first three arguments advanced on behalf of the Minister should prevail. Relevantly, this was not a case where the review applicant was unaware of the issue that had arisen, as the information and claims giving rise to the asserted “issues” had been advanced on the appellant’s behalf. Furthermore, while the appellant’s post-hearing submission relied upon events post-dating the Tribunal hearing, it arose in the context of the question of whether there was any basis for the appellant to claim protection by reason of religious persecution, which had been explicitly raised as an issue by the Tribunal at the hearing. In this regard, the appellant’s disavowal of reliance on such a claim at the hearing did not mean that the issue was not present or did not exist. Rather, it meant that the appellant had not, at that time, provided information by which that possible basis for advancing a claim for a protection visa had any content. He chose to give that issue content after the hearing, by reason of events that also took place later. He provided all of the information upon which that claim was based, albeit also by reference to country information (which was accepted by the Tribunal). Having done so, the Tribunal was obliged to consider and assess the information so advanced, including by having regard to its inherent characteristics, strengths and weaknesses. The Tribunal’s reasons disclose the thought processes in carrying out that essential function. It must have been known to the appellant and those who advised him that he had effectively disavowed any religious persecution claim when that had been raised by the Tribunal at the hearing. It must similarly have been appreciated that the information supplied, including country information referred to which was before this Court, did not directly relate to the appellant’s home town or village, but rather to places some distance away, and that the nexus asserted was indirect and inferential at best. The Tribunal was entitled to – indeed, obliged to – consider that information and evaluate it, including with regard to the context in which it arose. Those features were, in the terms of Alphaone reproduced above, readily apparent from the nature and contents of the information supplied, as understood in the context of the antecedent Tribunal hearing and, in particular, the raising of the possibility of such a claim. As Katzmann J pointed out in SZRTF at [62]:In any case, the obligation to comment or respond only extends to “information” and “information” “does not encompass the tribunal’s subjective appraisals, thought processes or determinations … nor does it extend to identified gaps, defects or lack of detail or specificity in evidence or to conclusions arrived at by the tribunal in weighing up the evidence by reference to those gaps, etc.” (VAF v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 206 ALR 471; [2004] FCAFC 123 at [24] per Finn and Stone JJ, cited with approval by the High Court in SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609; [2007] HCA 26 at [18]).