Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSNW

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSNW [2014] FCAFC 145

Citation: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSNW [2014] FCAFC 145
Appeal from: SZSNW v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 134
Parties: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION v SZSNW and PETER MCDERMOTT IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
File number(s): NSD 562 of 2014
Judge(s): MANSFIELD, BUCHANAN AND PERRAM JJ
Date of judgment: 3 November 2014
Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – reasons and recommendation of Independent Merits Reviewer in relation to refugee status assessment – where the reasons proceed on a false factual premise – where false factual premise destructive of applicant’s credit – whether decision of Independent Merits Reviewer was unreasonable in a legal sense – whether reasons and recommendation contained legal error – whether acting on the false factual premise denied the applicant procedural fairness
Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 28(1)(b)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2), 46A
Cases cited: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223
Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1949) 78 CLR 353
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
FTZK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 26
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 308 ALR 280
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323
Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 243 CLR 319
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZSNW v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2014] FCCA 134
SZRHL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCA 1093
Date of hearing: 26 August 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 111 
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J Smith
Solicitor for the Appellant: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Kennett SC with Ms B Tronson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: SBA Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 562 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Appellant

AND:

SZSNW
First Respondent

PETER MCDERMOTT IN HIS CAPACITY AS INDEPENDENT MERITS REVIEWER
Second Respondent

JUDGES:

MANSFIELD, BUCHANAN AND PERRAM JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

3 NOVEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed. 

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 562 of 2014

ON APPEAL FROM…
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Details
Case
[2014] FCAFC 145
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSNW, the central issue revolved around the assessment of a refugee status application by the first respondent, a young Tamil male from Sri Lanka. The primary concern was whether the Independent Merits Reviewer (IMR) had acted unreasonably by relying on a false factual premise in their assessment, which ultimately undermined the credibility of the first respondent. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, which had appellate jurisdiction over the matter.

The legal issues before the court included whether the IMR's decision was unreasonable in a legal sense, and if the reasons and recommendation contained legal errors. Additionally, the court had to consider whether acting on the false factual premise denied the first respondent procedural fairness. The court's analysis was grounded in established legal principles regarding judicial review, including the concepts of unreasonableness and procedural fairness.

The Federal Court found that the IMR had indeed acted unreasonably by ignoring clear evidence from the Refugee Status Assessment (RSA) interview, where the first respondent had mentioned sexual torture. This omission led to a false conclusion about the first respondent's credibility. The court held that the IMR's decision was flawed due to this error and the reliance on an incorrect premise. The decision was thus deemed unreasonable and legally erroneous. Furthermore, the court concluded that the first respondent was denied procedural fairness because of the IMR's failure to consider relevant evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, pay the first respondent's costs of the appeal. This decision underscores the importance of thorough and accurate fact-finding in administrative law, particularly in matters involving refugee status assessments.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the present case, the declaration that the IMR had made an error of law was based upon a conclusion by the primary judge that the IMR had acted “unreasonably” in the sense referred to in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 (“Li”), as discussed by a Full Court of this Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1 (“Singh”). It will be necessary to return to the foundation for that conclusion in due course. Background The first respondent is a young Tamil male who claimed to have fled from Sri Lanka in fear of his life in 2004 and thereafter lived in Qatar for about five years. He claimed to have returned to Sri Lanka in 2009 but to have been immediately arrested at the airport. After release on bail he fled again, to Malaysia. He boarded a vessel for Australia but was intercepted by the Indonesian navy and spent about six months in Indonesia. In June 2010 he left Indonesia, bound for Australia by boat, was intercepted by the Australian navy and was taken to Christmas Island. The entry interview On 20 July 2010 the first respondent was interviewed at Christmas Island (“the entry interview”). At this stage, he had made no formal claim for protection. During the entry interview he complained about treatment he had received whilst imprisoned in Sri Lanka in 2004, before fleeing to Qatar, claiming to have been tortured with other Tamils. The refugee status assessment About one month later, on 20 August 2010, the first respondent was assisted by an IAAAS (Immigration Advice and Application Assistance Scheme) Provider to complete an application for a Refugee Status Assessment (“RSA”). The purpose of the RSA was for an assessment to be made about whether the first respondent was a person in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations. The RSA assessor found that the first respondent was not such a person. That finding led to the further consideration of the first respondent’s claims by the IMR. In the statutory declaration which he was assisted to complete for the RSA on 20 August 2010, the first respondent said: 9.I was kept at the Pusar camp for 5 months, during which time I was tortured and humiliated. … During the RSA interview three days later, which took place at Christmas Island, the following exchange occurred: Q. You say you were tortured and humiliated. Why did they torture you?A. INTERPRETER: He doesn’t know really but once he told them that if he ever gets out he will publish in the papers about his father’s death because he was the witness, mainly because of that. Q. So you told them that while you were in captivity? A. INTERPRETER: Yes. Q. Did they question you about the LTTE? A. INTERPRETER: They just say that everyone in the camp are called LTTE members, LTTE, but they did question him about it but they were just calling Tamil. Q. Did they ask you questions? Did they interrogate you? A. INTERPRETER: No, they didn’t ask any questions. Normally they know why they captured him. Q. So how many times did they beat you, every day? A. INTERPRETER: Every day they used to beat him and they used to torture him, sexually torture him, tie his hands and legs and they did lots of times very bad tortured him. ADVISER: I was asked specifically if we could avoid talking about details of that particular aspect of it. RSA ASSESSOR: Well there’s no need to. ADVISER: I said I didn’t think you would ask anyway but – RSA ASSESSOR: No that’s fine. That’s fine. (Emphasis added.) and (after a break in the interview of about 13 minutes): RSA ASSESSOR: Interview resumes at 1529. Q. … now that we’ve resumed the interview is there anything you’d like to ask me or anything you’d like to tell me before we finish? A. INTERPRETER: He has been suffering a lot at Poosa, he was tortured so much and sexually tortured as well that he tried to commit suicide but that failed, … (Emphasis added.)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The remark by the adviser (not the same adviser who was at the RSA interview) was incorrect. As earlier indicated, the matter was raised at the RSA interview. The IMR decision The decision of the IMR was given almost 9 months later, on 2 March 2012. There was, accordingly, no lack of opportunity for the IMR to study the relevant records, which by this time included the record of the RSA interview. Early in the decision the IMR referred to the first respondent’s statutory declaration dated 20 August 2010: He states that he was kept in the camp for five months where he was tortured and humiliated. … and the statement dated 9 July 2011: He also states that whilst in prison he was sexually assaulted and otherwise tortured. … Then the IMR summarised the IMR interview, apparently relying on a record of it. The summary referred to matters I have set out above, but not to the information provided by the first respondent that he had mentioned sexual torture to the RSA assessor. Then, the IMR said: 78. I asked him whether he had mentioned at Christmas Island his sexual torture in Sri Lanka: he replied that he did. I informed the claimant that there is no reference of sexual torture in his Christmas Island statement. I informed him that he mentioned an injury which was a scar to his forehead. He stated that he had spoken about this to the case manager. … 86. I told the claimant that it was only at the IMR interview that I saw a reference to sexual torture. I stated that the claimant had not made mention of this in his statutory declaration. Later, but not in connection with any discussion about sexual torture, the IMR said: 113. After the IMR interview I obtained a copy of the interview before the RSA officer: … … 135. I have listened to the interview of the claimant before the RSA officer. … Towards the end of the IMR decision the following was said: 142. The claimant has maintained that he mentioned his sexual torture at Christmas Island. He could have made such a claim at the DIAC entry interview, but I have read and listened to the record of that interview. There is no allegation of sexual torture in these records of the entry interview. I also informed the claimant that there is no reference of sexual torture in his Christmas Island statement which had been prepared with legal assistance. I informed him that there is a reference to injury which was a scar to his forehead. He stated that he spoke about this at the case manager’s interview but I do not accept this contention. (Emphasis added.) The conclusion stated in the last sentence amounts to an assertion that the first respondent had fabricated the information he provided to the IMR. Either the IMR did not read or listen to the relevant part of the record of the RSA interview, or he forgot about it. In either case he disregarded it and reached a demonstrably false conclusion (at least in this respect) about the first respondent’s veracity and reliability. The IMR decision went on: 143. The claimant did not make any claim of sexual torture at the DIAC entry interview at Christmas Island. This interview lasted for more than four hours and the DIAC officer asked the claimant questions about his claims. If he was the victim of sexual torture then he would have had adequate opportunity to mention this claim. The DIAC officer also read out the warning to the claimant which I have earlier quoted in this report (at [33]). The terms of that warning are, in my opinion, particularly appropriate to this claim of sexual torture. I certainly have doubts about his claims of sexual torture. This also causes me to have serious reservations about the credibility of the claimant. 144. This is not a case where the claimant has stated that stated [sic] to be too embarrassed at mentioning sexual torture at the entry interview. Instead the claimant has stated that he did make a claim of sexual torture at Christmas Island. There is no mention of sexual torture in the records of the entry interview. There is also no mention of sexual torture in the statutory declaration dated 12 September 2010 that he made at Christmas Island with the assistance of his agent with expertise in refugee law. I do not believe that the claimant made a claim of sexual torture at Christmas Island. (Emphasis added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established