SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1370

Appeal from: SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 1510
File number: NSD 1203 of 2017
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 27 November 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in not finding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal misapplied the “well-founded fear test”

Held: appeal dismissed with no order as to costs

Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36
Cases cited:

BKL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 802; 241 FCR 450

SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 175; 238 FCR 404

Date of hearing: 22 November 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 26
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms B Perris of Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 1203 of 2017
BETWEEN:

SZTAP

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGE:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 NOVEMBER 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.There be no order as to costs. 

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

GRIFFITHS J:

  1. This is an appeal from a decision and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA).  The decision, which was published on 30 June 2017, is reported as SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 1510. In an ex tempore judgment, the primary judge rejected the appellant’s judicial review application in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT).  The AAT affirmed a decision dated 11 February 2013 of the Minister’s delegate which refused the appellant a protection visa.  The delegate’s decision was previously affirmed by a differently constituted AAT on 17 June 2013.  That decision was subsequently set aside on 9 December 2015 by the Full Court (see SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 175; 238 FCR 404 (SZTAP Full Court)). 

  2. This appeal relates to the primary judge’s decision in respect of the decision of the AAT on that remitter, which decision was published on 15 April 2016. 

    Summary of background facts

  3. The relevant background facts are conveniently summarised by Robertson and Kerr JJ is SZTAP Full Court at [24] to [34]:

    The claims

    24The Tribunal summarised the appellant’s claims as follows. The appellant was a member of Sri Lanka's minority Tamil community and was 18 years of age. He claimed to be from the fishing village of Udappu. From the age of 12, for six years, both during the civil war between the LTTE and the Government and subsequently, his mother had to pay sums of money to particular officers…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCA 1370
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the Federal Court of Australia was tasked with reviewing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) concerning the appellant's claim for refugee status. The appellant, a Sri Lankan national of Tamil descent, argued that he faced a real chance of persecution if returned to Sri Lanka due to his alleged links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The primary judge had dismissed the appeal, and the appellant sought further judicial review. The court was required to determine whether the primary judge erred in dismissing the appeal and whether the AAT had correctly applied the well-founded fear test.

The central legal issue was whether the primary judge correctly assessed the AAT's application of the well-founded fear test in determining the appellant's refugee status. The appellant contended that the AAT's acceptance of a past incident where his mother paid a bribe to prevent his abduction implied an acceptance that he was suspected of LTTE links. However, the AAT concluded that there was no real chance of persecution due to either his Tamil ethnicity or suspected LTTE connections. The court had to examine whether the primary judge's assessment of the AAT's reasoning was accurate and whether the AAT's conclusions were supported by the evidence.

The court found that the primary judge's assessment of the AAT's decision was correct. The AAT had clearly distinguished between the isolated 2006 incident and ongoing extortion attempts by corrupt CID officers. The AAT accepted that the appellant's father was questioned in 2006 due to suspected LTTE links, but it found no evidence that these officers intended to harm the appellant. The AAT also concluded that the appellant was not at risk of persecution if he returned to Sri Lanka. The court held that the primary judge appropriately reviewed the AAT's decision and found no error in the primary judge's reasoning. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that there be no order as to costs. The court acknowledged the appellant's right to appeal but found that the primary judge's decision was sound, and the appeal lacked merit. The court's decision underscores the importance of correctly applying the well-founded fear test in refugee status determinations and highlights the rigorous scrutiny applied to such claims in Australian courts.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. There be no order as to costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This appeal relates to the primary judge’s decision in respect of the decision of the AAT on that remitter, which decision was published on 15 April 2016. Summary of background facts The relevant background facts are conveniently summarised by Robertson and Kerr JJ is SZTAP Full Court at [24] to [34]:The claims24The Tribunal summarised the appellant’s claims as follows. The appellant was a member of Sri Lanka's minority Tamil community and was 18 years of age. He claimed to be from the fishing village of Udappu. From the age of 12, for six years, both during the civil war between the LTTE and the Government and subsequently, his mother had to pay sums of money to particular officers from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). She did so because these men threatened to take the appellant in the absence of his father, who in 2006 was sought by the CID on suspicion of being in the LTTE. Because the appellant was becoming a young man and thus more likely to be targeted for kidnapping and harm by government forces, his family decided he should leave the country in 2012. The findings25 The findings of the Tribunal were as follows. 26The Tribunal first addressed the issue of whether there was a real chance the appellant would be persecuted because of his Tamil race. The Tribunal found that the appellant had never been questioned, harassed or harmed by members of the security forces because of his race. The appellant had never been subjected to any serious harm, or indeed any discrimination or harm, because he was a Tamil. The Tribunal was satisfied that the chance of his being persecuted in the reasonably foreseeable future simply because he was a Tamil was remote. 27The Tribunal then addressed whether there was a real chance the appellant would be persecuted as a result of being imputed with a political opinion through suspected links with the LTTE. 28The Tribunal found that the appellant's mother had been subjected to extortion by certain officers from the CID in Udappu. 29The Tribunal was satisfied that if the appellant returned to Sri Lanka, corrupt officers from the CID may continue to visit his mother and extort money from her as they had done for the past six years or so. The Tribunal was satisfied that those corrupt officers would continue to extort money from the appellant's mother using alleged suspicions about the appellant's father's connection with the LTTE as an excuse. 30However, the Tribunal was not satisfied that, “despite their threats, these men intend to detain or harm the [appellant]. This is primarily because they have shown no interest in him.” 31The Tribunal took evidence by telephone from the appellant's father in Sri Lanka. In answer to the question why the CID had not taken the appellant from his school, for example, by the day of the Tribunal hearing, even if not his home, the appellant’s father said it was because his son was “small”. The Tribunal said that that may once have been a reasonable explanation, but the appellant was now almost 19 years of age and was not a child. The Tribunal said it was not persuaded by this explanation and said: “It is far more likely that the corrupt officers' threats towards the [appellant] are bluff designed to elicit money from his mother.” 32The Tribunal was satisfied that the corrupt officers did not intend to abduct the appellant before he left Sri Lanka. The Tribunal said the following, at [51]: As to his treatment by them if he returns to Udappu, it is difficult to establish how these officers might react. However, having regard to their past conduct I am satisfied that their overriding aim is simply to extort money from his mother and, in the absence of any claim that she proposes to stop making payments, I consider that situation will continue unchanged despite the [appellant] no longer being a child. There is not a real chance that the [appellant] will be abducted or otherwise seriously harmed by these men if he returns to Udappu.33The Tribunal considered the complementary protection criteria. The Tribunal accepted that the appellant would be questioned at the airport on return, that he may also be charged with leaving the country illegally, that he could be held in remand for a brief period while awaiting a bail hearing, and that he might be later fined. The Tribunal was not satisfied that this would involve treatment amounting to significant harm in terms of the complementary protection criteria. 34In this context, relevant to ground 3, the Tribunal said, at [61]-[62]: I do accept however that under tightened procedures adopted in late 2012, returnees who are believed to have left the country in breach of the Immigration and Emigration Act are, regardless of ethnicity, arrested at the airport and brought before a court to apply for bail. This will plainly apply to the [appellant] as he left Sri Lanka without his passport. Bail is routinely given on the accused’s own recognisance although a family member is also required to provide surety. The evidence indicates that if the arrival occurs over a weekend or on a public holiday the returnee is placed in the remand section of Negombo for a few days until a bail hearing is available. Conditions in remand have been described as dirty, cramped and uncomfortable, although there have been no reports that individuals awaiting bail hearings have been intentionally ill-treated. According to a local lawyer, when the cases come to court they might be fined between Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 100,000. However in the absence of these cases being finalised under the new tightened procedures there is insufficient evidence that the penalty will be applied in a discriminatory way towards the [appellant] for any of the Convention reasons.Having considered the currently available information I am not satisfied that the treatment afforded returnees for departing Sri Lanka unlawfully, either at the airport on arrival, on remand awaiting a bail hearing or when they are later dealt with by the courts, can reasonably be seen as constituting ‘serious harm’ to the [appellant], and systematic and discriminatory conduct. It follows that, on the basis of the current available evidence, I am not satisfied there is a real chance that the applicant would suffer Convention-related persecution for his illegal departure if he were to return to Sri Lanka.(Citations omitted.)

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

I do not accept the Minister’s submission that costs should follow the event. For reasons given above, it is not difficult to understand why the appellant brought the appeal having regard to the brevity of the primary judge’s reasons for judgment and the difficulty of comprehending why his judicial review ground was rejected. I appreciate that the Minister bears no responsibility for this but I consider that it is appropriate that there be no order as to costs. Conclusion For these reasons, the appeal must be dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant did not provide an outline of written submissions. After being invited by the Court to make oral submissions, the appellant complained that his claims that he would face “problems” in Sri Lanka were not accepted. When pressed to identify any error by the primary judge, the appellant indicated that he did not wish to say anything further in support of his ground of appeal. Consideration and disposition of the appeal It appears that the appellant’s essential complaint relates to the AAT’s reasoning in [25] of its reasons for decision (see [8] above), in which it accepted that the 2006 incident occurred, yet it rejected the appellant’s claim to be a refugee. As the particulars to the judicial review ground made plain, the appellant contended that, because the AAT accepted that the appellant’s mother had paid a bribe in 2006 to prevent him from being detained by corrupt CID officers, this necessarily implied an acceptance that the appellant was suspected as having LTTE connections. The primary judge’s reasoning in [26] for rejecting this contention is notably brief. The appellant does not complain, however, that the reasons were inadequate in law (see BKL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 802; 241 FCR 450 at [8] – [16] per Flick J, with which I respectfully agree). The fundamental difficulty with the appellant’s complaint, as reflected in ground 1 of his judicial review application and in his sole ground of appeal, is that it is predicated on an inaccurate reading of the AAT’s reasons. In [24] to [26] of its reasons for decision, the AAT drew a distinction between the particular incident which occurred in 2006, as opposed to the claims of ongoing extortion attempts by the CID officers against the appellant’s mother after the 2006 incident. The AAT made a finding of fact in [24] that the mother was not subject to ongoing extortion attempts for any reason, including the reasons advanced by the appellant. In [25], the AAT stated that it was prepared to accept that, on one occasion in 2006, the CID asked the appellant’s mother about the whereabouts of her husband and that the mother paid a bribe to ensure that the appellant was not abducted by the corrupt CID officers. The AAT’s reasoning in [26] is not a model of clarity. That is for two reasons. First, the first sentence contains a statement that the AAT did not accept that the appellant’s father was suspected of being supportive of the LTTE. That finding, if viewed in isolation, is difficult to reconcile with the AAT’s acceptance in the previous paragraph that, on one occasion, in 2006 the appellant’s mother was asked by the CID about the whereabouts of her husband and the AAT’s implicit acceptance that the reason for that questioning was that the father was suspected of having links with the LTTE. Secondly, the third sentence in [26] is also cryptic. In particular, it is unclear why the AAT used the word “if” in that sentence, having regard to its acceptance in [25] that the 2006 incident occurred.