FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1370
Appeal from: SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 1510 File number: NSD 1203 of 2017 Judge: GRIFFITHS J Date of judgment: 27 November 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – whether primary judge erred in not finding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal misapplied the “well-founded fear test”
Held: appeal dismissed with no order as to costs
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 36 Cases cited: BKL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 802; 241 FCR 450
SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 175; 238 FCR 404
Date of hearing: 22 November 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the Respondent: Ms B Perris of Clayton Utz ORDERS
NSD 1203 of 2017 BETWEEN: SZTAP
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
GRIFFITHS J
DATE OF ORDER:
27 NOVEMBER 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GRIFFITHS J:
This is an appeal from a decision and orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). The decision, which was published on 30 June 2017, is reported as SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2017] FCCA 1510. In an ex tempore judgment, the primary judge rejected the appellant’s judicial review application in respect of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT). The AAT affirmed a decision dated 11 February 2013 of the Minister’s delegate which refused the appellant a protection visa. The delegate’s decision was previously affirmed by a differently constituted AAT on 17 June 2013. That decision was subsequently set aside on 9 December 2015 by the Full Court (see SZTAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 175; 238 FCR 404 (SZTAP Full Court)).
This appeal relates to the primary judge’s decision in respect of the decision of the AAT on that remitter, which decision was published on 15 April 2016.
Summary of background facts
The relevant background facts are conveniently summarised by Robertson and Kerr JJ is SZTAP Full Court at [24] to [34]:
The claims
24The Tribunal summarised the appellant’s claims as follows. The appellant was a member of Sri Lanka's minority Tamil community and was 18 years of age. He claimed to be from the fishing village of Udappu. From the age of 12, for six years, both during the civil war between the LTTE and the Government and subsequently, his mother had to pay sums of money to particular officers…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 1370
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the primary judge correctly assessed the AAT's application of the well-founded fear test in determining the appellant's refugee status. The appellant contended that the AAT's acceptance of a past incident where his mother paid a bribe to prevent his abduction implied an acceptance that he was suspected of LTTE links. However, the AAT concluded that there was no real chance of persecution due to either his Tamil ethnicity or suspected LTTE connections. The court had to examine whether the primary judge's assessment of the AAT's reasoning was accurate and whether the AAT's conclusions were supported by the evidence.
The court found that the primary judge's assessment of the AAT's decision was correct. The AAT had clearly distinguished between the isolated 2006 incident and ongoing extortion attempts by corrupt CID officers. The AAT accepted that the appellant's father was questioned in 2006 due to suspected LTTE links, but it found no evidence that these officers intended to harm the appellant. The AAT also concluded that the appellant was not at risk of persecution if he returned to Sri Lanka. The court held that the primary judge appropriately reviewed the AAT's decision and found no error in the primary judge's reasoning. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed and that there be no order as to costs. The court acknowledged the appellant's right to appeal but found that the primary judge's decision was sound, and the appeal lacked merit. The court's decision underscores the importance of correctly applying the well-founded fear test in refugee status determinations and highlights the rigorous scrutiny applied to such claims in Australian courts.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant did not provide an outline of written submissions. After being invited by the Court to make oral submissions, the appellant complained that his claims that he would face “problems” in Sri Lanka were not accepted. When pressed to identify any error by the primary judge, the appellant indicated that he did not wish to say anything further in support of his ground of appeal. Consideration and disposition of the appeal It appears that the appellant’s essential complaint relates to the AAT’s reasoning in [25] of its reasons for decision (see [8] above), in which it accepted that the 2006 incident occurred, yet it rejected the appellant’s claim to be a refugee. As the particulars to the judicial review ground made plain, the appellant contended that, because the AAT accepted that the appellant’s mother had paid a bribe in 2006 to prevent him from being detained by corrupt CID officers, this necessarily implied an acceptance that the appellant was suspected as having LTTE connections. The primary judge’s reasoning in [26] for rejecting this contention is notably brief. The appellant does not complain, however, that the reasons were inadequate in law (see BKL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 802; 241 FCR 450 at [8] – [16] per Flick J, with which I respectfully agree). The fundamental difficulty with the appellant’s complaint, as reflected in ground 1 of his judicial review application and in his sole ground of appeal, is that it is predicated on an inaccurate reading of the AAT’s reasons. In [24] to [26] of its reasons for decision, the AAT drew a distinction between the particular incident which occurred in 2006, as opposed to the claims of ongoing extortion attempts by the CID officers against the appellant’s mother after the 2006 incident. The AAT made a finding of fact in [24] that the mother was not subject to ongoing extortion attempts for any reason, including the reasons advanced by the appellant. In [25], the AAT stated that it was prepared to accept that, on one occasion in 2006, the CID asked the appellant’s mother about the whereabouts of her husband and that the mother paid a bribe to ensure that the appellant was not abducted by the corrupt CID officers. The AAT’s reasoning in [26] is not a model of clarity. That is for two reasons. First, the first sentence contains a statement that the AAT did not accept that the appellant’s father was suspected of being supportive of the LTTE. That finding, if viewed in isolation, is difficult to reconcile with the AAT’s acceptance in the previous paragraph that, on one occasion, in 2006 the appellant’s mother was asked by the CID about the whereabouts of her husband and the AAT’s implicit acceptance that the reason for that questioning was that the father was suspected of having links with the LTTE. Secondly, the third sentence in [26] is also cryptic. In particular, it is unclear why the AAT used the word “if” in that sentence, having regard to its acceptance in [25] that the 2006 incident occurred.