FQL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

FQL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 121

Appeal from: FQL17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 2087
File number: NSD 1394 of 2019
Judge: KERR J
Date of judgment: 14 February 2020
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court of Australia – protection visa application – validity and effect of the use of “person identification digits” in Migration (IMMI17/015: Person who is a Fast Track Applicant) Instrument 2017 (Cth) to specify fast track applicants – consideration of SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 30 – evidence establishes that legislative instrument effective to specify Appellant – no basis on which to question the legal validity of instrument – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5(1), 5(1AA)

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Seeker Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

1           Migration (IMMI17/015: Person who is a Fast Track Applicant) Instrument 2017 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2013] HCA 3; 249 CLR 1

SZTVU v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 30

Date of hearing: 6 February 2020
Date of last submissions: 29 January 2020
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 71
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr Prince SC and Ms Wong
Solicitor for the Appellant: Michaela Byers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Morris
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz

ORDERS

NSD 1394 of 2019
BETWEEN:

FQL17

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KERR J

DATE OF ORDER:

14 FEBRUARY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KERR J:

  1. The Appellant is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China. He arrived in Australia by air on a student visa on 13 February 2007. However, he ceased studying on the basis that he could not pay his tuition fees.

  2. In October 2007, the Appellant’s father came to Australia and applied for a protection visa listing the Appellant as a dependent applicant. That application was refused. On 16 December 2014, the then Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) affirmed that decision. An appeal to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) from that decision was dismissed.   

  3. In June 2012, the Appellant applied for a protection visa on the basis that he had in 2012 become a member of I-Kuan Tao: a version of Taoism that is outlawed in China. That application was refused. The RRT affirmed that decision. 

  4. The Appellant’s father then made a further application for a protection visa, again listing the Appellant as a secondary applicant. That application was again refused, and the RRT again affirmed that decision.

  5. In…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 121
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of FQL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, a fast track applicant, challenging the validity and effect of the legislative instrument that specified him as a fast track applicant. The matter was before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, which dismissed the appeal, and subsequently, the High Court of Australia, which declined to grant special leave to appeal. The appellant argued that the instrument specifying him as a fast track applicant was invalid, as it relied on the use of a "person identification digit" (PID) without proper legal basis or verification. The court was required to determine whether the legislative instrument was valid and whether the appellant was correctly identified as a fast track applicant under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

The court examined the statutory framework and the relevant legislative instrument, Migration (IMMI17/015: Person who is a Fast Track Applicant) Instrument 2017 (Cth), which was made under s 5(1AA)(b) of the Migration Act. The court found that the appellant had conceded that he had been allocated a PID and was referred to by that PID in Schedule 1 of IMMI17/015. The court also considered the evidence provided by the Minister, including a screenshot of the appellant's PID in the Department's internal database system and a letter confirming the allocation of the PID to the appellant. The court held that there was no basis on which to question the legal validity of the instrument or the identification of the appellant as a fast track applicant.

In light of the findings, the High Court of Australia declined to grant special leave to appeal. The court emphasised the general reluctance of an appeal court to permit a party to rely on an appeal ground not agitated in the court below. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed. The decision highlights the importance of properly identifying fast track applicants and the role of legislative instruments in achieving this objective.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The Appellant is to pay the costs of the First Respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court of Australia regarding a protection visa application. The Appellant, a fast track applicant under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), had his application for a Subclass 866 Protection Visa refused by a delegate of the Minister. The Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) affirmed this decision. The Appellant sought review of the IAA's decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA), which was dismissed. The appeal to the Federal Court of Australia challenges the validity and effect of the Migration (IMMI17/015: Person who is a Fast Track Applicant) Instrument 2017 (Cth) (IMMI17/015), used to specify fast track applicants. The Appellant conceded that he had been allocated a Person Identification Digit (PID) and that he was referred to by that PID in Schedule 1 of IMMI17/015. However, he argued that the instrument was invalid and that the IAA failed to consider whether the delegate's decision was valid and whether it had jurisdiction to review that decision.

The Appellant's application for review of the IAA's decision was dismissed by the FCCA on 31 July 2019. This decision is now the subject of an appeal to the Federal Court of Australia. The Appellant had previously raised several grounds of review in the FCCA, including the invalidity of IMMI17/015 and the IAA's failure to consider whether it had jurisdiction to review the delegate's decision. The Appellant conceded that he had been allocated a PID and that he was identified by this digit in IMMI17/015, but still argued that the instrument was invalid and that the IAA did not properly exercise its jurisdiction.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Third, in declining to grant leave their Honours took into account the principles relating to the general reluctance of an appeal court to permit a party to rely on an appeal ground not agitated in the court below.THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA DECISION Before the FCCA, the Appellant in the present case pressed the following three review grounds: Ground 2: IMMI17/015 is invalid in so far as it purports to apply to the Applicant. Particulars The IAA failed to consider whether the Applicant was a person specified by an anonymised particular reference in IMMI17/015 and that the Applicant was a “fast track applicant” when there was no basis to do so. Ground 3: The IAA failed to consider whether the delegate’s decision was a valid decision. ParticularsThe IAA failed to consider whether it had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision. Ground 4: The IAA failed to consider whether it had jurisdiction to review the delegate’s decision. ParticularsThe IAA failed to determine whether the Applicant was a fast track applicant or not. In those proceedings the Appellant ultimately conceded that he had been allocated a PID, and that he was referred to by that PID in Schedule 1 of IMMI17/015. The basis for his making that concession was the following evidence, which the Minister provided to the Court: 9.In an affidavit of Che-Long Chang of 13 June 2009, the Court has been provided with a screenshot of the first respondent’s “integrated client services environment (ICSE) internal database system in respect to the applicant, which records among other things, the Person Identification Digit (“PID”) allocated to the applicant” on 10 November 2006. In addition, the Court has been provided with a copy of a letter dated 5 September 2017, from the first respondent to the authorised representative of the applicant, confirming the allocation of the personal identification digit to the Applicant. However, the Appellant nonetheless submitted that he was not “a person who is, or who is included in a class of persons who are, specified by” IMMI17/015. The primary judge summarised the Appellant’s submissions in that regard as follows: 18.It was submitted that the term "Personal Identifier" is a term defined in s 5A of the Act to include, for example, a person's fingerprints, a photograph of a person's face and shoulders and a person's signature. The purpose of a "Personal Identifier" under s 5A (3) of the Act is to assist in the identification of and to authenticate the identity of persons for the purposes of the Act. It was further submitted that unlike "Personal Identifier" the term "Personal Identification Digit" is not defined by the Act (or by IMMI17/015). It was submitted that the Act did not empower a person to give a PID to a particular person or to specify that a particular number is a PID and is referrable to a particular person. 19.It was submitted that a Court is simply informed by the Minister that a person has been given a PID by the Department and has no means to independently verify that claim within the statutory framework. It was submitted that there was no way for a Court to test whether a mistake has occurred in allocating the PID or whether a Departmental officer has exceeded his or her authority by giving the person a PID or that the Minister proceeded on the understanding that the particular PID corresponded to a particular natural person in the making of the regulation.20.During submissions before the Court, Ms Byers submitted that a list of numbers does not specify a class of person. In order for there to be a class of persons there must be shared attributes which are specified by the legislative instrument, informing those persons so they can verify whether or not they in fact meet the legislative requirements for being a "fast track applicant".

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

On 5 September 2017, the Department sent the Appellant a further letter notifying him that the Minister had exercised his power under s 48B of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) to enable him to make a further protection visa application. That letter again informed the Appellant of his Person Identification Digit, as follows: Personal identifierFor processing and correspondence purposes, you have been given a Personal Identification Digit (PID), which is recorded at the top of this letter. Please keep a record of your PID. On 12 September 2017, the Appellant made a fresh application for a Subclass 866 Protection Visa (Protection Visa). On 19 December 2017, a delegate of the Minister (the Delegate) refused to grant that Protection Visa. The Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) reviewed that decision. On 11 December 2017, it affirmed the Delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the Appellant the Protection Visa that he sought. The Appellant sought review of the IAA’s decision in the FCCA. That application was dismissed on 31 July 2019. It is that decision which is the subject of the present appeal. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK By way of background to the issues that arise in this appeal, it is helpful to first provide some context as to the relevant regulatory framework. That framework was established by the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Seeker Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth). The definition of “fast track applicant” in s 5(1) of the Migration Act provides that the term refers to: (a) a person: (i)who is an unauthorised maritime arrival and who entered Australia on or after 13 August 2012, but before 1 January 2014, and who has not been taken to a regional processing country; and (ii) to whom the Minister has given a written notice under subsection 46A(2) determining that subsection 46A(1) does not apply to an application by the person for a protection visa; and(iii) who has made a valid application for a protection visa in accordance with the determination; or (b)a person who is, or who is included in a class of persons who are, specified by legislative instrument made under paragraph (1AA)(b). (Emphasis added). This appeal turns on issues related to the validity and/or effect of a legislative instrument titled: Migration (IMMI17/015: Person who is a Fast Track Applicant) Instrument 2017 (Cth) (IMMI17/015). That instrument was purportedly made under s 5(1AA)(b) of the Migration Act. That section provides, relevantly: (1AA)The Minister may make a legislative instrument for the purposes of the following provisions: …(b)paragraph (b) of the definition of fast track applicant in subsection (1). Under the Migration Act, the IAA has jurisdiction to review decisions to refuse protection visas to fast track applicants. It is uncontentious that the Appellant’s circumstances do not fall within the terms of s 5(1)(a) of the Migration Act. Thus, he can only be a “fast track applicant” if he is a person who has been “specified” by IMMI17/015.