CHM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 38 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

CHM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1132

Appeal from: CHM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1464
File number: NSD 1192 of 2017
Judges: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 1 August 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court dismissing application for judicial review of fast track reviewable decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) – where IAA affirmed decision refusing to grant a safe haven visa – whether IAA correctly applied complementary protection criterion - whether appellant denied procedural fairness by not being invited to attend a hearing before the IAA – whether denial of procedural fairness by reason of alleged deficiencies in interpreting at safe haven visa interview – whether denial of procedural fairness by IAA in failing to invite the applicant to a hearing – consideration of the nature of the fast track review process under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 – whether IAA erred in declining to consider new information under s 473DD – appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473CA, 473DA, 473DC, 473DD

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth)

Cases cited:

BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958

DBE16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 942

Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v AMA16 [2017] FCAFC 136

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1

Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] HCA 23; (2010) 241 CLR 252

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZIJL v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 665

SZSGA v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCA 774

SZSHK v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 125; (2013) 138 ALD 26

WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612

WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 969

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Date of hearing: 15 November 2017
Date of last submissions: 22 December 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 60
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the Respondents: Mr B D Kaplan
Solicitor for the Respondents: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 1192 of 2017
BETWEEN:

CMH16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

1 AUGUST 2018

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read CHM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1132
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of CHM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court (Federal Circuit Court) which dismissed an application for judicial review of a fast track reviewable decision by the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, had applied for a safe haven visa, which was subsequently refused by the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The IAA affirmed this decision. The central legal issues in this appeal were whether the IAA correctly applied the complementary protection criterion under the Migration Act, whether the appellant was denied procedural fairness due to the Department's failure to conduct interviews with a standard Bangladeshi language interpreter, and whether the IAA denied the appellant procedural fairness by not inviting him to a hearing.

The Full Court of the Federal Court found that the IAA was correct in its application of the complementary protection criterion. The Court held that the IAA, as a limited review body, was not required to consider new information unless there were exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, the Court held that the appellant had not been denied procedural fairness by the Department's failure to use a standard interpreter during the interviews, as the IAA had relied on the Department's records and had not made its decision with a closed mind. Lastly, the Court determined that the IAA did not err in declining to invite the appellant to a hearing, as the fast track review process under Part 7AA of the Migration Act did not mandate such a hearing.

In light of the above, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay the costs of the first respondent as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below the appeal must be dismissed. 2. BACKGROUND2.1 The application for a visa The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who entered Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival (as defined in s 5AA of the Act) on 12 November 2012. The appellant was interviewed by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) on 14 November 2012. At that time, the appellant made no mention of his claims to fear persecution or harm. As an unauthorised maritime arrival, the appellant was initially precluded from making a valid application for a visa onshore: see s 46A of the Act. However on 7 July 2015 the Minister exercised his power under subs 46A(2) of the Act to permit the appellant to apply for the safe haven visa. On 17 August 2015, the appellant applied for the safe haven visa. He provided a statement dated 27 July 2015 in support of his application setting out his claims for protection. The appellant claimed to fear persecution at the hands of the Awami League on the basis of his membership of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (the BNP). In particular, he claimed to have been wrongly accused in April 2007 of murdering a member of the Awami League, an accusation which he said was politically motivated, and to have been attacked by a group of men after threats were made to his mother about the level of his political involvement in the BNP. The appellant attended an interview with the Minister’s delegate on 22 October 2015. On 25 November 2015, the delegate wrote to the appellant inviting him to comment on adverse information that the delegate considered would be the reason, or part of the reason, for refusing to grant him the safe haven visa. By a letter dated 22 December 2015, the then representative for the appellant responded to the Departmental letter.2.2 The delegate’s decision On 14 June 2016, the delegate made a decision to refuse to grant the appellant a safe haven visa on the ground that the delegate did not consider that he was a person in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations so as to satisfy the criteria in subss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act. In particular, the delegate did not accept that the appellant was a member of the BNP, he had been threatened due to an affiliation with the BNP, he was attacked by the Awami League due to an actual or imputed affiliation with the BNP, or he had been falsely accused of murder. These findings led the delegate to reject the appellant’s claims in their entirety. 2.3 The fast track referral to the IAA The delegate also found that the appellant satisfied the definition of a fast track applicant in subs 5(1) of the Act. Accordingly, the delegate’s decision was referred by the Minister to the IAA pursuant to s 473CA of the Act. The appellant was notified of the referral by the IAA by email on the following day. The letter explained that the IAA would proceed to make a decision on the appellant’s case on the basis of the information sent to it by the Department unless the IAA decided to consider new information. The letter also pointed out that the consideration of such new information could occur only in limited circumstances. Those circumstances were said to be explained in documents attached to the email, being a fact sheet in English and Bengali entitled “What you need to know about the Immigration Assessment Authority” and the Practice Direction for Applicants, Representatives and Authorised Recipients (the Practice Direction). The Practice Direction was issued by the then President of the AAT pursuant to s 473FB of the Act. It explained that the appellant could provide a written submission on why he disagreed with the delegate’s decision and as to any claim that had been overlooked by the delegate. 2.4 The appellant’s submission to the IAA

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In relation to the adverse credibility findings made by the delegate, the appellant’s representatives submitted to the IAA that the appellant was disadvantaged in his interview for the safe haven visa by “extremely poor interpreting”, relying upon the audio recording of the interview. The submission also alleged that the delegate failed to take into consideration the fact that the appellant’s family had to leave Bangladesh for the same political reasons as those claimed by the appellant, attaching evidence to prove that his family were living overseas. Further, the submission referred to country information suggesting that political activists at all levels may be at risk of harm, that police corruption is a very serious problem in Bangladesh, that the judiciary is not independent, and that extrajudicial killings in Bangladesh remain widespread.2.5 The IAA Decision The IAA accepted that the appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh and that this was his receiving country for the purpose of the assessment (IAA reasons at [12]). The IAA first considered the appellant’s claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason so as to satisfy the criterion in subs 36(2)(a) of the Act (IAA reasons at [10]-[42]). However, the IAA ultimately rejected his claims to fear persecution by reason of his involvement with the BNP and his claims that members of his immediate family were politically active with the BNP. In particular, the IAA was not satisfied that the appellant had demonstrated any specific knowledge of the BNP. The IAA did not accept that the vagueness of the appellant’s BNP knowledge was because of the allegedly poor quality of interpreting (IAA reasons at [19]-[20]). Nor did it accept his explanations for failing to mention his BNP involvement at his entry interview, or the claim that he had previously been targeted on account of his political activities, because he was too frightened or traumatised to answer questions accurately (IAA reasons at [24]). Thus, while the IAA accepted that the appellant was attacked by a group of men in 2007, it did not accept that the attack was politically motivated or that he received other threats following the attack through his mother from the Awami League. Rather, the IAA found that the 2007 attack was an isolated criminal incident and that no other threats were issued (IAA reasons at [25]). Nor did the IAA accept that the appellant’s immediate family fled Bangladesh for reasons relating to his political involvement. The IAA also did not accept the appellant’s claims to have been falsely accused of murdering a local Awami League leader (IAA reasons at [29]). The IAA reached this finding in the context of having rejected the appellant’s claims regarding his involvement with the BNP, the fact that the appellant did not mention the murder charge prior to his application for the safe haven visa, and its rejection of his explanations for the lack of detail and omissions at his entry interview (IAA reasons at [27]-[35]). Nor did the IAA consider that the appellant faced a real chance of harm on any other basis.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Thus, as the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill which introduced Pt 7AA explains (in an overview described as “helpful” by the Full Court in AMA16 at [13]): In carrying out its functions under the Migration Act, the IAA is to pursue the objective of providing a mechanism of limited review that is efficient and quick. While there will be discretionary powers for the IAA to get new and relevant information and to get information in the most suitable and convenient way from applicants, the IAA is under no duty to accept or request new information or interview an applicant.As a limited review body, other than in exceptional circumstances, the IAA is prohibited from considering any new information for the purposes of making a decision, irrespective of whether the IAA obtained it through its discretionary powers or an applicant provided it of their own volition. New information will only be considered if the IAA is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify the consideration of that new information. For example, exceptional circumstances may be found where there is evidence of a significant change of conditions in the applicant's country of origin that means the applicant may now engage Australia's protection obligations. Where an applicant provides or seeks to provide the IAA with new information of their own volition, they would also have to satisfy the IAA that the new information could not have been provided to the Minister before the primary decision was made. The limited review mechanism supports the measures in the Migration Amendment (Protection and Other Measures) Bill 2014 which clarify the responsibility of asylum seekers to specify the particulars of their claim, provide sufficient evidence to establish their claim and encourage complete information to be provided upfront. The measures will prevent those asylum seekers who attempt to exploit the merits review process by presenting new claims or evidence to bolster their original unsuccessful claims only after they learn why they were not found to engage Australia's protection obligations by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.4. CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL4.1 The issues By the notice of appeal, the appellant, who was unrepresented below and in this Court, raises a number of grounds of appeal, namely, that the primary judge erred in failing to hold that:(1)the IAA failed to apply the correct test in subs 36(2)(aa) of the Act to determine if the appellant satisfied the test for complementary protection (FCA Ground 1);(2)the IAA exceeded its jurisdiction or constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction (FCA Ground 2);(3)the IAA “made inconsistent assertions on the credibility testimony” (FCA Ground 3);(4)the appellant was denied procedural fairness when the Department failed to conduct the first and second interviews “by a standard Bangladeshi Language Interpreter”, the IAA “fully relied on the Departmental records of hearing and did not believe it is relevant”, and the IAA “did not give importance of Communication barriers and made decision with closed mind” (FCA Ground 4);(5)the IAA did not afford the appellant a hearing (FCA Ground 5); and (6)“Sub(2) of s 473DC(3) was not used intentionally in the name of fast track notion of Department. A judicial procedural requirement for fair trial or hearing was discarded which is essence of the common law. [The primary judge] failed to hold the judicial foundation of the Common law and compromise with the Department.” (FCA Ground 6).