FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DYK17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 943
Appeal from: DYK17 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2799 File number: WAD 375 of 2018 Judge: KERR J Date of judgment: 20 June 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) – where Authority had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first Respondent refusing the Appellants’ applications for Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visas – whether Authority erred in taking an unduly narrow view of “exceptional circumstances” for the purposes of s 473DD(a) – where it may be inferred Authority gave consideration exclusively to whether information could have been provided to the Minister’s delegate – whether it was legally unreasonable for Authority not to exercise its discretion to obtain further information under s 473DC – where Appellant had advised she did not feel comfortable with a male interpreter during interview conducted by Minister’s delegate – appeal allowed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 55, 473CA, 473CB, 473DC, 473DD, Pt 7AA Cases cited: BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 114; 261 FCR 35
BVZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 958; 254 FCR 221
CHM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1132
Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd [1993] FCA 456; 43 FCR 280
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; 257 FCR 111
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v CRY16 [2017] FCAFC 210; 253 FCR 475
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v DZU16 [2018] FCAFC 32; 253 FCR 526
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 357 ALR 408
Plaintiff M174 /2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 16
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1347
Date of hearing: 26 February 2019 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 80 Counsel for the Appellants: Mr R S Jahnke Solicitor for the Appellants: Estrin Saul Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms S J Oliver Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
WAD 375 of 2018 BETWEEN: DYK17
First Appellant
DYL17
Second Appellant
DYM17 (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
KERR J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 JUNE 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 31 July 2018 be set aside, and in lieu thereof order that:
(a)An order in the nature of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Second Respondent dated 1 August…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 943
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine whether the IAA erred in taking a narrow view of "exceptional circumstances" and whether it was legally unreasonable for the IAA not to exercise its discretion to obtain further information. The Appellants submitted that the IAA should have considered new information, particularly in light of the Appellant's discomfort with a male interpreter during the interview. The Minister argued that the IAA's decision was not legally unreasonable given that the Appellant had already been given an opportunity to provide evidence and had confirmed the completeness of her submissions. The court had to weigh these submissions and determine whether the IAA acted within its discretion and whether the Appellant's concerns warranted further investigation.
The court found that the IAA did not act unreasonably in declining to exercise its discretion under section 473DC. The Appellant had been provided with an opportunity to present her claims and had confirmed the completeness of her evidence at the interview. The IAA noted that the Appellant's legal representatives had not elicited any claims that she was unable to express at the interview. Given these circumstances, the court held that it was not legally unreasonable for the IAA to not consider obtaining new information. The court also distinguished the present case from previous cases, finding that the Appellant's situation was sufficiently different to warrant a different outcome. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Circuit Court, and remitted the matter to the IAA for reconsideration.
The court ordered that the decision of the IAA be quashed, the matter be remitted for determination according to law, and that the Minister pay the Appellants' costs of the proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia on 31 July 2018 be set aside, and in lieu thereof order that:
(a) An order in the nature of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Second Respondent dated 1 August 2017;
(b) The matter be remitted to the Second Respondent for determination according to law; and,
(c) The First Respondent pay the Applicants’ costs in the sum of $7,328.00.
3. The First Respondent pay the Appellants’ costs of the appeal as agreed or as taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Oliver accepts this Court is bound by the reasoning in CRY16 and DZU16, but would distinguish those cases. On behalf of the Minister she submits:18. In CRY16, the Full Court was of the view that, in circumstances where:(a) the IAA determined the matter against the appellant on the issue of relocation to a particular location in Lebanon;(b) the issue of relocation was not explored by the delegate at the interview, or subject of the delegate’s findings; and(c) the IAA knew that it did not have, but the appellant was likely to have, information relevant to the reasonableness of the applicant’s relocation to Beirut;it was unreasonable for the IAA to not consider inviting the appellant to provide new information to it on the issue of relocation. A similar outcome was reached in DZU16. The first respondent submits that the decisions in CRY16 and DZU16 are clearly distinguishable on their facts.19. In the present case, the first respondent did not act in a legally unreasonable manner by not considering exercising its power under section 473DC to get new information, in circumstances where:(a) the issue of the fifth appellant’s risk of harm from her former husband or members of his family was raised by the fifth appellant;(b) the fifth appellant agreed to provide evidence in relation to her claims at interview before the delegate, whilst using a male interpreter;(c) the fifth appellant was advised to alert the interviewer if at any time she did not feel comfortable with the male interpreter, and was provided with an opportunity to present her claims via an alternative means if she wished;(d) the fifth appellant confirmed she had presented and discussed all of those claims at interview despite a female interpreter not being available (AB 530 and 532);(e) the fifth appellant did not seek to make further claims or elaborate on her evidence to the delegate after interview (AB 503-508 and 532);(f) the fifth appellant made submissions to the IAA in respect of this issue, which the IAA considered, noting that she had the benefit of legal representation. The IAA noted that the representatives had not elicited any claims that the fifth appellant was unable to express at the SHEV interview; and(g) the fifth appellant made no request for a further interview as a result of the use of a male interpreter at the interview.20. It is immaterial that, in this case, the delegate and the IAA made different findings in relation to the fifth appellant’s claim. The relevant point is that the fifth appellant was aware of the issue and she therefore had an opportunity to give whatever evidence and submissions she thought relevant either to the claim or the use of a male interpreter. It was not legally unreasonable for the IAA to not consider exercising its discretionary powers to obtain new information in those circumstances, and in the context of the relevant statutory regime.Consideration Section 473DC is concerned with when the Authority can “get”, in the sense of seek out, “new information”. As the plurality of the High Court noted in M174, it is purely facultative. It provides:Getting new information(1) Subject to this Part, [the Authority] may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information (new information) that:(a) were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and(b) the Authority considers may be relevant.(2) [The Authority] does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances.(3) Without limiting subsection (1), [the Authority] may invite a person, orally or in writing, to give new information:(a) in writing; or(b) at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.