Ave21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs

[2022] FedCFamC2G 173

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

AVE21 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 173

File number(s):

MLG 617 of 2021

Judgment of:

JUDGE A KELLY

Date of judgment:

16 March 2022

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visa – judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where application filed outside 35-day time limit – where extension of time sought – where applicant had substantial criminal record – where applicant feared harm and persecution if returned to Turkey – where applicant sought five grounds of review for judicial review –  applicable principles – extension of time not granted – application be dismissed.   

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 65, 422B, 474, 476A, 477, 494B, 494C, 501

Cases cited:

CHM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1132
DHX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs(2020) 278 FCR 475
Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 242 FCR 585
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476
Pohahau v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1243
Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155
Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (2013) 236 FCR 442
SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86
Tran v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 533
WZANW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 1075
WZASQ v MIBP [2013] FCCA 1726

WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612

Division:

Division 2 General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs:

50

Date of hearing:

15 December 2021

Place:

Melbourne

Applicant:

Self-represented

Solicitor-advocate for the first respondent:

Mr J. Mintz

Solicitor for the first respondent:

Clayton Utz

ORDERS

MLG 617 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

AVE21

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE A KELLY
DATE OF ORDER:	16 MARCH 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to ss 202-203 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), direct that the parties be allowed to appear and to make submissions before the Court by video and audio link.

2.The application made pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) for an extension of time within which to apply for judicial review of the decision of the second respondent refusing his application for a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa be dismissed.

3.The application filed on 7 April 2021 be dismissed.

4.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in the sum of $7,853.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

KELLY A, J

Introduction

1. By application filed 7 April 2021, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 19 January 2021 affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent (Minister) refusing to grant a Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) (visa) pursuant to s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).

2. By his application, the applicant also sought an extension of time pursuant to s 477 of the Act within which to seek judicial review of that decision. Although the application was filed some weeks after the expiry of the 35-day time limit fixed for the filing of the application, it is not in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension. Upon the applicable threshold, the applicant has not demonstrated any reasonably arguable case so as to engage the discretion to grant an extension of time. Indeed, notwithstanding the provision of some assistance from a refugee legal practice and legal aid, the applicant has not filed submissions in support of his application. The application should be dismissed.

   Background

3. This background is drawn from the Minister’s submissions together with my examination of the materials in the court book and those documents that have been filed in this Court.

4. On 2 July 1970, the applicant, a male Turkish citizen born in Ankara, then aged three years, first came to Australia with his parents and siblings.  The applicant has held two types of visa since his arrival in Australia.  From 1989 to 1990 he held a BF-R visa.  From 1995 to 2018, the applicant held a Resident Return Visa (RRV) (Class BB) (subclass 155) (Resident Return visa).  He has visited Turkey on four occasions while holding these visas but has lived in Australia continuously since January 2000.

5. Most of the applicant’s immediate family reside in Australia, being his father, step-mother, three siblings, three children, and three grandchildren.  During his time in Australia, the applicant completed ten years of school, two TAFE courses and a recreational boat operator course.  Further, from 1999 to 2006 he was the owner of a mechanical repairs business.

6. The applicant has a substantial criminal record within the meaning of ss 501(6)(a) and 501(7)(c) of the Act, having offended between 1982 to 2018 and being sentenced on 15 February 2010, for two years and nine months imprisonment, and 6 June 2018, for four months imprisonment. The sentences related to a series of drug related charges of trafficking and possession.

7. On 25 June 2018, a delegate of the Minister cancelled his visa pursuant to s 501(3A)(b).

8. On 29 March 2019, that decision was affirmed on review by the Tribunal: [2019] AATA 579. On 13 February 2020, the applicant through his counsel, appeared and made submissions before the Federal Court of Australia challenging the Tribunal’s decision. On 19 May 2020, the application for a judicial review was dismissed: [2020] FCA 667 (Anderson, J).

9. On 30 July 2020, the applicant applied for a visa to the Department of Home Affairs. The applicant’s claims, as articulated in the visa application, were that he claimed to fear harm in Turkey on account of his having evaded military service and not paying a military service exemption fee.  The applicant informed the Department that he would provide an additional statement in respect to his grounds for protection at a later unspecified time.

10. On 5 August 2020, the Department transmitted a request via email for the applicant to attend the visa interview on 10 August 2020 to discuss his application and claims for protection.  Attached to the Department’s email was a fact sheet which provided information in respect to the interview process.

11. On 10 August 2020, the applicant attended the visa interview via teleconference at the Melbourne Immigration Transit Accommodation (MITA), Broadmeadows.

12. On 11 August 2020, Refugee Legal sent an email to the Department requesting a recording of the interview along with an attached declaration for Refugee Legal to act as the applicant’s legal representation.  On 17 August 2020, the Department informed Refugee Legal that the recording of the visa interview was sent to the mailing address of the applicant.

13. On 28 August 2020, the applicant provided the Department a post interview statement for his grounds of protection.  The statement echoed similar points raised in his application with the addition of information concerning his past criminal behaviour, drug use, mental health, and divorce from ex-partner.  

14. On 24 September 2020, a delegate of the Minister, not being satisfied that the applicant was a person in respect to whom Australia had protection obligations, refused to grant the visa.

15. On 30 September 2020, the applicant lodged an application for review of the decision by the Tribunal.  On 1 October 2020, notification of acknowledgement by the Tribunal was sent to the applicant.  Attached with the notification of acknowledgement were fact sheets relating to the availability of interpreters and informing him of steps taken in the refugee review process.

16. On 9 November 2020, documentation was transmitted from the Tribunal to MITA for the purposes of inviting the applicant to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 2 December 2020 to give evidence and present his arguments in respect to his matter.  Attached to the invitation was a response form and fact sheet detailing information about Tribunal hearings.  Later, on 11 November 2020, an officer of MITA handed a copy of the documentation to the applicant.

17. On 13 November 2020, the applicant lodged his response to the hearing invitation indicating he would not rely on any documents during the hearing and requesting his father and sister provide oral evidence.

18. On 24 November 2020, the Tribunal received, via email, a request from the applicant to postpone the 2 December 2020 hearing because his lawyer, who was retained the same day, needed time to gather information in order prepare his case.  Later, on 25 November 2020, the Tribunal responded to the applicant denying his request, deferring his concerns about representation to be raised at the hearing.

19. On 30 November 2020, the applicant’s legal representative transmitted a further statement by the applicant, signed on 27 November 2020, in support of his protection claim and noted ongoing legal assistance would not be provided, and to direct future correspondence directly to the applicant.  The applicant then informed the Tribunal he would attend the hearing.

20. Following the hearing, on 2 December 2020, the Tribunal transmitted to the applicant a copy of the Tribunal hearing recording.

21. On 13 December 2020, the Tribunal received, via email, letters in support of the applicant’s protection claim from family members and his NDIS support coordinator.  The next day, the director of Ascend Care transmitted to the Tribunal more letters of support for the applicant from family members.  On 16 December 2020, the applicant forwarded an email sent to him from Refugee & Immigration Legal Centre attaching another support letter from a family member and photograph of the applicant’s medication details.

    Tribunal’s decision

22. On 19 January 2021, the Tribunal made a decision affirming the decision to refuse the visa application and provided a statement of reasons for doing so (Reasons).  The Tribunal affirmed the decision that there was no real chance or real risk the applicant would be compelled to act, denied certain rights or face serious harm and persecution if returned to Turkey in respect to: (a) his evasion of military service; (b) his drug-related convictions, history and imprisonment; (c) being a non-practicing Muslim; (d) his state of physical and mental health; (e) being perceived as a foreigner or not being Turkish enough; and (f) his previous marital relations.  The applicant was provided, via email, of the Tribunal’s decision and Reasons.   

23. Set out below are the Reasons at [71] to [74]:

    Conclusions

    71 The Tribunal finds that there is no real chance or real risk that the applicant would be required to complete any period of military service in Turkey. It follows from these findings, that there is no real chance or real risk that the applicant would be required to pay a fine. The Tribunal finds that there is no real chance or real risk that the applicant would be arrested, prosecuted or imprisoned for having evaded the draft. The Tribunal finds that there is no real chance or a real risk that the applicant will face serious or significant harm at the hands of members of the broader community or the authorities for any adverse perceptions associated with evading draft. The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that the applicant will face serious or significant harm at the hands of the authorities or members of the community due to his past drug addiction. The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that the applicant will face serious or significant harm at the hands of the authorities or members of the community for the reason of his drug- related criminal convictions, his criminal history and his imprisonment. The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that the applicant will face serious or significant harm in Turkey for being a non-practising Muslim. The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that the applicant will face serious or significant harm for the reason of his religious beliefs and practices, or lack thereof. The Tribunal does not accept that the applicant will be denied access for any reason to health care, appropriate medical services, medication, mental health support or other related services in Turkey. The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that the applicant will be subjected to serious or significant harm by the authorities or anyone else for the reason of, or reasons related to, his state of physical or mental health. The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that the applicant will be targeted for harassment or harm in Turkey because he will be perceived as a foreigner or not being Turkish enough. The Tribunal does not accept that the challenges the applicant is likely to face in Turkey amount to serious harm, including significant economic hardship or denial of access to basic services or denial of capacity to earn a livelihood, where such hardship or denial threatens the applicant’s capacity to subsist, for any of the reasons mentioned under s.5J(1)(a). Nor does the Tribunal accept that any potential hardship in this context constitutes ‘significant harm’. The Tribunal does not accept that there is a real chance or a real risk that he will face serious or significant harm at the hands of his ex-wife’s family members if he were to return to Turkey.

    72After considering all of the applicant’s claims, both individually and cumulatively, the Tribunal finds that there is no real chance that the applicant will face serious harm in Turkey for the reason of his race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of any particular social group. The Tribunal finds that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted. Therefore, the applicant does not satisfy the criterion set out in s.36(2)(a).

    73 Having concluded that the applicant does not meet the refugee criterion in s.36(2)(a), the Tribunal has considered the alternative criterion in s.36(2)(aa). The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the applicant being removed from Australia to Turkey, there is a real risk that he will be subjected to any form of harm that would be the result of an act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on the applicant for the reasons specified in paragraphs (a)–(e) of the definition of ‘torture’ in s.5(1) of the Act. The Tribunal is not satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer harm that would involve the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, or pain or suffering, either physical or mental, such as to meet the definition of ‘cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment’ in s.5(1). Nor is it satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that he will suffer such harm as to meet the definition of ‘degrading treatment or punishment’ in s.5(1), which refers to an act or omission that causes, and is intended to cause, extreme humiliation which is unreasonable. The Tribunal is not satisfied that it has substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the applicant will suffer arbitrary deprivation of his life or the death penalty. The Tribunal, therefore, is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(aa).

    74 There is no suggestion that the applicant satisfies s.36(2) on the basis of being a member of the same family unit as a person who satisfies s.36(2)(a) or (aa) and who holds a protection visa. Accordingly, the applicant does not satisfy the criteria in s.36(2).

    Procedural history

24. On 7 April 2021, the applicant filed an application for review of the Tribunal’s decision.  The application was filed out of time, when the applicant was self-represented and in detention. However, the applicant had the benefit of some assistance from Refugee & Immigration Legal Centre and Victoria Legal Aid.  The applicant sought an application for an extension of time for the lodging of his application and supported that application by an affidavit, sworn on 25 March 2021, to which he exhibited a copy of the Reasons and provided an explanation of why he had not filed his application within the 35-day time limit. 

25. On 13 April 2021, the Minister filed a response opposing the application and sought an order that the application be dismissed on the grounds that: the Court had no jurisdiction to conduct a review because, pursuant to s 477(1) of the Act, the application had been lodged out of time; no jurisdictional error was shown in relation to the Tribunal’s decision, and; the applicant had not established it to be necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so.

26. Although afforded an opportunity to file an amended application, supplementary court book, and written submissions, the applicant did not take those opportunities.

    Judicial review

27. If the decision is a privative clause decision, it is not amenable to judicial review: Act, s 474(2). A decision upon the merits review of a visa application is not amenable to judicial review unless it is vitiated by jurisdictional error: Act, s 474(1)(c), 476(2)(b); Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476, [76].

    Extension of Time Application

28. On 1 April 2021, the applicant signed an unsworn statement (due to the Covid-19 pandemic) in which he essentially repeated the grounds for an extension of time

29. The Minister submitted that by letter dated 20 January 2021 emailed to the applicant, the Tribunal informed the applicant of its decision to affirm the delegate's decision to refuse to grant the visa.  Accordingly, the 35-day time period for an application for judicial review expired on 24 February 2021.  The application for review was 36 days out of time.

30. Section 477(2) of the Act allows the Court to grant an extension of time if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order.

31. No particular criteria are specified by s 477 which must be satisfied to establish that it is in “the interests of the administration of justice” to grant an extension.  Settled guidelines have been developed identifying the factors which might ordinarily be taken into account in considering the interests of the administration of justice in this context.  Commonly, those factors include: the extent and reason for the delay; whether there is any prejudice to the Minister; whether the applicant’s substantive case for judicial review is sufficiently arguable to justify the extension of time: SZRIQ v Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (2013) 236 FCR 442 at [46]–[48] (Foster J); Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 (Hunter Valley).

1. It was conceded that there was no prejudice to the Minister in the granting of the extension of time that could not be addressed through an order for costs.  However, the absence of prejudice to the Minister in itself was insufficient to warrant the grant of an extension: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]; Hunter Valley at 348.

2. In this case, the delay of 36 days, while not excessive, is not inconsequential.  In WZASQ v MIBP [2013] FCCA 1726 at [14], Lucev J described a delay of 74 days in filing the application to the Court as “substantial”. Elsewhere, the Court held that a delay of 54 days is likely to be fatal to an application for an extension of time where there is no reason for the delay: WZANW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 1075 at [28] (Lucev FM).

3. In general, the longer the delay, the more persuasive the explanation needs to be: Tran v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 533 at [38] (Wigney J). Here, there was no reasonable or adequate explanation for the delay. The letter notifying the applicant of the Tribunal's decision was sent directly to the applicant's nominated email address on 20 January 2021, and the applicant was taken to have received that letter at the end of the day on 20 January 2021: Act, ss 494C(5), 494B(5). Notably, all prior correspondence had apparently reached the applicant without issue. Relatedly, the applicant had used the same nominated email address in his application for an extension of time in this Court.

4. The dispositive consideration is that it will not be in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time where the proposed application has little or no prospect of success: Pohahau v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1243 at [35] (Wigney J). For the purposes of the application to extend time, the Court's consideration was confined to considering whether the proposed grounds are arguable, at a reasonably impressionistic level: DHX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 278 FCR 475 at [76]-[77] (Collier, Rangiah and Derrington JJ).

5. The applicant’s grounds for an extension of time as set out in his application read:

   1. I am currently detained in MITA and my application was affirmed by the AAT on 19 January 2021. However, I did not realise the AAT had refused my application until my detention case manager advised me of this and provided me with a copy of the refusal decision a week ago. By this stage, it was out of time.

   2.I was then assisted by Refugee Legal to get in contact with Victoria Legal Aid. I now lodge this application for judicial review.

6. By s 477(1), a 35-day time limit is fixed for the making of an application for judicial review of a migration decision. The Court may extend the time for filing an application: s 477(2). The power to extend time is subject to two conditions: (1) an application has been made in writing for such an extension, in which the applicant specifies why it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for an extension to be granted; (2) the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so.

7. While the discretion is broad, the Court should not grant an application for an extension of time unless it is proper to do so. If it is proper to conclude that a claim is bound to fail, the Court should not permit the application to proceed and accordingly decline to extend time. That this is so brings to attention that legislative time limits are not to be ignored. Equally, the discretion conferred by s 477(2) recognises that there will be cases in which, although no prejudice may be sustained by the Minister, the consequences for an applicant in losing a right of appeal are real. Although an alternative route of review might be available, the refusal of an application for an extension of time forecloses any right of appeal: Act, par 476A(3)(a); see also MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 242 FCR 585, [65] (Mortimer J).

   Substantive grounds of review

8. The applicant’s substantive grounds of review read:

   1.The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) Decision on 19 January 2021 is legally unreasonable in that it is vitiated by jurisdictional error.

   2.The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) denied me procedural fairness because the member did not give me a fair hearing.

   3.The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) failed to properly consider all my claims.

   4.The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) failed to consider a relevant consideration.

   5.The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) made a decision that was legally [sic]

   Ground 5 is incomplete and devoid of content.  The four other grounds of proposed challenge are wholly unparticularised and liable to dismissal on that basis: WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612 at [60] (Judge Lucev); CHM16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1132 at [27] (Perry J).

   Ground 1: legal unreasonableness

9. Absent particulars there is no aspect of the Tribunal’s consideration of the applicant's claims and evidence that could be said to have been legally unreasonable.

10. The Minister, who contended that this ground may be understood as taking issue with the Tribunal’s decision to refuse the applicant's request to adjourn the hearing, accepted that the Tribunal’s discretion to adjourn the hearing under s 427(1)(b) must be exercised reasonably: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [63] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ).

11. On 23 November 2020, the applicant requested that the hearing be adjourned so that he could obtain legal representation.  The next day, the applicant notified the Tribunal that he had obtained legal representation, but that he did not know how much time his representative would need to gather information.  No appointment of representative form was submitted to the Tribunal. After considering the applicant's request, the Tribunal decided not to postpone the hearing.  The Minister submitted that the exercise of that discretion was not unreasonable, as: (a) the Tribunal notified the applicant he could address his concerns at the hearing; (b) the Tribunal case notes confirm the applicant was informed, on the Member's instructions, that if he needed time to submit any additional documents he could raise that request at the hearing.  The applicant confirmed he understood this information, and did, in fact, submit supporting documents following the hearing.

12. There is nothing to suggest the Tribunal acted in a manner that was arbitrary or capricious, or lacked an evident and intelligible justification: cf Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [28], [31] (French CJ); at [76] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ). Even when considered at an impressionistic level, Ground 1 raises no reasonably arguable complaint.

    Ground 2: procedural fairness / natural justice 

13. By Ground 2, the applicant asserts the Tribunal did not give him a fair hearing.  Again the want of particulars makes it difficult to understand the precise basis for this proposed ground.

14. The Minister correctly submitted that any assessment of the Tribunal’s obligation to afford procedural fairness must be considered in the context of s 422B of the Act. Section 422B provides that Div 4, Pt 7 of the Act is taken to be an “exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to the matters it deals with.”

15. There is nothing to suggest the Tribunal did not provide the applicant procedural fairness.  The Tribunal: (a) invited the applicant to a hearing, which he attended; (b) put relevant information to the applicant during the course of the hearing; and (c) afforded the applicant the opportunity to put on additional evidence following the hearing.

16. The Tribunal did not make any error of the sort identified in SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152. As the delegate had earlier not been satisfied that the applicant had established his claims, the applicant was on sufficient notice of the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. Ground 2 is not reasonably arguable.

    Grounds 3-4: consideration of the applicant’s claims /relevant considerations

17. The Minister properly accepted that a material failure to address a particular claim, or an integer of a claim, either expressly or impliedly made, would entail jurisdictional error: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2001) 194 ALR 244; NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1. Again, the want of particulars obscures consideration of the claim, or relevant consideration, which was purportedly not considered.

18. I agree that the Tribunal was not bound to accept, uncritically, any of the applicant’s claims: Randhawa v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437, 451 (Beaumont J); Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559, 596 (Kirby J); Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155, 169-70 (Wilcox J). Ultimately, the Tribunal found that none of the applicant's claims were made out on the evidence before it. The Tribunal’s reasons demonstrate active intellectual engagement with those claims and the relevant evidence, being the applicant's documentary and oral evidence, and the applicable country information.

    Conclusion

19. The application for an extension of time should be refused.  Consequently, the application filed on 7 April 2018 will be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding fifty (50) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge A Kelly.

Associate:

Dated:       16 March 2022