FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
FEY17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1014
Appeal from: FEY17 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 3650 File number(s): QUD 866 of 2018 Judge(s): GREENWOOD J Date of judgment: 16 July 2020 Catchwords: MIGRATION – consideration of an application for leave to rely on additional grounds of appeal – consideration of the existing grounds and the grounds sought to be relied upon with leave – consideration of whether the primary Judge erred by failing to find jurisdictional error on the part of the Immigration Assessment Authority Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 409, 424A, 424AA, 473CB, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE, Pt 7AA Cases cited: Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488
Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQHH (2012) 200 FCR 223
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng (2001) 205 CLR 507
NADH of 2001 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 214 ALR 264
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte H (2001) 75 ALJR 982; 179 ALR 425
WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612
WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 969
WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760
Date of hearing: 9 May 2019 Date of last submissions: 13 June 2019 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 110 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the Respondent: MinterEllison ORDERS
QUD 866 of 2018 BETWEEN: FEY17
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
GREENWOOD J
DATE OF ORDER:
16 JULY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GREENWOOD J:
These proceedings are concerned with an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application for the grant of the constitutional writs in relation to a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“IAA”) affirming a decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse the appellant’s application for a Protection Visa subclass XE-790 (a “Safe Haven” visa) under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”).
The background to this appeal is as follows.
On or around 18 March 2013, the appellant came to Australia as an unauthorized maritime arrival. The Australian navy intercepted the vessel he was travelling on and transported the passengers to Christmas Island.
On 18 April 2013 and 6 May…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read FEY17 v Minister for Home Affairs and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2020] FCA 1014
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in the case was whether the primary judge had erred in finding that the IAA did not commit a jurisdictional error by considering new information. The applicant argued that the IAA had breached its statutory obligations by considering information that was not before the Minister and by considering new information without exceptional circumstances. The respondent contended that the IAA had not erred in considering the new information, as the information was relevant and credible, and the IAA was entitled to consider it in exceptional circumstances.
The court examined the relevant statutory provisions and found that the IAA was required to conduct its review with reference to the material provided by the Secretary but without accepting or requesting new information or interviewing the appellant. While the IAA had the power to obtain new documents or information that were not before the Minister, it did not have a duty to do so. Additionally, the IAA was required not to consider any new information unless it was satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify the consideration of the new information. The court found that the primary judge had not erred in finding that the IAA did not commit a jurisdictional error by considering the new information, as the information was relevant and credible, and the IAA was entitled to consider it in exceptional circumstances.
The appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 473DB(1) provides:473DB Immigration Assessment Authority to review decisions on the papers(1) Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority must review a fast track reviewable decision referred to it under section 473CA by considering the review material provided to the Authority under section 473CB:(a) without accepting or requesting new information; and(b) without interviewing the referred applicant. Section 473DC provides:473DC Getting new information(1) Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information (new information) that:(a) were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and(b) the Authority considers may be relevant.(2)The Immigration Assessment Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances.(3)Without limiting subsection (1), the Immigration Assessment Authority may invite a person, orally or in writing, to give new information:(a) in writing; or(b) at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.[emphasis added] Finally, s 473DD provides: 473DD Considering new information in exceptional circumstancesFor the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b)the referred applicant satisfied the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred Applicant, the new information:(i)was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii)is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims. Under s 473DB, the IAA was required to conduct its review with reference to the material provided by the Secretary under s 473CB, but without accepting or requesting new information or interviewing the appellant. The IAA had the power, under s 473DC(1), to obtain new documents or information that was not before the Minister which it considered relevant, but importantly, did not have a duty to do so: s 473DC(2). Finally, under s 473DD, the IAA was required not to consider any new information unless it was satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify the consideration of the new information; and the appellant was able to satisfy the IAA that the information was not, and could not have been, provided to the delegate before the delegate’s decision was made, and that the information was credible personal information not previously known, which would have materially affected the consideration of the appellant’s claims had it been known.