Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 1249   

File number(s): NSD 1187 of 2021
Judgment of: PERRY J
Date of judgment: 21 October 2022
Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for leave to appeal from a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court summarily dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision by the Australian Human Rights Commission – where grounds of application are not particularised and would have no prospects of success if leave to appeal were granted – where application fails to identify any arguable error in the reasons of the primary judge – application for leave to appeal dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for adjournment by applicant refused in circumstances where not in the interests of justice to stay the proceeding indefinitely

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Family Law Regulations 1984 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Opened for signature 19 December 1966. 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)

Cases cited:

Bibawi v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1476

Bibawi v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 607

Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225

Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397

FEY17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1014

FKV17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1950

Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30

Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20; (1995) 183 CLR 273

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission(No 2) [2018] FCA 473

Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2020] FCA 198

WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612

WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 43
Date of hearing: 20 September 2022
Counsel for the Applicant The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent  The first respondent filed a submitting notice 
Solicitor for the Second Respondent Mr J Hutton of the Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 1187 of 2021
BETWEEN:

MIROSLAW PRZYBYLOWSKI

Applicant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

First Respondent

ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

PERRY J

DATE OF ORDER:

21 OCTOBER 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the second respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRY J:

1.               INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of a judge of this court summarily dismissing the application…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1249
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Mr Miroslaw Przybylowski, sought leave to appeal a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court that summarily dismissed his application for judicial review of a decision by the Australian Human Rights Commission. The primary judge's decision was that Mr Przybylowski's application for judicial review lacked reasonable prospects of success. This appeal concerns the refusal of the primary judge to grant leave to appeal and the refusal to grant an adjournment in the interests of justice.

The central legal issues in this case were whether the primary judge's decision to summarily dismiss the application for judicial review was attended with sufficient doubt to justify reconsideration on appeal and whether there was any arguable error in the primary judge's decision. The applicant argued that there were jurisdictional errors, breaches of natural justice, and breaches of procedural fairness. However, these grounds were not particularised and did not identify any arguable error in the primary judge's decision.

The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated any arguable error in the primary judge's decision. The primary judge's reasons demonstrated that she properly considered the merits of the application for judicial review and correctly concluded that it had no reasonable prospects of success. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The court also refused the applicant's application for an adjournment, stating that it was not in the interests of justice to stay the proceeding indefinitely.

In conclusion, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the second respondent's costs as agreed or taxed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the second respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of a judge of this court summarily dismissing the application for judicial review brought by the applicant, Mr Miroslaw Przybylowski, under r 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR): Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1398. That application should be dismissed for the following reasons. 2. BACKGROUND The primary judge set out the relevant background in her Honour’s reasons at [9]–[30]. It is not necessary to repeat all of the detail in these reasons and I have focused on the matters of most direct relevance to the present application. In essence, Mr Przybylowski’s application for judicial review before the primary judge was the third set of proceedings instituted by him in the Federal Court arising from the registration of orders made by a Polish Court requiring Mr Przybylowski to pay spousal support and child support (the spousal maintenance payments) to his former wife (the Polish Orders) by the Department of Human Services in Australia in January 2014. That decision to register the Polish Orders was the subject of an unsuccessful application for review by Mr Przybylowski in 2014 in the Social Security Appeals Tribunals (SSAT) (now the Social Services & Child Support Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunals (AAT)) (Application Book (AB) 49–54). Mr Przybylowski then appealed the decision of the SSAT (the 2014 SSAT decision) to the (then) Federal Circuit Court (FCC) in September 2014. That appeal was dismissed in May 2015 on the ground that it was incompetent and lacking in merit. Mr Przybylowski first sought judicial review in the Federal Court of a decision made by the first respondent to the present proceeding, the Australian Human Rights Commission, on 12 May 2017 not to enquire into complaints made by him with respect to various departmental decisions in relation to child support and spousal maintenance and against the Family Court of Australia. That application was dismissed on the basis that it did not disclose any reasonable cause of action and had no reasonable prospects of success: Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission(No 2) [2018] FCA 473 (Perry J). A further set of proceedings was instituted by the applicant in the Federal Court for judicial review of a decision made by the Commission on 13 June 2019 not to continue to enquire into his complaint. Those proceedings were summarily dismissed on the basis that the arguments sought to be advanced by Mr Przybylowski were either non-justiciable or lacking in substance, and therefore his application had no reasonable prospects of success: Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2020] FCA 198 (Flick J) (the 2020 Judgment). On 19 November 2020, the applicant wrote to the AAT seeking to re-open the 2014 SSAT decision (AB63). The AAT responded by email to the applicant’s letter advising that it was unable to assist him further with his query on the basis that its power to determine the substantive aspects of the 2014 SSAT decision came to an end once it had delivered its decision and reasons, and otherwise noting that section 34(1) of the AAT Child Support Review Directions prevented any further explanation of its decision where a statement of reasons had been provided (AB57). The applicant then complained to the Commission about the failure of the AAT to reconsider his matter (AB46–8). As the primary judge explained, the genesis of the complaint before her Honour was the refusal by the AAT to “reopen” or “redecide” the issues determined in the 2014 SSAT decision, in circumstances where the appeal from that decision to the FCC had been dismissed in 2015. That refusal by the AAT (the AAT decision) was the subject of a complaint by Mr Przybylowski to the Commission, made on 26 November 2020 on the ground that it amounted to a breach of his human rights. Further details of his complaints were set out in subsequent correspondence and summarised by a delegate of the President of the Commission in a letter sent to Mr Przybylowski on 17 December 2020 (the natural justice letter) (AB108). In that letter, the principal investigator and conciliator at the Commission informed Mr Przybylowski that:(1)while Mr Przybylowski had ticked a box nominating the claims of victimisation and age discrimination as part of his complaint, those claims had not been substantiated and therefore his complaint would be considered only as one alleging a breach of human rights under Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and(2)the delegate of the President of the Commission (the delegate) was considering exercising the power under s 20(2)(ba) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act) not to enquire into his complaint because it lacked merit, other remedies were available, and the prospects of a practical outcome being achieved through the Commissioner’s complaint process were lacking.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 19 November 2020, the applicant wrote to the AAT seeking to re-open the 2014 SSAT decision (AB63). The AAT responded by email to the applicant’s letter advising that it was unable to assist him further with his query on the basis that its power to determine the substantive aspects of the 2014 SSAT decision came to an end once it had delivered its decision and reasons, and otherwise noting that section 34(1) of the AAT Child Support Review Directions prevented any further explanation of its decision where a statement of reasons had been provided (AB57). The applicant then complained to the Commission about the failure of the AAT to reconsider his matter (AB46–8). As the primary judge explained, the genesis of the complaint before her Honour was the refusal by the AAT to “reopen” or “redecide” the issues determined in the 2014 SSAT decision, in circumstances where the appeal from that decision to the FCC had been dismissed in 2015. That refusal by the AAT (the AAT decision) was the subject of a complaint by Mr Przybylowski to the Commission, made on 26 November 2020 on the ground that it amounted to a breach of his human rights. Further details of his complaints were set out in subsequent correspondence and summarised by a delegate of the President of the Commission in a letter sent to Mr Przybylowski on 17 December 2020 (the natural justice letter) (AB108). In that letter, the principal investigator and conciliator at the Commission informed Mr Przybylowski that:(1)while Mr Przybylowski had ticked a box nominating the claims of victimisation and age discrimination as part of his complaint, those claims had not been substantiated and therefore his complaint would be considered only as one alleging a breach of human rights under Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and(2)the delegate of the President of the Commission (the delegate) was considering exercising the power under s 20(2)(ba) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (AHRC Act) not to enquire into his complaint because it lacked merit, other remedies were available, and the prospects of a practical outcome being achieved through the Commissioner’s complaint process were lacking. The natural justice letter also invited Mr Przybylowski to respond, as he in fact did by a number of responses, including a letter dated 17 December 2020 (although recorded with the incorrect year) (AB115–6). Mr Przybylowski sent further responses to the Commission on 18 December 2020 (AB136) and on 20 December 2020 (AB146) by way of email and letters containing further information. Receipt of these was acknowledged by the Commission. Mr Przybylowski sent further correspondence by email to the Commission between 11 January 2021 and 13 January 2021 inclusive (see AB112–144). On 14 January 2021, the delegate decided pursuant to s 20(2)(ba) of the AHRC Act not to enquire into Mr Przybylowski’s complaint. The delegate’s reasons, as set out in the letter to the complainant dated 14 January 2021 (AB191–9), may be summarised as follows.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The power to grant leave to appeal is discretionary and relevant factors include whether in all of the circumstances the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to justify its reconsideration on appeal and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused: Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225 at [29] (McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ); Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398–9 (the Court). 6. CONSIDERATION Mr Przybylowski identifies three grounds in his application for leave to appeal (AB409), namely:(1)jurisdictional error;(2)breach of natural justice; and(3)breach of procedural fairness. Mr Przybylowski clarified at the hearing that these errors were allegedly made by the primary judge (T7.46–8.2; T16.5–17.30). However, Mr Przybylowski’s oral submissions focused upon challenging the correctness of the 2014 SSAT decision, despite it being made clear that his focus should be upon the grounds on which he seeks to appeal from the decision of the primary judge. The Attorney-General submitted that leave should be refused on the basis that none of the grounds in the application have any merit. I agree. None of these grounds are particularised in the application (AB409). This is sufficient in itself to dismiss the application for leave to appeal: FEY17 at [90] (Greenwood J); WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 at [35] (Gilmour J); WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612 at [60] (Judge Lucev) (upheld in WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 969). Nor does the affidavit on which Mr Przybylowski relies in support of his application for leave to appeal, or the affidavits subsequently filed by him, identify any error in the decision of the primary judge. Further and in any event, the decision below is not attended by any doubt about its correctness and substantial injustice would not therefore result if leave to appeal is refused. First, as this is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the primary judge, it is incumbent upon Mr Przybylowski to demonstrate arguable error in the primary judge’s decision. However, none of the documents filed by Mr Przybylowski in support of his application for leave to appeal address the central question of whether the primary judge fell into error. While Mr Przybylowski clarified at the hearing that the primary judge herself made a jurisdictional error, he provided no further submissions in support of that ground of appeal (T16.47–T17.16). Rather, as earlier explained, his submissions attempt to take issue with the correctness of the 2014 SSAT decision and to deal with related aspects of his maintenance dispute. As such, Mr Przybylowski has not identified any arguable jurisdictional (or other) error in the decision of the primary judge. Nor is any arguable error apparent in the decision of the primary judge. As the Attorney‑General submits, in dismissing Mr Przybylowski’s application for judicial review, it is plain that the primary judge did not act outside the Court’s jurisdiction, or do anything which she was not authorised to do. As such, this ground must fail.