FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 1249
File number(s): NSD 1187 of 2021 Judgment of: PERRY J Date of judgment: 21 October 2022 Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – application for leave to appeal from a decision of a single judge of the Federal Court summarily dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision by the Australian Human Rights Commission – where grounds of application are not particularised and would have no prospects of success if leave to appeal were granted – where application fails to identify any arguable error in the reasons of the primary judge – application for leave to appeal dismissed
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for adjournment by applicant refused in circumstances where not in the interests of justice to stay the proceeding indefinitely
Legislation: Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Family Law Regulations 1984 (Cth)
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Opened for signature 19 December 1966. 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976)
Cases cited: Bibawi v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1476
Bibawi v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 607
Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225
Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397
FEY17 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 1014
Fokas v Mansfield as Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Maria Fokas (No 2) [2020] FCA 30
Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh [1995] HCA 20; (1995) 183 CLR 273
Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission(No 2) [2018] FCA 473
Przybylowski v Australian Human Rights Commission [2020] FCA 198
WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612
WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 43 Date of hearing: 20 September 2022 Counsel for the Applicant The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent The first respondent filed a submitting notice Solicitor for the Second Respondent Mr J Hutton of the Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 1187 of 2021 BETWEEN: MIROSLAW PRZYBYLOWSKI
Applicant
AND: AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
First Respondent
ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
PERRY J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 OCTOBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the second respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
PERRY J:
1. INTRODUCTION
This is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of a judge of this court summarily dismissing the application…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1249
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues in this case were whether the primary judge's decision to summarily dismiss the application for judicial review was attended with sufficient doubt to justify reconsideration on appeal and whether there was any arguable error in the primary judge's decision. The applicant argued that there were jurisdictional errors, breaches of natural justice, and breaches of procedural fairness. However, these grounds were not particularised and did not identify any arguable error in the primary judge's decision.
The court found that the applicant had not demonstrated any arguable error in the primary judge's decision. The primary judge's reasons demonstrated that she properly considered the merits of the application for judicial review and correctly concluded that it had no reasonable prospects of success. Therefore, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
The court also refused the applicant's application for an adjournment, stating that it was not in the interests of justice to stay the proceeding indefinitely.
In conclusion, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the second respondent's costs as agreed or taxed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the second respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The power to grant leave to appeal is discretionary and relevant factors include whether in all of the circumstances the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to justify its reconsideration on appeal and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused: Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; (2003) 195 ALR 225 at [29] (McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ); Décor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398–9 (the Court). 6. CONSIDERATION Mr Przybylowski identifies three grounds in his application for leave to appeal (AB409), namely:(1)jurisdictional error;(2)breach of natural justice; and(3)breach of procedural fairness. Mr Przybylowski clarified at the hearing that these errors were allegedly made by the primary judge (T7.46–8.2; T16.5–17.30). However, Mr Przybylowski’s oral submissions focused upon challenging the correctness of the 2014 SSAT decision, despite it being made clear that his focus should be upon the grounds on which he seeks to appeal from the decision of the primary judge. The Attorney-General submitted that leave should be refused on the basis that none of the grounds in the application have any merit. I agree. None of these grounds are particularised in the application (AB409). This is sufficient in itself to dismiss the application for leave to appeal: FEY17 at [90] (Greenwood J); WZAVW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 760 at [35] (Gilmour J); WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 612 at [60] (Judge Lucev) (upheld in WZATH v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 969). Nor does the affidavit on which Mr Przybylowski relies in support of his application for leave to appeal, or the affidavits subsequently filed by him, identify any error in the decision of the primary judge. Further and in any event, the decision below is not attended by any doubt about its correctness and substantial injustice would not therefore result if leave to appeal is refused. First, as this is an application for leave to appeal from a decision of the primary judge, it is incumbent upon Mr Przybylowski to demonstrate arguable error in the primary judge’s decision. However, none of the documents filed by Mr Przybylowski in support of his application for leave to appeal address the central question of whether the primary judge fell into error. While Mr Przybylowski clarified at the hearing that the primary judge herself made a jurisdictional error, he provided no further submissions in support of that ground of appeal (T16.47–T17.16). Rather, as earlier explained, his submissions attempt to take issue with the correctness of the 2014 SSAT decision and to deal with related aspects of his maintenance dispute. As such, Mr Przybylowski has not identified any arguable jurisdictional (or other) error in the decision of the primary judge. Nor is any arguable error apparent in the decision of the primary judge. As the Attorney‑General submits, in dismissing Mr Przybylowski’s application for judicial review, it is plain that the primary judge did not act outside the Court’s jurisdiction, or do anything which she was not authorised to do. As such, this ground must fail.