Bibawi v Australian Human Rights Commission

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bibawi v Australian Human Rights Commission [2022] FCA 607

Appeal from: Bibawi v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1476
File number: QUD 413 of 2021
Judgment of: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 24 May 2022
Catchwords:

HUMAN RIGHTS – Application for summary dismissal of appeal against dismissal of application for judicial review of decision by Australian Human Rights Commission – where appellant’s “complaint” did not satisfy requirements of s 46P(1A) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth)

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - Application for summary judgment – where appeal has no reasonable prospects of success – appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46P(1A)

Disability Discrimination Act1992 (Cth) s 42

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24, 25, 26, 31, 31A and 32

Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) ss 11 and 27

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 26.01

Cases cited:

Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172

Bibawi v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1476

Penhall-Jones v New South Wales [2007] FCA 925

Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 40
Date of last submissions: 11 February 2022 (Second Respondent)
14 February 2022 (Appellant)
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person via telephone
Counsel for the First Respondent: The First Respondent filed a submitting notice
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr T Eteuati appeared via MS Teams
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor appeared via MS Teams

ORDERS

QUD 413 of 2021
BETWEEN:

MAGDY BIBAWI

Appellant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

First Respondent

COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY GENERAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 MAY 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

  1. On 9 October 2021, the first respondent (the Commission) decided that the appellant’s “complaint” did not satisfy the requirement of s 46P(1A) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) (the Act) that it be, “reasonably arguable that the alleged acts, omissions or practices are unlawful discrimination”.

  2. On 24 November 2021, Greenwood J (the primary judge) dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of the Commission’s decision: Bibawi v Australian Human Rights Commission [2021] FCA 1476. The appellant has appealed against that judgment.

  3. On 11 February 2022, the second respondent filed an interlocutory application seeking summary judgment on the basis that, relevantly, the appellant has no reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting the appeal. On 2 February 2022, Mr Bibawi filed an interlocutory application seeking, relevantly, leave to adduce new evidence in the appeal in the form of three affidavits.

  4. The parties consented to the determination of the second respondent’s interlocutory application on the papers.  These…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 607
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Bibawi v Australian Human Rights Commission concerns an appeal against the dismissal of an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Australian Human Rights Commission. The appellant, Mr Bibawi, sought to challenge the Commission's decision not to investigate his complaint, arguing that it contravened the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth). The primary judge dismissed the application on the basis that the complaint did not meet the statutory requirements.

The legal issues before the court were whether the appeal had any reasonable prospects of success and whether the application for summary judgment under Rule 26.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) should be granted. The court needed to determine whether Mr Bibawi's allegations of error by the primary judge were substantiated and whether the dismissal of the application was justified. The court also considered the threshold requirements for summary judgment, including whether the proceeding was frivolous or vexatious, had no reasonable cause of action, or was an abuse of the court's process.

The court found that Mr Bibawi's appeal lacked reasonable prospects of success. His allegations of error against the primary judge were vague and unsupported by particulars. The court noted that the primary judge had provided comprehensive reasons for the dismissal and had adequately considered the arguments and material presented by Mr Bibawi. The court held that the appeal was essentially an attempt to relitigate the case, which the court was not obliged to entertain. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and granted the application for summary judgment under Rule 26.01.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal is dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Rule 26.01(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides:26.01 Summary judgment(1)A party may apply to the Court for an order that judgment be given against another party because:(a)the applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or part of the proceeding; or(b)the proceeding is frivolous or vexatious; or(c)no reasonable cause of action is disclosed; or(d)the proceeding is an abuse of the process of the Court; or(e)the respondent has no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding or part of the proceeding. The word “proceeding” is defined in s 4 of the FCA Act to include an appeal. In Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ held:59In many cases where a plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of prosecuting a proceeding, the proceeding could be described (with or without the addition of intensifying epithets like “clearly”, “manifestly” or “obviously”) as “frivolous”, “untenable”, “groundless” or “faulty”. But none of those expressions (alone or in combination) should be understood as providing a sufficient chart of the metes and bounds of the power given by s 31A. Nor can the content of the word “reasonable”, in the phrase “no reasonable prospect”, be sufficiently, let alone completely, illuminated by drawing some contrast with what would be a “frivolous”, “untenable”, “groundless” or “faulty” claim.60Rather, full weight must be given to the expression as a whole. The Federal Court may exercise power under s 31A if, and only if, satisfied that there is “no reasonable prospect” of success. Of course, it may readily be accepted that the power to dismiss an action summarily is not to be exercised lightly. … Under s 24(1)(a) of the FCA Act, the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from a judgment of a single judge of the Court exercising the original jurisdiction of the Court. Section 25(1) provides that in such an appeal, the appellate jurisdiction of the Court shall be exercised by a Full Court. However, s 25(2B)(aa) allows a single judge to determine an application for summary judgment. In order to succeed in the appeal, it is necessary for Mr Bibawi to demonstrate that the order dismissing his application is the result of some legal, factual or discretionary error: see, for example, Allesch v Maunz (2000) 203 CLR 172 at [23]. The allegations made by Mr Bibawi consist primarily of allegations of improper and fraudulent conduct by the primary judge and the Commission. These are bare allegations unsupported by any particulars and have no prospects of success. Mr Bibawi asserts that his Honour failed to provide reasons for the judgment. That allegation is patently wrong. To the extent that the assertion may be that the reasons are inadequate, Mr Bibawi has not identified in what way they are inadequate, and no such inadequacy is apparent. Mr Bibawi alleges that the primary judge ignored numerous documents that he had submitted. His Honour gave comprehensive reasons which indicate that he considered Mr Bibawi’s arguments and material. His Honour found that much of that material was irrelevant. There is nothing to indicate that his Honour ignored any material.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.