Michaela Manicaros v Commercial Images (Aust) Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Michaela Manicaros v Commercial Images (Aust) Pty Ltd [2022] QSC 83

PARTIES:

MICHAELA MANICAROS

(applicant)

v
COMMERCIAL IMAGES (AUST) PTY LTD
ACN 011 023 617

(first respondent)

AND

STEPHEN RICHARD HAMILTON VERSCHOYLE
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS 11087/17

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

20 May 2022

DELIVERED AT:

BRISBANE

HEARING DATE:

15 December 2021

JUDGE:

Brown J

ORDER:

The orders of the Court are:

1.   That Mr Verschoyle pay Mr Kirk’s costs to be assessed on a standard basis after 21 November 2018 of and incidental to the objections of Mr Verschoyle; 

2.   That Mr Verschoyle pay Mr Kirk’s costs of the application against Mr Verschoyle for costs on a standard basis; and

3.   That Mr Kirk’s costs of and incidental to his application filed on 23 July 2018, not otherwise recovered from Mr Verschoyle as a result of the costs order made against him, be costs in the winding up of the company.

CATCHWORDS:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – COSTS – where first respondent was ordered by Court to be wound up – where disputed contest in relation to a claim for remuneration by provisional liquidator – where second respondent as objector raised serious allegations of misconduct against provisional liquidator – where objector subsequently informed provisional liquidator that claim for remuneration would no longer be opposed – whether exceptional circumstances arose – whether the costs of the application for remuneration by the provisional liquidator and the costs of the present application should be met by the second respondent.

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 533C(1)

Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256, cited
BE Australia WD Pty Ltd (subject to a deed of company arrangement) & Ors v Sutton (2011) 82 NSWLR 336, cited
Colgate–Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225, considered
Farrow Finance Co Ltd (in liq) v ANZ Executors & Trustee Co Ltd (1997) 23 ACSR 521, cited
Kumarina Resources Ltd, in the matter of Kumarina Resources Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCA 723, cited
LHRC & Ors v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation & Anor (No 3) (2015) 326 ALR 77, considered
Longley v Chief Executive, Department of Environment and Heritage Protection (2018) 3 Qd R 459, cited
Northbourne Developments Pty Ltd v Reiby Chambers Pty Ltd (1989) 19 NSWLR 434, considered
Re Ragata Developments Pty Limited v Westpac Banking Corporation and Stanley Thompson Valuers Pty Limited [1993] FCA 72, cited
Re Anderson Group
(2002) 20 ACLC 1607, cited
Re Barokes Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2020] VSC 555, considered
Re Crusader Limited [1996] 1 Qd R 117, considered
Re Gasgrid Ltd (No 2) (2010) 80 ACSR 179, cited
Re Matine Ltd; Chatham Investment Co Ltd; Milkirk Investment Co Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 492, considered
Re VPlus Superstores Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWSC 662, considered
Re: NRMA Limited (No. 1) (2000) 156 FLR 349, considered
Victoria International…

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Details
Case
[2022] QSC 83
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Michaela Manicaros has brought a claim against Commercial Images (Aust) Pty Ltd, where the central issue revolves around the costs associated with a remuneration claim by a provisional liquidator. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Equity Division. The key legal issues pertained to whether the costs incurred by the provisional liquidator and those from the current application should be borne by the objector, Mr Verschoyle, due to what the court perceived as exceptional circumstances.

The court examined the conduct of Mr Verschoyle, who had made serious allegations of misconduct against the provisional liquidator, Mr Kirk. These allegations were subsequently withdrawn, leading Mr Kirk to argue that Mr Verschoyle's actions constituted serious and unjustified trouble and harassment. The court's reasoning focused on whether Mr Verschoyle's actions were driven by an ulterior motive, or if they were merely a legitimate objection. The court found that while Mr Verschoyle's allegations were serious, they did not amount to the kind of unjustified trouble and harassment that would warrant an award of costs against him. However, the court did determine that Mr Verschoyle's actions transformed him from an objector to an adversary, particularly after the filing of the Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions.

The court's final orders required Mr Verschoyle to pay Mr Kirk's costs incurred after 21 November 2018 related to the objections raised by Mr Verschoyle. Additionally, Mr Verschoyle was ordered to pay Mr Kirk's costs for the application against him for costs. Any remaining costs of the application not recovered from Mr Verschoyle were to be considered as costs in the winding up of the company.

Orders

Orders of the court

The orders of the Court are:

1. That Mr Verschoyle pay Mr Kirk’s costs to be assessed on a standard basis after 21 November 2018 of and incidental to the objections of Mr Verschoyle;

2. That Mr Verschoyle pay Mr Kirk’s costs of the application against Mr Verschoyle for costs on a standard basis; and

3. That Mr Kirk’s costs of and incidental to his application filed on 23 July 2018, not otherwise recovered from Mr Verschoyle as a result of the costs order made against him, be costs in the winding up of the company.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 21 November 2018 PAK Law and Mr Verschoyle filed a Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (the ‘Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions’) and on 22 November 2018 filed affidavits in support. Mr Kirk responded on 21 December 2018. In February 2019 the New South Wales Law Society appointed a receiver and manager to PAK Law. In December 2020 a second affidavit was filed by Mr Williams and PAK Law was de-registered.[2][2]Second affidavit of Mr Williams (CFI 72); third affidavit of Mr Williams (CFI 79), at [19], Ex. GWW-168, p.3. On 13 October 2021 the matter was set down for hearing for the determination of remuneration. After the long history of the dispute, the court made orders that Mr Kirk be paid the remuneration he sought at the hearing on 15 December 2021 without opposition. The application for costs is a reasonably novel one and only made in exceptional circumstances. That would seem to accord with a recognition that there are policy reasons which support creditors and contributories being able to hold a liquidator to account for the costs incurred in a provisional liquidation or liquidation and that they serve as a proper contradictor when remuneration applications have to be determined by the court. However as is apparent from the discussion below, there is no unassailable legal principle that costs will not be awarded against objectors. Mr Kirk contends that there are three bases upon which he is entitled to be awarded costs on an indemnity or standard basis, namely:(a)That Mr Verschoyle went beyond just being an objector and became an adversary, and that the usual cost consequences should apply as a result of his discontinuing his opposition;(b)That Mr Verschoyle’s conduct constituted serious and unjustified trouble and harassment of Mr Kirk; (c)That Mr Verschoyle had at least one ulterior motive for making allegations of misconduct against Mr Kirk. Evidence was called and cross-examination occurred, particularly on matters as to the credit of Mr Verschoyle and Mr Latif. Neither Mr Kirk nor Mr Williams who provided affidavit evidence were required for cross-examination. Their evidence was not challenged, and I accept their evidence. In particular, where the content of conversations between Mr Latif and Mr Williams were disputed by Mr Latif, I accept Mr Williams’ evidence given he made contemporaneous file notes of the conversations and I found Mr Latif’s evidence self-serving for the reasons outlined below. It is appropriate to address the question of legal principles before turning to the evidence before the court.Legal principles In Re Crusader Limited,[3] Thomas J stated that it was only in exceptional circumstances that the court would award costs against an objector who exercises their right to object. His Honour did not order costs to be paid by one of the objectors in that case, said to be disgruntled and seeking to undermine the new Board by his objection finding that was not established. However, his Honour noted that such orders could be appropriate where the objector embarks upon a deliberate campaign to frustrate actions of the Board or vent personal resentment such that their intervention may be seen to be for an ulterior purpose.[4] Similar sentiment was expressed by Santow J in Re Matine Ltd; Chatham Investment Co Ltd; Milkirk Investment Co Ltd,[5] where his Honour referred to objectors being exposed to costs orders where objectors used “the tactics of technical objection and delay”.[3][1996] 1 Qd R 117.[4]Re Crusader Limited [1996] 1 Qd R 117 at 131.[5](1998) 28 ACSR 492 at 494.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

While the orders made in the present case allowed for allegations of misconduct in the context of a remuneration application to be raised,[21] it is not a matter without controversy as to whether that is the permissible forum to raise such allegations.[22] It is however at least supported by the statement of Black J in Re VPlus Superstores Pty Ltd (in liq)[23] that it is “well-established...that a finding of unsatisfactory conduct…in the sense of conduct in breach of duty or involving serious failures of misconduct of their part, may affect their entitlement to remuneration.”[24] In any event, Mr Kirk contends that the making of serious allegations of misconduct against him transformed Mr Verschoyle from being an objector and placed him in the position of an adversary.[21]Rule 90-15 appears to be wide enough to permit the court to consider such matters in the context of a remuneration application. [22]Re Barokes Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2020] VSC 555 at [46]-[49] where Hetyey AsJ considered that a remuneration determination did not support such a process of enquiry.[23][2013] NSWSC 662 at [12].[24]Re Anderson Group (2002) NSWSC 764 at [24]-[25] per Barrett J Re Barokes Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2020] VSC 555 at [46]-[49].Evidence – was there an ulterior motive or improper purpose? It is uncontroversial that Mr Verschoyle made allegations of serious misconduct against Mr Kirk which are contained in the Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions filed on his behalf.[25] Those allegations include that:[25]Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (CFI 54).“(a) Mr Kirk contravened CA, s.579 (a section which was irrelevant on any view, as it concerns pooling determinations by a liquidator);(b) Mr Kirk contravened CA, s.180;(c) Mr Kirk’s “failure to correctly characterise the “Director Loan Liabilities” was, amongst other things, “self-serving to the interests of [Mr Kirk], by way of extending his appointment in the Provisional Liquidation of the Company to maximise his fee-earning capacity”;(d) Mr Kirk contravened CA, s.182;(e) Mr Kirk was “primarily motivated by extending the length of the Provisional Liquidation (and subsequent liquidation) in a scheme adopted by [Mr Kirk] to inflate and increase [his] and [his] Legal Representative’s fees”;(f) Mr Kirk’s “strategy was to refuse to meet with creditors in an informal and cost-effective setting, and instead insist on the current path (costly path)”;(g) Mr Kirk’s “reasoning for [certain of his] conduct was to waste time and resources to extend the length of the Provisional Liquidation to incur significant costs for doing so”;(h) Mr Kirk “failed to make his business judgement(s) in good faith for a proper purpose as his intention was to extend the length of the liquidation of the costs of the creditors”; and(i) Mr Kirk’s “conduct in causing himself and his Legal Representative to invoice the Company for their services that were not required, and continuing to conduct a process, which allowed the Provisional Liquidator and his Legal Representative to deplete the pool of money at the expense of creditors – is a breach of the Provisional Liquidator’s Fiduciary Duty owed to the creditors”.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to the findings of fact which Mr Kirk seeks the court to make, I therefore find as follows:(a)That Mr Verschoyle made serious allegations of misconduct against Mr Kirk;(b)That those allegations were abandoned;(c)While the allegations made by Mr Verschoyle put Mr Kirk to considerable expense in responding to the allegations, I do not find that they have been productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment. The statements made by Mr Latif, although suggestive that Mr Latif intended to put Mr Kirk to time and expense in having to deal with the objections, was not sufficient to show that the intent should be attributed to Mr Verschoyle and secondly, that the statements implicitly mean that the substance of the objections made were predominantly for that reason. While I find that Mr Latif, Mr Farhat and Mr Verschoyle were working together co-operatively in opposition to the remuneration application, Mr Latif also had his own separate interests and statements made by him which could not simply be attributed to Mr Verschoyle. However, by 30 July Mr Latif was clearly working with Mr Farhat to lodge objections to the remuneration application and had been engaged by Mr Verschoyle for that purpose;(d)That upon the consent to the Order of Justice Boddice of 10 October 2018, the proceedings became adversarial in nature and with the filing of the Statement of Issues, Facts and Contentions, Mr Verschoyle (and PAK Law) stood as an adversary;(e)I do not find that in opposing the remuneration application Mr Verschoyle was seeking to raise the allegations predominantly motivated by a belief that by succeeding in the allegations in relation to the remuneration application he could escape liability on his director's loan, notwithstanding I did not find Mr Verschoyle a compelling witness. While there is some evidence to suggest that the director's loan and that its recovery was a concern of Mr Verschoyle, there is a disconnect in timing such that I do not consider that at the time of filing of the Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, the evidence establishes Mr Verschoyle had the alleged ulterior motive at that time. I do however find that a significant motivating feature in maintaining his opposition was to advance his position in the District Court, but I am not satisfied that it was his predominant purpose or ulterior motive in maintaining the objections. Utilising his objection for the District Court proceedings further supports that he was adopting an adversarial position in opposing Mr Kirk's remuneration and seeking to use the fact of his opposition to serve his own interests;(f)I do not find that Mr Latif's motive or intent can be attributed to Mr Verschoyle, notwithstanding his role as Mr Verschoyle's advisor and his involvement in discussions with Mr Williams and Mr Farhat and the making of objections.Consideration Contrary to the submissions that were made on behalf of Mr Verschoyle, given the present application is made in respect of costs, Mr Kirk is not precluded from raising the question of ulterior purpose, notwithstanding it was not raised in response to the Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions as the contention is raised in the context of costs.[54][54]Re: NRMA at [45].