Walton v ACN 004 410 833 Ltd (formerly Arrium Ltd) (In liq)

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KIEFEL CJ,
GAGELER, KEANE, EDELMAN AND STEWARD JJ

MICHAEL THOMAS WALTON & ANOR  APPELLANTS

AND

ACN 004 410 833 LIMITED (FORMERLY ARRIUM
LIMITED) (IN LIQUIDATION) & ORS  RESPONDENTS

Walton v ACN 004 410 833 Limited (formerly Arrium Limited) (in liquidation)

[2022] HCA 3

Dates of Hearing: 6 & 7 October 2021
Date of Judgment: 16 February 2022

S20/2021

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed. 

2.Set aside orders 3, 4 and 5 made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 30 July 2020 and, in their place, order that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

3.The first and second respondents pay the appellants' costs of and incidental to the appeal, including the application for special leave to appeal.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

N C Hutley SC and J Shepard for the appellants (instructed by Banton Group)

M A Izzo SC with T E O'Brien for the first respondent (instructed by Arnold Bloch Leibler)

J K Kirk SC with A B Emmerson for the second respondent (instructed by Ashurst)

Submitting appearance for the third respondent

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. KIEFEL CJ AND KEANE J.   The first respondent ("Arrium") was a producer of iron ore and steel and was listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. Between September and October 2014 it raised $754 million in capital. It provided an Information Memorandum in connection with the capital raising and shortly prior to that action it published its financial results for the year ended 30 June 2014. In its half‑yearly results published in February 2015 the company acknowledged a reduction in the value of its mining operations of $1,335 million. Earlier, in January 2015, it had announced that it would be suspending or closing one of its principal mining operations. The announcement followed a decline in the export price of iron ore. The company was placed into administration in April 2016 and in June 2019 liquidators were appointed.

  2. In April 2018 the solicitors of the appellants, who were shareholders of Arrium, wrote to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission ("ASIC") requesting that the appellants be given the status of an "eligible applicant", a term defined by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)[1] to include a person authorised in writing by ASIC to make an application under Pt 5.9, Div 1. Section 596A, in Pt 5.9, Div 1, relevantly provides that such a person may apply to the Court for a summons to be directed to a person who is an officer of a corporation or was an officer of a corporation in a specified period relating to the administration or winding up of the corporation, to be examined about the corporation's "examinable affairs"[2]. ASIC provided that authorisation.

    [1]s 9.

    [2]See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 9.

  3. The appellants applied to the Supreme Court of New South Wales for orders that…

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Details
Case
[2022] HCA 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal concerning the use of compulsory examination powers under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The appellants, shareholders of a company in liquidation, sought to set aside a summons issued to a former director for examination. Their stated purpose for seeking the examination was to investigate potential personal claims they might have as shareholders against former directors and auditors of the company.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the appellants' purpose for seeking the examination under section 596A of the Corporations Act was a legitimate one, or if it constituted an abuse of process. Specifically, the Court had to determine the scope and intended purpose of the statutory power to summon individuals for examination about a company's examinable affairs, particularly when the examination is sought to facilitate private litigation unrelated to the company's external administration or the interests of its creditors and contributories.

The High Court reasoned that the compulsory examination provisions, particularly section 596A, are designed to benefit the company, its creditors, or its contributories by facilitating the winding-up process and the recovery of assets. The Court affirmed the established understanding that these powers are not intended to be used as a tool for investigating or prosecuting private claims that have no connection to the external administration of the company. To permit such use would fundamentally alter the statutory purpose and potentially allow the examination process to be employed in a wide range of unrelated proceedings.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal that had dismissed the appellants' appeal. The High Court ordered that the appeal to the Court of Appeal be dismissed with costs, and that the first and second respondents pay the appellants' costs of and incidental to the High Court appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside orders 3, 4 and 5 made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 30 July 2020 and, in their place, order that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

3. The first and second respondents pay the appellants' costs of and incidental to the appeal, including the application for special leave to appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

KIEFEL CJ KEANE J GAGELER J
One result of the broader purpose for which the appellants contend would be that the special power of examination would be available in all manner of proceedings, wholly unconnected with the external administration of a company or the interests of persons in its outcome. By way of example, there would seem to be nothing to prevent a person seeking an examination in aid of an industrial dispute or an action for personal injuries arising in the workplace. If such a significant change had been introduced it might have been expected that some mention might have been made of it in the Harmer Report or the Explanatory Memorandum to the 1992 Act.Conclusion For these reasons the Court of Appeal was right to adhere to the settled understanding that the purposes which inform s 596A confine its application so that it does not authorise an examination to facilitate the investigation or prosecution of a claim that has nothing to do with the external administration of the company and which is being pursued exclusively for the benefit of persons other than the company, or its creditors or contributories considered as a whole. The appeal should be dismissed with costs. Part 5.9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) makes provision for the compulsory examination of a person before "the Court"[120] about the "examinable affairs"[121] of a corporation that is in "external administration" within the meaning of Ch 5 of the Corporations Act. The Part was examined in detail in Palmer v Ayres[122]. The process for which it provides includes creation of a record of the examination which is to be open for public inspection and able to be used in evidence in legal proceedings against the person[123].[120]Section 58AA.[121]Section 9 (definition of "examinable affairs").[122](2017) 259 CLR 478 at 486-489 [9]-[19], 513-515 [94]-[99].[123]Section 597(13)-(14A). The gateway to the process of compulsory examination for which the Part provides is the making of an order summoning a person for examination about a corporation's examinable affairs. The Court is empowered to make such an order, on the application of an "eligible applicant"[124], under either s 596A or s 596B. [124]Section 9 (definition of "eligible applicant"). There is an important difference between s 596A and s 596B. Section 596A imposes a duty on the Court to make an order summoning a person for examination. The duty arises if the Court is satisfied that the person is, or was during a specified period, an "officer"[125] or "provisional liquidator"[126] of the corporation[127]. Section 596B, by contrast, confers a discretion on the Court to make an order summoning a person for examination. The discretion arises if the Court is satisfied that the person "has taken part or been concerned in examinable affairs of the corporation and has been, or may have been, guilty of misconduct in relation to the corporation"[128] or if the Court is satisfied that the person simply "may be able to give information about examinable affairs of the corporation"[129]. [125]Section 9 (definition of "officer").[126]Section 9 (definition of "provisional liquidator").[127]Section 596A(b).[128]Section 596B(1)(b)(i).[129]Section 596B(1)(b)(ii).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KIEFEL CJ, KEANE J, GAGELER J