Cosenza v Tigani - [2024] FedCFamC2G 697

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Cosenza v Tigani [2024] FedCFamC2G 697

File number: ADG 7 of 2023

Judgment of: JUDGE BROWN

Date of judgment: 16 August 2024

Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Practice and procedure – Application for summary dismissal – Applicant seeks to examine the respondent and various associates – Where the respondent was discharged from bankruptcy 14 years ago – Documents sought relate to a period of 18 years – Where the trustee previously appointed to administer the estate does not support any further efforts being undertaken – Whether the summonses are oppressive and vexatious or an abuse of process – Status of applicant to bring proceedings – Matters to be considered

Legislation:
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 5, 58, 81, 116, 127, 139WA, 149, 153, 178, 263, 263A, 265, 267, 269

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 143, 190

Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A

Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 15

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Bankruptcy) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 6.01

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 2.06, 13.13

Cases cited:
Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175

Austino Wentworthville Pty Limited v Metroland Australia Limited [2013] NSWCA 59

Cosenza & Denco Holdings Pty Ltd v Tigani & Annatom Pty Ltd [2005] SADC 63

Cosenza v Duncan (Trustee in Bankruptcy) (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1749

Cosenza v Duncan (Trustee in Bankruptcy), in the matter of Tigani [2020] FCA 105

Cosenza v Registrar Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2022] FedCFamC2G 1041

Karounos & Ors v Official Trustee (1988) 19 FCR 330

Re Abrahams; Ex parte Thomas (1985) 9 FCR 232

Re Csidei; Ex parte Andrew (1979) 28 ALR 381

Re Todd; Ex parte Todd [1986] 68 ALR 483

Roufeil v Fiore, in the matter of the Bankrupt Estate of Peter Andrew Fiore (No 2) [2019] FCA 916

Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118

Walton v ACN 004 410 833 Limited (formerly Arrium Ltd) (in liq) [2022] HCA 3

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law

Number of paragraphs: 171

Date of hearing: 6 October & 7 December 2023

Place: Adelaide

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Lazarevich (direct brief)

Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Flaherty

Solicitor for the Respondent: Scales & Partners
ORDERS

ADG 7 of 2023

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

IN THE MATTER OF THOMAS TIGANI, A BANKRUPT

BETWEEN:
DEAN COSENZA

Applicant

AND:
THOMAS TIGANI

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE BROWN

DATE OF ORDER:

16 AUGUST 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to rule 13.13 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) the Applicant’s Application filed 22 December 2022 be summarily dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of this application to be as agreed or otherwise taxed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE BROWN:
INTRODUCTION

These reasons for judgment relate to an interlocutory application[1] brought by Thomas Tigani, who was formally a bankrupt, to have set aside various examination summonses directed to him and persons associated with him, which have been issued on behalf of Dean Cosenza, who asserts he is one of his creditors arising from Mr Tigani’s bankruptcy.
[1] See Interim Application of Thomas Tigani filed on 29 August 2023.
Ancillary to this application is a related one brought by Mr Tigani to dismiss summarily Mr Cosenza’s originating application, which seeks a number of declarations that he (the bankrupt) has breached various provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth)[2] which in common parlance resulted in him Mr Tigani deceiving both his creditors and the trustee appointed to administer the bankruptcy.
[2] Hereinafter referred to as “the Bankruptcy Act” or “the Act”.
Mr Cosenza commenced this current round of proceedings on 13 December 2022. The relevant summonses seek both oral examination and the production of documents and are directed to four associates of Mr Tigani, namely Jason Di Iulio; Armando Cirilllo; Patrizia Carbone; and Angelo Carbone, as well as Mr Tigani himself.
The factual underpinning of Mr Cosenza’s case is that he asserts that Mr Tigani, aided by his associates, conducted lucrative commercial activities during the period of his bankruptcy, which were not declared to either his trustee or creditors, of which Mr Cosenza was one. He wishes Mr Tigani and those individuals to be held to account for allegedly breaching the Act in this manner.
The power vested in the court to issue an examination summons in respect of bankruptcy is created by section 81 of the Act. It confers a wide discretion on the court (both before and after the end of the bankruptcy) to issue a summons for the examination of any relevant person in respect of the bankruptcy.
Significantly, the individuals who have standing to seek the issue of such a summons include a creditor of the bankrupt, who has or had, a debt proven in the bankruptcy. In addition, the trustee of the relevant estate may also seek the issue of such a summons.
Section 81(1B) of the Act specifies that any documents subject to summons must be in the possession of the person subject to the summons and relate to the bankrupt in question. Mr Cosenza seeks the production of financial documents created between 2006 and now. Mr Tigani contends this is too wide and is therefore oppressive.
Mr Tigani was bankrupted, on his own petition, on 20 November 2006. Steven Duncan, a chartered accountant, was appointed by the court to administer the estate on that date. Mr Duncan has steadfastly indicated that he is disinclined to seek to examine Mr Tigani and believes he and his colleagues have responded appropriately to the very many demands, originating with Mr Cosenza, to investigate Mr Tigani for allegedly concealing assets from creditors.
On 21 November 2009, Mr Tigani was automatically discharged from his bankruptcy, pursuant to the operation of section 149 of the Act. As will be detailed in due course, Mr Cosenza was aggrieved that Mr Duncan did not oppose the discharge and, in the years since, has declined to pursue Mr Tigani further, despite having been provided, by Mr Cosenza, with what the latter considers is irrefutable evidence that Mr Tigani has committed a fraud during the currency of his bankruptcy.
In these circumstances, given the terms of section 81, it is Mr Cosenza’s position that he has no viable alternative, given Mr Duncan’s stance, other than to issue the summonses himself in order to reveal the extent of Mr Tigani’s commercial impropriety during his bankruptcy and obtain relevant documents to this end from individuals associated with him.
From Mr Tigani’s perspective, he has been discharged from bankruptcy for over 14 years and axiomatically any attempt to re-examine his affairs, and of persons associated with him, must necessarily represent both an abuse of the court’s processes and be oppressive and unfair to him and his associates.
In addition, he submits as follows:
·Mr Cosenza, in his personal capacity, is not a creditor in his bankruptcy and so he lacks standing to seek the issue of the various summonses in question;
·Mr Cosenza has not provided any adequate explanation as to why he has delayed in issuing the current summonses. This is relevant in the context of the failure of earlier proceedings instituted by him involving Mr Duncan, which were dismissed by the Federal Court in February 2020, nearly two years before the current proceedings were commenced;
·The affidavits filed in support of the issue of the summonses in question fail to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the criteria specified in section 81(1B) of the Act;
·The summonses in question are too wide and/or vague; and oppressive and/or unfair;
·The affidavits filed in support of the application are objectionable and do not provide sufficient evidentiary basis to justify the issue of the summonses in question being tainted by hearsay or subject to characterisation as bald sweeping statements or bald assertions;
·Mr Cosenza has failed to disclose relevant information regarding his relationship with Mr Tigani, which is likely to have had relevance to the exercise of the court’s discretion to issue the summonses in question;
·Overall, the application represents an abuse of process and should be summarily dismissed.
These reasons for judgment are directed to the resolution of this interlocutory application for summary dismissal. The court has authority to enter summary judgment and or dispose of an application both by the provision of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) [section 143] and the rules made under it, Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 [rule 13.13].
At this juncture, it is appropriate to set out in full the provisions of the relevant rule:
(1)The Court may order that a proceeding be stayed, or dismissed generally or in relation to any claim for relief in the proceeding, if the Court is satisfied that:
(a)the party prosecuting the proceeding or claim for relief has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the proceeding or claim; or
(b) the proceeding or claim for relief is frivolous or vexatious; or
(c)the proceeding or claim for relief is an abuse of the process of the Court.
In Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (“Spencer”),[3] French CJ and Gummow J said of section 31A of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth), which is analogous to section 143 that it:
[A]uthorises summary disposition of proceedings on a variety of bases under its general rubric. It will apply to the case in which the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action and their deficiency is incurable. It will include the case in which there is unanswerable or unanswered evidence of a fact fatal to the pleaded case and any case which might be propounded by permissible amendment. It will include the class of case in the longstanding category of cases which are "frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of process". The application of s 31A is not, in terms, limited to those categories.[4]
[3] Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118.
[4] See Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118, 131 [22] (French CJ and Gummow J).
It is the submission of counsel for Mr Tigani that this matter is one which falls within the rubric provided by Spencer and should be dismissed at an interlocutory stage. Counsel for Mr Cosenza submits otherwise and contends that the evidence mustered by his client indicates that this is a matter replete with issues which mandate the court’s investigation through the process initiated by his client. These reasons for judgment are directed towards the resolution of this controversy.
MR COSENZA’S APPLICATION
Mr Cosenza commenced these proceedings by lodging an application on 13 December 2022, which was formally filed on 16 January 2023. An earlier application, in the same form had been lodged with the court in June of 2022 but rejected by the court’s registrar pursuant to the powers conferred upon him by rule 2.06 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021.[5]
[5] Hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”.
This decision was subject to judicial review pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). Ultimately, I decided that this decision should be set aside and the relevant documents accepted for filing.[6]
[6] See Cosenza v Registrar Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2022] FedCFamC2G 1041.
The orders sought by Mr Cosenza can be summarised as follows:
·Mr Tigani be examined pursuant to section 81 of the Act;
·A declaration be made that Mr Tigani committed a fraud on his bankruptcy trustee;
·A declaration that Mr Tigani concealed property from his bankruptcy trustee in breach of section 263 of the Act;
·A declaration that Mr Tigani made false statements on oath in documents relevant to his bankruptcy in contravention of section 263A of the Act;
·A declaration that Mr Tigani failed to disclose property to his bankruptcy trustee in contravention of section 265(1) of the Act;
·A declaration that Mr Tigani breached section 267 of the Act;
·A declaration that Mr Tigani obtained credit of more than $3,000.00 whilst a bankrupt in breach of section 269;
·A declaration that Mr Tigani made business decisions whilst a bankrupt;
·A declaration that Ms Anna Tigani, Ms Patrizia Carbone and Mr Angelo Carbone assisted Mr Tigani to escape punishment for his breaches of the bankruptcy law and to conceal property from his creditors; and
·Indemnity costs.
Sections 263, 263A, 265 and 269 of the Act are penal provisions creating criminal offences punishable by fine and imprisonment. As I understand his case, it is Mr Cosenza’s position that Mr Tigani and a number of his associates engaged in some form of conspiracy to defeat his bankruptcy and should be held to account for it.
There is a complication to this position. On 29 November 2023, after Ms Flaherty, counsel for Mr Tigani, had made submissions to the court on 6 October 2023, and the case had been adjourned to 7 December 2023 for Mr Lazarevich, counsel for Mr Cosenza, to complete his submissions, Mr Cosenza applied to the court to withdraw the declaratory aspects of his application, rendering any summary dismissal application in respect to them potentially otiose.
In her submissions, Ms Flaherty had strenuously argued that the application for the various declarations sought was misconceived, given this court has no jurisdiction to institute criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings against any person.
It seems self-apparent that the decision to withdraw the declaratory aspects of the application was tactically motivated. As the evidence presently stands, there can be no evidence to support any of the declarations sought. The efficacy of this aspect of the proceedings is depending on something germane being revealed by Mr Tigani in any the oral examination approved by the court.
When the case resumed on 7 December 2023, Ms Flaherty raised her concern that what was sought by Mr Cosenza was the discontinuance of this aspect of the proceedings, whilst what she had sought, on behalf of Mr Tigani, was their dismissal.
In these circumstances, her client was concerned that Mr Cosenza was liable to re-agitate these aspects of his complaint against Mr Tigani, if and when it suited him and this, of itself, was unfair to him. In these circumstances, she persisted with her application for dismissal of this aspect of Mr Cosenza’s initial application.
MATERIAL RELIED UPON
The matters traversed in these proceedings occurred over the course of well over twenty years. Each of the parties concerned – Mr Cosenza and Mr Tigani – seem to have been involved in very many commercial dealings, through a variety of entities. As such, it is not always easy to follow their respective affairs at some years removed.
In addition, each has been involved in many legal proceedings over the past two decades or so. Each of them has become bankrupt – Mr Cosenza on two occasions. Against this background, Mr Cosenza has filed several affidavits, to which are attached other affidavits filed in other proceedings to which in turn are attached lengthy exhibits, relating to yet other court proceedings both civil and criminal in which Mr Tigani has been involved.
In support of his application for the issue of the relevant summonses, Mr Cosenza relies on the following affidavits:
·An affidavit of himself lodged on 13 December 2022;
·A further affidavit of himself lodged on 13 December 2022;
These affidavits were sworn on 22 June of 2022 in support of the earlier rejected application.
Attached to the second of these affidavits were two affidavits filed by Mr Cosenza in the earlier proceedings brought by him against Mr Duncan in May and November of 2017. These affidavits consist of over six hundred pages, mostly exhibits. In practical terms, it is these affidavits which provide the evidentiary basis said to support the issue of the various examination summonses.
The exhibits attached to the 2017 affidavits include the following:
·Statement of Claim filed in the matter of Tigani v Stix Farms Pty Ltd in the District Court on 9 September 2014;
·Affidavits sworn by Mr Tigani in support of this application;
·Judgment of Judge Kitchen dated 7 June 2005 in Cosenza & Denco Holdings Pty Ltd v Tigani & Annatom Pty Ltd;
·Transcript of Mr Tigani’s evidence in the Magistrates Court at Murray Bridge on 5 July 2011 in proceedings between Kingsford Machinery and Stix Farms v Colmar Enterprises;
·Various documents provided to Mr Duncan’s office regarding concerns in respect of missing olive harvesters;
·Sentencing remarks in respect of Mr Tigani delivered in the District Court in September 2014 in respect of firearms charges;
·Mr Tigani’s statement of affairs presented on 20 November 2008;
·A transcript of Mr Tigani’s evidence provided in the District Court criminal proceedings against him between 4 and 6 March 2014.
More recently, Mr Cosenza has filed an affidavit in response to Mr Tigani’s application and affidavit in support seeking summary dismissal, in which affidavit Mr Tigani contends that Mr Cosenza was never personally a creditor in his bankruptcy.
This affidavit was filed by Mr Cosenza on 29 September 2023. Attached to it is a letter dated 1 May 2017, which purports to be a notice pursuant to the provisions of section 15 of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA).
It is Mr Tigani’s position, as I understand it, that he was not advised of any assignment of the relevant debt and even if he was, the assignment was not effective, and the notice said to be provided of it given to the wrong person.
Although these various affidavits are apt to be described as being burdensome because of their length, this is due to the extent of these annexures. The body of the affidavits themselves are relatively brief. It is the 2017 affidavits which appear to be central to the matter.
As will be delineated in greater detail, in due course, it is the submission of Ms Flaherty that it is necessary for Mr Cosenza to provide more than bald assertions or broad sweeping statements in respect of the irregularities allegedly committed by Mr Tigani, during the currency of his bankruptcy, in order to satisfy the conditions implicit in section 81 to authorise the issue of an examination summons.
The particular statements, objected to as lacking sufficient particularity and connection to anything that could be the subject of either an order for production or as satisfying the criteria for oral examination, are as follows:
I was at all material times aware that Tigani did not disclose all of his assets and income and interests to the trustee in Bankruptcy. I advised Mr. Gyss[7] of this regularly.
On or about 21 November 2009, Tigani was discharged from bankruptcy despite my various complaints made to Mr. Gyss. No investigations into Tigani's affairs various business affairs were conducted by the trustee. No objection to discharge was filed.
Tigani was at all material times making decisions affecting a business and managing a corporation whilst disqualified.
Tigani was on various occasions using other people, including his children, his wife (former), his father, his mother and his girlfriend during his bankruptcy, to place their names and associated entities as owners of interests in land, leases and various businesses which he controlled.
…
Tigani has failed to disclose his various personal interests and income to the trustee.[8]
[7] Mr Gyss is an associate of Mr Duncan.
[8] See affidavit of Dean Cosenza sworn 3 May 2017 being Annexure DC 1 to his affidavit filed 13 December 2022.

Ms Flaherty submits that these various statements amount to hearsay and provide no actual evidence to support the contentions made. As such, they represent conjecture on Mr Cosenza’s part.
Ms Flaherty also points to the fact that much, if not all, of the material on which Mr Cosenza relies in his current application to orally examine Mr Tigani was found to be insufficient, in an evidentiary sense, to support his earlier action against Mr Duncan for breaching his duties as trustee of Mr Tigani’s estate. A finding which was not disturbed by Charlesworth J on appeal.
In this context, she submits that, as the evidence remains the same, but an even longer period of time has passed, it is self-apparent that Mr Cosenza’s application must represent an abuse of process and be unfair to Mr Tigani.
THE SUMMONSES
Ms Flaherty characterises the documents sought to be produced as relating to an excessive period of eighteen years, which is clearly in excess of any period referrable to the bankruptcy; lacking in clarity; not clearly linked to the examinable affairs of Mr Tigani; and as generally being vague and too wide in their scope and so being unfair. In addition, she submits that one category of documents is subject to legal professional privilege. In broad terms the documents are as follows:
·All bank statements, cheque books and credit card statements for Mr Tigani and ten businesses between 2006 and now;
·In respect of each business specified all documents in relation to it for the same period;
·All tax returns for each business and Mr Tigani for the same period;
·Expenditure for Stix Farms;
·Documents relating to a Mercedes Benz motor vehicle;
·Documents relating to the lease of Stix Farms from 2007 to date;
·Documents relating to the olive oil extraction machinery;
·All document tendered in the District Court proceedings between Mr Tigani and Stix Farms, including those relating to the compromise of the action.
Ms Flaherty appears only for Mr Tigani. Arrangements have been made for the other recipients of the summonses issued on behalf of Mr Cosenza to be served by a variety of methods. In addition, Mr Cosenza has caused subpoenae to be issued to a wide variety of sources, which include Mr Tigani’s solicitor in the action against Stix Farms and the liquidator of one of the companies associated with Mr Tigani, Tomdan Pty Ltd.
I do not consider that I have to consider these summonses in the context of the current proceedings. Their currency will depend on the outcome of the current proceedings. If Mr Cosenza’s application is summarily dismissed each of these summons and indeed the other subpoenae, some of which are subject to objection, will fall away.
MR TIGANI’S APPLICATION
Mr Tigani filed his application seeking summary dismissal on 29 August 2023. It is supported by an affidavit of Mr Tigani sworn on the same date. He deposes that at the time he became bankrupt in 2006 he was a director of the following companies, each of which was deregistered prior to it:
·Tomdan Pty Ltd;
·Australian Olive Oil Corporation Pty Ltd;
·Kingsford Olives Enterprises Pty Ltd; and
·Estotilandia Investments Pty Ltd.
Mr Tigani challenges the veracity of some aspects of Mr Cosenza’s affidavits, most significantly in respect of his alleged standing to bring the current proceedings as a creditor of Mr Tigani. It is the effect of Mr Tigani’s evidence that Denco Holdings Pty Ltd was one of his creditors in his bankruptcy not Mr Cosenza. Mr Tigani has deposed that he has no knowledge of any purported assignment of the debt from Denco Holdings to Mr Cosenza.
In addition, Mr Tigani asserts that Mr Cosenza has failed to disclose information to the court relevant to the exercise of its discretion to issue the summons under challenge. This information can be summarised as follows:
·Mr Tigani’s brother Rocco was the partner of Mr Cosenza’s former wife for over 20 years;
·Mr Cosenza was convicted of some species of criminal offence against Rocco, which relate to him paying money to a person to hurt Rocco;
·Mr Cosenza believes that it was Mr Tigani who informed police of this conspiracy leading to Mr Cosenza being apprehended and ultimately sentenced to a term of imprisonment;
·Mr Cosenza, when gaoled, lost his restaurant business.
The import of these matters is that Mr Tigani contends that Mr Cosenza is motivated by the ill-will which he holds for him, harboured over many years. In these circumstances, he asserts that Mr Cosenza’s application lacks sufficient probity, balance and the prerequisite degree of objectivity required before the court should embark upon the significant and potentially expensive exercise for the community and onerous task for him personally of an oral examination to the extent foreshadowed by Mr Cosenza in the material filed by him currently.
Mr Tigani summarises his position in the following portion of his affidavit:
I am entitled as a discharged bankrupt to earn an income and attempt to rebuild my post-bankruptcy life. I was discharged some 14 years ago. The Applicant, with whom I have a strained relationship, now seeks my current (and post discharge) personal financial information in circumstances where he, himself, was not a creditor of mine and I have seen nothing to suggest that he is. In those circumstances I consider the issuance of the summons for examination to be, amongst other things, unfair.[9]
[9] See affidavit of Thomas Tigani filed 29 August 2023 at [15.9].
BACKGROUND
Mr Cosenza and Mr Tigani have apparently known each other for many years, both in a commercial and social setting. There can be no doubt that the relationship between them has soured to a very marked degree.
Ms Flaherty has submitted that Mr Cosenza has failed to be candid, with the court about some aspects of his relationship with Mr Tigani and about his own record regarding personal insolvency.
As such, it is asserted that it is apparent that Mr Cosenza has a significant level of personal animus against Mr Tigani, which is relevant to whether the current proceedings should be considered to constitute some species of abuse of process.
Mr Cosenza asserts that he is a proven creditor of Mr Tigani in an amount of $199,699.00, as a result of a judgment debt entered against Mr Tigani and a company Annatom Pty Ltd, in the District Court of South Australia on 7 June 2005.[10]
[10] Cosenza & Denco Holdings Pty Ltd v Tigani & Annatom Pty Ltd [2005] SADC 63.
As best I can understand, no dividends were received from the administration of Mr Tigani’s estate. Certainly, none were distributed to Mr Cosenza. This has been, and remains, a significant source of grievance, so far as to Mr Cosenza is concerned.
Mr Cosenza has deposed that, in 1998, he invested a sum of money – $150,000.00 – with a company Kingsford Olives Pty Ltd of which Mr Tigani and his wife Anna were directors. The company had some form of interest in land at Pinnaroo, in the Riverland District of South Australia, on which it was proposed olive trees would be grown for the purpose of producing olive oil for export.
It seems to be the case that the land in question was effectively owned by Mr Tigani’s parents. Much of Mr Cosenza’s case turns on his allegations regarding Mr Tigani’s use of the land and his investment in it during his bankruptcy and afterwards.
It would seem to be the case that the mechanism for the advance of the money, which Mr Cosenza asserts is due to him personally, was via a company controlled by Mr Cosenza, namely Denco Holdings Pty Ltd. In Mr Tigani’s statement of affairs Denco Holdings is listed as one of his unsecured creditors in an amount of $238,575.28.[11]
[11] See Exhibit DC-3 to the affidavit of Mr Cosenza filed 13 December 2022.
After the initial advance, both Mr Cosenza and Denco Holdings Pty Ltd sought a personal guarantee from Mr Tigani in respect of this advance, as well as from Annatom Pty Ltd, apparently the holding company operated by Tom and Anna Tigani.
This guarantee, granted in June of 2001, was dishonoured, leading to the proceedings in the District Court brought by Mr Cosenza and Denco Holdings Pty Ltd against Mr Tigani and Annatom Pty Ltd and ultimately a judgment debt in Denco Holdings’ favour only.
From Mr Tigani’s perspective, this creates its own set of controversies in respect of Mr Cosenza’s standing to bring the current proceedings in his own capacity. Judge Kitchen, in the relevant judgment, explained why judgment was entered, by the District Court, in favour of Denco Holdings only:
In the course of the first day of the trial, counsel for the plaintiff informed the court that Mr Cosenza had been adjudged bankrupt on 12 December 2003 upon his own petition. The trial was adjourned to a subsequent date; when it resumed a notice of discontinuance of Mr Cosenza’s claim was filed by Mr Cosenza’s trustee in bankruptcy. The trial continued as an action by Denco Holdings only.[12]
[12] Cosenza & Denco Holdings Pty Ltd v Tigani & Annatom Pty Ltd [2005] SADC 63 at [2].
In these circumstances, it is Mr Tigani’s position that Mr Cosenza has no standing to bring his application as the judgment debt on which he now places reliance was one proven in favour of not him but Denco Holdings Pty Ltd, albeit he might have been the company’s sole director and shareholder.
In the alternative, it is submitted by Ms Flaherty that this is a veil of uncertainty about who actually has been assigned this debt and what were the circumstances surrounding such assignment, which Mr Cosenza is obliged to remove given he seeks the exercise of the court's discretion to issue the applicable summons.
Mr Cosenza asserts that Denco Holdings assigned the debt to him by means of a deed executed on 1 May 2017. The relevant deed reads as follows:
Denco Holdings Pty Ltd as trustee for the Denco Trust hereby assigns all rights, interests, debts, entitlements, chose in action, causes of action that the said Trust may have against Thomas Tigani and the bankrupt estate of Thomas Tigani and the trustee administering the bankrupt estate of Thomas Tigani arising howsoever and any related rights to enable the said Trust to have the full benefit of any damages compensation, debt, entitlement to which the said Trust would otherwise be entitled howsoever determined, to Dean Cosenza in consideration of the sum of $2 dollars which the said Trust acknowledges to have received.[13]
[13] See Exhibit E.
In the judgment, Judge Kitchen provided the following context regarding Mr Cosenza’s bankruptcy:
There is the matter of Mr Cosenza's bankruptcy. He admitted that on 11 December 2003, the day before he presented his own petition for the sequestration of his estate and he was made a bankrupt, he assigned to a man I will identify only as Mr GS "for valuable consideration" his interest "in all loans and guarantees" the subject matter of these proceedings (Exhibit D6). He was taken (in cross-examination) to the statement of affairs filed in relation to his bankruptcy. Preparatory to his being asked questions concerning the assignment and the statement of affairs, he was informed of his right to refuse to answer questions which might incriminate him of a serious offence. He, substantially, exercised that right. The significance of my reference to these matters is that it is apparent Mr Cosenza was of the view, on the date of the assignment, that he had a proprietary interest in the loan and the guarantee the subject matter of this action.[14]
[14] Cosenza & Denco Holdings Pty Ltd v Tigani & Annatom Pty Ltd [2005] SADC 63 at [18]
In addition, in the judgment Judge Kitchen alluded to the fact that Mr Cosenza was convicted of assaulting Mr Tigani’s brother in July of 2001 and had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment, which was suspended. As previously indicated, it is Mr Tigani’s position that this was a matter which should have been revealed by Mr Cosenza.
In the context of Mr Cosenza’s bankruptcy, Ms Flaherty tendered both the current and historical company extract in respect of Denco Holdings and Mr Cosenza’s entry on the national personal insolvency index.[15] The latter indicated that Mr Cosenza became bankrupt on 12 December 2003 and was discharged on 17 September 2007.
[15] Exhibit B & C respectively.
The company extract indicates that Mr Cosenza ceased to be a director of Denco Holdings on 11 December 2003, the day prior to his bankruptcy. At this stage, Mr George Snell becomes a director, remaining so until 31 January 2008, when Mr Cosenza resumed his role as director.
Ms Flaherty draws attention to the coincidence in the initial of the anonymised GS in Judge Kitchen’s judgment and the Mr Snell who became involved with Denco Holdings. More noteworthy is the fact that Mr Cosenza had apparently indicated to the District Court that he had transferred his interest in all loans to GS for valuable consideration.
In this context, Ms Flaherty is critical that no deed of assignment was provided by Mr Cosenza in respect of this assignment at the time of the commencement of these proceedings. In his affidavit, Mr Tigani asserts that he became aware of the purported assignment only when he read the judgment provided by me in the proceedings between Mr Cosenza and Mr Duncan to which he was not a party.[16] Mr Lazarevich, who was counsel for Mr Cosenza in those proceedings and remains so, tendered the relevant deed in these earlier proceedings.
[16] Cosenza v Duncan (Trustee in Bankruptcy) (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1749 at [6].
As previously indicated, Mr Tigani doubts, at the very least on a prima facie basis, that there has been compliance with the provisions of section 15 of the Law of Property Act 1936 (SA), which require notice to be given, in writing to the debtor concerned.
In this context, Ms Flaherty points to the lack of evidence regarding what occurred in respect of the debt owed to Denco Holdings between the date Mr Snell ceased to be its director and the date in May of 2017, when Mr Cosenza asserts it was assigned to him by Denco Holdings for the sum of $2.00. It is Ms Flaherty’s submission that in order to be an effective assignment of the debt the court must be able to ascertain the terms and effect of such assignment according to the construction of it as whole.[17]
[17] See Austino Wentworthville Pty Limited v Metroland Australia Limited [2013] NSWCA 59 at [62].
Essentially, Ms Flaherty contends, as I understand it, that it must be viewed as suspicious that Mr Cosenza ostensibly divested himself of his proprietary interest in the relevant debt for an unspecified consideration, shortly prior to his bankruptcy, then after a hiatus of just under fourteen years, has it assigned back to him without providing any explanation as to what role Mr Snell took in any necessary earlier assignment during the years in which he was a director of Denco Holdings. As such, it is submitted that the terms and effect of these various assignments cannot be discerned from any construction of the documents in question.
In addition, it is Ms Flaherty’s contention that it must be viewed as an improbably coincidental that Mr Cosenza has only provided proof of informing Mr Tigani of the alleged assignment to him, by Denco Holdings of the relevant debt, after the issue has been raised by him.
In any event, Ms Flaherty contends even if the court accepts the section 15 notice was sent and received by Mr Tigani, it was ineffective as a consequence of the operation of section 153 of the Act, the effect of which, on his discharge, was to release Mr Tigani from all previous debts. In these circumstances, Ms Flaherty submits the appropriate person to send notice of the assignment of the alleged debt was Mr Duncan, Mr Tigani’s trustee, not Mr Tigani himself.
It is clear that in the years which have followed the entry of the judgment debt in favour of Denco Holdings and Mr Tigani’s subsequent bankruptcy, Mr Cosenza has brought several applications directed towards correcting what he asserts was a significant injustice to him resulting from what he would characterise as the maladministration of Mr Tigani’s estate, whilst he was a bankrupt, particularly in respect of Mr Tigani’s involvement with companies engaged in olive oil production at the Pinnaroo farm.
In the affidavit filed in support of his application,[18] Mr Cosenza has deposed that he continues to believe that Mr Tigani has committed fraud against his creditors and against Mr Duncan as trustee by failing to disclose assets that were owned and controlled by him and by engaging in business and commercial activities, during the course of his bankruptcy. These activities included being able to personally invest $500,000.00 in improvements on the land.
[18] Affidavit of Dean Cosenza filed 13 December 2022.
In support of this contention, Mr Cosenza points to the complicated structure of Mr Tigani’s financial affairs, which are characterised by multiple companies; a related trust or trusts controlled by family members; and the parcel of agricultural land, at Pinnaroo, on which olive oil and charcoal are produced and on which Mr Tigani worked. He seeks the court’s assistance to unravel the web of companies behind which has sat Mr Tigani, both before and after his bankruptcy.
In this context, it is Mr Cosenza’s position that he became aware of the extent of the relevant fraud as a result of reviewing documents filed in District Court proceedings between Mr Tigani and a trustee company, Stix Farms Pty Ltd, effectively controlled by his father, Francesco Tigani, which owned the agricultural land through a trust. Those proceedings were commenced in September of 2014.
In the course of those proceedings, it is Mr Cosenza’s position that Mr Tigani admitted that, during the course of his bankruptcy, he had been a primary producer on the land concerned and had invested a significant sum of the money in improving the land and in purchasing machinery to operate it. In particularly he admitted entering into a lease with Stix Farms Pty Ltd, for valuable consideration to farm the land owned by it, which generated significant income for Mr Tigani, which he did not declare in his bankruptcy.[19]
[19] Affidavit of Dean Cosenza filed 13 December 2022 at [9].
Further, Mr Cosenza has alleged that during the course of his bankruptcy, Mr Tigani operated a number of companies for profit, which had connection to the olive oil industry and the sale of equipment, such as harvesters, used in it. These companies included Kingsford Machinery Sales & Service Pty Ltd; Tigani Olive Oil Pty Ltd; McLaren Vale Table Olives & Olive Oil Co Pty Ltd and several others.
In addition, in April of 2012, Mr Tigani and others were charged with growing an illegal crop of cannabis on the property at some time in 2011 (after his discharge from bankruptcy). Mr Tigani was ultimately acquitted of the charge, but his co-accused were not.
During his trial, Mr Tigani gave evidence in his own defence regarding his involvement in the property prior to the cultivation, which Mr Cosenza asserts supports his assertion that Mr Tigani was engaged in commercial activities, for profit, on his own account, whilst a bankrupt, on the land, whilst, in effect, hiding behind a complex corporate and trust structure.
This is not the first time I have been involved with Mr Cosenza. In May of 2017, Mr Cosenza commenced proceedings, in this court, against Mr Duncan, seeking to challenge his decision not to oppose Mr Tigani’s discharge from bankruptcy and alleging various breaches of provisions of the Act related to his administration of Mr Tigani’s estate.
The basis of Mr Cosenza’s application was that he sought to invoke the court’s supervisory jurisdiction in respect of bankruptcy matters provided by section 178 of the Act in order to investigate his complaint that Mr Duncan had been in someway remiss in this administration of Mr Tigani’s estate and should have opposed his automatic discharge from bankruptcy.

Ultimately, Mr Duncan sought the summary dismissal of Mr Cosenza’s various applications, which came on before me in 2018. In the resulting judgment,[20] I summarised the factual issues surrounding the matter in the following terms:
·Mr Cosenza became aware of the proceedings between Mr Tigani and Stix Farms in 2016. Since that time, he had remonstrated with Mr Duncan to investigate Mr Tigani’s affairs more thoroughly as he himself had done so during the bankruptcy itself;
·Mr Duncan had not investigated these matters both because there were no funds in the estate to do so and he questioned the utility of pursing these matters;
·Mr Cosenza’s concerns had been referred to ITSA, which determined Mr Duncan had discharged his obligations under the Act;
·Mr Duncan had viewed the pleadings in the 2016 District Court proceedings between Mr Tigani and Stix Farms and formed the view that they did not in fact disclose any asset of Mr Tigani that had not been previously identified;
·Material relating to the District Court proceedings had been referred to AFSA, which had not recommended any proceedings against Mr Tigani.
[20] Cosenza v Duncan (Trustee in Bankruptcy) (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1749.
During this hearing, Mr Duncan maintained his position that he had been unable to locate any funds or assets during his administration of the estate and afterwards and it was not economically feasible for him or any other regulatory authority to fund any further investigation of Mr Tigani’s affairs.
His counsel, Mr Bullock characterised Mr Cosenza’s claims of breach of statutory duty against Mr Duncan as being misconceived and lacking specificity. Significantly, it was not asserted on Mr Duncan’s behalf that Mr Cosenza personally was in any way disqualified from pursuing Mr Tigani, in any way he considered appropriate.
Although Mr Cosenza may dispute the acumen and vigour with which Mr Duncan and Mr Gyss approached the task of administering Mr Tigani’s estate, it cannot be said that they took no action or totally disregarded the assertions made to them by Mr Cosenza. They had referred matters to regulatory authorities, which had declined to take action. In addition, I accepted that Mr Duncan had faced funding constraints in respect of taking any action of the sort proposed by Mr Cosenza.
In my earlier judgment, I summarised other complaints Mr Cosenza had made in respect of Mr Tigani’s conduct, during his bankruptcy and the failure of Mr Duncan and Mr Gyss to pursue them, in the following terms:
·Mr Tigani had entered into a lease with his Stix Farms – his father’s trustee company – to farm the land owned by it at Pinnaroo, which had generated significant profits for him during the currency of his bankruptcy and which had come to light to Mr Cosenza when he discovered the District Court proceedings commenced in September 2014, which was after Mr Tigani’s discharge from bankruptcy:
·Necessarily, Mr Cosenza asserted that the terms of any compromise of this action might be germane to his various complaints of impropriety. Axiomatically, Mr Cosenza personally did not know what those terms were and to what period they related. Ms Flaherty submits they are subject to privilege;
·Mr Tigani had operated businesses selling olive oil and olive oil machinery namely McLaren Vale Olive Oil Processing Co and Kingsford Machinery Sales & Services;
·In this context, Mr Tigani had given evidence in the Murray Bridge Magistrates’ Court against Colmar Enterprises in July of 2005. In a subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr Tigani had been described as the principle of Stix Farms.
In these circumstances, I found as follows:
[I]n my view, Mr Cosenza has not established any arguable basis that the circumstances delineated by him invoke the court’s supervisory jurisdiction under either section 178 or section 90-15(3)(a) of the Insolvency Law Reform Act 2016.
I appreciate that it is the case that the court has a wide jurisdiction arising under the relevant legislation. However, Mr Duncan is also required to exercise his professional skills, particularly in the context of what is commercially sound. In my view, the court must be careful not to interfere with a bankruptcy trustee’s decision making, in respect of an estate, particularly one in which the administration has been concluded.
It is evidence that Mr Cosenza has a significant degree of animus for Mr Tigani. That is his entitlement. Mr Duncan is under no obligation to take direction from Mr Cosenza as to how he exercises his duties as a trustee. In these circumstances, in my view, Mr Cosenza faces a high threshold, which he must cross before the court’s supervisory jurisdiction can be invoked, on his behalf.
…
In this case, Mr Cosenza is not able to point to any actual physical assets, which he asserts have been concealed by Mr Tigani. In my view, his case relies on conjecture and innuendo arising from the uncertain medium of court pleadings. The matters raised, in those documents, were investigated by Mr Gyss.
Significantly, Mr Gyss sought advice from the independent regulator regarding his possible duties as a trustee under section 19(1)(h) & (i), particularly whether there was any possibility Mr Tigani had committed an offence under the Act.
The advice received by Mr Gyss was that there was insufficient evidence available to conclude that any such offence had been committed. In addition, Mr Gyss exercised his professional judgement, based on the trustee’s investigation into Mr Tigani’s affairs, over several years, to form the view that there were no options open to the trustee to recoup any further moneys from Mr Tigani. In my view, there is currently no evidence available to me to indicate that this conclusion was capricious or otherwise legally unreasonable.
More significantly, at this juncture, Mr Cosenza has not provided any further evidence, which was not available to Mr Duncan, and his staff, to call into question this decision. To adopt the phraseology of Mr Bullock, Mr Cosenza has not been able to put any flesh on the bones of his various assertions against Mr Duncan and his staff.[21]
[21] Cosenza v Duncan (Trustee in Bankruptcy) (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1749 at [117] – [119] & [121] – [124].
As a consequence of these findings, I decided to dismiss summarily Mr Cosenza’s application. However, I concede that this decision was subject to a rider, which was that I indicated in the judgment my view that it remained open to Mr Cosenza to bring proceedings against Mr Tigani in whatever form he deemed appropriate. Indeed, this had been a view advocated by Mr Duncan himself.
During the course of these proceedings, Mr Cosenza sought to join Mr Tigani to his application against Mr Duncan. I determined that, with the failure of his action against Mr Duncan, there were no proceedings on foot to which Mr Tigani could be joined. Mr Tigani had not, in any event, filed any material in response to the application.
In these circumstances, it is Mr Cosenza’s contention that, in order to correct the various injustice to which he has been subject and given the ruling of Charlesworth J, confirming his standing to bring a section 81 application personally, he has no alternative other than to step up himself and examine Mr Tigani and his various associates to get to the bottom of what he asserts has been systemic abuse of the mechanisms of bankruptcy by Mr Tigani.
Accordingly, the proceedings against Mr Duncan represented unfinished business so far as Mr Cosenza was concerned. As indicated above, Mr Cosenza has, to all intents and purposes, rebadged his earlier application against Mr Duncan and utilised the evidence mustered for those proceedings in his current one against Mr Tigani. Axiomatically, he has not been able to muster any fresh evidence.
My determination was subject to appeal in the Federal Court. Leave to appeal was refused by Charlesworth J on 12 February 2020.[22] However, it would be inaccurate for me to indicate that none of the grounds of appeal advanced by Mr Cosenza were successful.
[22] Cosenza v Duncan (Trustee in Bankruptcy), in the matter of Tigani [2020] FCA 105.
On its face, the application of section 178 is subject to a time limitation. Any such application must be brought within 60 days of the person concerned becoming aware of the relevant act or omission of the trustee concerned. I determined that Mr Cosenza’s application was out of time and the applicable period could not be extended. Justice Charlesworth determined that I was in error in this regard.
However, it was not considered that, in the circumstances, the error justified the granting of leave to appeal and so the maintenance of the action against Mr Duncan with the potential for it to include Mr Tigani. This was Mr Cosenza’s preference. It being his position that following any examination of Mr Tigani, Mr Duncan could then be enjoined to recover any relevant assets revealed by such examination.
Justice Charlesworth described Mr Cosenza’s submission in this regard as proceeding from an optimistic assumption that the examination would disclose the existence and whereabouts of assets that had hitherto been concealed.[23]
[23] Cosenza v Duncan (Trustee in Bankruptcy), in the matter of Tigani [2020] FCA 105 at [51].
That the assumption was to be characterised as being optimistic arose from the fact that Mr Cosenza himself had not been able to definitively identify any such assets and his case essentially rested on his long-held suspicion regarding Mr Tigani. At the same time, neither Mr Duncan nor any regulatory authority had been able to detect any irregularity in Mr Tigani’s various impugned commercial activities, which was amenable to being investigated in a cost-efficient manner.
Her Honour did however note that Mr Cosenza had standing to bring his own application in relation to the bankruptcy but it was not necessary for Mr Duncan to be a party to it. This was the essential basis on which I concluded that it was an error for the Registrar not to accept for filing Mr Cosenza’s current application.
However, of some moment, so far as the current proceedings are concerned, Charlesworth J was not persuaded that I was in error in determining that Mr Cosenza’s application against Mr Duncan should be summarily dismissed. In this context, in my view, it is important to note that Mr Cosenza essentially relies on the same matters as he relied upon in his action against Mr Duncan.
In her judgment, Charlesworth J said as follows:
The principal difficulty for Mr Cosenza is that the proceeding he commenced in the FCCA was (or at least purported to be) an appeal brought pursuant to s 178 of the Bankruptcy Act against Mr Duncan in respect of decisions that had been made in the past. That was the application to which the summary dismissal application was directed. Quite apart from the fact that the originating application did not seek orders in terms against Mr Duncan, Mr Cosenza was found to have an insufficient evidentiary basis to support an arguable case for interference with Mr Duncan’s past decisions. There is insufficient doubt attending that particular conclusion to warrant the grant of leave to appeal. The grounds of appeal assert no error of that kind in any event.[24]
[24] Cosenza v Duncan (Trustee in Bankruptcy), in the matter of Tigani [2020] FCA 105 at [56].
Accordingly, it is clear that Mr Cosenza is entitled to seek orders against Mr Tigani personally, pursuant to the provision of the Act. However, in the light of Mr Tigani’s opposition, the court must consider the evidence relied upon by Mr Cosenza to base his application.
In this context, Ms Flaherty submits that it must be regarded as highly relevant that Charlesworth J did not disturb my finding that the evidence submitted by Mr Cosenza was insufficient to found any action against Mr Duncan regarding the allegation that he had failed to pursue Mr Tigani with sufficient rigour in respect of concealed assets – as her Honour characterised it, Mr Cosenza’s optimistic assumption.
As previously indicated, Mr Cosenza has not provided any additional evidence to that which was relied upon by him in his proceedings against Mr Duncan. In my view, he remains in the same position vis-à-vis Mr Tigani as he was at the end of the proceedings against Mr Duncan, namely as Charlesworth J put it: maintaining a floating claim of impropriety against Mr Tigani, whilst casting about for a legal or factual basis to sustain it.
In my view, it must also be regarded as highly relevant to the exercise of any discretion arising in the court pursuant to the provisions of section 81 of the Act that Mr Tigani was discharged from his bankruptcy in November of 2009 – now over fourteen years ago. In this period and during the currency of the actual bankruptcy, Mr Cosenza was unable to persuade either Mr Duncan or any other regulatory authority of cogency of his complaints against Mr Tigani.
Now, Mr Cosenza, in effect, wishes to trawl through every conceivable form of financial record relating to Mr Tigani in an attempt to find some document or admission on which to base his currently broad-brush assertion of mala fides relating to Mr Tigani’s commercial activities over many years.
Essentially, when it is boiled down, Mr Cosenza asserts that because it is evident that Mr Tigani was engaged in some form of commercial activity during his bankruptcy, it is self-apparent that he must have been acting fraudulently by concealing monies. In this context, the focus of the current proceedings is on locating the smoking gun which will confirm Mr Cosenza’s suspicions.
MR TIGANI’S SUBMISSIONS
Ms Flaherty’s submissions have four main themes. Firstly, in order to satisfy the criteria applicable to the issue of a summons for examination under section 81, the applicant concerned must be a creditor with a provable debt. It is submitted Mr Cosenza is not such a creditor. Denco Holdings may be, but any assignment of its debt to Mr Cosenza is ineffective. Accordingly, Mr Cosenza has no standing to seek the issue of the summons.
Secondly, the scope of the summons and the documents sought pursuant to it is too wide and oppressive in its operation and should be set aside in the exercise of the court’s discretion. It is in effect a fishing expedition. Essentially, Mr Cosenza has not delineated with sufficient precision what are the issues which he seeks to investigate with Mr Tigani. Rather he has made inchoate complaints of misconduct against Mr Tigani.
Thirdly, given the largely inchoate objectives of Mr Cosenza directed towards Mr Tigani, which include the prospect of some form of criminal prosecution being brought against Mr Tigani, it behoved Mr Cosenza to be frank with the court about matters which might have implications for how its discretion to issue a section 81 summons should be exercised. The evidence available in this matter indicates Mr Cosenza has not been candid with the court.
Fourthly, the evidence available to the court arising from the proceedings instituted by Mr Cosenza against Mr Duncan in the former Federal Circuit Court, and on appeal in the Federal Court, refutes Mr Cosenza’s contention that Mr Duncan and other regulatory authorities with jurisdiction in respect of insolvency were lax or negligent or otherwise failed in their statutory obligation to investigate Mr Tigani’s affairs during the currency of his bankruptcy and afterwards.
As a consequence, the burden on Mr Cosenza to satisfy the court that he should be entitled to examine Mr Tigani, is to be regarded as an onerous one, which should not be easily discharged, particularly in the circumstances of this case, where the relevant bankruptcy came to an end in 2009. The underpinning of Ms Flaherty’s submissions is that Mr Cosenza has not discharged this burden as his case is a string of broad and bald assertions of malfeasance.
In these circumstances, Ms Flaherty submits that it is in the interests of both Mr Tigani and the community generally that the issues arising from the bankruptcy be concluded. Otherwise there is the prospect that a bankruptcy would never end and the import of section 153(1) of the Act – namely that a discharge releases a bankrupt from prior debt – would be defeated.
MR COSENZA’S SUBMISSIONS
It is clear from Mr Cosenza’s various affidavits that he has an extremely jaundiced view of Mr Tigani, whom he regards as being criminally dishonest. It is not the function of this court to determine whether this is so or not. Rather, my obligation is to determine whether the issue of the summons in question will aid in the recovery of funds, which may be allocated to any unsatisfied creditors of Mr Tigani. Ancillary to this exercise is the question of whether Mr Cosenza is in fact entitled, as an unsatisfied creditor of Mr Tigani, to pursue the exercise in any event.
The main thrust of Mr Lazarevich’s submissions is on the central underpinning of the regime for the management of personal insolvency which provides that trustees and creditors generally had a very long metaphorical half life in which to pursue debts owed to them.
In his submission this follows from the operation of section 127(1) of the Act and the provisions relating to assessments which may be made in respect of a bankrupt’s income pursuant to section 139WA.
Section 127(1) reads as follows:
After the expiration of 20 years from the date on which a person became a bankrupt, a claim shall not be made by the trustee in the bankruptcy to any property of the bankrupt, and that property shall, subject to the rights, if any, of a person other than the trustee in respect of the property, be deemed to be vested in the bankrupt, or a person claiming through or under him or her, as the case may be.
Section 139WA(1) provides that an assessment of a bankrupt’s income and the extent to which there should be any contribution made from that income to the relevant trustee is not subject to any time limit and may be made after a bankrupt has been discharged.
During both his written and oral submissions, Mr Lazarevich provided a forensic examination of the various documents, which Mr Cosenza has obtained to pursue his application, first against Mr Duncan, and more recently against Mr Tigani, to support his assertion that there are or have been patent irregularities in his financial affairs which warrant it appropriate for the court to mandate a more onerous examination of Mr Tigani.
When the submission is boiled down, in colloquial terms, it amounted to an assertion that where there is smoke, there must be fire. To extend the metaphor, the smoke being evidence of some level of commercial activity, particularly in regard to Stix Farms; the fire being concealed assets amenable to recovery.
The problem, in my view, with this approach, is that unlike smoke and fire, commercial activity during bankruptcy (and afterwards) do not automatically correlate with concealed assets. At the outset of this exercise, Mr Cosenza is not able to point to any actual assets of Mr Tigani which may be subject to any action by Mr Duncan.
Mr Lazarevich conceded that Mr Duncan had not himself been prepared to undertake the exercise, after undertaking a cost/risk analysis. He also accepted that his client was not subject to the same commercial constraints. However, Mr Cosenza’s purpose in engaging the process of examination, in Mr Lazarevich’s words was in order to get evidence that would be able to satisfy the trustee that an oral examination could be justified commercially.
In my view, the problem with this analysis is that it has no regard for the financial implications of the process for its subject – Mr Tigani, who may potentially be subject to an open-ended process of investigation and, as it is presently framed, one involving his associates and the production of records over a period of eighteen years.
In this context, I concede that it cannot be determined beyond any shadow of doubt that the oral examination will not produce the smoking gun which Mr Cosenza apparently fervently believes exists. However, in my view that is not the test.

Rather I must examine the evidence, which is currently available to consider, on balance, whether to continue the proceedings would amount to an abuse of process so far as Mr Tigani is concerned.
In the alternative, I must determine whether Mr Cosenza has no reasonable prospects of securing the evidence which he hopes to obtain and achieving his ultimate aim of being paid all or some of the sum of money said to have been assigned to him by Denco Holdings.
As I indicated earlier, Charlesworth J regarded Mr Cosenza’s approach to his application as being marked by an air of optimistic assumption. In an exchange with Mr Lazarevich, I compared Mr Cosenza to Charles Dickens’ character Mr Micawber who too was noted for his optimism and his belief something will turn up.
As I say, the prospect of something turning up cannot be irrefutably negated. However, at the same time the court must weigh up the potential oppression on the person sought to be examined, and as Charlesworth J observed, the potential abuse of being subject to a floating claim whilst his examiner casts about for a legal or factual foundation to sustain it.
The starting point for Mr Lazarevich’s examination of the material already in existence to support the issue of the summons, is Mr Tigani’s statement of affairs produced to his trustee in November of 2006.
This discloses that he was employed by Tomdan Pty Ltd as a salesperson and farmer in the olive industry and had been paid the sum of $15,876.00 in the previous year and expected to be paid the sum in the forthcoming year.[25] He disclosed no other assets.
[25] See Exhibit DC 3 to the affidavit of 13 December 2022.
Mr Lazarevich then moves to the affidavit[26] which Mr Tigani filed in the District Court proceedings between him and Stix Farms in September of 2014, nearly five years after his discharge from bankruptcy.
[26] See Exhibit DC-15 to the November 2017 affidavit being Exhibit DC 2 to affidavit of Dean Cosenza filed 13 December 2022.
The affidavit provides details of Mr Tigani’s involvement between 1994 and the date of the affidavit with land which was owned by various corporate entities and related trusts controlled first by him and then his father Francesco.
Significantly, Mr Cosenza has been able to produce a lease dated 2 May 2007 between Mr Tigani and Stix Farms, which requires payment of an annual rental of $30,000.00 per annum and a requirement to maintain the improvements on the property.
In this context, Mr Lazarevich emphasises the fact that Mr Tigani deposed, in his affidavit, that he had invested over $500,000 of my own financial resources in the maintenance of the subject land. As a consequence of this statement, Mr Lazarevich posed the following rhetorical question:
…so, pausing there, an obvious question is how does a bankrupt person invest $500,000 from his own financial resources - his language - when, according to the statement of assets and liabilities which is provided to the trustee, he has zero assets, no money in the bank and nothing of value?[27]
[27] Transcript of 6 October 2023 at page 64.
A little later, Mr Lazarevich relies on the admission in Mr Tigani’s second affidavit that he was the sole manager and/or the lessee of the land, including at times when a portion of it was used to grow a large marijuana crop, which came to the notice of the authorities in February 2011.
In all these circumstances, it is Mr Lazarevich’s contention that there must be an obvious inference that Mr Tigani was receiving an income from the land, which has not been disclosed to the trustee and potentially claimed by him for distribution between creditors.
Mr Lazarevich characterises the lease, entered into by Mr Tigani, as after-acquired property for the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act and submit that it vested in Mr Duncan, as such, when it was entered into in May of 2007, during the currency of Mr Tigani’s bankruptcy. It is submitted that there is an obvious question arising from this evidence regarding what income the lease produced, which is potentially captured by section 139WA.
Pursuant to section 58(1)(b) of the Act after-acquired property of the bankrupt vests, as soon as it is acquired by, or devolves on, the bankrupt, in the Official Trustee. After-acquired property is defined in section 58(6) of the Bankruptcy Act as:
…in relation to a bankrupt, means property that is acquired by, or devolves on, the bankrupt on or after the date of bankruptcy, being property that is divisible amongst the creditors of the bankrupt.
Property of the bankrupt is defined under section 5(1) of the Act as the property divisible among the bankrupt’s creditors and any rights and powers in relation to that property that would have been exercisable by the bankrupt if he or she had not become a bankrupt.
Property which is divisible among the creditors is specified in section 116(1) of the Act and subparagraph (1)(a) includes all property acquired by or devolving on the bankrupt after the date of bankruptcy but before the discharge.
I agree that Mr Tigani’s affairs appear somewhat convoluted. However, in my view, such complexity, particularly at some many years removed, cannot of itself, justify the process sought to be invoked on behalf of Mr Cozensa. Mr Cosenza is not in position to point to the current existence of any such property currently in the control of Mr Tigani. His case, to adapt the terminology of Charlesworth J is based on optimistic conjecture. In this context, the court is obliged to consider whether a case based on such an assumption is to be characterised as an abuse of process.
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
Section 81(1) of the Bankruptcy Act provides as follows:
(1)Where a person (in this section called the relevant person) becomes a bankrupt, the Court or a Registrar may at any time (whether before or after the end of the bankruptcy), on the application of:
(a)a person (in this section called a creditor) who has or had a debt provable in the bankruptcy;
(b) the trustee of the relevant person’s estate; or
(c) the Official Receiver;
summon the relevant person, or an examinable person in relation to the relevant person, for examination in relation to the bankruptcy
Rule 6.01 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Bankruptcy) Rules 2021 specifies as follows:
(1)An application under section 50 of the Bankruptcy Act for a debtor, or an examinable person in relation to a debtor, to be summoned for examination must be in accordance with Form B2.
Note:    More than one application may be included in the same Form B2.
(2)The application must be accompanied by an affidavit complying with this rule.
(3)The affidavit must:
(a)       identify:
(i)        the person sought to be examined; and
(ii)if that person is an examinable person in relation to a debtor—the debtor; and
(b)if the person sought to be examined is an examinable person—state the facts relied on by the applicant to establish that the person to be summoned is an examinable person; and
(c)if the summons is to require the person sought to be examined to produce books at the examination:
(i)        identify the books that are to be produced; and
(ii)give details of any inquiry by the applicant about the books to be produced and any refusal by the person to cooperate with the inquiry.
The expression examinable person is defined in section 5(1) of the Act as follows:
examinable person, in relation to a person (in this definition called the relevant person), means:
(a)if the relevant person is a debtor and property of the debtor is known or suspected to be in the possession of a person—that person;
(b)if the relevant person has become a bankrupt and any of the property of the bankrupt is known or suspected to be in the possession of a person—that person;
(c)in any case—a person who is believed to be indebted to the relevant person;
(d)if a person, including:
(i) a person who is an associated entity of the relevant person; or
(ii)a person with whom an associated entity of the relevant person is or has been associated;
may be able to give information about the relevant person or any of the relevant person’s examinable affairs—that person; or
(e)if books (including books of an associated entity of the relevant person):
(i)are in the possession of a person, including a person of a kind referred to in subparagraph (d)(i) or (ii); and
(ii)may relate to the relevant person or any of the relevant person’s examinable affairs;
that person.
In Re Csidei; Ex parte Andrew,[28] Lockhart J discussed a repealed version of section 81, describing the purpose of the section as being to elicit information that may be relevant for proper conduct of the bankruptcy and that may aid the process of finding and recovering assets available for distribution.
[28] Re Csidei; Ex parte Andrew (1979) 28 ALR 381 at 385.
In my view, the object of the provision is not to identify incidents of impropriety, in a broad sense, by any bankrupt person. In this context, I am gravely concerned that Mr Cosenza has not actually identified property said to have actually accrued to Mr Tigani during the currency of the latter’s bankruptcy.
It would appear axiomatic that the location of assets said to have accrued to Mr Tigani during the currency of his bankruptcy is Mr Cosenza’s motivation for seeking the issue of the various summonses in question.
In this context, in my view, two points need to be emphasised. Firstly, Mr Tigani’s bankruptcy has concluded and he was discharged around 14 years ago. Secondly, the trustee appointed to administer the estate does not support any further efforts being undertaken to locate assets.
In this latter context, Lockhart J considered that considerable weight must be given to the view of the trustee as it is he who is most conversant with the problems that exist in relation to the affairs of the bankrupt and the information that is necessary.[29]
[29] Re Csidei; Ex parte Andrew (1979) 28 ALR 381 at 387.
Given my view about the complexity of Mr Tigani’s relationship with the land at Pinnaroo and the related lease between him and his father; the absence of any clear evidence of what sums of money were paid in respect of rent; and the fact that the proceedings, which give rise to Mr Cosenza’s complaint against the trustee, arose after discharge from the relevant bankruptcy, in my view, this must be a most cogent consideration.
Mr Duncan had the same material as I do and determined that there was nothing requiring formal examination. On the agitation of Mr Cosenza, the relevant documents were referred to the insolvency authorities who also did not consider there were any matters warranting prosecution. These issues arose after discharge.
It is not possible, in my view, from the evidence relied upon by Mr Lazarevich, to identify any particular asset, which may be recoverable in the bankruptcy, as at the present time. True it is that the lease was entered into during the bankruptcy. It is not possible, however, to discern when the improvements said to have been undertaken by Mr Tigani were done – either before or after discharge.
In addition, it is not clear what is meant by the term financial resources, particularly the date on which the resources were obtained and what was their provenance. As Ms Flaherty rightly points out, bankruptcy alone did not disqualify Mr Tigani from engaging in all commercial activity. Certainly, it did not prevent him from engaging in commercial activities after his discharge.
It does not seem to me to be unreasonable that the court should take into account in determining whether it is appropriate to issue a summons for examination whether the circumstances sought to be examined occurred after discharge or before. In Re Todd; Ex parte Todd[30] Pincus J said as follows:
Plainly, the obligation of disclosure is not intended to be lifelong.
Under s. 153, discharge releases a bankrupt from his debts, with certain exceptions. It may be thought arguable that s. 153 exhaustively prescribes the consequences of discharge. However, that would seem plainly not to be so; the disabilities of bankruptcy are surely not intended, in general, to survive discharge.
[30] Re Todd; Ex parte Todd [1986] 68 ALR 483 at 485.
In his affidavit material, Mr Cosenza asserts that Mr Tigani and his father settled their dispute about the lease on the relevant farmland for a sum of $300,000.00 in 2017. The inference said to flow from this being that Mr Tigani must have had financial resources which he invested in the land, during the course of his bankruptcy, which justified the subsequent settlement.
In my view, this is wholly conjectural and unsupported by any collateral evidence. I do not consider, in all the circumstances of this case, that Mr Cosenza’s suspicions, so long after the events in question, which have been put to the relevant bankruptcy trustee and been rejected, can justify the issue of the summons in question.
It is in this context that the court needs to consider whether the issue of the summonses sought by Mr Cosenza can be considered an abuse of process. The court’s overwhelming obligation is to manage its process in the community interest and ensure justice is administered justly and efficiently.[31]
[31] Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), section 190.
It needs to be emphasized that the power vested in the court to issue a summons pursuant to the provisions of section 81 of the Act is discretionary in nature. Thus, Mr Cosenza is not in a position to demand the issue of the various summonses. In Re Abrahams; Ex parte Thomas[32] Lockhart J said as follows:
…the power prescribed by section 81 of the Act is an extraordinary power, that it must be carefully exercised, that the power given to the court or a Registrar to issue a summons under section 81 is a discretionary one, and that no rigid rules should be laid down for the proper exercise of the discretion by the court or the Registrar, but that it must be borne in mind at all times that in the exercise of that discretion the court or the Registrar must not lend aid to an unfair or oppressive use of this compulsory process.
[32] Re Abrahams; Ex parte Thomas (1985) 9 FCR 232 at 237.
The Full Court of the Federal Court discussed the various criteria likely to be relevant to the issue of an examination summons in Karounos & Ors v Official Trustee.[33]These can be summarised as follows:
·The power conferred by section 81 is an unusual and far-reaching one. Thus the issue of summonses for examination is to be approached responsibly and controlled carefully by the Registrar and the court;
·The power is one to be exercised in the interests of creditors. The procedure is basically designed to establish what assets the bankrupt had and what happened to those assets. As an incident of those inquiries, consideration can be given as to whether action should be commenced to recover any assets revealed;
·The grounds stated in the application for a summons must clearly identify the grounds on which an examination is sought. These need not be compendious;
·The summons itself should be expressed in terms which make the area for inquiry as clear as circumstances permit and specify as clearly as possible what records need to be produced;
·The Registrar should examine the application and form of summons carefully so as to be satisfied that the grounds of the application are sufficiently clear and the terms of the summons are not oppressive or vexatious by being too wide in their expression;
·If the application and summons are in proper form, the Registrar should issue the summons;
·If the person subject to the summons believes compliance to be oppressive and vexatious, application can be made to have the summons set aside;
·If such an application is made, the court needs to consider the material produced in support of the summons afresh.
[33] Karounos & Ors v Official Trustee (1988) 19 FCR 330 at 335.
The first issue to consider is whether Mr Cosenza has standing to bring his application in the sense that he is actually a creditor of Mr Tigani. As indicated above, the evidence regarding his relationship with Denco Holdings and the divesting and reversion of the relevant judgment debt between the two is indeed a tangled skein, about which I do not consider Mr Cosenza has been completely candid, particularly in respect of the involvement of Mr Snell.
It seems to me that it was convenient for Mr Cosenza to purportedly resume the debt, after learning of the District Court proceedings between Mr Tigani and his father, so that he (Mr Cosenza) could resume his dogged pursuit of Mr Tigani on whatever pretext was available to him. I do not consider that Mr Cosenza can be considered to be a creditor in these circumstances.
However, even if I am mistaken in this assumption, a more fundamental objection to the summons in question is my assessment that its application is to be considered an abuse of the court’s processes and therefore render it liable to being dismissed summarily pursuant to the power created by section 143 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth).
In my view, the summons is abusive because of the following factors:
·The delay in Mr Cosenza bringing the application which falls in three areas:
·Primarily, the period following Mr Tigani’s discharge from bankruptcy in late 2009 and the decision conveyed to Mr Cosenza, which preceded it, that Mr Duncan was not going to oppose his discharge;
·The delay in Mr Cosenza instituting proceedings given the basis of his current application is understanding that Mr Tigani had commenced proceedings against his father in the District Court in October 2016;
·The delay in Mr Cosenza filing this application since the date of the judgment of Charlesworth J.
·Mr Cosenza’s lack of standing to bring the application, given he is not an actual creditor of Mr Tigani;
·Mr Cosenza’s lack of candour in respect to the extreme personal animus he feels in respect of Mr Tigani personally, which demonstrates his use of the examination process for a purpose contrary to its statutory intent;
·The extreme breadth of the documents sought over very many years, which renders it oppressive and unfair;
·Fundamentally, the lack of any evidentiary basis for the issue of the summons in question. Mr Cosenza’s application rests on optimistic conjecture on his part.
As was pointed out by French CJ in Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (“Aon”)[34] courts have an obligation to ensure that the litigation coming before them is transacted effectively and efficiently, not only in the interests of the individual parties concerned but also in the interests of other litigants and users of the court, whose cases are inevitably affected by how other cases in the system are managed. His Honour said as follows:
…the adversarial system has been qualified by changing practices in the courts directed to the reduction of costs and delay and the realisation that the courts are concerned not only with justice between the parties, which remains their priority, but also with the public interest in the proper and efficient use of public resources.[35]
[34] Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175.
[35] See Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 at 189, [23].
In the case, French CJ also noted that courts have the inherent authority to control their processes and prevent their application in a way which would be unfair to a party or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people.[36]In this context it was noted that it was impossible to comprehensively list all possible categories of abuse. In this context, his Honour noted:
A broad merits-based judgment [is] required, taking account of public and private interests affected and focussing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it an issue which could and should have been raised earlier. As Lord Bingham said:
“As one cannot comprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or not”. [37]
[36] See Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 at 193, [33].
[37] See Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 at [34]; citing Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1 at 31 per Lord Bingham of Cornhill.

In my view, the issue of the summons sought by Mr Cosenza, in the circumstances which prevail in this case, chiefly the effluxion of time; the fact that Mr Duncan has declined to take the steps sought by Mr Cosenza because he considers them to be futile; and the lack of any obvious indication that there will be the discovery of something that may aid the process of finding and recovering assets available for distribution; are matters which are liable to cause right-thinking individual to consider it abusive of Mr Tigani.
In my assessment, the relevant summons in this matter is too wide and vague and renders it unfair and oppressive to Mr Tigani. The court is under a duty to control its process and protect individuals from potential abuses of them. In Roufeil v Fiore (No 2)[38] Jackson J noted that the receipt of a summons is a significant matter, as in theoretical terms, non-compliance may result in a finding of contempt as such it is incumbent on the person seeking a summons to ensure it is framed with sufficient precision both to make the scope of what is sought clear, and to make the burden of compliance reasonably proportionate to the purpose of the Trustee in conducting the examination.
[38] Roufeil v Fiore, in the matter of the Bankrupt Estate of Peter Andrew Fiore (No 2) [2019] FCA 916 at [38].
I do not consider the current summons has such precision given its width. In addition, I do not consider that it can be said to be directed towards identifying property which may be relevant to the now long concluded bankruptcy. In this context, Mr Cosenza has not identified any property currently available.
Given the protracted history of these proceedings and the long-standing personal hostility which I am satisfied exists between Mr Cosenza on the one hand and Mr Tigani, on the other, which extends over many years, when coupled with the lack of actual particulars of what evidence or documents Mr Cosenza seeks other than he asserts that Mr Tigani is dishonest and has defrauded him, it is not clear to me what is the forensic purpose to which the issue of the summons is actually directed, other than Mr Cosenza hopes that something will turn up from it and Mr Tigani will be revealed as the fraudster Mr Cosenza believes him to be. In my view, this is not a purpose congruent with the purpose of the section in question but is foreign to its legislative intent and, as a consequence, renders the summons in question an abuse of power.
The examination power under the Act is to provide information which may be relevant to the affairs of a bankrupt person and identify property which may be included in the bankruptcy. In this context, it needs to be pointed out the relevant bankruptcy is long concluded and Mr Cosenza, other than in purely hypothetical terms, is not able to identify any such property.
In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the issue of the summons is not in keeping nor collateral to the purpose envisaged by section 81 of the Act and should therefore be dismissed as an abuse of process.[39] I will dismiss the application in question, together with all the related summonses which hang off the one addressed to Mr Tigani.
[39] See Walton v ACN 004 410 833 Limited (formerly Arrium Ltd) (in liq) [2022] HCA 3 per Kiefel CJ and Keane J at [19].
In all these circumstances, it is appropriate that the applicant should pay the respondent’s costs. I will therefore direct that Mr Cosenza pay Mr Tigani’s costs of the application to be as agreed or otherwise taxed.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and seventy-one (171) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Brown.
Associate:
Dated: 16 August 2024

File number:	ADG 7 of 2023
Judgment of:	JUDGE BROWN
Date of judgment:	16 August 2024
Catchwords:	BANKRUPTCY – Practice and procedure – Application for summary dismissal – Applicant seeks to examine the respondent and various associates – Where the respondent was discharged from bankruptcy 14 years ago – Documents sought relate to a period of 18 years – Where the trustee previously appointed to administer the estate does not support any further efforts being undertaken – Whether the summonses are oppressive and vexatious or an abuse of process – Status of applicant to bring proceedings – Matters to be considered
Legislation:	Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 5, 58, 81, 116, 127, 139WA, 149, 153, 178, 263, 263A, 265, 267, 269 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 143, 190 Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A Law of Property Act 1936 (SA) s 15 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Bankruptcy) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 6.01 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 2.06, 13.13
Cases cited:	Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 Austino Wentworthville Pty Limited v Metroland Australia Limited [2013] NSWCA 59 Cosenza & Denco Holdings Pty Ltd v Tigani & Annatom Pty Ltd [2005] SADC 63 Cosenza v Duncan (Trustee in Bankruptcy) (No 2) [2018] FCCA 1749 Cosenza v Duncan (Trustee in Bankruptcy), in the matter of Tigani [2020] FCA 105 Cosenza v Registrar Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2022] FedCFamC2G 1041 Karounos & Ors v Official Trustee (1988) 19 FCR 330 Re Abrahams; Ex parte Thomas (1985) 9 FCR 232 Re Csidei; Ex parte Andrew (1979) 28 ALR 381 Re Todd; Ex parte Todd [1986] 68 ALR 483 Roufeil v Fiore, in the matter of the Bankrupt Estate of Peter Andrew Fiore (No 2) [2019] FCA 916 Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118 Walton v ACN 004 410 833 Limited (formerly Arrium Ltd) (in liq) [2022] HCA 3
Division:	Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs:	171
Date of hearing:	6 October & 7 December 2023
Place:	Adelaide
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Lazarevich (direct brief)
Counsel for the Respondent:	Ms Flaherty
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Scales & Partners

ADG 7 of 2023
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2) IN THE MATTER OF THOMAS TIGANI, A BANKRUPT
BETWEEN:	DEAN COSENZA Applicant
AND:	THOMAS TIGANI Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:	JUDGE BROWN
DATE OF ORDER:	16 AUGUST 2024