Kallimanis and Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (Compensation)

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Kallimanis and Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2023] AATA 4496 (19 December 2023)

Division:                  GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2021/3157

2022/2947

2022/3308

Re:Eftimios Kallimanis

APPLICANT

Linfox Australia Pty LtdAnd  

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member Dr Linda Kirk 

Date:19 December 2023

Place:Sydney

The First Review Application is dismissed under section 42B(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).

The Reviewable Decisions which are the subject of the Second and Third Review Applications are affirmed.

.................................[SGD].......................................

Senior Member Dr Linda Kirk

CATCHWORDS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – COMPENSATION – estoppel – claims previously made for compensation arising from employment – whether raising same substantive issues – relevance of principles of res judicata, estoppel, issue estoppel in proceedings of Tribunal – whether application frivolous or vexatious – power of Tribunal to limit evidence on matters canvassed in review of previous decisions and subject of extensive findings of fact – First Review Application dismissed.

COMPENSATION – whether liability should be accepted under section 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – Applicant diagnosed with Adjustment Disorder – whether a consequence of the injury sustained to his left biceps during the work incident on 12 January 2017 and left biceps tendon surgery and recovery period -d whether an ailment – whether a disease – causation – whether ailments contributed to, to a significant degree, by employment – Second and Third Reviewable Decisions affirmed.

LEGISLATION  

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)

Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth)

Tribunals Amalgamation Act 2015 (Cth)

CASES

Abrahams v Comcare (2006) 93 ALD 147

Australian Postal Corporation v Sellick (2008) 101 ALD 245

Cheung v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2009) 176 FCR 20

Commonwealth v Snell [2019] FCAFC 57

Drake v Minister for Immigration (1979) 24 ALR 577

Ellison and Comcare (2022) 175 ALD 62

Ellison v Comcare [2022] FCA 95

Frosch v Comcare [2004] FCA 1642

Habib v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 23

Hickey v Australian Postal Corporation [2023] FCA 57

Jeffrey & Katauskas v SST Consulting Pty Ltd (2009) 239 CLR 75

Kallimanis and Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2020] AATA 1796

Kallimanis and Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2022] AATA 3737 

Kennedy v Comcare [2014] FCA 82

Lees v Comcare (1999) 56 ALD 84

Morgan v WorkCover Corporation [2013] SASCFC 139

Mununggurr v Comcare [2020] FCA 1786

Novosel v Comcare [2017] FCA 722

NXPQ and Comcare [2021] AATA 4094

Re Ashton and Linfox Armaguard Pty Ltd (2011) 128 ALD 593

Re Durham and TNT Australia Pty Ltd (2011) 124 ALD 136

Re Quinn and Australian Postal Corporation (1992) 15 AAR 519

Rippon v Chilcotin Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 142

Snell and Commonwealth of Australia (Compensation) [2018] AATA 1107

State Bank of New South Wales Ltd v Stenhouse Ltd (1997) Aust Torts Reports 81-423

Telstra Corporation v Hannaford [2006] FCAFC 87

Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507

Wong v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs…

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Details
Case
[2023] AATA 4496
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Kallimanis and Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (Compensation)* concerned an applicant who had lodged claims for compensation arising from his employment. The dispute centred on whether the applicant was entitled to further compensation for an Adjustment Disorder, which he claimed was a consequence of an injury sustained to his left biceps during a work incident on 12 January 2017, and the subsequent surgery and recovery period. The matter came before Linda Kirk SM of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

The legal issues before the Tribunal were twofold. Firstly, it had to determine whether the applicant's Adjustment Disorder constituted an "ailment" or a "disease" for the purposes of the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988* (Cth), and crucially, whether it was contributed to, to a significant degree, by his employment. Secondly, the Tribunal considered whether the applicant was entitled to compensation under section 14 of the Act for this condition, in light of previous decisions and findings of fact. The Tribunal also addressed preliminary issues regarding estoppel and the power to limit evidence on matters already canvassed.

The Tribunal's reasoning focused on the definition of "injury" and "disease" under the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988* (Cth). It applied the principles that an ailment is contributed to to a "significant degree" if it is substantially more than material. The Tribunal reviewed the evidence and the findings from a previous decision, which had determined that the applicant's accepted left biceps tendon condition had been satisfactorily repaired and that there was no further entitlement to compensation for that specific injury or subsequent incapacity from 26 March 2018. The Tribunal affirmed the previous decisions, finding that the applicant's Adjustment Disorder was not an injury that resulted in incapacity or impairment arising out of, or in the course of, his employment, nor was it a disease contributed to to a significant degree by his employment.

The Tribunal affirmed the Second and Third Reviewable Decisions. It found that the respondent was not liable to accept liability for the applicant's Adjustment Disorder under section 14 of the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988* (Cth).

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Outline of Respondent’s Submissions, Applications 2018/2681 and 2019/2338 dated 20 December 2019.The Tribunal has reviewed the evidence before it and refers to relevant materials below.BACKGROUND The Applicant was born in 1963 and is currently 60 years of age. In 2011, he commenced employment with the Respondent. In January 2017, the Applicant was employed as a Storeperson Grade 2 and was 2IC to the Team Leader in respect of the 3PL contract to Joint Logistics Command, Department of Defence and Naval, at Garden Island.[16] His work duties included sorting, lifting, packing, paperwork, and computer use.[17][16] Applicant’s statement, 22 July 2019, [5].[17] Exhibit R1, T11, 90.Work incident - 12 January 2017 On 12 January 2017, an incident report recorded the following:At approximately 1000hrs today one of our employees [the Applicant] had felt a twinge in the left arm and as such was taken to the Medical Centre.It was determined from there that [the Applicant] had to undergo additional Medical Treatment and as such the treating Physician has advised that [the Applicant] needs surgery to remedy the injury. In his statement dated 22 July 2019, the Applicant described how the incident (‘the work incident’) occurred and the pain he consequently felt:[18]… I was moving a crate so that it would sit on a pallet correctly. I did not realise how heavy the crate was. It did not have a “heavy item” sticker on it. When I went to lift and slide the crate, I felt sudden severe pain in my left elbow.[18] Applicant’s statement, 22 July 2019, [19]. On 12 January 2017, the Applicant was examined by Dr Kwan Yeoh, Hand, Wrist and Upper Limb Surgeon, who diagnosed him as suffering from an ‘acute rupture left distal biceps tendon’ and recommended that he undergo a ‘repair left distal biceps tendon’.[19][19] Exhibit R1, T9, 74 – 75.First compensation claim – 13 January 2017 On 13 January 2017, the Applicant lodged a claim for compensation (‘First compensation claim’) under the SRC Act in relation to ‘bicep tear at elbow level’ he claimed to have sustained on 12 January 2017 as a consequence of ‘sliding a crate’.[20] The part of the body injured was ‘upper left arm from elbow.’[21][20] Ibid, T11, 87, Question 10.[21] Ibid, T11, 87, Question 11. On 16 January 2017, the Respondent issued a Determination accepting liability for the Applicant’s left elbow condition, being an ‘acute rupture left distal biceps tendon’ pursuant to section 14 of the SRC Act (‘the left biceps tendon condition’).[22] Several Determinations were subsequently issued by the Respondent accepting liability to pay compensation for the Applicant’s medical treatment expenses.[23][22] Ibid, T14, 98 – 103.[23] Ibid, T23, T28, 118 – 121, 129 – 132. On 19 January 2017, the Applicant underwent repair of the left distal biceps tendon (‘left biceps tendon repair surgery’) performed by Dr Yeoh.[24][24] Ibid, T21, 113 – 114. Following the work incident, the Applicant was off work for about three months and then returned to work on light duties and restricted hours. He gradually progressed to full-time hours, but he remained on restricted duties as the injury to his bicep prevented heavy lifting.[25] The Respondent continued to compensate the Applicant in respect of the left biceps’ tendon condition.[26][25] Applicant’s statement, 22 July 2019, [27].[26] Ibid, [24].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

On 30 April 2019, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the second Reviewable Decision.First Tribunal decision – 11 June 2020 In its decision dated 11 June 2020, the Tribunal, constituted by Deputy President Constance and Dr Bygrave (‘the First Tribunal’), affirmed both Reviewable Decisions.[40] It found that as at 8 May 2018 (the date of the First Reviewable Decision) the Applicant had no present entitlement to payment of compensation for medical treatment expenses and incapacity benefits pursuant to sections 16 and 19of the Act arising from the accepted left biceps tendon condition.[41] In relation to the Second Reviewable Decision, the First Tribunal found that the Respondent was not liable under section 14 of the Act to compensate the Applicant for his other left arm conditions.[40] Kallimanis and Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2020] AATA 1796; Exhibit R1, T87, 341 – 378. [41] Ibid, [62] and [175]. The Tribunal relevantly determined:(1)that by 28 March 2018, the Applicant's accepted left biceps tendon condition had been satisfactorily repaired;[42] (2)since 26 March 2018, there was no medical treatment obtained by the Applicant that was reasonable for him to obtain in respect of the left biceps tendon condition;[43](3)from 26 March 2018, the Applicant has suffered from no incapacity for employment;(4)the Applicant’s other left arm conditions were not compensable for the purposes of section 14 of the SRC Act;[44] and(5)made factual findings as to the physiological conditions suffered by the Applicant in the context of his reported pain conditions.LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK [42] Ibid, [52].[43] Ibid, [50].[44] Ibid, [109], [135], [174].Liability to pay compensation The entitlement to compensation for an employee under the SRC Act is conferred by section 14(1) of the SRC Act which provides that a respondent is:… liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act in respect of an injury suffered by an employee if the injury results in death, incapacity for work, or impairment. ‘Injury’ is defined in section 5A of the SRC Act:(1)…(a)a disease suffered by an employee; or(b)an injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee, that is a physical or mental injury arising out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment; or (c)an aggravation of a physical or mental injury (other than a disease) suffered by an employee (whether or not that injury arose out of, or in the course of, the employee's employment), that is an aggravation that arose out of, or in the course of, that employment; but does not include a disease, injury or aggravation suffered as a result of reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner in respect of the employee's employment. A ‘disease’ is relevantly defined in section 5B of the SRC Act to mean:(1)…(a)an ailment suffered by an employee; or (b)an aggravation of such an ailment; that was contributed to, to a significant degree, by the employee's employment by the Commonwealth or a licensee.(2)In determining whether an ailment or aggravation was contributed to, to a significant degree, by an employee's employment by the Commonwealth or a licensee, the following matters may be taken into account:(a)the duration of the employment;(b)the nature of, and particular tasks involved in, the employment;(c)any predisposition of the employee to the ailment or aggravation;(d)any activities of the employee not related to the employment;(e)any other matters affecting the employee's health.This subsection does not limit the matters that may be taken into account.(3) In this Act:‘significant degree’ means a degree that is substantially more than material.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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