Snell and Commonwealth of Australia (Compensation)

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Snell and Commonwealth of Australia (Compensation) [2018] AATA 1107 (2 May 2018)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:           2017/3060

Re:Patrick Snell

APPLICANT

AndCommonwealth of Australia

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis

Date:2 May 2018

Place:Brisbane

The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and in its place determines that the Applicant’s malignant metastatic melanoma was contributed to in a material degree by his relevant employment and that non-economic loss should be calculated at 47.3%. The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review with respect to the Applicant’s degree of permanent impairment and remits it, and the calculation of amounts payable to the Applicant, for reconsideration by the Respondent.

..............................[sgd]..........................................

Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis

CATCHWORDS

COMPENSATION – seafarers compensation – metastatic malignant melanoma – whether the Applicant’s employment contributed to in a material way his condition – where Applicant had spent more than forty years at sea – degree of permanent impairment – calculation of non-economic loss – decision under review set aside and remitted

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – issue estoppel – Matusko methodology – where Applicant had previously been successful before the Tribunal in a consent decision – where then-Respondent had accepted liability for broad range of solar induced skin conditions – whether issues the same – whether connection between Applicant’s current and former conditions – where Applicant’s current condition the same as one for which liability had been accepted – whether there is a reason to allow re-litigation – where Respondent sought to adduce new evidence – whether Respondent could have adduced the same or similar evidence in earlier proceedings – whether justice to the parties favours re-litigation – the discretion to allow re-litigation was not enlivened

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 33
Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth), ss 3, 10, 26, 39
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), ss 14, 16, 19, 21, 27

CASES

Blair v Curran

(1939) 62 CLR 464


Canute v Comcare

(2006) 226 CLR 535
Miller v University of New South Wales
[2003] FCAFC 180
Moore and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission
[2017] AATA 532
Quinn and Australian Postal Corporation [1992] AATA 668
Re Matusko and Australian Postal Corporation
[1995] AATA 14
Telstra Corporation v Hannaford [2006] FCAFC 87


Wiegand and Comcare

[2014] AATA 413

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Guide to the Assessment of the Degree of Permanent Impairment (Edition 2.1)

Handley, K R, Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata (4th ed, LexisNexis, 2009)


Pearce, D, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2015)


Second Reading Speech: Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Bill 1992

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis

2 May 2018

INTRODUCTION

  1. Mr Patrick Snell (“the Applicant”) is suffering from metastatic malignant melanoma, a terminal cancer. He attributes this condition to his time serving in the merchant marine, and, accordingly, has lodged a claim for compensation under the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth) (“the Act”).

  2. A complicating factor in this matter is the fact the Applicant has previously – and successfully…

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Details
Case
[2018] AATA 1107
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for compensation by the Applicant, a seafarer, who was suffering from metastatic malignant melanoma. The Applicant had previously been successful before the Tribunal in a consent decision where the Respondent’s legal predecessor accepted liability for a "solar induced skin disease" contracted during his employment. The Applicant argued that this prior decision should prevent the Tribunal from re-litigating the issue of whether his employment contributed to his current condition. The case was heard by Senior Member Theodore Tavoularis of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

The primary legal issues before the Tribunal were: firstly, whether the Applicant's current diagnosis of metastatic malignant melanoma was the same condition for which liability had previously been accepted; and secondly, if it was the same condition, whether the Applicant could rely on issue estoppel, or a similar principle based on the *Matusko* methodology, to prevent re-litigation of the contribution issue. If issue estoppel did not apply, the Tribunal also needed to determine if the Applicant's employment contributed in a material degree to his present condition, and if so, to assess the degree of permanent impairment and calculate non-economic loss.

Senior Member Tavoularis considered the Applicant's argument for issue estoppel, noting that while the Tribunal has historically expressed uncertainty about the applicability of strict issue estoppel, the Applicant relied on the *Matusko* methodology. This methodology allows a tribunal to refuse re-litigation of an issue if certain requirements are met, even if strict issue estoppel does not apply. The Tribunal noted that if the current condition was found to be different from the one in the 2013 decision, no issue estoppel or variant thereof could apply. The Tribunal also considered the Respondent's attempt to adduce new evidence, assessing whether this evidence could have been presented in earlier proceedings and whether justice favoured re-litigation.

The Tribunal found that the Applicant was suffering from metastatic malignant melanoma. However, it determined that the Respondent's attempt to re-litigate the contribution issue was not precluded by issue estoppel or the *Matusko* methodology. The Tribunal concluded that the discretion to allow re-litigation was not enlivened in this instance, implying that the Respondent could indeed seek to argue the contribution issue anew. The decision was ultimately set aside and remitted for further consideration, indicating that the Tribunal would proceed to determine the contribution issue and, if necessary, the quantum of compensation.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

A complicating factor in this matter is the fact the Applicant has previously – and successfully – claimed compensation from Australian River Co. Ltd., a company of which the parties agree the present Respondent is a legal successor, before the Tribunal.[1] In that case, a consent decision was reached, whereby the then-respondent accepted liability for the Applicant’s “solar induced skin disease” under the Act.[2] I shall refer to that consent decision henceforth as “the 2013 decision”.[1] See the consent decision in Tribunal Case Number 2012/0189.[2] Ibid.THE QUESTIONS THIS DECISION MUST ANSWER In this context, and having reference to the submissions lodged by the Applicant and the Respondent, I must approach this case by reference to the following questions:(a)What is the diagnosis of the condition from which the Applicant is presently suffering?(b)Is the present disease the same as the condition for which the then-respondent accepted liability in the 2013 decision?(c)If the answer to (b) is ‘yes’, can the Applicant avail himself of issue estoppel or some variant thereof?(i)I note that if the answer to (b) is ‘no’, no issue estoppel or variant thereof could apply, as the issues in this case are different from those previously determined by the Tribunal.(d)If the answer to (b) is ‘no’, what is the relevant onus of proof (i.e. is the Applicant’s current condition “of a kind specified by the Minister, by legislative instrument, as a disease related to employment of a kind specified in the instrument”)[3]?(e)Considering the answer to (d) (and if the answer to (b) is ‘no’), did the Applicant’s employment with the Respondent’s legal predecessor contribute, in a material degree, to his present condition?(i)If the answer is ‘yes’, the Respondent will be liable to the Applicant. If the answer is ‘no’, no liability will be established and I need not proceed any further.(f)If the answer to (c) or to (e) is ‘yes’, what degree of permanent impairment is relevant to the Applicant?(g)If the answer to (c) or to (e) is ‘yes’, what is the correct or preferable assessment of the Applicant’s non-economic loss?[3] See the Act, s 10(1)(b). Only if the answer to questions (c) or (e) is ‘yes’, will the Respondent be liable to the Applicant. The answers to questions (f) and (g) will dictate the quantum of the Respondent’s liability. I will now proceed to answering the above questions.CONSIDERATIONThe Applicant’s current diagnosis I have been furnished with written reports and oral testimony of two experienced medical practitioners: Dr Godfrey Wagner,[4] briefed by the Applicant and Professor Richard Fox,[5] who was briefed by the Respondent. In addition to this, I have received a swathe of medical reports and information which is contained in the T-Documents.[4] Exhibit 9, T-Documents, T 44, pp 1067-1071.[5] Ibid, T 39, pp 1032-1038. On the basis of the evidence available to me, I find that the Applicant is presently suffering from the disease of metastatic malignant melanoma.Can the Tribunal consider the contribution issue?

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I will now proceed to answering the above questions.CONSIDERATIONThe Applicant’s current diagnosis I have been furnished with written reports and oral testimony of two experienced medical practitioners: Dr Godfrey Wagner,[4] briefed by the Applicant and Professor Richard Fox,[5] who was briefed by the Respondent. In addition to this, I have received a swathe of medical reports and information which is contained in the T-Documents.[4] Exhibit 9, T-Documents, T 44, pp 1067-1071.[5] Ibid, T 39, pp 1032-1038. On the basis of the evidence available to me, I find that the Applicant is presently suffering from the disease of metastatic malignant melanoma.Can the Tribunal consider the contribution issue? In order for the Applicant to succeed in the present case, the Tribunal must be reasonably satisfied that the Applicant’s employment contributed in a material degree to the contraction of his metastatic malignant melanoma.[6] As noted above, the Applicant has already had some success before the Tribunal in asserting that a solar-caused skin condition of his was contributed to in a material degree by his employment. Now, he asserts that his success in the 2013 decision prevents or ought to prevent the Tribunal from considering whether his metastatic malignant melanoma was contributed to in a material degree by his employment.[6] The Act, s 3. While Counsel for the Applicant termed the mechanism through which he argued this should happen “issue estoppel”,[7] that term does not faithfully reflect his argument.[8] Rather, relying on the case of Re Matusko and Australian Postal Corporation [1995] AATA 14 (“Matusko”) and my own decision in Moore and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2017] AATA 532 (“Moore”),[9] the Applicant instead relied upon a close analogue of issue estoppel. Using the Matusko methodology, the Tribunal, under the auspices of s 33(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), can refuse to allow for an issue or a matter to be re-litigated if certain requirements are met. [7] Exhibit 1, Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (“SFIC”), [82]-[98].[8] For the classic definition of issue estoppel, see Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 531-532 (Dixon J).[9] I note that the Tribunal in Matusko expressly stated that issue estoppel does not apply in the Tribunal. However, there is a great deal of uncertainty on this point (see Miller v University of New South Wales [2003] FCAFC 180 at [63]; Dennis Pearce, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (4th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 2015) at 17.7-17.8). I further note that I took no position on whether issue estoppel is applicable in the Tribunal in Moore. At the outset, I should note that, as observed by Ryan and Giles JJ in Miller v University of New South Wales [2003] FCAFC 180 at [63], “It is clear enough that it is difficult, if not impossible to reconcile” the authorities on whether issue estoppel is applicable before Commonwealth tribunals. I do not propose to attempt such an undertaking. Rather, I will proceed on the basis upon which the Applicant has brought issue estoppel into consideration: the Matusko methodology. Before I do so, I consider it worthwhile mentioning that if the Tribunal was wrong in Matusko and a true issue estoppel does apply before the Tribunal,[10] and the issue in the present case is the same as one in the 2013 decision, the rules around issue estoppel would prevent me from exercising any discretion to allow for that issue to be re-agitated.[11][10] Cf Re Matusko and Australian Postal Corporation [1995] AATA 14 at [33(a)].[11] See K R Handley, Spencer Bower and Handley: Res Judicata (4th ed, LexisNexis, 2009) 103-123.The Matusko methodology