Kallimanis and Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2022] AATA 3737 (7 November 2022)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2021/3157, 2022/2947 & 2022/3308
Re:Eftimios Kallimanis
APPLICANT
AndLinfox Australia Pty Ltd
RESPONDENT
Decision
Tribunal:Deputy President B W Rayment OAM KC
Date:7 November 2022
Place:Sydney
The application for dismissal of the applications for review under s42B(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) is refused.
................................[SGD]........................................
Deputy President B W Rayment OAM KC
Catchwords
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – s 42B(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – previous application for review to the Tribunal – previous application affirmed by the Tribunal – new application based on similar facts – not clear that same claim is being made – abuse of process not established – application for dismissal refused
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth)
Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth)Cases
Canute v Comcare [2006] HCA 47; (2006) 226 CLR 535
Cheung v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2009) 176 FCR 20
Commonwealth of Australia v Snell [2019] FCAFC 57; (2019) 269 FCR 18
Kallimanis and Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2020] AATA 1796
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hannaford (2006) 151 FCR 253REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President B W Rayment OAM KC
7 November 2022
In these interlocutory proceedings the respondent claims that the present proceedings are an abuse of process, having regard to the fact that in earlier Tribunal proceedings between the same parties, the Tribunal, by Deputy President Constance and Member Dr Bygrave, rejected a relevantly similar claim made by the present applicant. The moving party says that the matters found by DP Constance and Dr Bygrave answer the claim now put forward by the applicant.
The relevant background is that in the earlier Tribunal proceedings, the Tribunal affirmed two reviewable decisions made by Linfox Australia Pty Ltd (‘Linfox’). The first was a reviewable decision of 8 May 2018 that Mr Kallimanis had no present entitlement to payment of compensation for medical treatment expenses and incapacity benefits pursuant to sections 16 and 19 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the ‘Act’ or ‘SRC Act’) arising from an accepted left elbow condition. The second was a reviewable decision of 12 April 2019 denying liability to compensate Mr Kallimanis pursuant to the Act for claimed conditions of left ulnar neuritis, left auxiliary nerve lesion and left lateral epicondylitis. Earlier workers’ compensation claims made by Mr Kallimanis, being claims made in January 2017 and thereafter until 26 March 2018 under ss 16 and 19 of the Act, had been accepted by Linfox and paid. They arose from an accident at work in which he suffered on 12 January 2017 an acute rupture of a tendon in the left distal bicep.
The Tribunal’s reasons discuss views as to causation expressed by two specialists qualified by the parties, and prefer the views expressed by Dr Steadman, called by Linfox.
The decision of the Full Court of the Federal…
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- Case
- [2022] AATA 3737
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the doctrine of issue estoppel applied to prevent the Tribunal from reconsidering a matter that had already been the subject of a previous determination by the Tribunal, particularly in light of section 62 of the *Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992* (which is cognate with section 62 of the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988*). The Tribunal had to consider the effect of section 43(6) of the *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975* on its own previous decisions.
The Tribunal reasoned that, by virtue of section 62 of the relevant Act and the principles established in cases such as *Snell* and *Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hannaford*, it was not bound by its own earlier decisions between the same parties. The doctrine of issue estoppel was considered inapposite to the Tribunal's constitutional and statutory context. The Act permits progressive and evolving decision-making, allowing for reconsideration of earlier determinations and findings of fact, even if no new evidence is presented. Earlier findings can be revisited when reviewing a different reviewable decision, and the Tribunal is not confined by previous determinations, being able to analyse facts anew. Consequently, the application for dismissal on the grounds of abuse of process was refused.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 78 of the Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 is cognate with a provision of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988: s 62. Sections 62(1) and (2) of the latter Act provide as follows: 62 Reconsideration of determinations1A determining authority may, on its own motion:(a)reconsider a determination made by it; or(b)cause such a determination to be reconsidered by a person to whom its power under this section is delegated, being a person other than the person who made, or was involved in the making of, the determination;whether or not a proceeding has been instituted or completed under this Part in respect of a reviewable decision made in relation to that determination.2A request to a determining authority to reconsider a determination made by it may be made by:(a)the claimant; or(b)if the determination affects the Commonwealth—the Commonwealth; or(c)if the determination affects a Commonwealth authority—that Commonwealth authority. An “earlier determination” will include a case in which this Tribunal has given the relevant decision in place of an internal review decision, because s 43(6) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 provides that: 43 Tribunal’s decision on review6A decision of a person as varied by the Tribunal, or a decision made by the Tribunal in substitution for the decision of a person, shall, for all purposes (other than the purposes of applications to the Tribunal for a review or of appeals in accordance with section 44), be deemed to be a decision of that person and, upon the coming into operation of the decision of the Tribunal, unless the Tribunal otherwise orders, has effect, or shall be deemed to have had effect, on and from the day on which the decision under review has or had effect. As was held by the Court in Snell, it follows that (in an SRC Act case) the Tribunal may reconsider an earlier Tribunal determination deemed for all purposes to be an earlier determination of the respondent, and it also follows that no issue estoppel exists in the Tribunal. More generally, the Court in Snell stated that the doctrine of issue estoppel is not apposite to the constitutional and statutory context of this Tribunal. In an SRC Act case in particular, it was decided that section 62 produced the result that the Tribunal was not bound by its own earlier decisions between the same parties. Its obligation in the later proceedings is to consider the evidence before it, and not to reject it on the ground that it is inconsistent with an earlier Tribunal decision. If nothing is added to the evidence led before the earlier Tribunal, and the later proceeding is not disposed of summarily, then the earlier Tribunal decision will have significant if not overwhelming weight. The Court referred to the earlier Full Court decision of Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hannaford (2006) 151 FCR 253 which, in the light of the text, structure and underlying policy of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988, did not suggest that any decision made under it “permanently enshrines’ every finding of fact on which it is made. The Court there said that s 62 specifically permitted the employer to reconsider earlier decisions at any time, including reconsidering any prior finding of fact. As Conti J, with whose reasons the other members agreed said, the Act allows for progressive and evolving decision-making, for adjustment or change in light of events and circumstances which may subsequently happen.