Rafidi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rafidi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2020] FCAFC 26

Appeal from: Rafidi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCA 620
File number: NSD 746 of 2019
Judges: GLEESON, LEE AND STEWART JJ
Date of judgment: 2 March 2020
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – appeal from decision of the Federal Court of Australia dismissing application for setting aside of bankruptcy notice – whether Court required to go behind judgment – whether consent judgment entered by consequence of vitiated consent –appeal dismissed
Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 30(1)(b)
Cases cited:

Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCAFC 15; (2014) 219 FCR 322

Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) [2001] FCA 1833; (2001) 117 FCR 424

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Rafidi [2016] NSWSC 1931

Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553

Guss v Johnstone [2000] HCA 26; (2000) 171 ALR 598

House v R [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499

Precision Plastics v Demir [1975] HCA 27; (1975) 132 CLR 362

Rafidi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2017] NSWCA 96

ReBriggs; Ex Parte Briggs v Deputy Commission of Taxation (WA) [1986] FCA 512; (1986) 12 FCR 310

Shaw v Yarranova Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 88; (2017) 252 FCR 267

Xu v Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) [2014] FCA 461; (2014) 315 ALR 523

Date of hearing: 26 November 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: General and Personal Insolvency
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 64
Solicitor for the Appellant: T Hall of Hall Partners
Counsel for the Respondent: E Holmes with J Foley
Solicitor for the Respondent: Dentons

ORDERS

NSD 746 of 2019
BETWEEN:

IYAD RAFIDI

Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

JUDGES:

GLEESON, LEE AND STEWART JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

2 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. The appellant (Mr Rafidi) appeals from the decision of a single judge of this Court, dismissing his application to set aside bankruptcy notice 212149 (bankruptcy notice): Rafidi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2019] FCA 620.

  2. The bankruptcy notice was issued on 21 February 2017 at the request of the respondent (Bank) and claims a total debt of $9,331,605.09. The bankruptcy notice expired on 3 May 2019 and the respondent (Bank) filed a creditor’s petition on 29 October 2019. However, both parties agreed that the Full Court may make orders upon an appeal against a refusal to set aside a bankruptcy notice and thereby undo the effects of an act of bankruptcy that occurred upon the expiry of the notice: Guss v Johnstone [2000] HCA 26; (2000) 171 ALR 598 at [62]-[63].

  3. The amount claimed in the notice is based…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 26
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Rafidi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, the appellant, Mr Rafidi, sought to appeal a decision of the Federal Court of Australia that dismissed his application to set aside a bankruptcy notice issued by the respondent, the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. Mr Rafidi argued that the primary judge was required to make certain factual findings that would have led to the conclusion that his consent to the consent judgment was "vitiated". The primary judge had dismissed Mr Rafidi's application to set aside the consent judgment, and Mr Rafidi now sought to appeal that decision.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge was required to make the five factual findings proposed by Mr Rafidi, and whether those findings, if made, would have required the conclusion that Mr Rafidi's consent to the consent judgment was "vitiated". The court found that the primary judge was not required to make the proposed findings, as the principles regarding applications to set aside bankruptcy notices and applications for a sequestration order are different. The court also found that even if the proposed findings had been made, they would not have required the conclusion that Mr Rafidi's consent was "vitiated".

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the primary judge had correctly exercised his discretion in dismissing Mr Rafidi's application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. The court found that Mr Rafidi's prospects of success were poor, and that it was not in the interests of justice to permit him to resile from the position he had taken previously. The court also found that the primary judge had not erred in his consideration of the 14 January 2009 letter and the Bank's submission concerning its alleged inauthenticity.

The final orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed, and that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. The court found that the appeal had no reasonable prospect of success, and that the appeal should be dismissed accordingly. The court also found that the respondent was entitled to costs on the appeal, as the appeal had been brought and pursued without merit.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The primary judge also rejected an argument concerning the form of the bankruptcy notice, which is not pressed on the appeal.FACTS SAID TO DEMONSTRATE THAT MR RAFIDI’S CONSENT TO JUDGMENT WAS VITIATED Mr Rafidi’s contention is that the primary judge was required to make five factual findings (being the five findings set out at [8(2)] above) which, in turn, required his Honour to make the further finding that Mr Rafidi’s consent to the consent judgment was “vitiated”. This contention involves two elements, namely, that:(1)the primary judge was required to make the five relevant findings; and(2)the five relevant findings required, in turn, the conclusion that Mr Rafidi’s consent was “vitiated”. Mr Hall, who appeared on Mr Rafidi’s behalf on the appeal, submitted that Mr Rafidi had relied upon a substantial body of evidence before the primary judge, raising everything that he would have raised at the creditor’s petition stage. On this basis, Mr Hall contended that the primary judge should have gone behind the consent judgment as a matter of good case management. We do not accept that submission. The principles regarding applications to set aside bankruptcy notices and applications for a sequestration order are different, reflecting, among other things, the effects of a debtor’s position under different provisions of the Act on third parties. The task of the primary judge was to consider whether to set aside the bankruptcy notice by reference to the principles identified by his Honour. Mr Hall also stated that Mr Rafidi would not contend that the Court should go behind the consent judgment at the creditor’s petition stage because he would have nothing to add. Mr Hall did not suggest that this contention had been made before the primary judge or explain how it should have affected the exercise of the primary judge’s discretion. In those circumstances, it does not advance Mr Rafidi’s case on the appeal.First and fifth proposed findings: 14 January 2009 letter and inadequate fraud pleading The first proposed finding is that the Bank “unfairly” made a submission in the Supreme Court proceeding that the relevant letter was not an authentic document of the Bank. The fifth proposed finding was that the Bank’s submission concerning the alleged inauthenticity of the 14 January 2009 letter dated 16 October 2016, entitled “Cross-defendant’s reasons in support of non-admission as to authenticity of 14 January 2009 letter (ordered T130 L 21-29)” (inauthenticity submission), was not a proper fraud pleading of which notice was given at an appropriate time. The primary judge addressed the letter and the submission as follows (at [36] and [46] of his Honour’s reasons):[36] The first [factual contention in support of Mr Rafidi’s argument that his consent to the consent judgment was vitiated] is that senior counsel for the CBA unfairly made a submission during the Supreme Court Proceedings that the 14 January 2009 letter was not an authentic document and asked the court ought to make a finding to that effect. There is no dispute that this allegation was made. The trial commenced on 11 October 2016. On 16 October 2016 senior counsel for the CBA supplied a 4 page written submission addressing the alleged inauthenticity of the 14 January 2009 letter. At that point, Mr Rafidi and BBC [Brick and Block Company Pty Ltd] were represented by senior counsel and solicitors. The trial was to continue for 6 weeks. Notably, particulars of the allegations were provided and the learned primary judge conducting the proceedings permitted the allegations so made to proceed.…[46] [T]he CBA’s allegation that the 14 January 2009 letter was a false document was particularised at an early stage in the trial and the Court permitted it to be advanced as part of the CBA’s case. In the circumstances, I see no basis upon which the decision-making of Mr Rafidi was inappropriately impaired by that process. In this regard, the evidence of Mr Rafidi in the present application that he “did not consent” to the case being run outside the pleaded case, or being “carried on as a fraud proceedings”, is beside the point. He was involved in adversarial proceedings in which the Court permitted the fraud argument to be advanced. Contrary to the submission advanced on behalf of Mr Rafidi in reply, any absence of cross-examination of Mr Rafidi on this subject does not alter the position. The notion that the conduct of the trial, and subsequent entry into the judgment order by Mr Rafidi was “unfair” on the basis of such an allegation is not, in my view, supported by the objective facts.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The amount claimed in the notice is based on a consent judgment made by the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 4 November 2016 (consent judgment). The consent judgment was given after about three weeks of a trial on the Bank’s claim to recover the amount from Mr Rafidi as guarantor of borrowings from the Bank. At the time of the consent judgment, Mr Rafidi’s cross-examination was well advanced but not complete. Shortly after the consent judgment was given, Mr Rafidi applied unsuccessfully to have it set aside: Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Rafidi [2016] NSWSC 1931. The primary judge made the following findings concerning this application, which are not contested on the appeal:[32] … In the Consent Orders judgment, Ball J records that the only reason advanced by Mr Rafidi for why the judgment should have been set aside was to give him an opportunity to clear his name in light of the application for the Court to refer the papers to the authorities. His Honour concluded that that was not a sufficient basis on which to set aside the judgment, first, because there was no evidence from Mr Rafidi that he had not appreciated that the papers could be referred, or that that would have made a difference to his decision to consent to judgment. At the time, Mr Rafidi was legally represented and was on notice through his legal representative that an application would be made for the referral of the papers following entry of the judgment. Secondly, the application to set aside the judgment was misconceived in any event, because the decision to refer the papers involved an independent administrative decision by the Court. Thirdly, because it was far from clear to his Honour that Mr Rafidi could have taken further steps to clear his name. Most of the witnesses he intended to call had given evidence, and it was apparent that their evidence had gone badly for his case and that his prospects of success were poor. Mr Rafidi had given his evidence in chief through affidavits and, although his cross-examination was not completed, he had been cross-examined extensively.[Ball J] found at [11]:... It may be inferred that Mr Rafidi consented to judgment against him because, having regard to developments in the case, it was apparent that his prospects of success were poor. In my opinion, it was not in the interests of justice to permit Mr Rafidi to resile from the position he took previously, presumably on legal advice, to achieve a collateral benefit that he thought would arise from pursuing the court proceedings. At [34], the primary judge noted that an application for leave to appeal from Ball J’s decision was subsequently dismissed: Rafidi v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2017] NSWCA 96. Mr Rafidi applied to set aside the bankruptcy notice on the basis of circumstances leading to the consent judgment. In short, Mr Rafidi’s contention was that the consent judgment is not a proper foundation for the bankruptcy notice. For the reasons that follow, the appeal should be dismissed.ISSUES ON THE APPEALNotice of appeal

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established