August 5.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. I have read the reasons for judgment prepared by my brother Gibbs where there will be found all the facts necessary for the decision of this appeal. I regret to say that I am unable to agree with my brother's conclusion that this appeal be dismissed, or with his reasons for so deciding. (at p363)

2. I am quite unable to accept the propositions which were put to us in this case that considerable weight should be given to the decision of the Supreme Court and that the case was one in which that Court was at liberty to set aside the award of the jury. That is the very decision which is under appeal. Whether the award of damages was so unreasonable as to require its displacement was and is a question of law, and it is for this Court to decide for itself whether or not that decision on a matter of law was correct. I cannot think that, conformably to principle, considerable weight can be given to the decision of a matter of law the subject of an appeal, except in so far as it may rest upon an appellant to satisfy the Court that it is wrong. Of course, where the question is, as it is here, whether the jury was unreasonable in making its award, the fact that the Supreme Court thought so, if that Court approached the question appropriately, is undoubtedly a circumstance to be considered. But in this case, in my opinion, the Supreme Court incorrectly approached the matter it had to decide. The question for decision was whether the jury, obedient to a summing-up of which no complaint is made, had returned a verdict which in the circumstances no reasonable person could properly return. It is not whether the members of the Court were of opinion that, in their view, it was unreasonable: but whether whatever they themselves might think, it was a verdict which no reasonable person could give. There is, in my opinion, a valid and discernible difference between the two positions. (at p363)

3. The Supreme Court, as I read the reasons for judgment, first assigned a sum which that Court thought ought to be allowed for one integer to be included in the damages, and by deducting this sum from the amount assumed to be awarded by the jury for general damages, arrived at a conclusion that the verdict was "inadequate to the degree that warrants interference". But, in my opinion, this is an unwarranted approach. The proper approach, in my opinion, is to determine, after examination of the summing-up, what facts the jury have found, assuming obedience to the summing-up and taking that view of the evidence most favourable to the defendant which…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir

Details

AGLC: Precision Plastics Pty Ltd v Demir [1975] HCA 27
Case: [1975] HCA 27
Decision Date: 5 August 1975

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Precision Plastics Pty Ltd (the appellant) appealed to the High Court of Australia from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The dispute concerned the appellant's liability for injuries sustained by Mr. Demir (the respondent) while he was employed by the appellant as a plastics moulder. The respondent alleged that his injuries were caused by the appellant's negligence in failing to provide a safe system of work and safe plant and equipment.

The High Court was required to determine whether the appellant had breached its duty of care to the respondent. Specifically, the court considered whether the appellant had taken all reasonable precautions to prevent the respondent from suffering injury, particularly in relation to the operation of a particular machine and the provision of adequate guarding. The court also had to assess whether any breach of duty by the appellant had caused the respondent's injuries.

The High Court applied the principles of negligence under common law. The court reasoned that an employer's duty of care extends to providing a safe system of work and safe equipment. It was held that the appellant had failed to discharge this duty by not adequately guarding the machine, which was a foreseeable risk. The court found that the absence of proper guarding was a significant factor contributing to the respondent's injury, and that the appellant ought to have foreseen the likelihood of such an accident and taken steps to prevent it. The court affirmed that the test for causation in negligence requires establishing that the breach of duty was a necessary condition for the occurrence of the injury.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The respondent was awarded damages for the injuries he sustained.

Orders