Sharpe v CNH Capital Australia Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sharpe v CNH Capital Australia Pty Limited [2018] FCA 49

Appeal from: CNH Capital Australia Pty Ltd v Sharpe [2017] FCCA 221
File number: NSD 464 of 2017
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 9 February 2018
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY – appeal from a sequestration order made in the Federal Circuit Court – whether the primary judge erred in declining to go behind the judgment where the debt underlying the judgment was admitted by the appellant – application of Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994 (NSW) after presentation of a creditor’s petition in relation to a farm debt – where no reason shown to question whether there is in truth and reality a debt owing – no appellable error demonstrated
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), Pt IV, ss 44, 44(1)(b), 44(1)(b)(ii), 52(1)(c), 52(2), 52(2)(b)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1)(d)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 4.12

Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994 (NSW), ss 4, 5(2)(b), 6, 8(3), 9(1A), 11, 11(1)(c)(i)

Cases cited:

Alam v Quest Enterprises [2006] NSWSC 752

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Coutts [2003] FCA 968; (2003) 201 ALR 728

Australian Beverage Distributors Pty Ltd v Evans & Tate Premium Wines Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 57; (2007) 69 NSWLR 374

CNH Capital Australia Pty Ltd v Sharpe [2017] FCCA 221

Croker v Federal Commission of Taxation [2003] FCAFC 23; (2003) 52 ATR 226

Khouzame v All Seasons Air Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 28; (2015) 229 FCR 279

McCracken v Phoenix Constructions (Queensland) Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 41; (2013) 210 FCR 149

Motor Terms Co Pty Ltd v Liberty Insurance Ltd (1967) 116 CLR 177

Pollack v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 32 FCR 40

Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28; (2017) 345 ALR 534

Re Agrillo; Ex parte The Bankrupt (1977) 29 FLR 484

Re Brent Hughes; Ex parte Westpac Banking Corporation (unreported, Merkel J, 28 November 1997)

Re Devy; Ex Parte BBC Hardware Limited (1996) 67 FCR 355

Re Goldberg; Ex parte Law Society of New South Wales (1988) 82 ALR 271

Re King; Ex parte Gallagher Ryan & Maloney v King (1994) 54 FCR 493

Re Tait; Ex parte Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 65 FCR 592

Re Vittoria Di Giacomo; Ex parte Boral Steel Limited (1983) 68 FLR 106

ReMendonca; Ex parte Commissioner of Taxation (1969) 15 FLR 256

Scope Data Systems  v BDO Nelson Parkhill [2003] NSWSC 137; (2003) 199 ALR 56

Sharpe v CNH Capital Australia Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 1113

Sharpe v Hargraves Secured Investments Ltd [2013] NSWCA 288

Sharpe v W H Bailey & Sons Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 1887

Sharpe v WH Bailey & Sons Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 921; (2015) 317 ALR 738

Udovenko v Mitchell (1997) 79 FCR 418

Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212

Date of hearing: 28 September 2017
Date of last submissions: 16 October 2017
Registry: New South Wales
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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 49
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The decision in Sharpe v CNH Capital Australia Pty Limited involved an appeal against a sequestration order issued by the Federal Circuit Court. The appellant, Mr Sharpe, argued that the primary judge had erred by not going behind a judgment debt, which was admitted by Mr Sharpe, in determining whether a sequestration order should be made. The primary judge had dismissed the appeal, holding that there was no basis to question the existence of the debt or the validity of the judgment, and no miscarriage of justice occurred. The appeal centered on whether the primary judge had correctly applied the law in deciding not to go behind the judgment.

The court needed to determine if the primary judge erred in not examining the circumstances behind the judgment debt, particularly in light of Mr Sharpe's arguments about the enforcement action being in non-compliance with the Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994 (NSW). The primary judge considered whether the principles for going behind a judgment applied and whether there was sufficient reason to question the existence of the debt. The court examined if the judgment followed a full investigation, and if there were any allegations of fraud, collusion, or a miscarriage of justice.

The primary judge concluded that Mr Sharpe had admitted owing the debt in previous proceedings and there was no fraud, collusion, or miscarriage of justice. The court held that Mr Sharpe's arguments were based on an incorrect interpretation of the Farm Debt Mediation Act and did not provide a sufficient reason to go behind the judgment. The court found no error in the primary judge's decision and dismissed the appeal.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves an appeal by the appellant, Mr. Sharpe, against a sequestration order made in the Federal Circuit Court. The underlying dispute stems from a debt owed by Mr. Sharpe to CNH Capital Australia Pty Limited. Mr. Sharpe admitted to owing a significant amount to CNH in proceedings before the District Court. The enforcement action leading to the District Court judgment was challenged by Mr. Sharpe on the grounds that it was not in compliance with the Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994 (NSW). Despite the admission of the debt by Mr. Sharpe, he argued that the judgment should be set aside on various grounds, including the alleged failure to follow the mediation requirements under the FDMA.

The matter came before the court as an appeal from a sequestration order made in the Federal Circuit Court. The appeal was heard by the court, which considered the submissions made by Mr. Sharpe regarding the enforcement action that led to the judgment debt. The primary judge had previously dismissed the appeal and Mr. Sharpe sought leave to appeal to the higher court. The appeal process involved a review of the arguments presented by Mr. Sharpe, focusing on the validity of the judgment and the application of the Farm Debt Mediation Act. The appeal did not succeed, leading to the dismissal of the appeal and the imposition of costs on the appellant.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having set out the background, I now turn to how the primary judge dealt with the submissions made below by Mr Sharpe, which remain relevant. B THE RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE PRIMARY JUDGMENT After reciting the background facts and the evidence read in support of the Petition, the primary judge referred to s 52(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act) which relevantly provides that the Court may dismiss the petition if it is satisfied the debtor is able to pay his or her debts or “that for other sufficient cause a sequestration order ought not to be made”. Although noting that Mr Sharpe’s arguments were difficult to follow, his Honour understood that Mr Sharpe contended that the Court ought go behind the Second Judgment and be satisfied that there was some “other sufficient cause” for which a sequestration order against the estate of Mr Sharpe ought not be made. Of the arguments persisted in on the appeal, albeit in a different guise, this contention was based on an assertion that the enforcement action which led to the Second Judgment was “otherwise” than “in compliance” with the FDMA and was “void” within the meaning of s 6 of the FDMA. Turning to the basis upon which a Bankruptcy Court should exercise its discretion to go behind a judgment, the primary judge observed at [20]-[25]: [20] The principles in relation to going behind a judgment were summarised as follows by Robertson J in Xu v Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) (2014) 315 ALR 523; [2014] FCA 461 at [55]ff:·The Court may, in an appropriate case, go behind a judgment to see whether in truth and reality a debt is due from the judgment debtor to the judgment creditor: Corney v Brien (1951) 84 CLR 343; [1951] HCA 31 (“Corney”) and Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212; [1972] HCA 5;·An appropriate case may include a judgment debt that has been obtained by fraud or collusion (sic) where there has been some miscarriage of justice: Corney at 347-348 and 352-353 and Emerson v Wreckair Pty Ltd (1992) 33 FCR 581 at 588;·If the judgment in question followed a full investigation at a trial on which both parties appeared, the Court will not reopen the matter unless a case of fraud or collusion or miscarriage of justice is made out: Corney at 356;·The inquiry involved is a two-stage process enquiry: first, as to whether there is sufficient reason to question the existence of a real debt behind the judgment; and second, if there is, determining that issue. These two steps may be determined together: Makhoul v Barnes (1995) 60 FCR 572 at 584 and Wolff v Donovan (1991) 29 FCR 480.[21] In deciding whether to go behind the judgment of the District Court, it is relevant to recall that Mr Sharpe has never claimed that he did not owe a significant amount of money to CNH. Mr Sharpe admitted it on the pleadings in both sets of District Court proceedings and did not dispute it in this Court. At their highest, Mr Sharpe’s arguments amount to a claim that, while he owes CNH hundreds of thousands of dollars, CNH simply cannot enforce that debt. That outcome alone suggests, in my view, sufficient reason not to go behind the judgment of the District Court. There are, as will be seen, other reasons for the same conclusion.[22] The first is that the District Court proceedings were fully contested. Some of the arguments relied on by Mr Sharpe in these proceedings were heard and rejected by Judge Delaney.[23] The second is that, subject to what follows, there was no allegation of fraud, collusion or any miscarriage of justice. The qualification to this is that, at the hearing of this matter, Mr Sharpe argued that Judge Delaney was not informed of a particular matter: namely, that there had been a mediation prior to his Honour’s first judgment in August 2012. Mr Sharpe argued that, if his Honour had been informed of that fact, there may have been a different outcome such as the making of a declaration that the certificate issued by the Authority was invalid. This argument relied on the proposition that there had been no “satisfactory mediation” and so the Authority could not have been satisfied that such a mediation had taken place. I will deal with that argument more fully below. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that, even accepting that that was correct and that the District Court had the jurisdiction to make a declaration to that effect, none of this amounts to a miscarriage of justice. [24] The judgment in question arose out of the second District Court proceedings, not the first and, more importantly, the first judgment was in Mr Sharpe’s favour. Critically however, Mr Sharpe, who was legally represented at the time of the first proceedings and during the course of the mediation, was just as aware of the mediation as CNH was and, as such, was able himself, to make the Judge aware of the mediation. In those circumstances there was no miscarriage of justice, or any other basis upon which to go behind the 2014 judgment on which the bankruptcy notice was based.[25] The third reason is that Mr Sharpe’s arguments rely on a construction of the FDM Act which is inconsistent with its purpose and should not be accepted.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered Mr Sharpe's contention that the Court should go behind the Second Judgment to determine if there was some "other sufficient cause" for which a sequestration order against him ought not be made. The primary judge applied the principles from Xu v Wan Ze Property Development (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) to determine whether there was sufficient reason to question the existence of a real debt behind the judgment. The court observed that Mr Sharpe admitted owing a significant amount of money to CNH and did not dispute it in the Federal Circuit Court. The District Court proceedings were fully contested, and there were no allegations of fraud, collusion, or miscarriage of justice. The court further noted that the arguments regarding the Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994 (NSW) were inconsistent with its purpose and should not be accepted. Therefore, the court held that there was no reason to go behind the judgment and dismissed the appeal.

The binding legal principle established by the decision is that a Bankruptcy Court will not go behind a judgment unless there is a sufficient reason to question the existence of a real debt, such as fraud, collusion, or a miscarriage of justice. In this case, the court found no such reasons, and the appeal was dismissed. The court also clarified that the application of the Farm Debt Mediation Act 1994 (NSW) is not relevant after the presentation of a creditor’s petition in relation to a farm debt when the debt has been admitted by the debtor.