Wotton v State of Queensland

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wotton v State of Queensland [2015] FCA 910

Citation: Wotton v State of Queensland [2015] FCA 910
Parties: LEX PATRICK WOTTON, AGNES WOTTON and CECILIA ANNE WOTTON v STATE OF QUEENSLAND and COMMISSIONER OF THE POLICE SERVICE WHO IS SUED AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE POLICE SERVICE AND AS REPRESENTING THE MEMBERS OF THE QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE ENGAGED IN THE IMPUGNED CONDUCT
File number: QUD 535 of 2013
Judge: MORTIMER J
Date of judgment: 21 August 2015
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to amend originating application and statement of claim substantially – application filed less than one month away from final hearing – consideration of relevant factors including proximity to trial, explanation for delay, effect of grant of leave on trial timetable and the interests of the administration of justice – alleged delay in discovery process – whether amendments assist precise resolution of issues in dispute – representative nature of proceeding weighs in favour of grant of leave – application granted in part

HUMAN RIGHTS – discrimination – jurisdiction of the Federal Court under Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO(3)

Legislation:

Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) s 46PO(3)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M(1), 37M(2); Pt IVA
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) s 9
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 8.21, 16.53, 16.55(4), 20.12(1), 20.13(3)

Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Opened for signature 16 December 1966. 660 UNTS 171, Art 27 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Opened for signature 21 December 1965. 660 UNTS 165, Art 5(b) (entered into force 4 January 1969).  

Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; 239 CLR 175
Dye v Commonwealth Securities Limited (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118
King v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd [2001] FCA 1487
King v Jetstar Airways Pty Limited (No 2) [2012] FCA 8; 286 ALR 149
Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75
MerckSharp & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson [2009] FCAFC 26
Research in Motion Ltd v Samsung Electronics Australia Ltd [2009] FCA 320; 176 FCR 66
Date of hearing: 19 August 2015
Place: Melbourne (via video-link to Brisbane and Sydney)
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 124
Counsel for the applicants: Ms C Ronalds SC with Ms S Pointing
Solicitor for the applicants: Levitt Robinson Solicitors
Counsel for the respondents: Mr M Hinson QC with Mr S Forrest
Solicitor for the respondents: Crown Law Queensland

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

QUD 535 of 2013

BETWEEN:

LEX PATRICK WOTTON
First Applicant

AGNES WOTTON
Second Applicant

CECILIA ANNE WOTTON
Third Applicant

AND:

STATE OF QUEENSLAND
First Respondent

COMMISSIONER OF THE POLICE SERVICE WHO IS SUED AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE POLICE SERVICE AND AS REPRESENTING THE MEMBERS OF THE QUEENSLAND POLICE…

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Details
Case
[2015] FCA 910
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court involved an application by the applicants, Wotton and others, to amend their originating application and statement of claim. The respondents, the State of Queensland and others, opposed the application. The dispute centered around alleged discrimination and other human rights violations, with the applicants seeking leave to amend their claims to include more specific details and additional human rights relied upon. The court had to decide whether to grant the applicants leave to amend their pleadings, given the proximity of the final hearing and the reasons for the delay in filing the application.

The court considered several factors in its decision, including the proximity of the final hearing, the explanation for the delay, the effect of the grant of leave on the trial timetable, and the interests of the administration of justice. The applicants attributed the delay to issues with the discovery process, but the court found that the applicants had not acted promptly in pursuing the discovery of relevant documents. Despite this, the court noted that the amendments sought would assist in the precise resolution of issues in the dispute and that the representative nature of the proceeding weighed in favor of granting leave. The court decided to grant the application in part, allowing certain amendments that clarified the claims under the Racial Discrimination Act but denying others that sought to expand the scope of the claims.

The final orders granted the applicants leave to amend their originating application and statement of claim in part, specifically allowing amendments that introduced more specificity to their claims and aligned them more closely with the terms of section 9 of the Racial Discrimination Act. The court did not allow amendments that sought to extend the applicants' claims to include events related to a specific individual, Mulrunji, unless it could be shown that he was a group member. Additionally, the court did not permit the extension of the applicants’ claims to include allegations regarding PLO Bengaroo. The applicants were also required to pay the respondents' costs associated with the interlocutory application and the amendments. The parties were instructed to confer and prepare proposed minutes of orders amending existing trial preparation orders and to submit these by a specified date. If the parties could not agree, they were to file their proposed minutes and short submissions justifying their form.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Subject to paragraph 2 of these orders, leave is granted to the applicants to amend their originating application in the form attached to the applicants’ application dated 11 August 2015.

2. Leave is not granted in respect of the amendments under the heading “Questions common to claims of group members” as set out in paragraphs 1 to 54 of the proposed originating application.

3. Subject to paragraph 4 of these orders, leave is granted to the applicants to amend their statement of claim in the form attached to the applicants’ application dated 11 August 2015.

4. Leave is not granted in respect of the amendments contained in proposed paragraphs 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 167 to 185 inclusive.

5. The applicants pay the respondents’ costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application and the amendments, including costs thrown away by reason of the amendments and the costs of conferring and preparing the minutes referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 of these orders.

6. The parties are to confer and prepare proposed minutes of orders amending existing trial preparation orders, and adding any supplementary orders necessary by reason of the outcome of the interlocutory application, such minutes to be submitted on or before 4 pm on Tuesday 25 August 2015.

7. If the parties fail to agree on any aspect of the proposed minutes referred to in paragraph 6, each party is to file and serve their proposed minutes together with short submissions justifying the form of those minutes, on or before 4 pm on Tuesday 25 August 2015.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The originating application has also significantly increased in size, mostly because of the inclusion of 57 common questions of law and fact that are alleged to arise, in contrast to the seven questions set out in the current originating application.THE EVIDENCE ON THIS APPLICATION In support of their application the applicants relied on two affidavits sworn by Mr Daniel Meyerowitz-Katz, a solicitor for the applicants, on 11 and 19 August 2015 and annexing correspondence between the parties’ legal representatives. Essentially, the explanation of the timing of the proposed amendments given by Mr Meyerowitz-Katz on behalf of the applicants is delay in the discovery process, most of the responsibility for which the applicants seek to lay at the feet of the respondents. I do not accept that explanation, nor do I accept that the respondents’ conduct is in large part responsible for the timing of the receipt by the applicants of the discovered documents they say have prompted the amendments.Mr Meyerowitz-Katz’s affidavit of 11 August 2015 At [59] of his affidavit dated 11 August 2015, Mr Meyerowitz-Katz stated that:In preparing the 3FASC, the Applicants have not attempted to broaden their claim on the basis of facts previously known. As explained above, the allegations of fact introduced in the proposed 3FASC are mostly derived from documents obtained by the Applicants through discovery, and their purpose is predominantly to expand on facts already alleged in the 2FASC by providing a much greater degree of particularity, or by introducing matters which were pleaded in the Applicants' Reply into the Statement of Claim. Where facts previously known have been raised for the first time, this has only occurred because the Applicants became aware of the relevance of those facts as a result of other matters uncovered during the discovery process. Mr Meyerowitz-Katz deposed (at [9]) that, as at 23 April 2015 when the applicants had filed an application for discovery, the applicants “had no access or only partial access to many documents which were crucial to the Applicants’ pleaded case.” In particular, Mr Meyerowitz-Katz stated that despite requests made to the respondents, the applicants had faced significant delays in obtaining copies of the following Queensland Police Service (QPS) documents:(1)the QPS Operational Procedures Manual as at November 2004;(2)the QPS Human Resource Management Manual as at November 2004; and(3)the QPS Palm Island Review dated 24 November 2008. It is fair to say, in my opinion, that the thrust of both Mr Meyerowitz-Katz’s evidence and submissions made on the interlocutory application on behalf of the applicants was on the unavailability of these three documents until relatively recently. These three documents were among the documents the subject of an interlocutory application for discovery filed by the applicants on 23 April 2015 and I made orders on 28 April 2015 that the respondents give discovery of those three documents, among others. Mr Meyerowitz-Katz stated (at [10]) that he believed soft copies of those documents were delivered to the applicants’ counsel on 5 May 2015, and (at [11]) that those documents were voluminous: After they were produced, we discovered that the 2004 version of the OPM is a document of some 1770 pages, the 2004 HRM is 1570 pages, and the Palm Island Review is 1003 pages. A total of 17 documents were produced on 5 May 2015, including other versions of the OPM and HRM.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Parts N (“Vicarious liability of respondents”) and O (“AHRC complaint”) are not substantially changed.Conclusions of this comparisonThe application Late though they are, the amendments which introduce more specificity to the applicants’ claims and align them more specifically with the terms of s 9 of the Racial Discrimination Act contribute to a clarification of the way the applicants put their claims. It is in the interests of the administration of justice that those amendments be permitted. Those amendments include paragraphs such as paras 1(a), 1(b), 2(a) and 2(b). Although there is a series of new human rights relied upon, whether or not the applicants succeed in establishing a contravention of s 9 by reason of their reliance on this new suite of rights involves predominantly questions of law, and characterisation of facts as found. It is in the interests of the administration of justice that the applicants be able to put their case under s 9 in the way they seek to do, so that all issues between the parties can be fully and finally resolved. Having been given this opportunity to recharacterise their claims under s 9, this grant of leave should not be seen as a licence to the applicants to attempt to do so again at some later stage. For reasons I set out more fully below in relation to the pleading, I do not propose to allow the extension of the applicants’ claims in this proceeding to include what they allege occurred to Mulrunji, in the sense of being claims upon which they seek to found entitlements to declaratory relief and to compensation. However, the amendments to refer in both the proposed application and pleading to Mulrunji’s race as one of the true reasons for the treatment of the applicants and the group members will be allowed, although I harbour some doubts about how the arguments can be made. I have no evidence before me to suggest that PLO Bengaroo is a group member. If he is, the terms of the application and the pleading already cover his rights and interests in the conduct alleged against the respondents. If he is not, then as with the allegations about Mulrunji, I have some doubt as to how the applicants can bring a claim relying on his race as the true reason for the respondents’ conduct. However, the proper construction of s 9 in this regard is a matter best left for determination at trial after full argument and I see no particular prejudice to the respondents in now having to meet this argument. It involves a characterisation of their conduct, rather than new factual allegations. The new sub-group is reasonably clearly identified in the proposed application, and the common questions of law and fact which are said to arise are set out. I consider leave should be granted in respect of the claims concerning the sub-group. I will not grant leave to add all the proposed common questions of law and fact. The purpose of identifying common questions was set out by the Full Court in MerckSharp & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson [2009] FCAFC 26 at [6] and [8]:In our opinion it is desirable, if not necessary, to identify precisely what issues will be determined in the “trial” (and those that will not be determined) on the assumption, which the parties did not gainsay, that at the end of the “trial”, orders will be made which reflect the determination made by the trial judge on both questions of fact and law or mixed questions of fact and law. That the “trial” will result in a determination of Mr Peterson’s claim (personal to him), is a given. As Sackville J did in Courtney v Medtel Pty Ltd (2003) 126 FCR 219 (by making orders on 16 August 2002 posing a number of questions which were partly answered on 3 March 2003 [2003] FCA 129), an order can be made identifying Mr Peterson’s claim as a matter (in the sense of subject matter entailing questions of fact and law) to which the trial will be directed. …It seems to us that given that there is controversy about what are the common issues, it would be desirable to structure the “trial” by identifying what might be the common issues for determination, though on the footing that if it became apparent from the evidence and the submissions that they were not common, they would not then be determined lest they be “an issue that relates only to the claims of [one particular] member”. If the issues are framed as questions, orders can be made answering them. At that point a party disaffected by the determination would be in a position to challenge those answers by way of appeal as contemplated by s 33ZC(1). Broadly described, one outcome could be that Mr Peterson failed in his own personal case and such issues as were found to be common either were not answered at all or, in some critical respect, were answered in a way propounded by Merck. Alternatively, another outcome, broadly described, could be that Mr Peterson succeeded in his own personal case and such issues as were found to be common were answered either in whole or in part in a way propounded by Mr Peterson. In the former situation and probably in the latter, it would be desirable that the disaffected party then had the opportunity to challenge the trial judge’s conclusions if so minded. Certainly in the latter case it is probably desirable that such a challenge occur before the circumstances of other individual members of the group were then considered. If there is no judgment, in a technical sense, at the end of the trial then the disaffected party would not be in a position to maintain such a challenge. (Emphasis added.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At [23]-[26], Mr Meyerowitz-Katz refuted the assertion that the applicants otherwise had access to relevant material now relied upon prior to receiving the respondents’ discovered documents: 23.At paragraph 31 of her affidavit, Ms Hamilton deposes that “the Applicants have had available to them the public findings of both Acting State Coroner Clements and Coroner Hine, along with the CMC Review, concerning the investigation into the death in custody.” Whilst I agree with Ms Hamilton’s allegation so far as it goes, the information available in the inquest findings and the CMC Review was second-hand, was, in each case, directed to a different purpose than the Applicants’ claim, and was relatively limited compared with the information available from all of the primary documents.24. At paragraph 31 of her affidavit, Ms Hamilton further deposes that:“witness statements and transcripts of interviews concerning the riot, as well as the running sheet that was prepared by the QPS in relation to the riot, were disclosed to Levitt Robinson Solicitors, as Lex Wotton’s legal representatives, in connection with his trial.”25.The material disclosed to our office in connection with Mr Wotton’s trial was the evidence on which the Director of Public Prosecutions relied in prosecuting Mr Wotton. I have reviewed both Levitt Robinson’s file from that prosecution and the materials discovered by the Crown, and accordingly can depose that the materials provided to us in the course of Mr Wotton’s trial were a fraction of the materials disclosed during the course of discovery in these proceedings. For example, all of the witness statements disclosed during Mr Wotton’s prosecution, printed single-sided, are contained in a single manila folder; whereas the witness statements disclosed by the Crown in these proceedings, printed double-sided, are contained in several lever-arch folders.26.Further, the material disclosed in the course of Mr Wotton’s prosecution was confined in its content to matters relevant to allegations against Mr Wotton. The material discovered in these proceedings was far broader in scope.REFERENCES TO THE QPS OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL AND CODE OF CONDUCT IN THE EARLIER AND CURRENT PLEADINGS At the hearing of this application on 19 August 2015, counsel for the applicants properly withdrew a submission that there are no references to the QPS Code of Conduct in the current pleading. To the contrary, failures by QPS officers to adhere to the Code of Conduct as well as to the QPS Operational Procedures Manual have been expressly pleaded since the very first iteration of the pleading filed on 22 October 2013. It suffices to extract only a few examples from that pleading:(1)Paragraph 27 of the statement of claim filed on 22 October 2013 read as follows: “Section 10.6 of Version 29 of the QPS Code of Conduct dated August 2003, in force in November 2004 (Code of Conduct) required officers to avoid both actual and apparent conflicts of interest and disclose details of any conflict to their supervising executive officer.” This pleading is retained and appears unchanged at para 83 of the current pleading.(2)Paragraph 30 of the statement of claim filed on 22 October 2013 read as follows: “Contrary to his obligations under the Code of Conduct, DI Robinson did not declare a conflict of interest.” An allegation that the Queensland Police Service breached section 10.6 of the Code of Conduct through DS Robinson’s failure to declare a conflict of interest appears at para 90(a) of the current pleading.(3)Paragraph 33 of the statement of claim filed on 22 October 2013 read: “The Code of Conduct required police officers to maintain and foster public trust and confidence in the operations of the QPS.” (4)Paragraph 34 of the statement of claim filed on 22 October 2013 read: “In order to fulfil their obligations under section 1.17 of the OPM and the Code of Conduct, DSS Kitching and DI Webber were obliged to satisfy themselves that DS Robinson was impartial and had no actual or apparent conflict of interest, before including him on or allowing him to continue to be part of, or to assist, the investigation team. DSS Kitching and DI Webber took no steps to do so.”