Arthur as litigation representative for CYG20 v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Arthur as litigation representative for CYG20 v Commonwealth of Australia [2021] FCA 259

File number(s): VID 359 of 2020
Judgment of: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 23 March 2021
Catchwords:  MIGRATION – separate question – alleged unlawful detention from 4 September 2019 to 2 October 2020 – whether ss 189 and 196 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) authorised the applicant’s detention – AJL20 v Commonwealth [2020] FCA 1305 – whether Commonwealth had failed to remove the applicant from Australia “as soon as reasonably practicable” under s 198(6) of the Act – objective assessment of the steps taken by the Commonwealth to effect removal – applicant’s detention lawful   
Legislation:

Constitution Ch III

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5H(1), 189, 196, 197C, 198

Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 (Cth) reg 4.75

Cases cited:

AJL20 v Commonwealth of Australia [2020] FCA 1305

Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; 219 CLR 562

ASP15 v Commonwealth [2016] FCAFC 145; 248 FCR 372

Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1992] HCA 64; 176 CLR 1

Kanhalingam v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] HCATrans 122

Kazemi v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] HCATrans 124

McHugh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 223; 385 ALR 405

Plaintiff M168/10 v Commonwealth [2011] HCA 25; 85 ALJR 790

Plaintiff M76/2013 v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] HCA 53; 251 CLR 322

Plaintiff M96A/2016 v Commonwealth [2017] HCA 16; 261 CLR 582

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; 211 CLR 476

Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] HCA 34; 253 CLR 219

Wotton v Queensland [2012] HCA 2; 246 CLR 1

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 111
Date of hearing: 2 March 2021
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms M Yu
Solicitor for the Applicant: Human Rights for All
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr G Kennett SC with Mr C Tran and Ms N Wootton
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 359 of 2020
BETWEEN:

BRIGID ARTHUR AS LITIGATION REPRESENTATIVE FOR CYG20

Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

GRIFFITHS J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 MARCH 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The separate question below is answered as follows:

Have ss 189 and 196 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) authorised the detention of the applicant since 4 September 2019, and if “yes” as to part only of that period then as to which part or parts?

Answer:

Yes, as to the entirety of the period from 4 September 2019 to 2 October 2020.

2.Subject to either party asking to have the matter relisted within 7 days hereof, the originating application filed on 29 May 2020 be dismissed. 

3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the separate question as agreed or taxed. 

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 259
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Arthur as litigation representative for CYG20 v Commonwealth of Australia concerned the alleged unlawful detention of a stateless Faili Kurd, born in Iran, from 4 September 2019 to 2 October 2020. The applicant, who arrived in Australia by boat at age 16, had been in immigration detention since 25 August 2013. The applicant sought damages for the alleged unlawful detention, which the Court found to be lawful. The primary issues for the Court were whether sections 189 and 196 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) authorised the applicant's detention and whether the Commonwealth had failed to remove the applicant "as soon as reasonably practicable" under section 198(6) of the Act. The Court found that the Commonwealth had taken reasonable practicable steps to remove the applicant and that the applicant's detention was lawful. The Court dismissed the originating application and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs of the separate question and the substantive proceeding, subject to relisting by either party.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The separate question below is answered as follows:

Have ss 189 and 196 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) authorised the detention of the applicant since 4 September 2019, and if “yes” as to part only of that period then as to which part or parts?

Answer:

Yes, as to the entirety of the period from 4 September 2019 to 2 October 2020.

2. Subject to either party asking to have the matter relisted within 7 days hereof, the originating application filed on 29 May 2020 be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the separate question as agreed or taxed.

4. Subject to either party asking to have the matter relisted within 7 days hereof, the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the substantive proceeding as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For reasons which will be explained shortly, for the purpose of the separate question the parties agree that the maximum relevant period of immigration detention in respect of the applicant’s claim of unlawful detention is the period from 4 September 2019 to 2 October 2020. Summary of background facts When he was 16 years old, the applicant arrived in Australia by boat on or about 25 August 2013 accompanied by his mother. The applicant’s mother was born in Baghdad, Iraq. The applicant and his mother were detained under s 189 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act). The applicant was kept in immigration detention during the period from 25 August 2013 to 2 October 2020. His immigration detention ended on 2 October 2020 when he was transferred to criminal detention after he was charged with several criminal offences. In his originating application filed on 29 May 2020, the applicant seeks damages (including aggravated and exemplary damages) in respect of the alleged unlawful immigration detention. It is evident that the applicant has been held in immigration detention for a significant period, being in excess of seven years (most of which has been taken up with processes relating to the applicant’s applications for a protection visa and/or related Court proceedings, in which the applicant has enjoyed some success). Such a long period of detention is a matter of major concern. All the more so in the applicant’s case because it appears to be common ground that he suffers from various mental health conditions and his intellectual abilities are in the low range. That is why the Court made an order appointing Sister Brigid Arthur as the applicant’s litigation representative. The applicant is a stateless Faili Kurd, who was born in Iran. On 31 March 2016, he was included as a dependant in his mother’s application for a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) visa (Protection Visa). On 20 June 2016, the Minister’s delegate refused that application. The application was referred to the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) which, on 11 July 2016, remitted the delegate’s decision back to the Minister with a direction that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of s 5H(1) of the Act. The IAA found that the applicant was born in Iran and this was his country of formal habitual residence. The IAA described Iran as “the receiving country” for the purpose of the Act. The IAA also found that the applicant had a well-founded fear of serious harm amounting to persecution if he were to return to Iran, taking into account that unregistered Faili Kurds “do not generally have access to services including healthcare and education”. It concluded that discrimination “involves systematic and discriminatory conduct because it results from laws and policies specifically aimed at the particular social group of which they are members, but which would impact particularly harshly on them because of their particular circumstances”. The IAA added at [45] of its reasons for decision:In this regard, I also note that in the SHEV application the applicant stated that her son had experienced bullying and physical violence directed at him because of his behavioural problems, learning disability and because he is a Faili Kurd. As noted above, DFAT assesses that societal discrimination against Faili Kurds, including being targeted for extortion or subject to harassment, detention or physical assault, is not widespread but cannot be ruled out in individual cases. Based on this information and the applicant’s evidence about the past experiences of the second named applicant, I consider that there is a very real possibility, given the second named applicant’s combination of vulnerabilities, that he may be subject to mistreatment of this kind in Iran. I am satisfied that there is a real chance that he would be subjected to significant physical ill-treatment or harassment constituting serious harm, directed at him for the essential and significant reason of his membership of the particular social group “unregistered Faili Kurds”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Consistently with that approach, in an important passage upon which the Commonwealth placed heavy reliance in the present proceeding, Bromberg J said at [116]:The absence of any or sufficient steps being taken to progress removal over a period of detention will not necessarily demonstrate that removal of the detainee from Australia was not undertaken or carried into effect as soon as reasonably practicable. As Hayne J noted in Al‑Kateb at [226]-[228] the removal of a non‑citizen from Australia will ordinarily require the cooperation of other countries to effectuate that removal. There may be delays or obstacles to the timely removal of a detainee caused by circumstances beyond the control of Australia which bring about inaction or cause the absence of active steps to progress removal. There may be other justifications for inaction or delayed action which will serve to deny the conclusion that the removal of the non-citizen was not undertaken or carried into effect as soon as reasonably practicable. The Commonwealth’s evidence summarised The Commonwealth read 15 affidavits. There was also an agreed Tender Bundle (Exhibit A1). The relevant parts of the evidence may be summarised as follows. Mr Ulysses Salting Prescilla is a Detention Status Resolution Officer (DSRO) at Villawood Immigration Detention Centre (VIDC). Mr Prescilla described the role of a DSRO as including:(a)conducting an initial interview to see if a detainee wants to apply for a visa or be removed. If the detainee wishes to be removed, the detainee is referred to the “removals team”;(b)conducting a monthly meeting with the detainee for case reviews;(c)regularly reviewing at each case review the status of the detainee, such as whether the detainee remains an unlawful non-citizen and facilitating the release of the detainee if he or she is granted a visa or where detention is no longer appropriate; and(d)keeping case notes on interactions with detainees. Mr Prescilla further explained that a case review occurs approximately monthly. The DSRO records a summary of the detainee’s case, including confirming that the person is an unlawful non-citizen, recording progression towards a visa or removal, noting any barriers to case progression and recording any steps that have been taken since the last case review and proposed future steps. Mr Prescilla was the applicant’s DSRO from May 2017 until 13 September 2019. In other words, he was the applicant’s DSRO for only nine days during the alleged unlawful immigration detention period (4-13 September 2019). Mr Prescilla deposed that he did not complete any case reviews for the applicant on or after 4 September 2019. I accept Mr Prescilla’s evidence. Mr Kamlesh Praveen Kumar is also a DSRO at VIDC. He affirmed two affidavits. He was the applicant’s DSRO from 13 September 2019 until 2 October 2020, which covers all but nine days of the alleged unlawful immigration detention period. I accept Mr Kumar’s evidence. I will summarise the main points of his evidence.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having regard to the findings of fact and my conclusion that the Commonwealth has demonstrated that it took reasonable practicable steps with a view to removing the applicant from Australia with reference to each of the three periods identified by the applicant, it is unnecessary to determine whether or not I consider any aspect of Bromberg J’s central reasoning in AJL20 to be plainly wrong. Conclusion For these reasons the separate question is answered “yes” in respect of all of the period from 4 September 2019 to 2 October 2020 (including the sub-periods identified by Ms Yu). This would appear to produce the necessary consequence that the originating application filed on 29 May 2020 should be dismissed. I will make an order to that effect but also provide the parties with an opportunity to have the matter relisted if they consider that this order is inappropriate. There is no evident reason why costs should not follow the event. I will make an order as to costs of both the substantive proceeding and the separate question. Again, however, either parties will have liberty to have the matter relisted if they wish to contest the order as to costs of the substantive proceeding.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Having regard to the way Commonwealth presented its case, it is convenient first to deal with the issue whether the Commonwealth has demonstrated that it did in fact take reasonable practicable steps during the relevant period of the applicant’s immigration detention to have him removed from Australia in accordance with the obligation imposed by s 198(6), before addressing the issue whether AJL20 should not be followed because it is plainly wrong. The latter issue does not arise if the former issue is determined in the Commonwealth’s favour. (a) Did the Commonwealth take reasonable practicable steps during the relevant period of immigration detention? For the following reasons, I am satisfied on the basis of the evidence adduced by the Commonwealth that it did take reasonable practicable steps during the relevant maximum period of the allegedly unlawful immigration detention here, as well as within the two smaller sub-periods as identified at [94] above. First, based on the evidence of Mr Prescilla and Mr Kumar, I find that during the entirety of maximum alleged unlawful immigration detention period, it was reasonably suspected by a Commonwealth officer that the applicant was an unlawful non-citizen, which engaged the obligation to detain him throughout that period in accordance with s 189 of the Act. Secondly, I find that the purpose for which the applicant was detained during the entirety of the maximum alleged unlawful immigration detention period was for the permissible purpose of him being removed from Australia, as required by s 198(6) of the Act. Thirdly, for the following reasons I find that the Commonwealth has demonstrated that sufficient reasonable practicable steps were taken throughout the entirety of the alleged maximum unlawful immigration detention period to discharge the statutory obligation imposed by s 198(6): (a)The objective assessment of the reasonableness of the Commonwealth’s steps or any inactivity during the relevant period must take account of the following important relevant features of the applicant’s individual circumstances:(i)The applicant’s statelessness and lack of any travel documents created significant practical difficulties for the Commonwealth in finding a country which would accept him, as described by Ms Davis and Mr Knight and, to a lesser extent, Mr Gillard. That is particularly so with Iran and Iraq, as is highlighted in the evidence of Ms Davis and Mr Knight, which is supported by documentary evidence as identified at [48]-[50] above. (ii)Those difficulties were exacerbated by the applicant’s consistent refusal throughout the relevant period to give his consent to being removed from Australia to any country, let alone Iran or Iraq. (iii)As to the applicant’s capacity to give informed consent to his removal from Australia, a matter which was raised in the present proceeding, I accept the Commonwealth’s submission that there is no evidence to indicate that, even if a guardian had been appointed during the alleged period of unlawful immigration detention, this may have produced a different outcome. In particular, it is most improbable that a guardian would have given consent to the applicant’s removal to either Iran or Iraq given his status as a Faili Kurd and the relevant findings of the IAA. (iv)It is difficult to be critical of the Commonwealth for not making direct inquiries of countries apart from Iran and Iraq as to whether they would accept the applicant given the applicant’s stated position that he would not consent to his removal to any country, and his lack of travel documents. The evidence before the Court did not indicate that any country would be willing to accept a person with these characteristics, not to mention his previous criminal record and conduct which underpinned the Minister’s latest decision to refuse him a Protection Visa. (v)I accept Mr Knight’s evidence of meetings he had on 30 October 2019 and 14 February 2020 with the Iranian Consul regarding involuntary removals to Iran. These discussions related to the possibility of returning six Iranian nationals who were in the off-shore detainee network and who were involuntary returns, but not the applicant himself, as Mr Knight candidly acknowledged. I accept this evidence. I also accept that, at least in Mr Knight’s own mind, those discussions were intended by him to hopefully obtain Iranian approval in relation to a smaller group of involuntary removals as a step towards Mr Knight then working to change the Iranian policy on involuntary removals more broadly. There is no reason to think that Mr Knight’s intentions were limited to the return of Iranian citizens. (vi)It is true that there were some intervals during the relevant period when there was no direct activity to remove the applicant from Australia, but that fact alone is not determinative. The relevant question is whether such periods of inactivity were unreasonable in the applicant’s particular circumstances. For the following reasons, I consider that they were not unreasonable. For example, there was a period of approximately two weeks prior to Mr Kumar referring the applicant to the Removals Team on 22 October 2019 when no active steps were evidently taken to remove the applicant, notwithstanding the expiration of the period within which the applicant could have commenced judicial review proceedings in relation to the Minister’s decision dated 4 September 2019. It is evident from the notes of the first case review conducted by Mr Kumar on 16 September 2019 (i.e. shortly after Mr Kumar had taken over as the applicant’s DSRO) that it was considered that the time period for commencing judicial review proceedings had not yet expired. Moreover, it was noted that the applicant was unwilling voluntarily to return to Iran. Mr Kumar conducted his second case review of the applicant on 28 October 2019 (i.e. six days after he had referred the applicant to the Removals Team). The notes of that case review record that, as at 3 October 2019, “s 195a + s 197ab referrals remain ongoing (adv from CCRS/SRSS)”. Similarly, although there was a regrettable failure to conduct two-monthly reviews of the applicant’s case in January, March and May 2020 as part of procedure described by Ms Dee for the “protracted caseload”, I consider that Ms Dee adequately explained that failure (see [43] above). It is evident that other steps were taken during this period, notwithstanding the failure to conduct two-monthly reviews, including generic steps described above concerning the position regarding involuntary removals to Iran which, even if not directed to the applicant personally, had potential implications for him depending on their outcome. (b)As described by Ms Masri, Ms Ly and Ms Dee, shortly after 22 October 2019 when the applicant was referred by Mr Kumar to the Removals Team, his case was assessed as one which should be included in the “protracted caseload”, which comprised removal cases with particular complexity and to whom there was a dedicated team of people. This was an appropriate management step, which was intended to have complicated and challenging cases, such as the applicant’s, dealt with by a separate team. Because of the complexities and complications relating to cases in the protracted caseload cohort, it is reasonable to expect that progress of such cases will often be more challenging and time-consuming compared with more straightforward cases. (c)As indicated above, I accept Ms Dee’s unchallenged reasons why she believed that there was a failure to conduct two-monthly reviews of the applicant in January, March and May 2020. Those omissions should not have occurred and if they had been accompanied by other relevant incidents, I may have taken a different view of this regrettable failure. As emphasised above, however, a broad view needs to be taken in assessing the reasonableness of the Commonwealth’s conduct. (d)Since at least mid-March 2020, there were very real practical difficulties presented by the COVID-19 pandemic in arranging for the applicant to be removed from Australia to any other country. These difficulties were described by Ms Davis, Ms Dee and Mr Wright, whose evidence I accept. In particular, I accept Ms Dee’s evidence that, even if it had been possible to remove the applicant to some other country during the relevant period, this could only have been done if he had a security escort because of his criminal record and the requirements of the Aviation Transport Security Regulations 2005 (Cth). These claims were not contested by the applicant in the present proceeding. I accept Ms Davis’s evidence that from mid-March 2020 all escorted removals were cancelled and that since that time no Serco escort has been used on a commercial flight. Ms Davis deposed that, as at mid-December 2020, escorted removals using Serco security guards had recommenced, but only on chartered flights. Ms Davis added that she had arranged a number of charter flights to remove unlawful non-citizens from Australia to countries such as New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Vietnam and Italy. This does not assist the applicant’s case in circumstances where the recommencement of removals on some chartered flights is outside the relevant alleged unlawful immigration period. In addition, the applicant steadfastly refused his consent to be taken to any country during that period and lacked any travel documents. (e)As to the applicant’s complaint that the process of assessing his identity could have commenced earlier than 4 September 2020, even if this complaint be accepted, it is difficult to see that it would have had any material bearing on the applicant’s case given his lack of travel documents and his steadfast refusal to be removed to either Iran or Iraq or, indeed, to any other country.