Vlies v Commonwealth of Australia

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Vlies v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] QSC 404

PARTIES:

KARL McKENZIE VLIES
(plaintiff/applicant)
v
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
(defendant/respondent)

FILE NO/S:

S 559 of 1986

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

16 November 2004

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

30 September 2004

JUDGE:

McMurdo J

ORDER:

The application for leave to proceed is dismissed

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – PRACTICE UNDER RULES OF COURT – TIME – DELAY SINCE LAST PROCEEDING – where plaintiff suffered injury 18 years ago as he was attempting to repel from helicopter – where application for leave under r 389(2) – whether prejudice to defendant – whether leave to proceed should be granted

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, r 389(2)

Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, cited
Cooper v Hopgood & Ganim [1999] 2 Qd R 113, applied

Hoy v Honan [1997] QCA 250, cited
Groves v The Commonwealth (1981) 150 CLR 113, cited
Quinlan v Rothwell [2002] 1 Qd R 647, applied
Tyler v Custom Credit Corporation Limited [2000] QCA 178, applied

COUNSEL:

R J Douglas SC with A Luchich for the applicant

D O J North SC for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

L A Ward Legal for the applicant

Australian Government Solicitor for the respondent

  1. J: McMURDOThis action was commenced by a writ which issued on 14 October 1986. It is a claim by the plaintiff, whose surname is now McKenzie, for damages for personal injuries from an accident which occurred in May of that year. The plaintiff was then a member of the Australian army, and he was injured when he fell from a helicopter in the course of a training exercise in North Queensland. Now, 18 years after the commencement of the proceedings, he seeks leave pursuant to r 389(2) to proceed with his claim, which he must do because no step has been taken for more than the past two years.

  1. This is not an especially complex case and it has at all times involved but two parties.  There have been no substantial interlocutory disputes.  There have been several lengthy periods in which nothing has been done on behalf of the plaintiff to move the case forward.  On two occasions his solicitors have had to deliver a notice of intention to proceed under the previous rules of court.  The defendant has contributed to the delay to some extent; it cannot claim that it has always sought to force the case on for trial.  Some delay has been caused by its slowness to answer correspondence.  Ultimately, however, it is the fault of the plaintiff or of those representing him that he finds himself in this position.  On any view, there is no good reason why his case was not tried well more than ten years ago.

  1. In Tyler v Custom Credit Corporation Limited [2000] QCA 178, Atkinson J (with whom McMurdo P and McPherson JA agreed) set…

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Details
Case
[2004] QSC 404
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Vlies v Commonwealth of Australia, the plaintiff sought to sue the Commonwealth for injuries sustained during an incident involving a helicopter 18 years prior. The matter was before the Supreme Court of Queensland, where the plaintiff sought leave to proceed under Rule 389(2) of the Supreme Court Rules, given the significant delay in initiating the proceedings. The primary issue before the court was whether the delay since the last proceeding would result in prejudice to the defendant and whether the plaintiff should be granted leave to proceed with the action.

The court considered the principles established in previous case law, focusing on the balance between the plaintiff's right to access justice and the defendant's right to be protected from the adverse effects of undue delay. The plaintiff argued that the delay was not due to any fault or negligence on his part and that the injuries sustained were significant and ongoing. Conversely, the defendant emphasised the substantial prejudice that would result from allowing the claim to proceed after such a long period, particularly in terms of the availability of evidence and witnesses.

After carefully weighing these considerations, the court concluded that the delay was indeed significant and would likely prejudice the defendant. The court noted the substantial passage of time, the difficulty in obtaining relevant evidence, and the potential unreliability of witness testimonies given the length of time since the incident. As a result, the court found that the plaintiff had not sufficiently demonstrated that the delay was justified and dismissed the application for leave to proceed. The court's decision underscored the importance of timely action in legal proceedings and the need to protect defendants from undue prejudice arising from significant delays.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application for leave to proceed is dismissed

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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